Iran’s April 1 missile attack on Israel sparked a wave of unrest and added tension to the turbulent Middle East. Today, the region is closer to a full-scale war than at any point in the post-October 7 period. Warnings from Israeli officials of imminent retaliation and threats to Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities have made Iran’s Arab neighbors afraid of entering into an unwanted war.
The countries of the Arabian Peninsula—especially Saudi Arabia, which recently turned multi-year tensions into a shaky peace through Chinese mediation—are trying to adopt a positive neutrality in this conflict to avoid the hostile consequences of both sides. However, Saudi Arabia has interests in the region that may involve Riyadh in the conflict, regardless of the outcome.
A No-Win Scenario
Saudi Arabia has no easy answers for navigating the conflict between Israel and Iran. Due to the lack of a common border between Tehran and Tel Aviv, the conflict will largely be conducted through proxy groups located near Saudi territory. Violence in Syria and Iraq could pose a serious threat to Saudi Vision 2030, which depends on a stable security environment to attract foreign investment. A regional war could also have destructive consequences for Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure, the backbone of its economy.
The easiest option in dealing with Tehran and Tel Aviv would be to maintain strict neutrality between the two. However, choosing this option would not serve all of Saudi Arabia’s national interests. On the one hand, the Saudis could be reprimanded by the United States for closing their airspace to Israel. On the other, Iran has threatened to launch missiles against Saudi Arabia if they allow Israel air access—presenting Saudi Arabia with a no-win scenario.
Risk of Conflict
Attacks on oil facilities and wells at the closest point to Saudi Arabia in the south of Iran could become a nightmare for the Saudis. The most accessible reaction of the Iranians would be an attack on the oil facilities of regional nations. Much of the oil infrastructure of the GCC states sits either on or adjacent to the Gulf and lies within easy reach of Iranian planes, drones, and missiles. According to reports by Torbjorn Soltvedt of UK-based risk intelligence firm Verisk Maplecroft, the main concern for countries in the Arabian Peninsula is that Iran’s retaliation will extend to attacks against their energy infrastructure.
The Saudis have not yet forgotten the Abqaiq attack in September 2019, which temporarily halved Saudi oil exports in a single blow—or the constant drumbeat of Iran-backed Houthi missile attacks against their oil infrastructure during the most active phase of the conflict in Yemen. Iran’s strategic calculus on oil exports effectively amounts to mutually assured destruction; as then-President Hassan Rouhani said in 2018, “If Iran cannot export, no one will.” Tehran can rely on its proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen for assistance in curtailing regional oil production.
Iraq-based Kataib Hezbollah, which is also supported by Iran, warned in a statement on October 3: “If the energy war starts, the world will lose 12 million barrels of oil per day. As Kataib Hezbollah previously stated, either everyone will be blessed with prosperity, or everyone will be deprived.”
Bombing Iran’s oil industries, with an export capacity of 1.8 million barrels of oil per day, would almost certainly cause a sudden shock to global oil prices—and could increase them by as much as 16 percent. Saudi Arabia and Iran have a long history of competition in the oil sector. In 2018, during the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign of President Donald Trump, who vowed to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) promised to compensate for Iran’s oil deficit on international markets. During an interview at that time, he promised that for every barrel of Iran’s oil removed, he could export two barrels to the world markets so that there would be no disturbance in the energy markets.l. This promise could have likely led to further tensions between Riyadh and Tehran, and laid the groundwork for the Abqaiq attack. If Trump resumes a similar policy during his upcoming second term, and MBS supports him, Iranian retaliation against Saudi Arabia is all but assured.
Another critical decision by strategists in Riyadh concerns whether or not to thwart Iranian missiles against Israel in the event of another attack. Saudi Arabia was reportedly involved in intercepting and thwarting Iran’s April 13 missile attack on Israel. This claim was denied by Saudi officials, and Riyadh remained notably quiet about its role (if any) in thwarting Iran’s second round of strikes against Israel in October 2024. However, if the country is forced under pressure to re-engage in intercepting Iranian missiles, Saudi territory could once again be attacked by Iran. A stronger possibility is the bombing of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia hosts 3,000 U.S. military personnel at dozens of U.S. military, strategic, or relief bases across the country. In this case, Saudi Arabia itself could become a place to settle accounts between Iran, Israel, and the United States.
Finally, Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that they will close the strait to all countries in the region in case of any disruption in Iran’s oil revenues and free transit. This is the worst-case scenario for the world’s—and Saudi Arabia’s—free oil supply. The Strait of Hormuz is a key shipping access point, and around 20 percent of the world’s total crude oil and almost 20 percent of the world’s LNG passes through the strait each day.
Although Saudi Arabia has spent years attempting to decrease its reliance on the strait—including through the construction of a 746-mile east-west crude oil pipeline, with a capacity of 5 million barrels per day, to bypass it—Saudi Arabia transports more crude oil and gas condensate through the Strait of Hormuz than any other country, according to tanker tracking data released by Vortexa. About 500,000 barrels per day were transited from Saudi ports in the Persian Gulf to Saudi ports in the Red Sea in 2022.
Shifting Ground
Over the past three months, Iran has been on a geopolitical losing streak. Its threats of overwhelming force against Israel proved to be empty; aided by the United States, Tel Aviv was able to shoot down hundreds of Iranian cruise missiles with relative ease. Worse still for Iran’s ambitions, Israel was able to virtually wipe out the leadership of Hezbollah, a key part of Iran’s deterrence strategy, in less than a week—including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a consummate survivor and a symbol of the organization’s strength. The killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 further underscored the extent to which Tehran’s position has slipped in the region.
In the aftermath of these setbacks, Iran’s deterrence policy has undergone profound changes, and some Iranian officials are talking about a gradual shift toward the development of nuclear weapons. In the latest move, 39 members of Iran’s parliament wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council calling for a change in the Islamic Republic’s deterrence policy and defense doctrine and a revision of the Supreme Leader’s religious fatwa regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has made clear that it will insist on nuclear weapons itself in the event of a nuclear Iran; MBS said in a 2018 interview, “Without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” Were this development to occur, it would substantially raise cross-Gulf tensions and could even lead to further regional proliferation.
With Donald Trump’s election as the new President of the United States, some speculated that Saudi Arabia might align with Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, as it had during his previous administration. However, remarks by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) during an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League in Riyadh on November 11 cast doubt on this assumption. MBS called on the international community to compel Israel to respect Iran’s sovereignty, signaling a stance that diverged from expectations of outright support for any future pressure on Iran.
Saudi Arabia is redefining its new role and power in regional and international relations, and is trying to influence public opinion to consolidate its leadership position in the Islamic world and the region. As a result, MBS’s remarks at the summit about condemning Israel and supporting Iran are not meant to avoid Trump’s pressure on Iran or to condemn Israel alone. Rather, Saudi Arabia is at a stage where it intends to maintain its relative independence while preserving its partnership with Washington. Riyadh aims to balance relations with the West and prioritize Saudi national interests as the guides of its actions.
The Middle East is on the cusp of a full-scale war that, if it starts, will involve all the countries in the region. Saudi Arabia’s position is probably to choose positive neutrality and not allow Israel access to the ground and sky to attack Iran. However, it is well aware that this position may not be sustainable. If the conflict persists, Riyadh’s position will grow steadily more precarious.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.
Issue: Geopolitics
Country: Iran, KSA