The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, held in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1, 2025, and followed by a military parade in Beijing on September 3, represented a moment of exceptional symbolic significance in international affairs and signaled the emergence of a new global order.
Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and other Eurasian leaders in a carefully orchestrated show of unity. While the official pretext was the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, the event was in fact a statement about the shifting balance of global power. It suggested that a loose coalition of non-Western states is increasingly willing to challenge the structures of US dominance and to articulate a vision of a multipolar international order. The presence of four leaders whose countries embody very different trajectories — China as an aspiring global hegemon, Russia as a power under siege, India as a balancing democracy and North Korea as an isolated outlier — highlighted both the potential and the limits of such an alignment.
The SCO, founded in 2001 by China, Russia and four Central Asian states, has gradually transformed from a regional security forum into a platform for economic, political and military cooperation. The scale of the SCO is remarkable. It spans nearly 60% of Eurasia’s landmass and includes over 40% of the world’s population. Its member states — China, India, Russia, Pakistan and the major Central Asian countries — bring together a unique concentration of future economic growth, vast energy reserves, historic and modern trade routes and formidable military power. And its reach continues to expand. Iran’s accession, along with the interest shown by countries such as Türkiye and key Gulf states participating as observers or dialogue partners, highlights the SCO’s growing appeal. Increasingly, it is emerging as the preferred hub for cross-regional diplomacy operating outside traditional Western frameworks. Dialogue partners and observers extend from the Middle East to East Asia. The organization presents itself as promoting a “new type of international relations” based on multipolarity, mutual respect and non-interference.
China, as rotating chair in 2024 and 2025, used the summit to advance its Global Governance Initiative, which seeks to reform international institutions in favor of the Global South. For Russia, the SCO serves as an indispensable tool of diplomatic outreach amid sanctions and isolation resulting from the war in Ukraine.
For India, participation offers both a vital link to Central Asia and a platform for sustaining dialogue with Moscow, particularly against the backdrop of rising tensions with Washington over tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. For North Korea, invited as a guest rather than a full member, the summit was an opportunity to break isolation and gain prestige by association. The North Korean leader’s presence in China marked a major milestone in Kim’s diplomatic standing: his first significant multilateral event, and the first time in 66 years that a North Korean leader had attended a Chinese military parade.
The Tianjin meetings brought together more than 20 leaders and resulted in several declarations. Among these was the Tianjin Declaration, which committed members to closer cooperation on artificial intelligence, cyber governance and data security. China announced the creation of an SCO Development Bank, conceived as an alternative to Western-dominated financial institutions and as a means of reducing dependence on the US dollar. Beijing pledged $280 million in aid and $1.4 billion in loans to the organization’s members over the next three years. Yet it was less the documents than the imagery that gave the summit its resonance. The first bilateral meeting in China between Xi and Modi in seven years signaled a tentative willingness to defuse border tensions that had soured relations since 2020. The public camaraderie between Xi, Putin and Modi, captured in widely circulated photographs of handshakes and embraces, conveyed a message of solidarity at a moment when US tariffs and Western sanctions were reshaping the global economy.
Kim’s attendance was particularly striking, since he rarely travels abroad, and it underlined North Korea’s growing alignment with anti-Western forces. Reports of arms transfers from Pyongyang to Moscow in support of the war in Ukraine gave his presence additional significance. India’s delegation, however, declined to participate directly in the parade, a decision that reflected its continuing reluctance to be identified too closely with anti-Western rhetoric.
For China, orchestrating the summit served multiple objectives. It placed Beijing at the center of Eurasian diplomacy by bringing together three nuclear-armed states under its patronage. It allowed the Chinese leadership to showcase the country’s technological and military modernization, reinforcing both deterrence and prestige. And it provided Xi with an opportunity to advance his broader project of promoting multipolarity as a counter-narrative to Western hegemony, linking the SCO with the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s other global governance projects. Yet Beijing also faces dilemmas: its support for Russia and North Korea risks alienating India and its own dependence on trade with Western markets prevents it from pursuing full-scale confrontation.
For Russia, participation in the SCO has become even more vital since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war. Putin used the Beijing stage to demonstrate resilience and to signal that Moscow is far from isolated. The summit provided opportunities to reaffirm the Sino-Russian partnership, court India through energy and defense cooperation and deepen ties with North Korea. Yet Russia’s position within the SCO reflects a broader asymmetry: while Moscow projects continuity and strength, its dependence on Beijing is increasingly evident, and the relationship between the two powers is less a partnership of equals than a hierarchical arrangement in which China is clearly dominant.
Despite these limits, for Europe, the SCO bolsters Russia’s resilience and complicates the West’s strategy in Ukraine. For Asia, it intensifies competition over influence and security arrangements. The risks are not only geopolitical but also economic and technological: a non-Western bloc focused on de-dollarization and alternative governance models could fragment global trade and heighten vulnerabilities in supply chains. North Korea’s involvement raises additional concerns about proliferation and the transfer of sensitive technologies.
In conclusion, the 2025 SCO summit and parade were less about the formal agreements signed than about the optics they projected. The sight of Xi, Putin, Modi and Kim on the same stage embodied a fragile but meaningful experiment in multipolarity. For China and Russia, the event demonstrated defiance in the face of Western pressure. For North Korea, it provided long-sought visibility. For India, it represented a careful act of balancing. The SCO is unlikely to cohere into a fully-fledged alliance, but its symbolic weight should not be underestimated. It reflects the erosion of unqualified Western dominance and the rise of a more fragmented, plural and contested global order.
