Amr Hamzawy: The Egyptian government has repeatedly rejected plans from both the Israeli government and Trump to displace Palestinians from Gaza and into Egypt and Jordan. Trump’s most recent proposal that the United States should assume control over Gaza and develop it economically has been met with fierce rejection from Cairo. The Egyptian government informed U.S. officials that the displacement and annexation plans threaten the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, signed in 1979 and sponsored by the United States, and puts the diplomatic relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv at stake.
Andrew Leber: The Saudi government has also rejected the plan in a strongly worded statement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the “firm and unwavering” stance of the Kingdom in support of a Palestinian state, despite that Saudi rhetoric previously has backed away from speaking of “steps” or “pathways” to statehood. Also noteworthy was the ministry’s explicit connection of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) to this stance, as well as MBS’s direct phone call with King Abdullah of Jordan—a rare event. The Saudi readout of the call explicitly noted “the Kingdom’s firm and supportive positions on the rights of the Palestinian people.”
Marwan Muasher: The Jordanian government has also rejected the plan, much as it has rejected all plans for mass transfer of Palestinians, whether to Egypt or Jordan. In September 2024, the Jordanian foreign minister said that any attempt to force Palestinians into Jordan will be a “declaration of war”, explicitly violating terms of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. After Trump’s latest proposal, the Jordanian royal court expressed “rejection of any attempts to annex land and displace the Palestinians.” King Abdullah II will meet with Trump in Washington on Tuesday to explain the dangers such a plan poses to both Palestinian and Jordanian interests.
Amr Hamzawy: Popular reactions in Egypt have been completely consistent with the government’s position. Egyptians have also been critical of Trump’s demand that their country host displaced Gazans. Professional unions such as the Press Syndicate and some civil society organizations and political parties have voiced their objections, and anti-displacement sentiments have shaped the public discourse through newspaper editorials, TV talk shows, and interventions by social media influencers. Evoking past moments of Egyptian opposition to U.S. policies in the Middle East, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, popular reactions have leaned toward a nationalist framing, calling on the government to stand up to the United States and not to acquiesce to Trump’s pressures.
Andrew Leber: Although gauging Saudi public opinion directly is difficult, well-positioned commentators clearly feel free to reiterate (and even celebrate) the Kingdom’s rhetorical support for a Palestinian state. Prince Turki Al Faisal, pointedly wearing a keffiyah, appeared on CNN to criticize what he termed a “mad ethnic cleansing plan.” On social media, Saudi nationalist influencers have championed the Kingdom’s stance as evidence of its influence in global affairs, and state-owned media accounts have posted archival footage of King Salman’s support for the Palestinian cause. The surfacing of these perspectives indicates the political value MBS and his advisers see in asserting Saudi support for the Palestinian cause—at least for now.
In addition, Jordan does not share any borders with Gaza, so many believe that pushing Palestinians from Gaza to Jordan will open the door to Israel also pushing Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan, with which it does have geographical borders. That will empty Palestinian land of its citizens, help achieve the annexation by Israel of all of the West Bank, revive the “Jordan is Palestine” argument, and attempt to solve the Palestinian issue at Jordan’s expense.
Amr Hamzawy: Since the Gaza war broke out in October 2023, Egypt has allowed a limited number of Gazans to travel to the country, whether for medical treatment or family reasons. Therefore, Egypt has not seen a significant increase in the number of Palestinian refugees on its territory. However, the admission of refugees from Sudan in large numbers due to the raging civil war and the continued presence of large numbers of Syrian and Yemeni refugees are putting economic and social pressure on the Egyptian government, and pushing it to reject any pressures to receive displaced Gazans.
In terms of governance and policy, the displacement plans directly threaten a pillar of Egypt’s national security: preventing all forms of mass presence of Palestinian refugees on Egyptian soil, especially in the Sinai Peninsula that borders Gaza. The plans also directly threaten the peace between Egypt and Israel, which since 1979 has been based on mutual respect for national sovereignty and nonaggression, as well as the strategic partnership between Egypt and the United States. Cairo has always valued its partnership with Washington as a fundamental component of its foreign policy that serves both countries’ interests.
Andrew Leber: MBS will not pursue a U.S.-Saudi deal at any cost. A weakened Iran reduces the immediate security value of more overt U.S. military support. At the same time, normalization with Israel—an essential component of treaty-level U.S. security guarantees—is even riskier with Trump’s plan on the table, given its proposed ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza (while leaving the door open to the same in the West Bank). Any association with a Palestinian displacement would hold major risks for the monarchy’s domestic stability and international reputation. In turn, Netanyahu’s “joke” about a Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia shows that the Israeli leader has little interest in courting the Kingdom diplomatically at this point.
Marwan Muasher: I totally agree with Andrew. The main reason why a Saudi-Israeli normalization agreement has not been reached so far is because the Saudis need to include a commitment, even a nominal one, by Israel for a pathway toward Palestinian statehood. But the Israelis have refused so far, with Netanyahu going as far as saying publicly that a two-state solution is “a reward for terrorism.” An annexation of the West Bank, or a forced expulsion of Palestinians outside their land, will make reaching such a deal extremely difficult.
Andrew Leber: Per Amr’s points, Trump’s policies aren’t receiving the warm welcome that his first administration did in Riyadh. At best, some of the president’s most ardent Saudi supporters are insisting the Gaza plan is a bluff to secure greater concessions from Israel. Other Saudi commentators have started to connect Trump’s erratic foreign-policy rhetoric, such as threatening Canada, to concerns about the reliability of his administration as a security partner. Much as MBS and other Saudi officials had significant frustrations with the Biden administration, they likely haven’t forgotten that it was Trump who declined to respond to Iranian attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. While this latest plan is unlikely to cause a major rupture in U.S.-Saudi relations—at least so long as it remains a plan—it will only further encourage Saudi Arabia to diversify its international partnerships. As for Saudi participation in the reconstruction of Gaza, columnist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed likely channels official thinking in stating that “there will be no funding for the reconstruction of Gaza, no matter what promises are made, as long as Arab and foreign funders feel that the possibility of another war is open.”