On November 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new nuclear doctrine governing the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Conjecture about this update had been underway for years, but for seasoned Russia watchers, it proved insignificant. Russia’s new doctrine does not necessitate any significant changes to U.S. nuclear doctrine, force posture, or plans. Rather, Russia’s doctrine aligns more closely to its observable force posture and Putin’s use of coercive nuclear threats. Instead, the United States should continue to seek to deter Russia and limit its nuclear forces, while better understanding the implication of Russia’s alliances.
Does the U.S. need to embark on a series of radical changes to its nuclear doctrine or force posture to respond to Russia’s new nuclear doctrine? The answer is no. Note that this memo does not examine the implications of the changes in the nuclear doctrine or force posture of China, North Korea, or Iran, or their shifting relationships with Russia itself – all of which requires sober analysis. However, Russia’s 2024 nuclear doctrine, which appears to lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use, does not by itself require the U.S. to change to its nuclear doctrine or force posture. Putin’s aggressive nuclear threats against the West, coupled with more frequent public deployments, tests of nuclear and nuclear-capable delivery systems, and long walk away from arms control, has been underway for more than two decades, and are unlikely to change soon.
U.S. policymakers have been debating how to respond to the re-emerging Russian threat with increased urgency over the past decade. Any potential future response comes in the midst of a long-delayed and very expensive modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, undertaken via a largely-stable bipartisan consensus that has endured for the past decade (give or take a nuclear-capable Sea-Launched Cruise Missile) in the form of the Program of Record (POR). Consensus on U.S. nuclear doctrine also appears to be stable along the lines of the need for a modernized and credible strategic nuclear arsenal to deter Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and other strategic-level threats, and the emerging need for new nuclear and other new and advanced weapons – alongside those of our allies – to deter non-strategic threats, especially in the European and Asian theaters. Significant changes to the POR are unlikely in the short term, although longer-term issues on infrastructure and human capital related to nuclear modernization remain.
Historically, the nuclear doctrines of nuclear weapon states have been among the most closely guarded of state secrets. However, at the end of the Cold War, President Bill Clinton sought to review the role that nuclear weapons played in its security policy, taking into account the momentous changes to the global security environment, and publish a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), with Congress subsequently establishing a requirement for regular updates. Numerous internal U.S. disagreements resulted in a muddled compromise in 1994 that reduced the number of nuclear weapons and their roles in defence, but continued to hedge against future threats. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration delivered its own Nuclear Posture Review, seeking to further reduce the number of and roles for of nuclear weapons in U.S. defence, pivoting towards homeland defence, focusing on “rogue states” and non-state actors, and explicitly decoupling its force posture from that of Russia.
Russia did not follow the U.S. example and publicly release its own nuclear doctrine, although a widely-publicized internal Russian debate surfaced in 1999, following the use of stand-off conventional precision-guided missiles in first Gulf War and the Yugoslav campaigns. This debate strongly indicated that Russia would continue to rely on nuclear weapons for its own security, with President Vladimir Putin directing massive state funding to modernize all aspects of Russia’s nuclear arsenal (albeit consistently with its arms control obligations – until 2023). Instead of Russia publishing a separate nuclear doctrine, it wrapped any mentions of nuclear doctrine into its Military Doctrine (with its latest version published in 2014).
The United States continued its policy of transparency with President Barack Obama’s 2010 NPR, explicitly tying its nuclear posture to the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons, consistent with the eventual goal of general and complete disarmament as expressed in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is noteworthy that none of the updates to U.S. nuclear policy or force posture were driven by public statements of Russian nuclear doctrine. Instead, worsening relations with Russia, combined with Russia’s aggressive nuclear rhetoric and rapid modernization, required that the U.S. amend its nuclear strategy, resulting in updates to Congress in the form of new U.S. Nuclear Employment Strategy in 2013, an updated 2018 NPR under President Donald Trump, and a new Nuclear Employment Strategy in 2020, and, in the wake of Russia’s renewed war on Ukraine, a new NPR in 2022 and a new Employment Strategy in 2024. These changes included re-centering Russia as a direct threat to the United States and a need to re-assert deterrence against Russia accordingly.
Russia’s first public, declassified nuclear doctrine was published in 2020, indicating a high threshold for nuclear use, consistent with a more benign foreign policy. However, this doctrine is inconsistent with Russia’s nuclear force posture (especially its extensive non-strategic nuclear arsenal) as well as its regular use of nuclear threats against a range of adversaries over the past 20 years, including threats against non-nuclear weapon states. This inconsistency, concomitant with its frustration over its inability to deter the United States and the West from supporting Ukraine, helped feed a public debate on nuclear doctrine inside Russia, increasing in intensity. Consensus in Russia landed on the need to shift “From Deterrence to Intimidation,” that is, to increase nuclear threats and lower the perceived threshold to force the U.S. to concede on major foreign policy disputes between the two sides, but this policy is likely to fail. Just as President Richard Nixon was unable to terminate the war in Vietnam on his terms through use of coercive nuclear threats, Putin must also fail – and be seen to fail – in his efforts to end the war in Ukraine on his terms.
The United States does not need to significantly alter its nuclear doctrine or its future force posture beyond the current program of record in response to Russia’s new nuclear doctrine. Indeed, Russia’s new doctrine does not indicate a new level of threat but rather brings it closer in line to observed Russian behavior across its nuclear force posture and use of nuclear threats. While caution is advised, wild swings in Western policy or force posture are not warranted in response to Russia. Russia will continue to use coercive threats to attempt to shape U.S. policy and actions, but they must not be allowed to succeed.
Instead, the U.S. should continue to pursue its foreign policy goals in concert with its allies and partners, while seeking a more stable relationship with Moscow through dialogue. That is not to say that the United States can or should ignore Russian threats, as they remain a vital indicator of its priorities and frustrations, but they do not necessitate significant changes in U.S. force posture or doctrine for now. Giving into threats will only lead to more demands from Russia and direct harm to U.S. national interests. Instead, a sober, measured, and calm U.S. response to Russia’s “new” nuclear threats can lead to a more stable relationship between the two countries and potentially help foster future dialogue based on that stability, rather than feeding a reaction-overreaction cycle.