Is this the dawn of a new era in the Middle East?

In the aftermath of Israel’s war on Gaza, many commentators have asserted that the Middle East regional order is undergoing a profound change. 

Various developments are used to justify these arguments, including Israel’s claims of crushing of Hamas and Hezbollah; its occupation of new Lebanese and Syrian territory; Iran’s relative retreat from these arenas; and the fall of Assad in Syria, along with the accompanying improvement in Turkey’s position. 

The return of US President Donald Trump and a shift in Washington’s approach underscore these claims of a new order. But how much are these developments a serious departure for the region?

Several of these shifts are not without precedent, notably Israel’s recent advances. The scale of destruction and loss of life in Gaza and Lebanon is new, but the military tactics are not. 

Hamas and Hezbollah in many ways resemble the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 1970s and ’80s, when Israeli military interventions and later occupation sought to destroy the movement. Then, as now, Israel’s war goals were to destroy its enemy and occupy a buffer zone. 

But while Israel did force the PLO out of Lebanon, the 1982 war catalysed the growth of a new opponent, Hezbollah, which made Israel neither safer nor more dominant over the Levant. Indeed, rather than ushering in an era of Israeli regional dominance, the 1980s saw it become mired in a draining occupation that ultimately forced it into retreat and compromise. 

Times change, of course, but these failures illustrated Israel’s limited capacity, especially in terms of troops – raising questions about how much it can translate military superiority into regional dominance. 

Iran weakened but not defeated

Ideas that Iran is in retreat should also be tempered. Iran has certainly suffered a blow. Its direct missile attack on Israel did not check Israeli aggression, exposing the limits of Tehran’s much-vaunted arsenal. 

But Iran is far from defeated. It retains a significant presence in Iraq, and its Houthi allies in Yemen have come out of the conflict in a stronger position. 

Though the general perception is that Hamas and Hezbollah are weakened, they remain in place, while Tehran retains ties with Syrian groups that could be utilised in the future. 

The regional position of the US is also not so divergent with the past. Trump’s two leading policy priorities, staunch support for Israel and upping sanctions on Iran, have been the standard approach for most of his predecessors – not least himself in his first term. 

Trump’s expressed desire to “take over” Gaza is certainly new, but it remains to be seen whether this is a serious scheme or a bargaining strategy to cajole Hamas and Arab leaders. Beyond Israel and Iran, Trump has focused his interests outside the Middle East.

At the same time, however, some of the recent shifts could usher in significant changes. The fall of the Assad regime is seismic, akin to the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a development that completely upended Iraq’s domestic and international politics. 

There remain many unknowns over Syria’s future. As the bloody events of recent days show, it could yet collapse into more fighting, with hopes of a more stable, inclusive Syria now in jeopardy. 

Similarly, the weakening of Hezbollah could yet transform Lebanese politics. It already broke a two-year political impasse over a new president, which could help the country move away from the political and economic stagnation of the past decade. But as in Syria, it is too early to tell.

Adapting to new realities

Syria’s transformation into a Turkish ally, with the possibility of military bases already reportedly discussed, is another significant shift. Such an outcome would give Ankara a physical foothold deep in the Levant, and could further increase the growing tensions between Israel and Turkey. 

But although this is a new development, it hasn’t come out the blue. Turkey’s regional influence has been growing since the AKP came to power in 2002, and it already has a military presence in Qatar, Libya, Somalia, northern Iraq and northern Syria. Flipping Damascus from a rival to an ally is significant, but this builds on Turkey’s existing position rather than completely transforming it.

Further, the agreement between the Syrian Kurdish SDF and the new interim president in Damascus, Ahmed Sharaa, to integrate Kurdish forces into the Syrian national army, alongside the call from jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Kurdish group to wind up its 40-year war with Turkey, is potentially historic. But it is too soon to know if either move will make it past the declaration phase. 

So does this all add up to a “new order” for the Middle East? As the late professor Fred Halliday once noted, seemingly once a decade, events rock the region’s geopolitics, prompting observers to pronounce a new era. 

The Gaza war and its aftermath in Lebanon and Syria seem to have strengthened the hands of Israel and Turkey … but how much this is truly a departure from the past should not be overstated

The 2011 Arab Spring, the “war on terror” that started in 2001, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 1979 Iranian revolution all appeared to usher in significant regional change. But, as Halliday also cautioned, despite rises and falls in the fortunes of particular powers brought about by these events, there was often more continuity than change. 

That may well prove true of developments today. The Gaza war and its aftermath in Lebanon and Syria seem to have strengthened the hands of Israel and Turkey, while weakening those of Iran and its allies. At the same time, the return of Trump appears to have brought the US even closer to Israel, and upped its opposition to Iran. 

But how much this is truly a departure from the past should not be overstated. Most powers, such as in the Gulf and Egypt, have had to adapt to the new circumstances, but their policy positions have not drastically altered. Israel has a bad track record of using its military might to increase its regional influence. Turkey is expanding, but this has been gradual rather than sudden; and while Iran is down, it is not necessarily out. 

The region has certainly been rattled, but it remains to be seen whether this constitutes a “new order”. What may ultimately prove more important in the long run will be events outside the Middle East: the global response to the Trump presidency. Any reordering of the US-European alliance, or the rehabilitation of Russia globally, could yet have unforeseen knock-on effects in the region.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.