Perspectives Paper No. 2,311, November 7, 2024
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel’s move in the north signals a clear strategy – the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy’s ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror – however successful they may be – are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israel’s approach to defeating Hezbollah.
Following the unexpected success of the chain of blows inflicted by Israel on Hezbollah’s high command in August and September, the IDF began a ground operation in Lebanon.
The confusion and embarrassment that gripped Hezbollah undoubtedly damaged not only its strategic and systemic command capabilities, but also the functioning of its operational formations. The organization’s rate of launches in late September was much lower than expected. More importantly, the quality of those launches – the ability to concentrate barrages of complex rockets and missiles to overcome Israeli air defenses, and the ability to locate and accurately hit targets in Israel – was significantly diminished.
Precisely in light of the enemy’s disequilibrium, the modest goals of the “Northern Arrows” operation stand out. From everything that has been said and published, the operation is intended to return the residents of the north to their homes through the cleansing of the first line of Lebanese villages from Radwan Force attack-supporting infrastructure.
This relatively modest plan suits the Israeli government’s political goals as well as the Americans’ desire to limit the war. A limited plan may entail limited risks in principle, but from a narrow military point of view, this particular plan is based on simplistic work assumptions and entails great operational risks. A clear definition of the work assumptions implicit in the plan will make it possible to critically assess whether the situation has changed and whether the plan should accordingly be changed.
According to the IDF, a force numbering about two divisions (accurate to early October) entered the strip of Lebanese villages very close to the Israeli border with the aim of destroying the Radwan infrastructure there. In other words:
- The IDF launched an operation against infrastructure, not against an enemy.
- As long as the enemy allows it, the IDF will prefer to carry out the mission without combat confrontation.
Although Hezbollah’s top command level was neutralized and a significant part of its rocket and missile arrays destroyed, the organization’s ground army in southern Lebanon was only slightly damaged. The IDF’s announcements about the operation’s limited objectives were intended for Israeli and American ears, but also signaled the enemy. The implied message was this: “If you refrain from opposing IDF forces in the limited operation, its expansion will be avoided. This will allow Hezbollah’s southern units to survive.” If that was indeed the message, then it is clear that Israel’s strategic goal is to end the war with an international agreement after the destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure on the border line.
From a purely military point of view, the Northern Command’s operational concept here is problematic. The deployment of the IDF on a very thin strip, in the face of a Hezbollah army that maintains significant military strength, including anti-tank and mortar capabilities, raids and ambushes, exposes the brigades to dangerous enemy initiatives. At least one battle so far, in which almost 50 fighters of the Egoz battalion’s combat team were injured, illustrated this risk, and since early October IDF casualties have grown significantly.
The IDF is trying to overcome this weakness by securing the forces with concentrated air effort and firepower. But from a military standpoint, it would have been more correct to capture the Hezbollah army in southern Lebanon through rapid divisional moves deep into the south and encircle the enemy based on the river lines (the Litani, Zaharni or Avali).
Defeating an enemy in battle is usually based on the principle of reducing friction with the hard shell and then quickly and aggressively surrounding and squeezing it. In this instance, the encirclement of Hezbollah’s military force and threat to destroy it would offer a better chance, if not a promise, of a) continuing to deny the enemy a return to operational equilibrium and b) bringing about the disintegration of the tactical arrays in the south in the same way the command arrays collapsed in Beirut.
On the micro-tactical level, quick and decisive divisional moves are supposed to reduce the main threat to IDF forces: advanced anti-tank missiles. In general, fast combat movement makes it more difficult for the defender and reduces his ambush and shooting opportunities. More concretely, as the days pass from the beeper blasts and the broad Air Force attacks on the bank of targets in the south, the more likely it is that the Hezbollah units will recover and prepare better for battle.
Despite the inherent risks, the strategy of clearing a narrow buffer strip and ending the war in the north with an agreement is a legitimate choice. Hezbollah’s southern army is a significant military threat capable of exacting a heavy price from the IDF. Hezbollah knows full well that after a year of fighting in Gaza, the IDF is not the fresh, capable army, armed to the teeth and furious, that it was at the beginning of the war. It is very possible that the enemy will cooperate with the plan and take the chance of preserving its power over an attempt to restore its lost dignity. It is also possible that that is Iran’s directive.
Either way, the assumptions underlying the current plan must be defined and their validity examined. One must also prepare for an immediate change of the plan in the north if it turns out that the enemy has chosen not to cooperate. In fact, just preparing the broader ground move may have a restraining effect on Hezbollah’s ground forces in the south.
We must define the situation clearly:
- The IDF went into Lebanon to fight the enemy’s infrastructure, not the enemy itself.
- Under these circumstances, combat contact will usually be initiated by the enemy.
- The current move is not optimal in terms of securing IDF forces. Israel is allowing Hezbollah’s defense and attack units, which are mostly complete, to watch the IDF’s moves and initiate action accordingly.
- De-equilibrium is, by definition, a temporary matter. As time passes, the impact of the inflicted blows weakens and operational cohesion returns. Restoring self-respect in the face of operational opportunities in the field may turn out to be a growing logic among the enemy forces in the south.
- Choosing a strategy that does not seek Hezbollah’s military defeat will inevitably leave the organization a military force in Lebanon.
If the risks inherent in points 1-4 materialize in several consecutive events, then the option of encirclement and ground decision of the Hezbollah army in the south should be realized quickly. It must be prepared for, both as an operational response and as a reserved threat to the enemy.
The fifth point concerns Israel’s strategy. At the moment, the strategy strives for the demobilization of South Lebanon not by force but by some kind of political agreement, apparently in the spirit of 1701 (the UN Security Council resolution that ended the Second Lebanon War). As we have bitter experience of the unreliability of foreign demobilization mechanisms, the true meaning of Israel’s strategy is that the current Lebanon War is not an end to the conflict with Hezbollah but simply a prelude to the next war.
Again, this is not necessarily a wrong strategy. Despite the achievements of the strikes in the summer, Hezbollah is not defeated, and its ground units in the south are certainly still capable of battle. Israel, meanwhile, is fighting in seven arenas. Also, to a significant degree, the prolongation of the war in Lebanon serves Hamas in Gaza, where the pressure has been eased. It is also difficult to see a clear ending mechanism for the direct war that has started between Iran and Israel. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages, and the important thing is to understand them.
The current strategy strives to shorten the long war we have fallen into. The thinking underlying this strategy is that the current Lebanon war will not be the last. As ever, Hezbollah will prepare for the next war while learning from its failures in the current round. In the future, Israel will not be able to assume that a series of secret operations will provide it with the same benefits. It is also possible that the bank of targets will not be replenished at the same rate in light of information security lessons the enemy is now learning.
The current war is being waged while counter-terrorism tactics, such as eliminating senior commanders, are yielding surprising systemic achievements. But even with these successes, Israel is choosing not to take advantage of a rare opportunity to overwhelm Hezbollah’s army in the south. This choice does not show much self-confidence in the purely military field.
If the IDF is to defeat Hezbollah’s future military power in the south and learn lessons from the current war, it will have to be not only more determined but also more adaptable. The current Israeli caution stems, at least in part, from an understanding that on the military level, our forces are dangerously vulnerable to enemy capabilities and not effective enough to cleanse the south without sinking into an eternal guerilla war.
The current strategy may be successful. It is possible that we will return the residents of the north and reach an agreement. But such a success, should it occur, will mark not only the operational achievement of the covert and air strikes that landed on the enemy but also their limitations.
No one will dismantle Hezbollah in Lebanon for us. And if a significant part of its power is preserved, its deterrence of Israel will improve, and Israel will not be able to enforce demilitarization by force. Hezbollah’s survival in defeat will simply turn over the hourglass for the next clash with a smarter enemy that is eager to restore its honor.
The current war marks, therefore, the opening of the race between the parties to prepare for the next war. This may be the decisive conflict not only in the north, but also for the future of the axis. The IDF must develop a clear and distinct military decision-making capacity – a military capacity, not just another list of methods of fighting terrorism.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. His next book, Renewal – The October 7th War and Israel’s Defense Strategy, is about to be published by Levin Publications.