Despite promising to learn from the events of 7 October, Israeli strategists keep repeating the same dangerous errors. Whatever gains tactical proficiencies and self-confidence have provided for Israel to date, these are no substitutes for sound strategic thinking.
The 7 October Hamas attack on Israel exposed severe flaws in Israel’s security system, as well as multiple errors across its defence and policy agencies. Like similar events, this disaster triggered a familiar process of soul-searching aimed at understanding what went wrong and how to fix it. The emerging consensus seems to be that this was an avoidable failure—one that Israeli officials have since admitted could and should have been prevented. Israel Defense Force Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, quickly acknowledged the military’s responsibility, stating, “On Saturday morning in the area surrounding the Gaza Strip, we did not handle [the situation].” Special military investigation teams were formed to probe different aspects of the military’s preparation and response to the attack. And even though the government still resists calls for a formal state inquiry into the sources of its failure, and have even engaged in blame shifting, some government officials have also acknowledged the scale of failure and have promised to learn from it.
Despite their apparent commitment to learning from past mistakes, the decisions and behaviour adopted by Israeli leaders and military strategists after 7 October already seem to have repeated some of the same strategic misjudgements, including those stemming from hubris, arrogance, and overconfidence. This casts doubt on Israel’s true ability to learn from its mistakes, needlessly jeopardizing regional stability and Israel’s own security. While it may be easy to point to political, ideological or even personal interests as factors contributing to strategic blind spots, the deeper problem of Israeli leaders’ historic inability to learn transcends party lines and personalities. In fact, it goes back a long way.
A Cycle of Miscalculations
Israel’s history of ignoring the impact of its own actions on its enemies and overlooking potential threats from weaker rivals is well-documented. In 1992, Israeli intelligence was caught off guard when Hezbollah and Iran retaliated for the assassination of a Hezbollah leader by attacking the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Two years later, Israel was again surprised by a bombing of the Jewish community centre in the same city, following another Israeli attack on Hezbollah. Similarly, Israeli intelligence missed Syria’s nuclear ambitions in the 2000s, and in 2010, it underestimated the resistance they would face aboard the Mavi Marmara vessel despite previous experiences with similar provocations. These recurring failures highlight a dangerous inability to internalise lessons from past conflicts.
But perhaps the best illustration comes from the comparisons made between the recent 7 October failure and the one that preceded it fifty years before, when Israel was surprised by a coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attack in October 1973. The similarities are striking: in both cases, despite available intelligence data, Israel clung to the assumption that its enemies recognised their conventional military inferiority and were therefore basically deterred. Even if its enemies entertained varying notions of striking Israel, Israel’s military strength—and primarily its intelligence and technological superiority—would allow it to easily suppress any attempt quickly and effectively. In both cases, Israel was confident that both strategy and time was on its side. In both cases, Israeli leaders complacently and arrogantly dismissed their enemies’ determination to change the status quo at almost any cost.
The 1973 intelligence failure is considered today a prime example of how not to conduct intelligence and security policy. It has also become somewhat of a cautionary tale among Israel’s security community. Over the years, senior officials have vowed to learn from these past lessons and to make sure they never occur again. And yet, even as Israel was commemorating its past failure and supposedly remembering its lessons, the same mistakes reappeared.
Similarly, Israeli intelligence officials ignored the ample warning signs pointing to Hamas’s intentions, believing the small terrorist group was clearly contained. Their sense of security was critically bolstered by the firm belief in technology’s ability to spot and foil any attempt by Hamas to attack from Gaza. Blinded by positive regional developments that seemed to justify Israel’s policy of no negotiations with the Palestinians, Israeli analysts missed the impact the Israel-Saudi normalisation process had on Palestinians and other regional actors (such as Iran) and the incentive it created for them to spoil the status quo. Israeli analysts interpreted Hamas’s relative quiet in previous years as a sign of deterrence rather than deception and preparation. This is even though Hamas had already pursued a similar spoiling strategy during the 1990s, during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first term as prime minister.
Repeating the Cycle
Despite the striking similarities between both failures, they continue to recur, even in the aftermath of 7 October. For example, in April 2024, Israel greatly escalated its attacks against Iranian targets in Syria and Lebanon when it bombed a building used by the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. This attack was part of Israel’s long covert struggle against Iranian activities to arm Hezbollah, a struggle which included assassinations of IRCG commanders and aerial bombings of suspected storage sites, weapons convoys, and other targets. This attack, however, was noteworthy as it broke previous targeting patterns by directly hitting an official state-linked asset. Initially, Israeli intelligence estimated that, like previous times, Iran will not directly retaliate if Israel avoided claiming official responsibility. They also dismissed concerns from allies regarding a likely Iranian response. However, it soon became clear Israel’s assessment was wrong.
A few days later, on the night between 13-14 April, Iran retaliated by launching over 300 projectiles at various targets in Israel, both from within and outside its territory. While most of the missiles were intercepted by Israel and international allies, some managed to breach Israeli defences. The physical damage was limited but significant, as were the symbolic impacts (a direct Iranian attack on Israel is now not an out-of-the-question response to future attacks) and financial costs. The price of intercepting the missile attack was estimated at US$1 billion. Shortly after the attack, Israel’s credit rating was downgraded by several rating companies. The situation nearly drew the US into conflict with Iran, a scenario some Israeli leaders may have desired but which American officials strongly sought to avoid.
Although some commentators viewed the results of Iran’s attack as a win for Israel, it is clear Israel misperceived the consequences of its actions. This dangerous miscalculation had real strategic costs, as it jeopardised important economic and strategic interests and bolstered Iranian self-confidence. In reality, Israel lost almost as much as Iran did. This was not an isolated event.
Nor is it the first time in its history Israel wrongly—and optimistically—assessed the impact of its actions. The lead-up to the 1967 war likewise began with a miscalculated escalation by Israel of its reprisals against Jordan and, ironically, Syria. In both cases, Israel meant to deter its enemies from attacking (Syria) or dissuading them from supporting Palestinian guerillas (Jordan). Instead, Israel’s escalatory reprisals forced both rivals to pressure Egypt to come to their defence, which it did a month later when it closed the Straits of Tiran, creating the May 1967 crisis that eventually led to war. At the time, the miscalculation was acknowledged by senior Israeli officials, including then-Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Defense minister Moshe Dayan. Today, it is unclear whether Israeli officials even remember these past events, let alone draw the relevant lesson from them.
Conclusion
Looking at the latest war between Israel and its rivals, the scorecard does not appear too dire from Israel’s perspective. Despite its initial surprise and complete lack of preparedness for a multi-front war, Israel boasts remarkable successes. Clearly, Israelis have much to be content about. However, focusing solely on the bottom line would be a mistake, as Israel’s current achievements mask many recurring intelligence and policy failures that remain unspoken and likely overlooked. Before both October surprises, Israel felt confident and reassured of its capabilities. In both cases catastrophe soon followed. The real lesson here is that tactical proficiency and self-confidence are no substitute for sound strategic thinking. Israeli leaders and commanders must pair their successes with a clear view of their failures, including those which, fortunately, did not end in total disaster. Greater reliance on Israel’s own record could help. A year into the Hamas attack, as Israelis continue to take a hard look at what went wrong—this is one lesson they should take to heart.
Ariel Reichard is a post-Doctoral fellow at the Institute for Political Studies, Charles University, and the Herzl Center for Israel Studies at Charles University, Prague. Or Honig is Visiting Assistant Professor at the Budd Shorenstein Center for Jewish Studies, and a member of the Violence, Conflict and Security Lab at the University of Florida.
This review is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.