can-turkey-undercut-israel’s-alliance-with-azerbaijan-over-the-gaza-war?

Can Turkey Undercut Israel’s Alliance with Azerbaijan Over the Gaza War?

Editor’s Note: Fuad Shahbazov is an Azerbaijan-based policy analyst who has written frequently for Stimson about regional security issues in the South Caucasus. He is also an expert on Turkey and the resurgence of ISIS.

By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives

The impact of the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East stemming from the ongoing Israel–Hamas war extends far beyond the region.

Since Hamas’s brutal October 7 terror attack on southern Israel, Israeli forces have conducted large-scale military operations in Gaza to try to destroy Hamas and armed radicals affiliated with the militant Palestinian group. Although many countries in Europe and Asia voiced support for Israel at least initially, others have tried to remain neutral while countries such as Iran, Russia, Turkey, Ireland and Spain have blamed Israel for the excessive use of force in Gaza and disregard of civilian lives.

Turkey’s conservative and pro-Islamist government led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has used harsh rhetoric against Israel and expressed support for Hamas in advocating for the Palestinian cause. Under pressure from Islamist communities, conservative, and leftist groups in Turkey, Ankara severed trade ties with Israel in May 2024, reversing an upward trend in bilateral economic relations.  Turkey anticipated that other regional Muslim-majority countries would follow suit, but so far, none have done so.

One of Turkey’s major allies and partners, Azerbaijan, appears particularly hesitant to halt its deepening economic, political, and military partnership with Israel. Azerbaijan has built strong partnerships with Israel in the fields of energy and defense in the last two decades despite also maintaining ties with Turkey and Iran. In 2020, Azerbaijan began openly touting its security partnership with Israel, sparking sharp criticism from Turkey and Iran. A year later, however, Azerbaijan skillfully mediated a restoration of ties between Turkey and Israel, ending a decade-long breach following an earlier Israel-Hamas war and the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla to Gaza in 2010.

Azerbaijan is continuing to try to maintain a balancing act. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry issued an official statement last October “condemning civilian casualties in Gaza” in an attempt not to damage its image in the Islamic world and alienate Turkey. At the same time, however, Azerbaijan has continued to boost its partnership with Israel. According to official numbers, between January – April 2024, Azerbaijan exported 1,021,917 tons of crude oil to Israel, an export growth of almost 28 percent compared to 2023. Indeed, Azerbaijan has been a reliable supplier to Israeli refineries in Haifa and Ashdod.

Until recently, despite its vitriolic rhetoric against Jerusalem, Ankara has been keen to maintain the flow because it nets Turkey ample transit fees for both the pipeline used by Azerbaijan and for shipping. Given its strategic partnership with Baku and deep economic ties, Ankara preferred to turn a blind eye to the continuing Azeri oil flow to Israel. However, many conservative Islamist groups and figures, including pro-Palestinian Turkish youth, have harshly criticized Azerbaijan’s partnership with Israel.

On June 20, a large pro-Palestinian group gathered in front of the Turkish headquarters of the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR), threw stones, and broke in the doors of the office demanding the secession of the company’s supply and transport of oil to Israel. Despite the violence, Turkish security forces appeared in no rush to disperse the gathering, although 13 individuals were later arrested. Amid the protests, the SOCAR Turkey office denied accusations of “supplying Israel with crude oil,” dubbing the allegations as provocations.

Azerbaijan exports crude oil to Israel not directly via SOCAR or the Turkish branch but through numerous foreign trading companies, which gives the company some plausible deniability about the destination of the crude oil. Moreover, unlike Turkey, the Azerbaijan–Israel partnership is not based only on trade and energy agreements but also on shared geopolitical concerns, especially over a mutual arch-foe, Iran. In this regard, Israel has proven a useful ally, particularly during a recent Azerbaijan – Iran confrontation between 2022-2023.

Indeed, these factors explain Baku’s long-term sympathy for Israel, even as it tries to show sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Unlike Turkey, which openly supports and accommodates Hamas, which is designated as a terrorist organization in the West, the Azerbaijani government communicates with the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority and supports the two-state solution plan.

Ankara hopes that Baku will demonstrate more empathy for the Palestinians. However, Azerbaijan is unlikely to give up its long-term strategic partnership with Israel to alleviate Ankara’s concerns.

Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the South Caucasus and a former research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies and senior analyst at the Center for Strategic Communications in Azerbaijan. He was also a visiting scholar at the Daniel Morgan School of National Security in Washington, DC. He tweets at @fuadshahbazov.