Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero has a particular expertise analyzing the foreign policies of Arab states in the Levant and bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Bashar al-Assad’s sudden fall last year was a geopolitical earthquake that surprised even the most seasoned Syria experts. While the longer-term implications of regime change in Damascus are unclear, Assad’s ouster has already impacted the Middle East’s balance of power. Turkey and some Gulf Arab monarchies appear to have gained the most from the Ba’athist government’s collapse, which constituted a major loss for Russia and Iran.
Moscow’s commitment to the Syrian regime’s survival was not only critical to Russian interests in the Middle East, but also to the country’s image as a rising global power capable of effectively challenging the Western-led post-Cold War order. Assad’s fall undeniably harmed Russia’s perceived ability to create realities on the ground in conflict-ridden countries outside the former Soviet space. Moscow worked to build this image through its intensified military intervention in Syria that began in September 2015.
Damascus recently canceled its operating lease with Stroytransgaz (a Russian engineering construction company) at Syria’s Tartus port, which Russia and Assad’s government signed in 2019. Since Assad’s ouster, no Russian military vessels have been spotted at this port, which the Kremlin had held since 1971. The abrupt termination of the contract severely undermines Russia’s military posture in the Mediterranean Sea with major implications for Russian operations in Africa.
Iran’s position in the future Syria remains uncertain. Syria’s erstwhile position in the “Axis of Resistance” and important role in Iran’s “forward defense” foreign policy doctrine explained why the Islamic Republic channeled tens of billions of dollars into efforts to prop up Assad’s government since 2011. Within this context, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Behrouz Esbati candidly remarked on January 7 that the Syrian regime’s fall was a “very bad defeat” for Tehran. Despite the Iranian Supreme Leader’s denial, it is difficult to disagree with Esbati’s conclusion.
Still, it is likely premature to say that Russia and Iran will have no influence in post-Assad Syria. Indeed, they may find ways of dealing with the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led administration in Damascus that are similar to how they have formed de facto relationships with the Talibanregime in Kabul since the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, despite their long hostility toward the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” dating to its first iteration in the 1990s.
At the same time, Ahmed al-Sharaa has demonstrated pragmatism since becoming Syria’s de facto leader and has expressed openness to Syria maintaining positive relations with both Russia and Iran. Moscow and Tehran are, in various ways, also signaling their desire to work with the new administration, swiftly changing their discourse about HTS after its lightning 11-day offensive.
In an interview with Al Arabiya on December 29, al-Sharaa addressed his country’s future relationship with Moscow, pointing to Damascus’s “strategic interests” with the “second most powerful country in the world” and explaining that “we don’t want Russia to exit Syria in a way that undermines its relationship with [the] country.”
The Kremlin has demonstrated its own pragmatism. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov labeled HTS a terrorist organization while addressing the Doha Forum on December 7, only for the Kremlin and Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to begin referring to the former al-Qaeda offshoot as the “opposition” when Assad fell the following day.
Shortly before the HTS-led coalition overthrew Assad, al-Sharaa urged Iran to abandon its support for Syria’s Ba’athist government and establish relations with HTS. One day after Assad’s ouster, the new Syrian leader sent a private message to Iran through Qatar which called for the new government in Damascus and Tehran to cooperate based on “common Islamic principles.” Then in his Al Arabiya interview, al-Sharaa encouraged Tehran to reconsider its policies and interventions throughout the region, noting that Syria’s rebels had provided Iranian positions and property with protection despite the Islamic Republic’s support for the Assad regime.
Iranian government officials spent many years referring to Assad’s enemies in Syria as “takfiri terrorists,” yet by December 7 – a day before Assad fled to Moscow – Tehran’s chief diplomat had begun referring to HTS and other rebel factions as “legitimate opposition groups.” On the day of Assad’s ouster, Iran’s foreign ministry called for a “national dialogue” to set up an “inclusive” Syrian government and stated expectations that Iranian-Syrian relations would continue by virtue of “common interests,” declaring that Iran “will spare no effort to help establish security and stability in Syria” and “will continue consultations with all influential parties.” Furthermore, Iranian officials stressed that HTS was not responsible for the storming of their country’s embassy in Damascus the day of Assad’s fall. According to an Iranian state broadcaster, “unknown individuals” were behind the attack on the Islamic Republic’s diplomatic mission in Syria.
Russia will probably have an easier time than Iran advancing its national interests in post-Assad Syria. This mostly has to do with certain forms of leverage which Russia has but Iran lacks. As al-Sharaa pragmatically engages regional and global players to build up his government’s “legitimacy” on the international stage — which is necessary for state-building and regrowing Syria’s economy — his administration needs positive relations with permanent members of the UN Security Council. Within this context, if the U.S. and European powers refuse to “legitimize” the new Syrian government, it would be easy to imagine Moscow (and probably Beijing too) exploiting such dynamics and stepping in to help shore up al-Sharaa’s administration while taking advantage of tensions between Damascus and Western capitals. Additionally, Russia’s ability to leverage Assad’s frozen assets and the Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia give Moscow certain cards that the Iranians do not possess.
There are no guarantees that the HTS-led government will consolidate its power across all of Syria and establish strong state institutions. The state could prove weak, with many non-state actors outside Damascus’s control governing different parts of the country. Under those conditions, it would not be difficult to imagine Tehran stepping up its relationship with theKurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) militia in eastern Syria or building up Shi’ite/Alawite militias along Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Ultimately, if Syria is a weak state, Iran’s networks in the country could possibly undermine HTS, especially if the Islamic Republic comes to perceive the new Syrian government as a threat.
The most important variable concerning Iran’s relationship with post-Assad Syria might be how the HTS-led government deals with Israel. Should Syria officially or unofficially normalize relations with Tel Aviv, Iran would consider that a major threat to Tehran’s interests and act accordingly. If the “New Syria” eventually confronts Israel over its new incursions into Syrian territory, al-Sharaa’s government may consider seeking Iranian assistance.
For now, it is too early to make bold predictions about Russia and Iran’s relationships with Syria in the short-term. Nonetheless, it is wise to avoid concluding that Assad’s fall marked the end of Moscow and Tehran’s influence, even if the regime’s collapse poses difficult challenges to both. These two former Assad regime allies are likely to approach the “New Syria” cautiously,observing how developments unfold during the transition before making any bold moves.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.