The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we shed light on the Iranian presidential elections and their potential impact on country’s trajectory.
On June 28, Iran will go to the polls to elect a new President following the death of Ebrahim Raisi. Six candidates have been authorised to participate in the electoral race by the Guardian Council: three radicals, two conservatives, and one reformist. Initially, when the Guardian Council released the list of approved candidates, many predicted another non-competitive race like the previous ones. However, the recent electoral campaign seems to be suggesting something different. The main contenders – reformist Pezeshkian, conservative Ghalibaf, and radical Jalili – have engaged in a heated electoral competition. According to the polls, they are currently competing fiercely for access to the second round, scheduled for July 5. The debates between candidates have focused on several critical issues, including the impact of sanctions, the fight against corruption, relations with the West, and the Internet ban. The issue of government repression and the hijab law has also been addressed, but it is hard to imagine that there will be any change in this regard. Moreover, in the economic sphere, the country’s difficult circumstances leave little room for creativity, and many fear that foreign policy will remain unchanged as well. These are the main reasons why popular disaffection persists, with today’s expected turnout around 50%, also due to the authorities’ lack of interest in holding fully competitive elections. Distrust is further fuelled by the Supreme Leader’s ultimate authority in decision-making. Nonetheless, while the central role of the rahbar is unquestionable, the President of the Republic’s role should not be underestimated. In light of these considerations, who has the best chance of becoming the next President of Iran? What challenges will he face in the aftermath of taking office?
Experts from the ISPI network discuss the most important aspects that emerged from the presidential election competition.
The role of President of the Republic should not be underestimated
“The role of the Iranian presidency can be both overstated and underestimated. The Supreme Leader wields ultimate influence on key foreign and domestic policy decisions, while heads of the executive branch have contended with the occasionally diverging interests of elected and unelected state institutions, like the parliament and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Nevertheless, with the presidency comes the power to appoint cabinet positions, chair the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, propose a budget, and generally serve as the system’s front-facing messenger and implementer. Under Raisi, conservative control across various centres of power became increasingly consolidated, although their internal disputes, centred not necessarily on ideology but on power struggles, surfaced in the absence of meaningful rivals from other political camps.”
Ali Vaez, Director, Iran Program, International Crisis Group
Sanctions and U.S. relations are the main themes of an undecided election
“One of the most surprising aspects of the presidential debates in Iran is the significant focus on diplomacy, the 2015 nuclear deal, and sanctions. Despite perceptions that US-Iran relations have moved beyond serious diplomacy, these elections underscore a political acknowledgment within Iran of the need for a diplomatic resolution to sanctions. This need has been articulated most strongly by reformist candidate Massoud Pezeshkian, but also notably by conservative candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The race has become a tight three-way competition between Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and the hardliner Saeed Jalili. Pezeshkian is trending upwards in the polls, while Ghalibaf and Jalili are losing ground. None of them are likely to secure the 50% required to win outright in the first round. If Ghalibaf and Jalili both stay in the race, it will likely go to a runoff. However, if turnout is higher than expected, Pezeshkian could win an upset victory in the first round, similar to Hassan Rouhani in 2013.”
Sina Toossi, Senior non-resident Fellow, Center for International Policy
The depoliticisation of Iranian society is set to continue with low voter turnout
“Iranians in general and the citisens of the capital, Tehran in particular, have become relatively de-politicised in recent years. This is one of the reasons behind lower-than-expected turnouts in the last three elections in 2020, 2021 and 2024. Another reason is the expansion of social media among Iranians, which automatically takes election campaigns from streets and face-to-face discussions or leaflets to cell phone screens. The third and the most important factor is a lack of interest on the part of the Nezam, to hold energetic elections. And that relates to the bitter experience of the 2009 disputed presidential election, which plunged Iran into an unrest for eight months. Considering all that, it is projected that the low-turnout trend will continue for the time being and at best, around 50 percent of the eligible voters will go to polling stations on June 28.”
Fereshteh Sadeghi, Freelance Journalist
Despite the differences in social programmes, the elections could mark a turning point after Raisi’s four-year term
“Frontrunner conservative Ghalibaf promises to crack down on illegal migration from Afghanistan and build a border wall with the country. He also promised to give land and housing to Iranians and touted his track record as Tehran’s mayor. Qazizadeh Hashemi, a hardliner who has no chance of winning, ran on family values, even praising Meloni’s Italian government as a role model. Reformist Pezeshkian’s campaign was focused on overcoming factional discord in the country as well as overcoming poverty. He also championed diplomatic talks with the West to lift the sanctions on the country, a theme also echoed by Ghalibaf, and seen as key to solving the country’s economic woes. The fundamentalist hardliner Jalili promised to ‘fight corruption’, but this is feared to be code for purging the civil service and replacing them with his hardliner loyalists. Whoever wins in these elections, it is likely that Iran will go in a different direction from the one taken by Raisi. Especially if the presidency passes on to Ghalibaf or Pezeshkian who, despite their differences, both ran on a centrist technocratic platform quite distinct from Raisi.”
Arash Azizi, Senior Lecturer, Clemson University
Reformists rally around Pezeshkian, but will it work?
“Masoud Pezeshkian – former Minister of Health during the second term of reformist President Khatami – is not considered a strong candidate. During the election debates was overshadowed by the conservative candidate Mostafa Pourmohammadi, who presented more convincing reformist proposals. Nevertheless, the reformist camp has rallied behind Pezeshkian, supporting his candidacy more vigorously than the candidate himself. A robust media campaign was launched to persuade sceptics to vote. In fact, Pezeshkian’s success depends on voter turnout: the higher the number of people who will head to the polls, the greater his chances of winning the elections. Current polls show him in the ascendancy, but if he does not win in the first round, a coalition between conservatives and radicals could jeopardise his chances. Moreover, a speech by Khamenei on Wednesday dealt a significant blow to reformist hopes. Criticising candidates with pro-Western tendencies, the Supreme Leader implicitly stressed that campaign rhetoric is one thing, governing is another.”
Luigi Toninelli, Middle East and North Africa Centre, ISPI
In the economic sphere, problems leave no room for creativity
“With the help of some of Rouhani’s team, mostly former FM Zarif, Pezeshkian is working hard to establish himself as a reformist. In reality, there is no reformist movement in Iran and all candidates, when they come to power, will be forced to maintain the regime stability above all and at any cost. Current economic conditions in Iran do not really leave room for creativity. The government has exhausted all possible sanction bypassing channels, and so-called ‘South-South’ economic collaboration opportunities yet has not managed to tackle the existing challenges. Nearly all candidates in their campaigns argued that the most significant economic challenge is not the sanctions, but it is corruption and mismanagement. It is the first time in over a decade that senior Iranian figures are admitting this. The candidates have made populist campaign promises such as: controlling inflation, raising wages, fighting corruption, seeking to eradicate unfair distribution of wealth, and paying subsidy handouts in gold. However, structural macroeconomic challenges, deep-rooted nepotism and corruption, and lack of updated economic knowledge and expertise amongst senior policymakers do not give a hopeful prospect of what the next administration can deliver.”
Sara Bazoobandi, Research fellow, GIGA; Associate Research Fellow, ISPI
Iran’s structural problems are bound to last despite candidates’ promises
“According to a 10 June 2024 survey by Iran’s economic outlet Donyâ-e Eqtesâd among 2,000 readers, removing international sanctions (54%) and curbing inflation (30%) were the two top priorities for the next president. These concerns are also reflected by many of the handpicked candidates’ campaign pledges. Inflation has long reached worrying dimensions, officially alone at about 50%. Sanctions, on their part, have deepened – not caused – the country’s economic crisis which is rooted in rampant corruption, mismanagement and exploitation by an élite that is monopolising political and economic power. Crucially, sanctions are mainly a result of the Islamic Republic’s own preferences, especially its ideological foreign policy. However, Iran’s ever-deepening economic and socio-economic crises are likely to continue to rage, as there is no indication of much-needed structural reforms enacted by Tehran’s power centre, i.e. the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. Even if Iran will experience some sanctions relief, e.g. as a result of a new nuclear deal with Washington, this will be enabled by a strategic decision of the centre of power, which the new president will execute as a loyal custodian of the system.”
Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Director, Center for Middle East and Global Order (CMEG), editor of CMEG’s Iran Revolution Monitor
No changes are expected in foreign policy. The economy remains the main issue to be addressed
“The ideological approach to the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic may not change after the Iranian snap elections. Nevertheless, two key issues may be affected by the arrival of a new political personality at the Iranian presidency in 2024. The implementation of the Iranian policy towards Washington and the economic strategy. Indeed, the easing of sanctions is a significant topic in the Iranian electoral debate given the rise of poverty in Iran and the need to address structural hurdles in an oil-producing economy. The so-called moderate faction is proposing a path focusing on the survival of the political system based on improving the economic internal situation to prevent and manage the rise of internal discontent. On the conservative side, the focus is on implementing hardline policy to guarantee the internal cohesion of the political system and avoid the risk of a weakening of the political system at a time of a crisis of legitimacy.”
Clément Therme, Research Associate, School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS)