The past two weeks have been turbulent due to Donald Trump’s multiple excesses in language and provocation. A new way of envisioning international relations is emerging, based on a simple principle: “I am the strongest, so I impose my policy by force.”. His latest transgression—freezing military aid to Ukraine to force the country into accepting the terms of a negotiation—is nonsensical, as it encourages the other party, Russia, to approach peace talks with a maximalist stance. To compare, it is like starting a football match with some players already sent off before the kickoff. The United States is unilaterally conducting negotiations on Europe’s security while simultaneously insisting that they are no longer involved in ensuring the continent’s security. It is time to open our eyes and stop pleading with someone who is no longer the “friendly” American. Continuing down this path is a position of weakness that will only further destabilise Europe. Instead, Europeans should seize this moment to take control of their own destiny. In reality, this is both a chance and an opportunity for the European Union to assert itself, moving away from being a mere reflection of the United States, whose image is set to deteriorate further in the coming weeks, both domestically and globally.
The foundational act, therefore, consists of stating that Europeans will lead peace negotiations with Russia—not the United States—and that Europe will not be bound by any peace agreement negotiated between the U.S. and Russia without European involvement. Consequently, it is necessary to:
- Reopen contact with Russia to convey that Europeans are willing to discuss a peace agreement and, more broadly, the future of security in Europe;
- Demonstrate that European states are prepared to defend themselves and will not allow Russia to impose a peace agreement by force.
In this context, the prevailing discourse suggests that Europeans are too weak, that they react too slowly, and that they cannot defend Europe without the Americans. This narrative must be challenged, as it is often based on inaccurate information—ironically, today, fake news comes more from the U.S. than from Russia. Several widespread misconceptions need to be debunked:
Misconceptions #1: NATO Cannot Survive Without the United States
NATO’s budget currently stands at €2.85 billion, ensuring its operations, defence planning, and collective defence of Europe. The U.S. contributes just under 16% of this budget—about €450 million. This means that NATO can continue to function without the United States, serving European interests instead. After all, is it really plausible that the other 31 NATO member states would be incapable of covering this €450 million shortfall, especially when the U.S. has voluntarily distanced itself from the alliance? Europeans can, therefore, take control of NATO for their own benefit.
Misconceptions #2: Europeans Are Militarily Weak and Unwilling to Spend Enough on Defence
Europeans did not wait for Donald Trump’s election to start taking responsibility for their own security. The total defence budgets of EU member states have risen from €200 billion in 2021 to €320 billion in 2024. This represents a significant increase. By spending 2% of their GDP on defence, European nations match or exceed Russia’s defence budget, which accounts for 7% of its GDP.
However, doubts have been raised about the claimed parity between European and Russian defence budgets, particularly by the British think tank The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This organisation applies a correction factor to Russia’s nominal defence budget of €137 billion, tripling it to reflect purchasing power parity. Yet, such adjustments are never applied between European countries or in comparisons between Europe and the U.S. Furthermore, Russia is not entirely self-sufficient—it depends on other nations for military equipment (Iran, North Korea) and components (China). The reality is that Europe is already capable of deterring a Russian attack. While improvements in European defence efficiency are necessary and gaps remain in areas such as air and missile defence, Europe is not as defenceless as some claim.
Misconceptions #3: European States Will Weaken Their Economies by Spending 3% of GDP on Defence by 2025
This claim is unfounded because such an increase is simply unachievable in the next few years.
It is impossible for states to increase their defence budgets by one-third in a single year. Defence budget increases must focus on acquiring more military equipment and developing new technologies, with priority given to closing capability gaps. This requires adjusting European defence industry production rates and ensuring that supply chains are scaled accordingly—something that cannot happen overnight. A case in point is the production of 155 mm artillery shells: it took two years to ramp up from 300,000 to 1 million shells per year. Therefore, for military production to be effective, it must scale up progressively and steadily.
By the time Europe reaches the 3% GDP defence spending threshold, it is likely that a resolution to the war in Ukraine will already have been found. That said, increasing defence budgets should still be a European goal—at the very least, as a means of bringing Russia to the negotiating table under favourable conditions. However, Europeans should not be unnecessarily alarmed about the cost of this effort. What must be avoided is a repeat of Germany’s 2022 decision to create a special €100 billion defence fund. By doing so, Germany pressured itself into spending that money too quickly, which could only be achieved by purchasing American equipment—over 50% of its defence spending since 2022. Did Germany really need to replace its dependence on Russian gas with dependence on American weaponry?
Misconceptions #4: Europe Can Only Defend Itself by Buying American Weapons
This claim is also false. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, European countries have purchased American weapons (63% of their acquisitions from 2022 to mid-2023) for three main reasons:
- To “buy” American security guarantees—an assurance that has now proven to be non-existent;
- Because the U.S. military’s larger stockpiles allowed for faster procurement—although these stockpiles have now been depleted, leaving the U.S. unable to quickly supply Europe;
- Because certain military equipment was not manufactured in Europe—this is true in some cases, but it remains a minority, and European nations are actively working to close these gaps.
Two additional factors now favour purchasing from the European defence industry:
- The U.S. is likely to prioritise its own military production, with an increasing focus on Asia, meaning that Europe will not be a priority customer when ordering weapons from the U.S.;
- More critically, there is no guarantee that Europeans will be able to buy American weapons for Ukraine in the future. Worse, what if Washington prohibits European states from using American weapons against Russia in the event of a direct European military confrontation with Moscow?
Between 2022 and 2024, Europe’s dependence on the U.S. for weapons fell to 44%. While this shows that Europeans have begun to act, the level of dependency remains far too high, posing a risk to European security that must be eliminated. And there is no need to fear retaliatory measures from Donald Trump: the U.S. arms market is already closed to Europe, with European companies holding less than 5% of the U.S. defence market. Closing this market further would have no impact on Europe. In the defence sector, a Buy European Act must, in reality, become a Buy European Security Act.
Les deux dernières semaines ont été agitées par les multiples excès de langage et de provocation de Donald Trump. Une nouvelle façon d’envisager les relations internationales, sous-tendue par un principe simple : « je suis le plus fort donc j’impose ma politique par la force ». Sa dernière incartade, geler l’aide militaire à l’Ukraine pour amener ce pays à accepter les termes d’une négociation, est un non-sens dans la mesure où elle incite l’autre partie, la Russie, à aborder les négociations de paix avec une position maximaliste. À titre de comparaison, c’est comme si l’on démarrait un match de foot en ayant des joueurs exclus du terrain avant même le coup d’envoi. Les États-Unis sont en train de conduire seuls une négociation sur la sécurité de l’Europe alors même qu’ils ne cessent d’affirmer qu’ils ne sont plus impliqués dans la sécurité du continent européen. Il faut donc ouvrir les yeux et cesser d’implorer celui qui n’est plus l’ami américain. Continuer dans cette voie serait une position de faiblesse qui ne peut que fragiliser l’Europe encore un peu plus. Les Européens peuvent profiter de cette situation pour prendre en main leur destin. Il s’agit en réalité d’une chance et d’une opportunité pour l’Union européenne pour exister en propre, pour ne plus coller à l’image des États-Unis qui ne peut que se dégrader dans les semaines qui viennent aux États-Unis comme dans le reste du monde.
L’acte fondateur consiste donc à dire que les Européens conduiront la négociation de paix avec la Russie et non les États-Unis, et qu’à l’inverse l’Europe ne sera pas tenue par un quelconque accord de paix négocié par les États-Unis avec la Russiesans les Européens. Par conséquent, il est nécessaire de :
- reprendre contact avec la Russie afin de faire passer le message que les Européens sont disposés à discuter d’un accord de paix et plus largement du futur de la sécurité en Europe ;
- montrer que les États européens sont prêts à se défendre, qu’ils ne sont pas prêts à se laisser imposer un accord de paix par la force par la Russie.
Dans ce contexte, les discours que l’on entend ici ou là laissent penser que les Européens sont trop faibles, qu’ils réagissent trop tard et qu’ils ne peuvent pas défendre l’Europe sans les Américains. Il faut combattre ce discours qui repose bien souvent sur des informations inexactes – le comble étant qu’aujourd’hui les fake news proviennent davantage des États-Unis que de la Russie – et notamment de combattre les idées reçues erronées qui fleurissent ici ou là. Il faut citer notamment