Since Turkey ended a period of sharp tensions with several Gulf countries in 2021, Ankara has improved relations with all the countries in the region, and ties between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in particular have significantly improved. Ankara and Riyadh have put aside their past disputes and deepened their strategic relations.
Now, the rebuilding of post-Assad Syria offers an opportunity for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to deepen their relations further. After becoming Syria’s new de facto leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa visited Saudi Arabia and Turkey for his first two visits abroad. This is a testament to the important role both countries are expected to play in the new Syria.
Sharaa is likely attempting to show the new Syrian leadership’s intent to distance itself from Iran and attract the Saudi financial investment that Syria desperately needs.
Turkey had the upper hand in Syria following the overthrow of the Assad regime and was labeled by many analysts as the country likely to become the most influential in Syria’s future. However, contrary to the expectations of some observers, it has not used this position solely to increase its own influence. Instead, Turkey has pursued strong diplomacy with Gulf countries, the European Union, and the United States to engage them in Syria’s future to ensure security and stability in the region. For the reason behind this inclusiveness and the shared objective of the Turkish and Saudi policies on Syria, look to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who said in December last year, “We do not want Iranian domination in the region, nor do we want Turkish or Arab domination.”
As the Turkish foreign minister’s statement suggests, Turkey can best achieve the goals of a prosperous postwar Syria and a stable region by cooperating and coordinating with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Increasing engagement with Gulf countries would strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy regarding its involvement in Syria’s future while helping to ensure the necessary funds for Syria’s reconstruction.
What Syria has shown
During the Arab Spring, Turkey and Saudi Arabia had different approaches to the issue of political Islam. While Saudi Arabia viewed the Arab uprisings as a threat to regional stability, Turkey supported most of them. Despite these worries, Saudi Arabia supported the uprisings in Syria due to its opposition to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and its goal of countering Iranian influence. However, unlike Turkey, Saudi Arabia supported groups within the Free Syrian Army that were not associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, as well as secular and nationalist political figures who did not embrace political Islam. Gulf leaders have made no secret of their worries over the new Syrian leadership’s jihadist background and how its rise to power could mark a return of political Islam throughout the region.
Aware of these concerns, Turkey, following Assad’s downfall, has invited the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to jointly invest in Syria’s future, as demonstrated by frequent meetings between the Turkish foreign minister and his Gulf counterparts. Turkey has sought to serve as an intermediary to help Syria’s new rulers develop their relations with Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia became one of the first Gulf countries to establish official relations with post-Assad Syria and, like Turkey, has called on the international community to lift sanctions on Syria.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the only Group of Twenty (G20) countries in the region and important partners of the United States, have a common interest in a stable and prosperous Syria and will seek to play a crucial role in its reconstruction, which is essential not just for Syria’s future but for the stability of the Middle East as a whole.
Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia would like to see a unified and stable Syria that isn’t a terrorist hub. They both also want to prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria and Lebanon, and to counter Iran’s influence in Iraq. This can only be possible with an inclusive Syrian administration, in which all religions and ethnic groups in the country are represented. This inclusiveness is a goal shared by countries across the international community, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both countries have an interest in ensuring that Syria is peaceful and able to recover economically, which will allow Syrian refugees living in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to safely return to their country.
Syria’s new rebuilding has shown Turkey and Saudi Arabia that they indeed have common interests that are worthy of cooperation. That has carved out an opportunity for Ankara and Riyadh to deepen their relations, particularly their defense ties, which are crucial for regional security.
The opportunity at hand
As part of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Riyadh aims to diversify its foreign defense suppliers and strengthen its own defense industry. Turkish-Saudi defense relations have significantly improved since the normalization of their relations in 2021, with Saudi Arabia accepting Turkey’s offers of technology sharing and giving opportunities for Saudi companies to participate in local production.
Turkey has been struggling for decades to get the defense equipment it has wanted from the United States and European countries due to official and unofficial embargoes and sanctions imposed on Ankara. These obstacles motivated the rise of Turkey’s domestic defense industry, which has emerged as the eleventh-largest arms exporter globally. In comparing the periods of 2014–2018 and 2019–2023, Turkey’s share of global arms exports grew 106 percent. Amid all this growth, Turkey has increased its arms exports to many Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Saudi Arabia, the vast majority of which consists of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Saudi Arabia is similarly motivated to reduce its dependence on the West for defense needs, stemming from its past difficulties in obtaining the desired equipment from Western partners. Thus, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have struck defense production and procurement deals, including one focused on co-producing the Turkish Bayraktar Akıncı, an armed UCAV. Such cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkish drone maker Baykar helps Riyadh not only boost its domestic defense-production capabilities but also deter Iran and counter the influence China has gained in the Middle East through its arm sales to the region.
But there are further opportunities for cooperation that are now emerging. Turkey expects to conclude an arms deal worth six billion dollars including the sale of warships, tanks, and missiles with Saudi Arabia. Turkey also could strike a deal regarding the sale of Turkish TF KAAN fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, which has been stuck in a prolonged discussion about acquiring F-35 fighter jets from the United States, expressed interest late last year in purchasing one hundred KAAN jets. Turkey had started to develop the fighter jet not only to replace its aging F-16 fleet but also to ensure it has access to needed equipment despite congressional holds on US arms sales and the US decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program in 2019. The first ten KAAN jets are expected to be delivered to Turkish air forces in 2028. Buying Turkish jets could also help Saudi Arabia develop its domestic defense industry, as the country can request that parts of the production line be located in Saudi Arabia.
Increasing defense cooperation via arms sales between Turkey and Gulf countries (such as Saudi Arabia) could alter the arms-supply dynamics in the region—and thus contribute to regional security and stability.
Why it matters for the Middle East—and the United States
If the United States is to further its strategic interests in regions likely to be deprioritized by the current administration, such as the Middle East, it will need to help cultivate regional gravitational centers by considering the needs of middle powers and working toward their integration. US partners, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are among the most significant emerging middle powers in the region, and it is in Washington’s interests to bring together its most important regional partners to contain Iranian and Chinese military and economic influence.
Writing about a possible nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran, George Friedman once suggested the best way to balance Iran is the formation of a bloc between the Gulf countries (led by Saudi Arabia) and Israel; he added that this bloc could only succeed if it includes Turkey.
There are new obstacles standing in the way of the emergence of such a bloc, among them the October 7, 2023 attack and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war. However, the Turkey-Saudi Arabia convergence stands out as a strong step toward regional balance and containing Iranian influence.
Pınar Dost, PhD, is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies. Follow her on LinkedIn.
The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.
Further reading
Image: Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud meets with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 27, 2025. Saudi Press Agency/Handout via REUTERS