Editor’s Note: Javad Heiran-Nia is a frequent contributor to Stimson on Iranian foreign policy, which he focuses on at a Tehran-based think tank. He is particularly expert on Iran’s relations with Russia, China and neighboring states.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The concept of a U.S.-led “new world order” was popularized by the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Iran’s incoming president, Masoud Pezeshkian also believes a new world order is emerging, one in which U.S. power is declining but remains significant.
Pezeshkian outlined his views in a recent article in the English-language Tehran Times. In it, he defended Iran’s decision to strengthen ties with Russia and China as well as neighboring countries and the Global South, but also said his administration’s foreign policy would be “balanced” and “include “constructive engagement” with the West.
“My administration will pursue an opportunity-driven policy by creating balance in relations with all countries, consistent with our national interests, economic development, and requirements of regional and global peace and security,” he wrote. “Accordingly, we will welcome sincere efforts to alleviate tensions and will reciprocate good-faith with good-faith.”
Pezeshkian’s views are a slightly softer version of those of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to whom any Iranian president is subservient on matters of national security. Khamenei sees the international order as based on three axes of global power. The first—the liberal order of institutions and norms created after World War II—is weakening in Khamenei’s view because American hegemony is declining. A second axis, formed by Russia and China, is seen as rising. The third axis joins Iran with this rising new world order under a policy of “look to the East,” and abandons the slogan of “Neither East, nor West” dominant after the 1979 revolution.
The vision allows for reducing tensions with the West but “mainly the view should be towards the East; Looking towards the West and Europe has no effect for us except to cause problems and humiliation,” Khamenei says. “We must look towards the East; there are countries that can help us.”
This view was strongly reflected by the administration of Ebrahim Raisi, whose death in a helicopter crash in May led to new presidential elections. A so-called Transformation Document of the Raisi government includes efforts to resolve Iran’s nuclear dispute with the West but not as a platform to improve relations. North America was not even mentioned as a region with which Iran can have relations.
According to Pezeshkian, power has shifted from West to East, and America’s role has declined, but new poles have not been established. This view mirrors that of influential former foreign ministers Mohammad Javad Zarif and Ali Akbar Salehi, key advisors to the new president. Zarif has written that the rigid bipolar order of the past is gone and that the world system is in a transition stage. Failure to appreciate the fact that a new order has not yet been created could be dangerous for Iran’s national interests, Zarif believes. “It is dangerous for Iran to be anti-Russian and anti-American,” Zarif says. “Because we have to prioritize our national interests and then consider opposition to American domination.” Zarif adds: “Iran should not wait for the emergence of new poles, but any great and effective power can emerge in a specific area.”
Salehi, a nuclear physicist who with Zarif was a key negotiator of the 2015 nuclear agreement, believes that if Iran clings to Russia, China, or America, it will be a disaster; Instead, Iran must stand in the middle of this triangle.
Because the new order does not have an inflexible polar nature, being too close to one power cannot assure Iran’s interests, in Salehi’s view. Because, for example, the nature and logic of China’s competition with the United States is not irreconcilable everywhere, so Iran’s desired interests cannot be secured by only being close to China.
Pezeshkian has stated that the foreign policy of his government will be neither anti-East nor anti-West. He pays special attention to the Global South: “Recognizing that the global landscape has evolved beyond traditional dynamics, my administration is committed to fostering mutually beneficial relations with emerging international players in the Global South, especially with African nations,” he wrote. “We will strive to enhance our collaborative efforts and strengthen our partnerships for the mutual benefit of all involved.”
As to the relationship with Russia and China, Pezeshkian writes that both countries “have consistently stood by us during challenging times. We deeply value this friendship. Our 25-year roadmap with China represents a significant milestone towards establishing a mutually beneficial comprehensive strategic partnership,’ and we look forward to collaborating more extensively with Beijing as we advance towards a new global order.” Pezeshkian also noted China’s role in facilitating Iran-Saudi normalization in 2023.
His approach to the West is two-fold. Regarding Europe, he criticizes its failure to compensate Iran for the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement but expresses his desire for constructive dialogue. He is tougher on the U.S., calling on Washington to change its approach and not stressing a desire for talks. Iran’s caution is the result of U.S. actions, he says, such as quitting the nuclear deal and putting Iran on an “Axis of Evil” in spite of its cooperation against the Taliban in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
At the same time, Pezeshkian understands that he cannot fulfill campaign promises to improve the Iranian economy without obtaining relief of U.S. sanctions and getting off the blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global watchdog against terrorism financing and money laundering. Ties with Russia and China and membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union cannot make up for sanctions.
Iran’s “Look to the East” policy also fails to insure that Russia and China always support Iran in the U.N. Security Council or defy U.S. unilateral sanctions to invest in Iran.
In general, Pezeshkian’s approach is practical and pragmatic. It recalls the foreign policy of the Hashemi Rafsanjani government, which sought to reconstruct Iran after the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. Like Rafsanjani’s successor, Mohammad Khatami, Pezeshkian seeks to present a more constructive image of Iran at the regional and global level. Like Hassan Rouhani, the president before Raisi, the new president seeks sanctions relief that will improve Iranians’ daily lives.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. His book, Iran and the Security Order in the Persian Gulf, is being published by Routledge. Follow him on X, formerly known as Twitter: @J_Heirannia.