While US President Donald Trump’s early foreign policy moves have been focused elsewhere in the world—from the Middle East to the Americas—Russia’s war in Ukraine is fast moving to the top of the agenda. Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, is set to visit European capitals and Ukraine in the coming days. Trump has repeated his determination to “end the war” quickly and has even shifted his rhetoric regarding the conflict, calling Russia an adversary and threatening Russian President Vladimir Putin with more sanctions if he fails to cease his attack on Ukraine. Still, Trump has yet to articulate with clarity how he intends to end this war in a manner that is consistent with his pledge to promulgate a national security policy of peace through strength.
If Europeans want to shape Trump’s approach to this conflict, they need to act fast and keep the following in mind:
First, much is at stake. A Russian victory would increase the risk of wider war in Europe, and it would likely embolden authoritarian states elsewhere in the world, including China, Iran, and North Korea. It would profoundly weaken the credibility of NATO and undermine the unity of the transatlantic community.
Second, Ukraine is being worn down by Russia’s onslaught, and Putin has yet to be convinced that the West has the will to defeat his aggression. The Russian president appears determined to continue his full-scale invasion, regarding calls from across the Atlantic community for a cease-fire, negotiations, and a deal as signs of continued transatlantic weakness, if not increased desperation.
Third, Trump and his senior advisors have repeatedly stated that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a European concern more than a US concern. Moreover, Trump has yet to be convinced that the United States’ European allies are really committed to standing up to Putin. Trump is not going to exceed Europe’s determination to support Ukraine.
Fourth, the window for Europeans to influence Trump is closing quickly. If decision making in the Biden and Obama administrations could be characterized as process-oriented and at times ponderous, yielding only incremental outcomes, then Trump and his team make their decisions fast, if not instinctively, always aiming for decisive results. Europeans should assume that Trump will take action on Ukraine within weeks, and he will likely chose one of three paths:
- Impose an unjust and unstable peace upon Ukraine as outlined by his advisers during his presidential campaign last year;
- Walk away from the conflict on the grounds that this is a European affair, which will likely lead to a similar outcome; or,
- Take decisive action in support of Ukraine in contrast to the Biden administration’s gradual, incremental approach.
Hence, Europe needs to move now with a coordinated proposal. This proposal needs to convince Trump to take the collaborative steps necessary to end the fighting on terms that will reinforce Ukraine’s security, bring enduring military stability to Europe’s eastern frontiers, and respect longstanding principles of sovereignty.
Deploy a coalition of the resolute in Ukraine
On February 13, NATO defense ministers are meeting in Brussels. This will be followed by the Munich Security Conference February from 14 to 16. In Munich, the United States will be represented by US Vice President JD Vance, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth may also attend. The impressions this delegation brings back to Washington of European resoluteness and fortitude, or the lack thereof, will have a profound influence on the evolution of Trump’s outlook on what he can or wants to achieve when it comes to the defense of Ukraine.
European leaders should use that moment to express to Trump a steely determination to change the “correlation of forces”—to use a Soviet term that Putin, a former KGB agent, will understand—decisively against Russia. That includes a significant increase in military assistance to Ukraine, intensified economic pressure on Russia, and the ramping up of efforts to generate political opposition to Putin’s war and his regime.
But a centerpiece of that strategy must be a European offer to deploy troops in Ukraine. Such a deployment would include “backstop” assistance from the United States—a phrase that Rubio has repeatedly used to describe how the NATO alliance should work in terms of burden sharing. But the military force would be predominantly European in composition and serve as the core of a security guarantee to Ukraine.
Such a deterrent force could consist of two or three plussed-up divisions, of which more than 80 percent of the personnel and equipment would be provided by European nations and Canada. This would include robust air force, air and missile defense, and long-range strike elements. The US “backstop” contribution could consist of a command element, as well as aircraft, air and missile defense, and long-range strike assets—assets that are already in Europe. The United States would be sourcing from its existing posture in Europe, with no overall increase in US troops on the continent compared to its current deployment size.
The optimum time to put this offer on the table and start deploying such a deterrent force is now, when Russia is struggling to advance its territorial gains against Ukraine and is unable to take on the Alliance. Such a deterrent force would deploy in Ukraine but well short of the line of confrontation, reinforce Ukraine’s defense of the territory and populations Kyiv now controls, and allow Ukraine to more effectively concentrate its forces against Russia’s offensive. Putin would realize that an attack on such a deterrent force would put at risk Russia’s defense of the territories it has seized from Ukraine.
Such a European offer presents to the United States the elements of a strategy necessary to change Putin’s perception of the correlation of forces surrounding his ambition to suborn Ukraine and convince him to seek negotiations. It also provides the foundation for the security guarantee necessary over the long term to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and establish enduring military stability in Eastern Europe.
Bring peace back to Europe
Such an offer is not beyond Europe’s capacity. Below the radar, European leaders and policymakers have been discussing what future security guarantees for Ukraine would entail. The president of France and the prime minister of the United Kingdom have reportedly discussed the option of troop deployments, while Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, is now open to what has been called a peacekeeping mission. Polish President Donald Tusk is on the more skeptical side, despite reports of discussions taking place between Poland and France, as well. Sweden, Lithuania, and Estonia have not ruled out such action, even while Finland, the Netherlands, and Latvia remain cautious over timing. The bigger the potential coalition of Europeans, the stronger it will be, and the more likely it will get US support.
There is no guarantee that Trump will be convinced of this way forward. But failure to make such a coordinated European proposal could set in motion US decisions that would undermine Ukraine, increase the risk of a wider war in Europe and elsewhere, and weaken the unity and credibility of the transatlantic alliance.
Such a proposal, however, does offer Trump a clear way to deliver on his promise to bring peace back to Europe, establish the credibility of his peace-through-strength national security policy, and establish a new precedent in European burden sharing within the transatlantic community.
The time is now for Europe to act and to act decisively.
Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.
Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.
Further reading
Image: Members of the military honour guard march, on the day of a meeting between German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius in Berlin, Germany, February 10, 2025. REUTERS/Liesa Johannssen