As a subplot to the Gaza war, the Yemen-based Houthi rebels have evolved from a domestic insurgency to a regional power capable of leverage in Red Sea geopolitics and disrupting global commerce.
Part of this shift has involved unprecedented naval attacks and resilience against airstrikes from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel.
The ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas announced on 18 January may alter their strategy. The group’s leader Abdul Malik Al-Houthi has pledged continued attacks on Israeli ships while also signalling a willingness to reduce strikes against broader international shipping.
Since December 2023, the Houthis have fired at international shipping passing through the Bab el-Mandeb – a vital chokepoint adjacent to Yemen through which 10 percent of global trade and 30 percent of the world’s oil and gas transit.
The Houthis’ actions have prompted a diversion of trade routes around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, a more costly and time-consuming alternative to navigating the traditional Red Sea and Suez Canal route.
During this time, the Houthis have taken steps to signal restraint and depict sincerity in reducing their actions. They released captured shipping crews from their Red Sea excursions, including those detained as early as December 2023 when the faction first turned its sights on international cargo.
Additionally, on 25 January, the Houthis freed over 153 prisoners from the internationally recognised Yemeni government who were captured during Yemen’s war.
These actions reflect a broader attempt to soften their image and gain international recognition. Despite these moves, questions remain over whether the Houthis may continue to threaten Red Sea shipping in the future.
After being sworn in as US President on 20 January, one of Donald Trump’s first acts in the Middle East was re-designating the Houthis as a terrorist organisation on 23 January, not only due to their attacks on Red Sea shipping but also their sporadic drone and missile attacks on Israel.
Developing as a regional power
One of the Houthis’ primary demands during the Gaza war was to halt Israel’s military operations, framing their actions in the Red Sea as sanctions against Israel and its Western allies.
By doing so, they not only highlighted their alignment with the Palestinian cause but propelled Yemen back into the international spotlight after nearly two years of relative calm following the UN-brokered ceasefire in April 2022.
This strategy gained the Houthis significant support among Yemenis and regional populations who overwhelmingly back Palestine.
Their sporadic attacks on Israel, including missile and drone strikes, while doing little damage, further bolstered their image as defenders of the besieged Palestinians.
However, analysts argue that the Houthis’ actions were driven more by a desire to consolidate their status as a regional power rather than by genuine solidarity with Gaza.
“The Houthis’ objective was not genuinely to support Hamas and the Palestinians in Gaza,” Yemeni researcher and analyst Nabil Al-Bukairi told The New Arab.
“Instead, they aimed to assert their international presence by exploiting this crisis to establish themselves as a significant regional force, compelling the world to recognise them, even if they did so by threatening international peace and security.”
The Houthis have warned that if the fragile Gaza ceasefire fails or violence resumes, they will escalate their attacks to previous levels, including a broader targeting of international ships. Such threats highlight their intent to maintain leverage over key maritime routes and assert their influence.
Domestically, the Houthis have solidified control over northern Yemen, a process rooted in decades of conflict.
Emerging in 1994 as a small revivalist movement addressing the marginalisation of northern Yemen’s Zaydi Shia community, the Houthis initially engaged in localised insurgencies against the central government throughout the 2000s.
Their influence expanded dramatically during the post-Arab Spring period, culminating in their September 2014 takeover of the capital Sanaa and the ousting of President Abed Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.
The subsequent war with the Saudi-led coalition from March 2015 enabled the Houthis to entrench their power in northern Yemen amid state collapse.
Iran’s consistent support played a key role, with Tehran providing arms, including ballistic and long-range missiles, and fostering deeper ties with the group both during and after the war. These efforts persisted even after the 2022 ceasefire, allowing the Houthis to further consolidate their strength.
Speaking of the Houthis’ emerging strength in the region, a UN expert panel noted in November 2024 that “the group’s shift to actions at sea increased their influence” in the region.
“Such a scale of attacks, using weapon systems on civilian vessels, had never occurred since the Second World War,” the panel added.
Beyond their ties with Iran, the Houthis have cultivated ties with various factions across the Middle East. These alliances include the Tehran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), with both groups claiming responsibility for missile attacks on Haifa, including its strategic port, in June 2024.
Moreover, there are suggestions, such as from US intelligence, that the faction has aligned with the extremist Al-Shabab faction in Somalia to discuss military cooperation.
Given the Houthis’ expanding influence, it is highly unlikely they would withdraw from the Red Sea. This is not only due to the political and popularity gains derived from these operations, but also the significant financial benefits.
“The Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea have provided them with an opportunity to gain significant leverage over international trade and to pocket perhaps $2 billion per year in fees imposed on some shipping companies to grant them passage,” Thomas Juneau, associate professor at the University of Ottawa, told The New Arab.
“Given the Houthis’ ambitions to position themselves as a regional power and to consolidate their power domestically, it strains the imagination to believe that they could simply and indefinitely forego the opportunity to continue these attacks.”
However, as the Houthis’ regional ambitions grow, they also face substantial domestic challenges. Roughly 70 percent of Yemen’s population lives under their control, where services and livelihoods have significantly deteriorated, while the majority still depend on humanitarian aid following the brutal seven-year conflict.
It’s therefore hard to imagine the Houthis willingly relinquishing their public support for the Palestinian cause, even if the Gaza ceasefire holds.
“Given the Houthis’ domestic vulnerabilities, especially on the economic front, we can expect them to continue their aggressive efforts to manipulate the Palestinian cause to protect their domestic interests,” Dr Juneau noted.
Future threat from the Houthis
Even if Houthi operations subside for the short term following the halt to Israel’s war on Gaza, the faction will likely aim to pressure Israel and the US, as well as Saudi Arabia, in the future, enabled by its newfound influence in the Red Sea.
US and UK raids against the faction since January 2024, seeking to diminish its military arsenal, still haven’t substantially weakened it. Even Israeli attacks, while damaging Yemeni infrastructure, have not crippled the Houthis, suggesting their limits in pinpointing the group’s leadership.
Israeli attacks have, however, weakened the capacity of Hodeidah port, which is vital for bringing in humanitarian aid.
US President Donald Trump’s decision to re-designate the Houthis as a terrorist organisation underscored this reality, but its effectiveness in curbing their activities remains uncertain.
For instance, while the Houthis have built independent financial networks which could diminish the impact of sanctions, the designation will cut vital aid to Yemenis, even though the Houthis themselves have been accused of smuggling aid.
“The threat to Red Sea trade will persist as long as the Houthis remain in power,” Yemeni analyst Nabil Al-Bukairi observed.
Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) – the body of the internationally recognised government – welcomed Trump’s designation as a means to reinvigorate efforts against the Houthis. Yemeni observers, including Al-Bukairi, stress that sustained international support for Yemen’s internationally recognised government is critical to curbing the Houthis’ influence.
Ultimately, the new Trump administration has proven itself fiercely pro-Israel, raising concerns over the safety of Palestinians over the next four years. Moreover, the Houthis have emerged as a stronger actor in the Red Sea and remain steadfast in utilising the Palestinian cause for their own benefit.
That combination will conceivably spell more confrontations in the Red Sea and between Israel and the Houthis.
Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa.
Follow him on Twitter: @jfentonharvey