Turkish officials paid close attention to the 2024 US presidential election. There was an understanding in Ankara that a win by either now President-elect Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris could have serious implications for the future of the Turkey-US alliance.
Over the years, a host of contentious and critical issues – from US sponsorship of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria to Russian-Turkish military relations and Turkey’s pro-Hamas foreign policy – have exacerbated tension between Turkey and the US.
Although these issues were set to continue fuelling friction in bilateral affairs irrespective of the outcome of this month’s presidential election, Trump’s win could impact this alliance’s trajectory.
Upsides of Trump 2.0 for Turkey
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan congratulated Trump after his win this month, referred to Trump as a “friend”, and invited him to Turkey. Ankara has various reasons for maintaining a positive outlook toward Trump’s second administration and what it will mean for Turkey’s national interests.
“The Turkish leadership views the re-election of Donald Trump with sanguine expectations, which I would call incautious optimism,” Dr Eyüp Ersoy, a lecturer at the Department of International Affairs of Ahi Evran University in Kirşehir, Turkey, told The New Arab.
“I think Turkey is between a rock and a hard place and Trump seems to be the better option,” explained Dr Özgür Pala, a lecturer at Koç University, Istanbul and co-author of Turkish-Qatari Relations: From Past to Present in a Turbulent Geopolitical Landscape, in an interview with TNA.
“One factor that conditions the views of the Turkish leadership is the unpalatable experiences with the former US President Joe Biden, who never visited Turkey. The essential factor, though, is the anticipation of renewed US initiatives to stop the ongoing military conflicts in the vicinity of Turkey. The instability in Turkey’s neighbourhood is subjecting the Turkish leadership to political and economic costs, both outside and inside Turkey,” said Dr Ersoy.
Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy is one that many Turkish officials can work with rather well. Whereas Trump is not guided by any principles when it comes to NATO and tends to prefer dealing with the Transatlantic Alliance in a transactional manner, the same can be said about how Turkey generally approaches NATO. Turkey’s “obstructionist” role in Finland and Sweden’s entry into the Alliance was a salient example of this point.
“[Erdogan and Trump] both like to get things done as in business deals and they like giving quick decisions. This will prove beneficial for Ankara. That is why Erdogan was one of the first leaders who congratulated Trump on his win and expressed his desire to continue cooperation,” noted Dr Pala.
Elon Musk, the Tesla CEO whom Trump has tasked with making the US government operate more efficiently, may be important to Turkey-US relations during Trump’s second administration. Mindful of Musk’s connections and past experiences with Erdogan and Turkey, the leadership in Ankara will probably look to Musk to open doors to higher levels of Turkey-US cooperation in the field of technology.
Ankara’s concerns about Trump’s return
On the other hand, there are reasons for Turkey to fear four more years of Trump at the helm of Washington’s foreign policy. During Trump’s first term, he took some actions that fuelled tension between Turkey and the US.
It is unclear how Trump’s second administration will deal with Iran, but Turkey would not welcome a ‘maximum pressure 2.0’ campaign. Just as the leadership in Ankara opposed Trump’s decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, today Turkey would be against US-led initiatives aimed at further squeezing and isolating Tehran.
With the Turkish economy experiencing many problems, Ankara wants to see Turkish-Iranian trade grow in this upcoming period with US sanctions on Iran being lifted rather than having Washington intensify its financial warfare on the country.
The incoming Trump administration encouraging more Israeli military operations against Iran would certainly infuriate Turkey’s government, which took a firm stance in defence of its neighbour to the east after Israel bombed various parts of Iran on 26 October. Any actions that increase the risk of a full-blown Iran-Israel war will be opposed by Ankara, which would see such an extreme scenario as representing major threats to Turkey’s security and economic interests.
US foreign policy toward Syria could be the greatest source of tension in the Ankara-Washington alliance with Trump back in the White House. It is unclear how Trump will approach the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked YPG and questions about the future of America’s military presence in northern Syria. Nonetheless, the policies that Trump’s second administration takes toward the YPG and counterterrorism in Syria will inevitably do much to shape the dynamics in Turkey-US relations.
The conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon are major issues for Turkey. With Erdogan and his domestic supporters being sensitive to the Palestinian issue and viewing Israel as guilty of genocide, the hope in Ankara is that Trump will use Washington’s leverage to rein in the military actions taken by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.
Some Turkish analysts are pessimistic about this occurring under Trump’s watch. “Despite [Trump’s] election pledges, the new US government is highly unlikely to put any meaningful pressure on Israel,” holds Dr Ersoy.
Yet, others argue that with a Kamala Harris administration in charge of US foreign policy, the picture would not be too different.
“For Ankara neither the Democrats nor the Republicans are trustable in terms of the tensions in the Middle East. Democrats have not done anything to end the war in Gaza and are responsible for [the] death of thousands and thousands of children and women. Ankara probably asks, how bad can Trump be? At least he wants the war to end in Gaza (we will see how that will happen). However, as I said [there is] not much difference between Trump and Kamala when it comes to Gaza or Israeli aggression [against] countries in the region,” commented Dr Pala.
Additionally, as the Trump administration’s reaction to the Andrew Brunson saga of 2018 highlighted, Trump has a record of taking advantage of Turkey’s economic weaknesses to push Ankara in favour of doing what he wants. Officials in Ankara have not forgotten the US financial sanctions that Trump imposed to pressure Turkey into releasing Brunson. Whether Trump’s second administration would apply such pressure tactics on Ankara if/when future disputes arise is a question on the minds of many in Turkey.
Turkey’s government is, for now, in a wait-and-see mode, hoping for the best while preparing for the worst. The leadership in Ankara will make decisions about Trump’s second administration based on its agendas and actions. Turkish officials will “observe first and understand exactly the priorities of Trump,” said Dr Murat Aslan, an Associate Professor of International Relations at Hasan Kalyoncu University, in a TNA interview.
“Bilateral relations will be compartmentalised… In this sense, there will be [an understanding] that we can witness cooperation, and sometimes debates or disputes. Let’s see,” he added.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero