PSCRP-BESA Reports No 116 (February 26, 2025)
The countries of the South Caucasus have approached Trump’s presidency under vastly different circumstances, which is unsurprising given that this region has never been geopolitically unified. Until recently, Georgia appeared aligned with the West, Armenia with Eurasia, and Azerbaijan with Central Asia. Yet, despite these orientations, they managed to interact—whether through alliances, conflicts, or trade.
The situation changed after 2020, when the 44-day war forced both Azerbaijan and Armenia to confront geopolitical realities, culminating between September 2023 and March 2024. The events of this brief period have presented the region’s countries with urgent challenges demanding immediate solutions.
Georgia’s leadership
Since Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine, Georgia’s leadership has focused almost exclusively on maintaining power. The government opted for confrontation with its Western partners, appeasement of Russia, and the entrenchment of a political system where the informal rule of Bidzina Ivanishvili would remain unchallenged. This path was highly risky, as alienating Western allies not only exposed Georgia to severe socio-economic shocks but also increased its vulnerability to Kremlin influence. The Georgian economy relies heavily on a banking and financial sector integrated into international (i.e., Western) financial institutions, as well as on raw material exports (such as manganese and ferroalloys) to the EU. Additionally, its transport infrastructure plays a crucial role in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR, also known as the Middle Corridor). All these elements are critically susceptible to potential sanctions from both Europe and the United States.
Nevertheless, the Georgian authorities, seemingly resigned to their fate, severed ties with the West, openly abandoning past achievements and shaping an image of a nation that has rejected democracy, even as an idea. This culminated in the adoption of a series of anti-democratic laws, particularly in the electoral and judicial spheres, the blatant falsification of the October 2024 elections, a deliberate provocation in withdrawing from EU membership negotiations, and, finally, the brutal suppression of protests—actions that neither the EU nor the US could ignore.
This policy would have been politically suicidal for both the country and its leadership were it not for their bet on Trump’s victory. The Georgian government calculated that, with Trump in power, it could negotiate with the new US administration on the basis of ideological alignment and a shared enemy—an idea they began promoting from the moment of Trump’s victory by rebranding the “global war party” as the deep state. This bet paid off, as Georgia’s authorities now have the opportunity to gain Trump’s attention by co-authoring an alternative UN resolution on Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Whether the Trump administration will appreciate this move remains to be seen. The future of Georgia’s leadership now depends less on ideological affinity and diplomatic support and more on Trump’s negotiations with Moscow, Ankara, and Beijing.
Armenia’s Position
On the surface, Armenia appears to be the ultimate loser. The war was lost. An adversary that Armenians occupied for 30 years now stands at their borders, militarily capable of seizing the entire country and cutting it off from its ally, Iran. Hopes that a Democratic administration in Washington—one that had steadfastly supported Armenia without demanding concessions—would remain in power have been dashed. The strategic plan of waiting for a systemic crisis in Azerbaijan (and perhaps even facilitating it) before reviving the Karabakh conflict along the Kosovo model—a plan long supported by Armenian society and its diaspora—has collapsed.
For Armenia’s leadership, the widespread expectation of Karabakh’s reoccupation is a major obstacle to achieving peace and relieving the national psychological distress that has persisted since autumn 2020. However, the present moment offers an opportunity to abandon these long-term, illusory hopes of revanche, allowing Prime Minister Pashinyan room for compromise with Baku. Ultimately, these aspirations can always be revisited, but for now, progress in the peace process and improved relations with Turkey could serve as strong electoral assets for Pashinyan.
Thus, Armenia’s main expectations from Trump’s administration revolve around maintaining the status quo and securing guarantees that Azerbaijan will not resort to force. While the probability of Azerbaijan using force remains minimal, it is not zero, and the situation could change. To mitigate this risk, Armenia has influential allies within Trump’s administration, ranging from the establishment figure Marco Rubio to the anti-establishment Tulsi Gabbard. Therefore, Yerevan’s position is not as dire as it may seem. Moreover, the Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed under the previous US administration, serves as a tangible roadmap for advancing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. If Georgia was able to extract significant benefits from a similar agreement in the late 2000s, there is no reason why Armenia, with its stronger foothold in US political circles, cannot do the same.
Azerbaijan’s Strategy
Azerbaijan, in the most advantageous position of the three, is now operating on a completely different level. The lingering psychological scars of its long war with Armenia remain, yet Baku is acutely aware of its economy’s critical dependence on European energy markets. However, this market is primarily Italian, where Azerbaijan enjoys strong relations, and Eastern European, where Baku has not just partners but genuine allies. Additionally, Azerbaijan’s energy exports extend beyond Europe to Israel, a strategic partner and major consumer of Azerbaijani oil.
With Trump’s administration, the risk of sanctions against Azerbaijan has diminished to near zero, allowing Baku to postpone Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement efforts and pursue concessions—from changes to Armenia’s constitution to opening a corridor to Nakhchivan and Turkey. There is no need for Baku to rush.
More importantly, Azerbaijan is undertaking a much more ambitious initiative: securing its long-term security through active participation in Middle Eastern and Eurasian (Central Asian) projects. Baku’s strong partnerships with Turkey, Israel, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan provide a solid foundation for this strategy. These projects not only yield economic dividends (such as involvement in TCITR, the development of Israel’s Tamar gas field, and Syria’s reconstruction) but also establish a political buffer against two existential threats to Azerbaijan: Russia and Iran. The recent diplomatic travels of Hikmet Hajiyev, Azerbaijan’s Presidential Advisor, underscore this approach.
The only potential weak link in Azerbaijan’s carefully constructed network is Georgia. Should Georgia fall under Russian influence, it would pose an unpleasant surprise for Baku. However, Azerbaijan’s leverage in this scenario is limited, leaving it to hope that this does not come to pass. Otherwise, Azerbaijan’s main expectations from Trump’s administration lie in US support for regional projects that will solidify its status as a mid-tier power.
In summary, Tbilisi seeks Trump’s recognition of its government as an ideological ally; Yerevan hopes for security assurances and the preservation of the status quo; and Baku anticipates US backing for its regional ambitions. The rest will be determined by time.