Engagement with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham demands extreme caution to avoid legitimizing terrorism and extremism.
In December 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive against Syrian regime forces, leading to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and his escape to Russia. This marked a historic moment for the Syrian people, who had endured decades of oppression and foreign interventions. For the region, long plagued by the regime’s alliances with Iran and Russia, this, too, was a blessing.
As the de facto ruler of Damascus, HTS has attempted to rebrand itself as a moderate group capable of governance, seeking to distance itself from its history of extremism and terrorism. However, Syria remains deeply fragmented, with numerous armed groups pursuing competing agendas, further complicating an already fragile crisis.
Recently, HTS announced the formation of a ninety-day transitional government, accompanied by rhetoric promoting pluralism, democratic transition, and minority protections—an apparent bid for international legitimacy. Yet, beneath this veneer lies a history of violence and ambitions for absolute control, raising serious concerns about HTS’s true intentions and the future of Syria under its rule.
This transformation presents a critical dilemma for the international community: how can it support the Syrian people without legitimizing a group that, until as recently as July 2024, the UN reported as the predominant terrorist group in northwestern Syria?
Soft Rhetoric and Harsh Reality
Despite HTS’ attempts to project a moderate stance, its governance in Idlib reveals a starkly different reality, marked by repressive policies that contradict its public narrative. A report from the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria documented systematic violations of civil liberties by HTS, including arbitrary arrests and torture of activists, journalists, and civilians, including women and children who voice dissent.
Between February and May 2024, Idlib witnessed widespread protests against HTS’s policies and leadership. Protesters voiced anger over arbitrary detentions, restrictions on freedoms, and the monopolization of decision-making under autocratic governance, demanding the ouster of Al Sharaa (al-Jolani).
In response, HTS resorted to violent repression, prompting international criticism. The U.S. Embassy in Damascus issued a statement condemning HTS’s “intimidation and brutality against peaceful protesters.”
Facing mounting internal and external pressure, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) attempted to defuse tensions through calls for dialogue and promises of reform. These included issuing a general amnesty for some prisoners, establishing a new Public Security Directorate, pledging elections for the General Shura Council, and reducing construction fees. He also dismissed Anas Khattab (Abu Ahmed Hudud), widely seen as responsible for the violations that fueled the protests.
However, these efforts did not signal real change. HTS continued its repressive policies, including imposing strict limitations on women’s participation in public activities and shutting down a Paralympic event in August 2024. The latter followed criticism from local religious authorities, who deemed the event incompatible with customs due to alleged “pagan symbols” and “mixing” of men and women. These actions reflect HTS’s ongoing oscillation between presenting a moderate facade to the international community and maintaining the support of its extremist base.
From the Umayyad Mosque to the People’s Palace
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s first public speech after entering Damascus took place at the ancient Umayyad Mosque. Dressed in military attire and speaking classical Arabic, he described the event as a victory for the Islamic Ummah, an event brought about by divine aid, and a triumph for the revolution. His speech was punctuated by chants of “Allahu Akbar” from his followers.
However, just days later, al-Sharaa shifted his tone, hosting delegations and conducting press interviews from the People’s Palace. Dressed in a modern suit, he spoke to the BBC about state-building, the rule of law, the constitution, and the need for a national dialogue leading to elections.
What should have been a Syrian transitional government is, in reality, an HTS-dominated regime controlled by figures loyal to al-Sharaa. Key appointments include his brother as the Minister of Health and loyal strongmen such as Asaad al-Shibani, Marhaf Abu Qasra, Anas Khattab, and Shadi al-Weissi—all with well-documented histories of violence and extremism.
For instance, Shadi al-Weissi, the Minister of Justice, was infamously documented supervising the execution of women under the guise of enforcing Sharia law. The United States designated Anas Khattab a terrorist in 2012 for his ties to Al-Nusra Front. The UN also sanctioned him in 2014 for links to Al-Qaeda. Although al-Sharaa dismissed Khattab during protests in Idlib, he later reinstated him as head of intelligence after HTS seized Damascus.
Marhaf Abu Qasra, previously HTS’s military leader, now tasked with overseeing defense as defense minister, has spearheaded the creation of a new army composed of HTS militants and other extremist factions. This force includes a significant number of foreign fighters, who make up an estimated 25–30 percent of HTS’s total strength of 12,000 to 20,000 fighters. Many of these foreign nationals, now integrated into the military and granted ranks, are wanted for terrorism in their home countries. Their presence within the army underscores the risk of Syria becoming a breeding ground for extremist networks capable of exporting violence across borders.
Although al-Sharaa announced plans to hold elections in four years, the indefinite postponement of the National Dialogue Conference—originally scheduled for January 4–5, 2025—reveals HTS’s true intentions: consolidating power and delaying any democratic process that might undermine its grip. These actions highlight the possibility of a broader strategy to transform Syria into an Islamic emirate under HTS governance.
Another Page From The Islamists’ Playbook
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rapid efforts to rebrand himself and HTS follow a familiar pattern seen among Islamist groups, blending calculated rhetoric with symbolic gestures to appeal to the West. For instance, when Mohamed al-Bashir was appointed as prime minister, his first meeting featured the Syrian revolutionary flag alongside the Shahada flag, a staple for Sunni Islamist groups. This display drew widespread criticism, prompting HTS to remove the Shahada flag from official events.
Similarly, al-Sharaa’s refusal to shake hands with German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock exposed HTS’s hardline Islamist stance and sparked international controversy. This act aligned with a statement by HTS’s government spokesman, who claimed that women are unfit for certain political and leadership roles. In a damage-control move, Asaad al-Shibani, HTS’s foreign minister, later shook hands with Baerbock during the Riyadh Conference.
HTS’s tactics align closely with the strategies of other Islamist groups, albeit with nuanced differences. The Taliban, following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, began with promises of moderation but quickly reverted to repressive policies. Similarly, Hamas in Gaza exploited democratic processes to gain power before imposing authoritarian rule. In Turkey, President Recep Erdogan demonstrated how a secular democratic system could be gradually directed toward an Islamist autocratic regime. These examples highlight the shared opportunistic and gradual playbook of Islamist groups.
The Risks of Legitimizing Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
Over the past month, there has been significant diplomatic engagement with the de facto rulers of Syria. This interaction is essential to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people and fill the vacuum left by the diminishing influence of Iran and Russia. Additionally, some regional powers are seeking to counter Iranian influence and establish a Sunni foothold in the emerging Syrian landscape while avoiding exclusive Turkish control. It is crucial to differentiate between cautious engagement and legitimization of HTS.
Granting legitimacy to HTS poses a significant threat to regional and international security. The lessons of easing sanctions on Iran are instructive. Iran used those additional resources to fund militant groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis, exacerbating instability across the region. Similarly, delisting the Houthis from terrorist organizations under the pretext of ensuring humanitarian aid allowed them to exploit this leniency, enhance their offensive capabilities, target international shipping lanes, and launch missiles at Israel.
The experience of supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan serves as another cautionary tale. What began as strategic backing against a common enemy eventually turned into a global threat.
The danger of legitimizing HTS extends beyond reintroducing extremist Islamist governance in Syria. It poses an ethical and ideological threat and sets a dangerous precedent that may encourage other extremist groups to use violence and terrorism as a pathway to power. This undermines attempts at coexistence, reform, peaceful opposition, and democratic transitions across the region. For these reasons, HTS must remain designated as a terrorist organization, and its activities must be subjected to strict international monitoring to prevent further destabilization and protect regional stability.
The Path Toward An Inclusive Syria
Relieving the suffering of the Syrian people requires a unified vision from international and regional partners, tied to a gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for tangible steps on the part of the government. These steps must include ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches those in need, protecting and integrating minorities, rebuilding institutions, and enhancing their governance capabilities. This approach must prioritize Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while fostering the development of robust national institutions capable of serving its people.
A comprehensive political process rooted in Syrian ownership is essential. It must reflect the country’s societal, religious, and sectarian diversity while prioritizing counterterrorism efforts to prevent Syria from becoming a safe haven for extremist elements. Strict oversight of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s actions is imperative to enforce human rights standards and avert the risk of Syria becoming a new hub for Islamist extremism.
Syria’s current situation presents a rare opportunity to rebuild the state on democratic foundations. However, engaging with HTS demands extreme caution to avoid legitimizing terrorism. If the transitional phase is managed wisely, Syria has the potential to emerge as a model for political and social reconstruction, setting an example for regional recovery instead of descending into a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism.
About the Author:
Mohamed Farid is a member of the Egyptian Senate and a founder of the Liberal Club in Cairo.
Image: Mohammad Bash / Shutterstock.com.