Over the past four decades, Iran’s policy vis-à-vis Afghan immigrants has repeatedly shifted in response to the changing conditions in its next-door neighbor. From open borders during the country’s humanitarian crises to a more restrictive approach during times of tension, Tehran has attempted to balance its need for low-cost foreign labor on one hand and concomitant socioeconomic pressures caused by large-scale immigration on the other. This complex relationship is particularly tangible in three distinct periods of Afghan immigration to Iran: the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing war, the Taliban’s rise to power in the late 1990s, and its abrupt return in 2021. During each of these crises, Afghans flocked to Iran, seeking refuge from deteriorating conditions and authoritarian governance. Iran has accommodated these refugee waves to varying extents, but it has yet to develop a cohesive, evidence-based immigration policy.
Iran’s initial open-door policy during the post-1979 period allowed Afghans to settle across the country and find low-paying jobs. The presence of Afghan labor helped to keep the country’s economy afloat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War when millions of young Iranian men left the workforce to fight against Saddam Hussein. That period also marked Iran’s strategic integration of Afghan immigrants into urban areas—a relatively assimilationist approach that sharply contrasted with Pakistan’s establishment of squalid refugee camps. For the next twenty years, the number of Afghans in Iran varied on par with political changes: for instance, the Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 1996 drove a second wave of refugees into Iran. As before, Afghan labor became instrumental in Iran’s post-war economic recovery, filling roles in construction, agriculture, and other labor-intensive sectors.
Yet, Iran’s willingness to welcome Afghan refugees has diminished in response to the increasing immigrant population, as well as rising socio-political pressures. The ongoing wave following the second Taliban takeover has spotlighted shortcomings in Iran’s immigration policy, which remains largely reactive and inconsistent and lacks any centralized system to oversee Afghan refugees’ entry, residency, or access to services.
Estimates of the Afghan population in Iran vary widely, from the official tally of six million to unofficial estimates of eight million or more. The Iran-Afghanistan border is fairly porous, and many Afghans cross via unrecognized routes, frustrating government attempts to keep reliable data on their number and whereabouts.
Although it has experienced numerous immigration cycles and dealt with the associated challenges each time, Iran has consistently lacked an evidence-based immigration policy since 1979. The truth is that no coherent, long-term plan has been implemented by any of the three branches of the government to contain the sharp increase in Afghan immigration or effectively deal with those already in the country. This absence of accurate data reflects policymakers’ longstanding but increasingly tenuous perception that immigration issues are transient or short-lived, leading the government to focus on issues such as temporary asylum and return transit. The lack of an overarching strategy—or, indeed, a coherent way of thinking about immigration—helps to explain why Iran’s immigration policy has oscillated between an open-door approach and strict limitations on the movement, residency, and repatriation of Afghan refugees.
Today, Iran’s policy of repatriation of Afghan immigrants has largely failed; given the difficulty of controlling the border, many Afghans facing deportation simply return to the country shortly after their expulsion. Nonetheless, Iranian authorities have maintained a stubborn focus on permanent return to Afghanistan as the primary solution for the country’s refugee problem. The government has made decisions accordingly, rendering living conditions precarious for many Afghan nationals. Welfare services and long-term support measures have been minimized or restricted in a bid to discourage long-term settlement, a policy that experts argue is misaligned with Iran’s current socio-political climate.
Other efforts have also been made in the past two decades to regulate the flow of refugees, but those measures have been reactive in nature, adjusting to immediate needs, state policies, and ongoing events. Therefore, such policies lack cohesion and have yielded unclear outcomes. This reluctance largely stems from concerns that enacting centralized immigration laws and regularizing the status of Afghan migrants might inadvertently attract further asylum seekers.
This challenge, and the debate over potential solutions, is now new to Iran. During the tenure of moderate President Hassan Rouhani, Iranian lawmakers introduced a bill to parliament that would establish a National Migration Organization (NMO) to oversee Iran’s immigration policy and address the varied needs of foreign nationals and refugees. Among other services, the NMO would streamline service provision, manage residence permits, and oversee housing and rental conditions for migrants. However, the initiative has constantly stalled, with recent reports indicating that the administration of newly-elected President Masoud Pezeshkian has withdrawn the bill for further amendments.
Afghan refugees have been part of Iranian society for over four decades, and the bulk of the current Afghan population are second and third-generation Afghans born in Iran. Afghan communities are mostly concentrated in the eastern and central provinces, including Tehran, Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Kerman, Yazd, and Fars. However, a high birth rate among Afghan families, coupled with a declining birth rate among Iranian families, has raised concerns among some policymakers about a long-term demographic shift. In particular, Iranian officials associated with the nation’s Shi’a clerical system have expressed concerns about an increase in the proportion of Afghan Sunnis, a dynamic that could have far-reaching consequences for the country’s delicate political and electoral balance. Afghan refugees currently face strict security and social restrictions including schools, workplaces, and public spaces, limiting their ability to request improved conditions or form representative institutions for themselves. Laws governing the behavior of Afghan migrants have reportedly grown even stricter following the emergence of ISIS-K, which has conducted mass-casualty terror attacks inside Iran.
Moreover, the presence of Afghan nationals in Iran has degenerated into a polarizing issue, triggering debates across society between proponents and opponents of Afghan immigration. The dismal economic conditions in Iran, driven by Western sanctions and hyperinflation, have exacerbated anti-immigrant sentiment. These challenges have made it increasingly difficult for Afghans to integrate into Iranian society, leaving their future uncertain amid unstable government policies and social pressures.
Critics of the late President Ebrahim Raisi accused his administration of adopting an “open borders” approach, allegedly motivated by ideological and political considerations. These complaints have overlapped with anti-government sentiment; activists have argued that Raisi’s refugee policy aimed to cultivate loyalty to the Islamic Republic within Afghan communities, essentially nurturing future supporters to replace native Iranians disillusioned with the clerical government—particularly the educated middle class already inclined to emigrate. Certain prominent ideological and religious figures connected to the Raisi administration openly backed such an approach, and anti-regime critics have pointed to the participation of Afghan nationals in state-sponsored events, such as controversial pro-hijab demonstrations, and the extensive coverage by the regime’s media outlets as potential evidence.
However, recent social issues, economic hardships, and the rising number of ISIS-K attacks—most notably the bombings in Kerman and Shiraz—have seriously challenged the feasibility of this strategy. The ensuing backlash, media scrutiny, and social unrest have reportedly led authorities to reconsider the policy, acknowledging the significant social and security challenges posed by the current immigration system.
Over the past year, reports of crimes allegedly involving Afghan nationals in Iran have also sharpened public sensitivities, leading to the rise of xenophobia and with some Iranian citizens calling for the mass expulsion of Afghans as a result. Incidents of bigoted violence against Afghan nationals have also surfaced in various regions, though such cases are seldom highlighted in official media. This climate has sparked extensive debate across society and in social media about the status of immigrants and state immigration policies. Social media in particular has become a focal point for anti-immigrant sentiment, with some influencers openly promoting violence against immigrants. They resort to platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Instagram to share videos claiming a “significant increase” in the number of immigrants at subways, parks, bakeries, and other public spaces. Many users depict the “massive presence” of Afghan immigrants across Iran, cautioning about the potential consequences. These images have also fueled concerns over depleting local resources. Long-term residents cite issues like rising housing prices and unemployment, viewing immigrants as encroaching on resources. Some locals have even justified violence against immigrants, perceiving them as “usurpers” of local resources and consequently calling for their expulsion.
Critics to rise of attacks on refugees have argued that calls for Afghan deportations are rooted in racism and run contrary to Iran’s support for humanitarian standards, accusing the media of stoking xenophobia. In response, the former administration of President Raisi initiated an integrated system to manage foreign nationals and immigrants, focusing on identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants. Additionally, the Iranian parliament approved the construction of a physical barrier along the border with Afghanistan to curb illegal entries. The wall project, which began in April 2024 and is set to be completed in three years, will be four meters (13 feet) high and topped with barbed wire. It is planned to stretch across Khorasan Razavi Province as part of a broader strategy to reinforce Iran’s eastern and northeastern borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan, areas heavily impacted by illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Nonetheless, critics question the efficacy of these barriers in deterring undocumented immigration.
In light of ongoing criticism of Iran’s immigration policies, Masoud Pezeshkian proposed three initiatives as part of his election campaign: fortifying Iran’s eastern border, dealing with the status of foreign nationals, and engaging in dialogue with European countries to relieve economic stress. Meanwhile, Interior Minister Esmail Momeni has emphasized that Iran cannot sustain the current number of foreign nationals, favoring the deportation of undocumented immigrants as a priority.
Iranian officials have announced a plan to repatriate about two million Afghans by the end of next March. Iran’s police chief Ahmadreza Radan recently announced that 500,000 Afghans had already been detained and deported this year, with 250,000 of them returning to Afghanistan voluntarily. However, the feasibility of the foregoing objective faces substantial logistical obstacles—not only in Iran but also in Afghanistan, where the relatively disorganized Taliban government seems poorly equipped to handle such a huge population transfer. Indeed, some analysts suggest this announcement may be a pressure tactic by the Islamic Republic to coerce the Taliban into addressing contentious issues with Iran.
Afghans in Iran contribute significantly to the Iranian economy. Through their involvement in Iranian business, they are collectively regarded as the largest group of foreign investors in the country, with millions of dollars in investment. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans work in Iran, and more than 500,000 Afghan students are reportedly enrolled in Iranian schools and universities. However, Iranian immigration experts often describe the government’s approach toward Afghan immigrants as rooted in control rather than in integration, driven by concerns over population growth among Sunni Afghans. The government’s restrictive stance has historically hindered social integration, rooted in the belief that Afghan immigrants could never fully assimilate as Iranians. Consequently, Afghan refugees lack access to citizenship, face challenges in housing, education, and healthcare, and reside mainly in marginalized and informal settlements. This social and economic segregation perpetuates poverty and reinforces a sense of disconnection from Iranian society.
Four decades on, younger Afghan immigrants in Iran represent a new, more diverse generation with values distinct from those of their predecessors. This new cohort was born and raised in Iran and holds aspirations and expectations that vastly differ from the original immigrant population. However Iran’s policies provide no structured integration pathways, leading to a fractured community with limited social or economic integration.
Iranian officials acknowledge that the lack of coherent immigration policies costs the nation billions of dollars per year and comes with negative social outcomes. Spatial segregation has reinforced social isolation, and policies aimed at encouraging “social integration” through geographical proximity have largely foundered. Due to the lack of a comprehensive legal framework to manage asylum seekers, Iranian police are primarily tasked with enforcing immigration laws and have often done so inconsistently. Moreover, the conditions prevailing in deportation camps are poor, with limited resources and support, highlighting the need for systemic improvements to meet international standards.
The presence of Afghan immigrants in Iran remains a polarizing issue. Despite stated goals, the process of identifying, organizing, and deporting undocumented immigrants poses significant challenges to the Iranian government. Failure to effectively address these issues could further strain already tense Iran-Afghanistan relations, intensify social tensions, and disproportionately impact impoverished and underdeveloped regions in eastern Iran.
Ultimately, it seems inevitable that Afghan immigrants will remain a part of Iranian society for the foreseeable future, much like the Iranian diaspora in the West. A long-term sustainable solution will require clear, balanced policies: a critical early step must be to grant some form of legal status to immigrants, aligning their contributions in Iran with access to basic services. In exchange for contributing to Iranian society through taxes, immigrants should likewise enjoy rights to essential services and social freedoms within Iran. Such a reciprocal relationship would benefit both immigrants and host communities, fostering mutual respect and stability. Conversely, continued tension and anti-immigrant sentiments risk damaging Iran’s already precarious social harmony.
As a signatory to the Geneva Convention on the Rights of Refugees, Iran is obligated to respect refugee rights. However, its relationship with international refugee organizations has been complicated and influenced by broader political tensions with the West. This mistrust, coupled with restrictive security policies on the operation of these organizations, has limited constructive cooperation between Iran and international refugee advocacy organizations like the UNHCR. Iran has often criticized these organizations over their insufficient financial support to meet refugee needs, and its appeals for increased funding have consistently encountered difficulties. Improving conditions for refugees through greater cooperation with international organizations, securing funding, and fostering positive diplomatic relations remain essential. Although challenging, these steps are necessary for a sustainable future that will both respect the dignity of Afghan immigrants and address Iran’s domestic needs.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.