Experts react: Rebels have toppled the Assad regime. What’s next for Syria, the Middle East, and the world?

The road to Damascus was surprisingly short. On Sunday, Syrian rebel groups took control of the capital after a lightning-fast offensive across the country. Dictator Bashar al-Assad resigned and left Syria, according to Russia, his most powerful patron. How did this happen so swiftly after such a long period of stasis in Syria’s thirteen-year civil war? And what comes next for Syria, the Middle East, and the external powers that have been shaping events there? Below, our experts answer these urgent questions and others.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rich Outzen: The Middle East’s power balance has rapidly shifted. The US will need a new strategy.

Jonathan Panikoff: A moment for Israel and Gulf states to reshape the region’s future rather than react to it

R. Clarke Cooper: Russia is losing its Middle Eastern power projection—and great-power claims

Danny Citrinowicz: With its proxies crumbling, Iran will rethink its security strategy

Sarah Zaaimi: The new Syria could normalize relations with Israel and reshuffle the region

Richard LeBaron: Arab leaders won’t like the shattering of Syrian stability

Karim Mezran: Libya offers important lessons for Syria’s next steps

The Middle East’s power balance has rapidly shifted. The US will need a new strategy.

The fall of the Assad regime less than two weeks into a coordinated assault by a broad array of opposition groups has, with shocking speed, changed the map and power balance in the Middle East and beyond. The long suffering of the Syrian people under a brutal regime that killed, tortured, dispossessed, and exiled millions of its people has ended. The Iranian hegemonic project in Syria, too, has ended, and with it Hezbollah’s privileged position. While the future of Russian bases, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria, interim governance, counter-terror activities, and Syria’s new role in the region may take months to take shape, it is clear today that Syria will be ruled by an opposition coalition with the support of a majority of Syrians.

Several analytic toplines stand out at this early stage. First, Assad’s hold on power was far more tenuous than was broadly perceived internationally, especially by those counseling reconciliation and normalization. Second, Iran and Russia have suffered a dramatic loss of influence in Syria and the region as a result of wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, making it impossible for them to save Assad in 2024 as they did in 2014-15. Third, Turkey is the only country that seems to have had a winning strategy for Syria: opposing Assad while negotiating with his backers, hosting refugees, supporting the opposition politically and militarily, and combating the People’s Defense Units (YPG), an offshoot of the anti-Turkey terror group Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in northern Syria. Ankara now has unrivaled economic, diplomatic, and military leverage over the stabilization and rebuilding process, and the goodwill of an overwhelming number of Syrians. Fourth, the US approach to Syria for the past decade—tolerating Assad and his Iranian patrons, hyper-focusing on the Islamic State, providing humanitarian assistance but ceasing political and military aid to the opposition, giving open-ended support to the YPG/PKK—has collapsed. Washington, and Jerusalem, will have to come up with a coherent and constructive approach to the new management in Damascus.

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

A moment for Israel and Gulf states to reshape the region’s future rather than react to it

The overthrow of the Syrian regime was so long coming and yet, shockingly, so rapidly achieved. The fall of Assad provides immediate closure on his rule in Syria, even as his horrific brutality will continue to echo for decades. But the sudden end of the Assad era leaves open the question of what comes next—with significant reasons for caution and concern that there could be fragmentation and chaos in the country. But no matter what follows in Syria, the implications of Assad’s departure will reverberate throughout the region.

For Israel, the overthrow of the regime is almost certain to be seen with mixed emotions, as the Israelis are uncertain if the devil they know will ultimately be replaced by a new devil they won’t. But there is opportunity, as well. Israel is unlikely to take a public victory lap but is entitled to one. The reality is that it was Israeli strikes in Lebanon over the last few months against a wide range of Hezbollah officials and weapons caches, and strikes in Syria preventing resupply to Hezbollah, that weakened the group to the point that Syrian opposition forces felt confident they could take advantage and try to capture Aleppo. Doing so required opposition forces to be confident that there wouldn’t be (sufficient) reinforcements to the Assad regime from Hezbollah, as had been a key issue in the past.

While Israel may not have intended or planned for the Syrian opposition to take advantage and use this development to overthrow the regime, Israel would be wise to immediately leverage it as a point of commonality and use it to seek out a quiet, private engagement with emerging leaders. If Israel wants to better ensure its security in the north, private, serious agreements with a new Syrian government that the country won’t be allowed to be used to transfer weapons to Hezbollah to rebuild the group. Having a Lebanon that is in line with the Taif agreement and not dominated by Hezbollah, and a Syria not allied with Iran, would better ensure Israel’s long-term peace and security than any amount of interdiction or other strikes could.

Gulf states—some of which had assumed the Assad regime was here to stay and re-welcomed him and Syria into the Arab League—are likely to have mixed reactions about his fall and the next steps they should take. While Doha might be more inclined to provide financial resources for whatever government emerges in Damascus, long-standing concerns by Abu Dhabi and Riyadh over Islamist-led governments, combined with a reluctance simply to give away free money, as opposed to investing in countries, may cause them both to wait to see what leadership actually emerges in Syria.

It’s too early to know if the overthrow of the Assad regime will bring greater prosperity to the Syrian people and security to the region—ultimately the Syrian people will determine their future governance. But moments like this are rare and all too fleeting. If Israel, Gulf states, and other regional actors are wise, they’ll take this moment as an opportunity to try to shape the region’s future and not just react to it.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Russia is losing its Middle Eastern power projection—and great-power claims

The liberation of Damascus by Syrian rebels, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is designated by the United States as a terrorist group, reflects the increasing degradation of the multinational ground forces supporting the Assad regime. But it also reflects a likely catastrophic loss of Russia’s significant investment in the Assad regime and Russia’s foothold in the Mediterranean.

The collapse of the Assad regime represents a contraction of Russia’s ability to project power in the region—and thus its claim of being a great power. Russia may now face losing a warm-water naval base as well as an air base. The damage to Moscow’s ability to maneuver in Africa and the Mediterranean may have a strategic impact on Russian influence across the world.

—R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

With its proxies crumbling, Iran will rethink its security strategy

The fall of Assad is another nail in the coffin of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, which will prompt Tehran to reconsider its security strategy.

In a matter of weeks, Iran lost its pillars in the Axis of Resistance. After the heavy blow that Hezbollah suffered at the hands of Israel, the fall of Assad is a fatal strike on Iran’s influence efforts in the Middle East. There is of course a connection between the two, since it is clear that the weakness of Hezbollah and especially the elimination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was personally committed to saving Assad, accelerated the overthrow of the Syrian regime.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Assad regime to Iran. Without him, Iran’s ability to rebuild Hezbollah’s power has weakened dramatically, as has its ability to threaten Israel from this arena. But above all, Syria enabled the same territorial continuity from Iran to Lebanon that established the “Shia crescent” and gave Iran unprecedented strategic depth while keeping the wars away from its borders.

But the collapse of the regime shows how much the tools in Iran’s hands to save Assad without Hezbollah were almost non-existent. This fact also indicates Iran’s weakness and its limited ability to influence what happens in the Middle East without its proxy. Now Iran will have to calculate a new course and find a solution that will strengthen its ability to deter Israel and the United States on its own, with no real support of its proxies.

Iran will likely now seek to strengthen its conventional capabilities, including fast-tracking its Su-35 deal with Russia, rebuilding its air defense system, and replacing its missiles that were damaged in the Israeli attack. But Tehran will also likely think about whether to update its nuclear strategy, either to advance toward a nuclear bomb or to submit more significant compromises to the West in hope of reaching a nuclear agreement that will reduce the danger of an external attack on Iran. And so, the dramatic events in Syria also require a focus on what is happening in the decision-making circle in Tehran.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

The new Syria could normalize relations with Israel and reshuffle the region

After more than sixty-one years of the Ba’ath party’s rule and thirteen years since the uprising ignited in Daraa, Syria’s agony has finally reached a denouement, and the Syrian people can finally obtain closure and reclaim agency over their political future. While other Arab Spring countries were able to topple tyrannical leaderships and change regimes with varying success or failure, Syrians were held hostage by foreign powers’ interference and calculus, which maintained Assad at the top of a failed political system and forcibly displaced more than fourteen million Syrians internally and externally. These events also mark the end of the last of the Nasserist Arab nationalist regimes in the region—the end of an entire despotic ideology.

The current political alternative to Assad is far from ideal as the opposition remains fragmented. Rebel leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani has a questionable past tied to international terrorism, and the rebel factions have various allegiances to regional powers, especially Turkey. However, the Syrian people should be allowed to determine their own sovereignty and to establish the transition of power they wish for their country without international guardianship. They will also have to resolve some existential questions about relations with their immediate neighbors. It is not out of the realm of possibility to imagine new leaders in Damascus normalizing relations with Israel and reshuffling regional dynamics to mark a true rupture with the Ba’athist doctrine.

Once the dust settles, there will surely be arduous negotiations over Syria’s future among the new masters of the land, yet initial indications seem promising. So far, the rebels are maintaining a plural and inclusive discourse calling for national unity and a peaceful transition of power. Jolani gave instructions not to desecrate shrines and minority cultural heritage sites, such as the Sayyeda Zaynab sanctuary. Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants had vandalized the shrine, a revered location for Shia Muslims, and the incident became one of the reasons Shia militias, especially Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, engaged in fighting in Syria. Even the traditionally pro-Assad Alawite cities, including Latakia, seem to be relieved that the Assad era is over, which is a positive indication that minority groups would likely join the political transition rather than engage in yet another costly civil war.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a nonresident senior fellow for North Africa and deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

Arab leaders won’t like the shattering of Syrian stability

Regimes in the Middle East most value stability. Political change of any kind, violent or non-violent, is considered a threat, not an opportunity. So there will be no congratulations for the Syrian people emerging from Arab leaders and no rush to embrace a new regime that is likely to be dominated by Sunni fundamentalists. There is unlikely to be a rapid response to the needs of the Syrian people as they emerge from the nearly fifty-four-year rule of the Assad family. Most Arab states were openly supportive of Bashar al-Assad, preferring a cruel, Iranian-supported dictatorship to any other options.

Among Arab states, perhaps only Qatar, which supplied aid to some Syrian opposition forces, will step forward to help now. Syria’s neighbor Israel has long preferred the quiet that the Assad family was able to impose on their border and will be wary of what comes next. Most Arab states (and Israel) will also view the revolution in Syria as a net plus for Turkey and therefore a net minus for Arab interests. Meanwhile, Assad’s supporters in Moscow and Tehran will be left to wonder how things went so badly so quickly.

—Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is a former US ambassador to Kuwait and a former deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Israel.

Libya offers important lessons for Syria’s next steps

It’s true that making comparisons between different countries is always a delicate and insidious effort. Nevertheless, the recent events in Syria bring to mind the events in Libya that brought the Qaddafi regime to a bloody end in 2011. Has Libya’s recent history anything to teach to Syria and its people?

While joyful manifestations and apparent happiness are welcome and to be expected, they should be limited in time and scope so as not to alienate and marginalize the supporters of the previous regime (even if they only consist of a small minority). This would with time form a hardcore group of opponents to any process of opening up and developing institutions. In other words, regimes that have held power for decades have deep roots, and they can often do fatal damage in the aftermath of their ouster.

A second lesson Libya can teach Syria is how to deal with foreign powers, whether regional or global. Libyans allowed foreign powers to divide and separate them in order for each one of them to exercise at least a veto power on political and economic developments. The new Syrian elites should strive to find a common denominator among themselves, and instead of rushing to elections they should organize a National Reconciliation Conference to draft the main principles and values that apply to all Syrians. Only after this moment of deep reflection and foundation-building of a new national interest based on a shared identity should the country proceed to elections.

—Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.