Eat, Pray, Govern: The Search for Meaning in Democratic Foreign Policy

Editor’s Note: The New Visions for Grand Strategy Project brought scholars from across the political and ideological spectrum to discuss what the future has in store for the United States in the world. The editors of this series sought to foster a lively debate about America’s global role and strategic futures. Each author in this collection speaks for himself or herself alone, and their views do not reflect the official positions of the Henry L. Stimson Center, or of their own employers. Jeremy Shapiro is the director of research at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

By Emma Ashford, Senior Fellow, New Visions for Grand Strategy Project

Nothing inspires reflection like losing an election. At this early stage in its grief, the Democratic Party has not even reached a consensus on why it lost in 2024 — much less on how to run a campaign in 2028, or whom to nominate. But beneath this emotional firmament, a new idea is emerging amidst the party’s internal divisions: a hunger not just for better policy, but for more meaningful politics.

This is no small task. It is not enough simply to deliver on policy. As Jennifer Harris, a former Biden administration official, has argued, the Biden administration’s economic policies may have “fed the body but not the soul,” delivering jobs and investment but without providing a vision of shared national belonging or public life.¹ Similarly, on foreign policy, Biden’s support for Ukraine in its war against Russia followed a coherent theory of reinforcing alliances and deterring authoritarian aggression. But this approach often failed to connect with the public emotionally, lacking a compelling narrative about how the war’s outcome will serve American identity, purpose, and everyday well-being.

This lack of meaning has emerged as the hole in the heart of American liberalism. Democratic leaders like Senator Chris Murphy (CT) see this void clearly and are attempting to fill it. Murphy believes that American politics must respond to what he calls the “spiritual unspooling”² of the nation: rising loneliness, loss of trust, and a thinning sense of solidarity.

Of course, foreign policy is not the leading edge of this partisan vision quest. Many voters pay almost no attention³ to international issues; others appear to view foreign aid, military assistance, and climate diplomacy as expensive distractions⁴ at best and elite indulgences⁵ at worst. Apparently, as Americans feel more atomized, emotionally adrift, and distrustful of institutions at home, they are more skeptical of U.S. missions abroad. After all, if elites cannot even govern California, how can they govern or even reform Iraq?

Nonetheless, some prominent Democratic politicians are attempting to articulate a foreign policy that does more than just accommodate that skepticism. They are trying to make foreign policy at least supportive of their overall effort to reconnect emotionally with the voters. This means attaching America’s global role to a sense of emotional fulfillment, moral clarity, and communal purpose.

Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ), for example, gave a 25-hour speech in the U.S. Senate in March 2025 as part of a broad protest of the Trump administration’s policies. He hardly mentioned foreign policy in a speech that necessarily ranged quite widely. But when Senator Booker did broach foreign policy, he critiqued the forever wars in strictly emotional terms: “We spent trillions of dollars in those foreign wars and guess what?…No common sacrifice. Only about 1% of our people will fight in those wars.”⁶ Booker is explicitly tapping into a widely held frustration with U.S. foreign policy. But he uses it to deliver a deeper point: If foreign policy demands sacrifice, it must restore dignity, equity, and national purpose. Otherwise, it is a betrayal of American values. Although he does not dismiss the American public’s “war fatigue,” he reframes it as a legitimate concern that must be addressed through a more accountable, community-based foreign policy.

This type of effort is a much deeper exercise than simply advocating for a values-based foreign policy, as many Democrats have traditionally done. It is instead a reimagining of foreign policy as an extension of the moral and emotional needs of the United States. Potential democratic leaders are, in essence, trying to reinvent foreign policy to better align with the emotional needs of the U.S. public for community, dignity, justice, and so forth.

This effort to forge a more emotionally resonant foreign policy is still taking shape, but the effort already begs the question: What kind of engagement with the world would a more meaningful U.S. grand strategy promote? In fact, there are many potential choices, covering nearly the full gambit from restraint to primacy — the various Democratic candidates represent most of that spectrum already. But this essay argues, perhaps surprisingly that given the current state of U.S. politics and geopolitics, a grand strategy of restraint could effectively serve the emotional needs of the U.S. electorate.

A Brief History of Strategic Disillusionment

The Democratic Party has long been a more consistent proponent of American global leadership than even the often-bellicose Republicans. From the Truman Doctrine⁷ to the Clinton-era belief in globalization and NATO expansion, Democrats were for decades confident that active global leadership served both U.S. interests as well as their own political interests. Former President Barack Obama, often associated with a more cautious foreign policy, expanded drone campaigns and maintained forward-deployed forces across the globe. Former President Joe Biden went even further, proposing a sort of new cold war aimed at an axis of authoritarian powers anchored by China and Russia.

During the last 20-plus years, disillusionment with this traditional democratic approach to foreign policy has grown, particularly among base voters but also within Democratic elite circles. The failures of post-9/11 interventions — most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan — have left a lasting mark on Democratic strategic thinking. The rise of populism at home and the persistence of geopolitical disorder abroad have further strained confidence in liberal internationalism and the leadership clan that promotes it.

The traditional Democratic foreign policy of liberal internationalism supported by U.S. global leadership faces two overlapping lines of critique from within the party ranks:

The first comes from the progressive wing of the party, which argues that U.S. foreign policy has been morally compromised — too often aligned with authoritarian regimes, militarized interventions, and economic arrangements that undermine justice both at home and abroad. From failed nation-building efforts to complicity in autocratic crackdowns to support for Israeli cruelty in Gaza, the gap between values and behavior has increasingly weighed on the Democratic conscience and thus Democratic politics. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), for example, noted that “the failure by the Biden administration to follow US law and to suspend arms shipments [to Israel] is a grave mistake that undermines American credibility worldwide.”⁸ Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT) was even more blunt: “This wholesale slaughter [of Palestinians] makes my stomach turn.”⁹ Overall, the progressive critique calls for a values-based realignment: one that centers human rights, racial justice, and global equity, even at the expense of short-term strategic advantage.

The second challenge to the leadership clan comes from those who advocate strategic restraint — pulling back from excessive military engagement. Realist thinkers and even some progressive Democrats see American global ambition as strategically unsustainable and politically untenable. “We have to return to a foreign policy of restraint,” according to Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA), “one that develops our capabilities and our potential in communities across America, and not become bogged down in unwinnable conflicts that lead to greater resentment of the United States, and that don’t advance American interests.”¹⁰ For restrainers, the issue is not so much moral hypocrisy as imperial overreach. They argue that America must do less, not only to purify its soul, but to protect its core interests and its fragile communities amid finite resources and waning public patience. Where progressives seek a better kind of political engagement with the world, restrainers seek less political engagement altogether.

Meanwhile, “leadership” Democrats have not passively accepted the progressive or realist reimagining of American global engagement. During the first Trump term, they effectively sought to retain relevance by championing a “foreign policy for the middle class,” which aimed to tether trade, security, and diplomacy more tightly to American economic prosperity. This was a strategic attempt to defend the core tenets of U.S. internationalism while acknowledging the political salience of domestic inequality and economic dislocation.

During the Biden administration, this rhetoric often came across as vague or technocratic. The administration, for example, invested heavily in semiconductors, clean energy, and alliance-building, but it struggled to explain how these efforts tangibly improved the everyday lives of working Americans or helped to build communities. The emphasis on industrial strategy and competition with China appealed to elites and policy wonks but lacked an emotional or moral narrative that could unify the public. Instead of stirring a sense of national purpose, it reinforced the perception that foreign policy is a distant, elite concern — ambitious abroad but unconvincing at home.

In the wake of former Vice President Kamala Harris’s loss in the 2024 election and as progressive and restrainer critiques gained traction, particularly through a repudiation of the Biden administration’s efforts in Gaza, leadership voices began adapting their own rhetoric. Increasingly, they framed foreign policy not merely as a source of material benefit, but as an expression of democratic renewal, shared values, and national dignity, borrowing the emotional register of their critics while seeking to preserve the architecture of traditional alliances and global leadership.

Andy Beshear, for example, the governor of Kentucky, has argued that alliance stability is not an abstract goal, but a precondition for reliable investment and local prosperity. “[O]ur alliances — especially our alliances with Europe,” he told the World Economic Forum in January 2025… are critical to global stability…and the ultimate reliability and consistency that we need to do global business and ultimately live in as safe of a planet as we can.”¹¹ This reformulates alliance as reinforcing U.S. and global prosperity rather than as vehicles of U.S. leadership. In doing so, Governor Beshear hopes to persuade voters that international engagement can be meaningful, even if its structures remain largely unchanged.

The Emotional Foundations of Restraint

Despite these examples, the leadership, progressive, and restrainer clans all struggle to connect emotionally with the public. Restrainers have found this to be particularly difficult. Owing to their roots in realism and academia, they often frame foreign policy in the cold language of tradeoffs, limits, and core interests.¹² They tend to emphasize what the United States should not do, rather than offering a compelling vision of what actions Washington should take.

This inherently negative approach, focused on avoiding quagmires and conserving power, rarely provides the kind of moral or aspirational language that resonates with voters seeking purpose or national pride. America, after all, is a can-do country. It put a man on the moon; won World War II; and invented nuclear weapons, the Internet, and online dating. Culturally, it prefers the language of moral crusades to the notion of limits.

Restraint’s language of prudence over passion represents a real disadvantage relative to both the leadership and progressive schools of Democratic foreign policy. Its advocates argue persuasively for limits, but they often fail to articulate how a restrained America might still lead, inspire, or do good. In a political culture that hungers for affirmation and meaning — especially after decades of disillusionment — the cold logic of strategic restraint can feel emotionally empty.

Public support for restraint already exists in latent form. Polling suggests that Americans are increasingly tired of foreign wars, skeptical of military aid, and hesitant to expand commitments.¹³ Concretely, this fatigue does reflect some genuine and probably inescapable failures of U.S. foreign policy. But in U.S. political culture, the failures of the past do not absolve politicians of the need to find a positive emotional frame for the future— one that says restraint is not retreat, but renewal.

To succeed in this competition for the next democratic foreign policy, realists need to fill this emotional void. And they can. The hunger for a more meaningful foreign policy is not inherently progressive or traditionalist, even if those schools have achieved more progress in embedding their policies in U.S. political culture. After all, what is more emotionally satisfying to a weary nation than the idea of moral purpose at home rather than endlessly intervening abroad? One can easily imagine a future aspirant to the mantle of John F. Kennedy connecting to the public by intoning, “Ask not what you can do for the world, ask what together we can do for our country.”

Some of the potential democratic presidential aspirants have already demonstrated this possibility, even as they do not necessarily associate themselves with the restraint school.

For example, Pete Buttigieg, the former Secretary of Transportation and a possible presidential aspirant, seeks to rest his policy agenda on a foundation of national character. He advocates engaging with the world in ways that reflect not just what America does, but who Americans aspire to be — a framing that makes space for restraint without sacrificing moral clarity. According to Buttigieg, “[T]he world needs America. But not just any America. Not an America that has reduced itself to just one more player, scrapping its way through an amoral worldwide scrum for narrow advantage…It has to be an America that knows how to make better the everyday life of its citizens and of people around the world, knowing how much one has to do with the other.”¹⁴ But within this moral appeal, Buttigieg also cautions against the reflexive use of force, noting that “strength is more than military power — it’s our power of inspiration. At key moments, the world has envied not just our strength but our prosperity, not just our prosperity but our liberty.”¹⁵

In other words, if foreign policy is a mirror, then what it reflects must be credible to a skeptical public. In particular, Buttigieg has signaled support for countering authoritarian digital practices — especially from China — by championing transparent global norms rather than military confrontation. Such an approach illustrates how restraint can be married to moral ambition, by grounding U.S. leadership less in the projection of power and more in democratic values that resonate at home.

Similarly, Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut imagines foreign policy not as a theater of dominance but as a stage for reaffirming human dignity — through anti-corruption efforts, democratic transparency, and cooperation over climate change. In practice, this is restraint in the sense that it means much less emphasis on military and other coercive tools and more on diplomacy and economic justice. The next administration, according to Murphy, will need to “gain back America’s faith in the national security establishment.”¹⁶ To do so, according to Murphy, the next president will need to adopt “restraint as a strategy” when it comes to military involvement abroad, to “show the American public that that finally, we have leaders that are willing to learn the lessons of the mistakes we’ve made.” Notably, Murphy advocates for at least a modest form restraint but casts that idea in moral rather than material terms.

Despite these resonances, restraint and the search for meaning are not automatically aligned. There are tensions — especially when moral purpose implies moral obligation. A values-based foreign policy could very well compel the United States to act more, not less, during humanitarian crises or when blatant injustice occurs.

It is hard, as former President Bill Clinton found out during the leadup to the 1999 US-led military intervention in Kosovo, to preach about the importance of preventing genocide and then resist the temptation to use whatever power your country has to prevent such an act. So, the Clinton administration bypassed United Nations Security Council approval and launched an intervention to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities in Kosovo. This was not a war of self-defense or a war that resonated back home, nor was it tied to a vital strategic interest — rather, it was grounded in a perceived moral imperative to act.

It is not hard to imagine progressives going down this route in the future. Consider Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, (D-NY), for example. Her critique of U.S. militarism is oriented around justice, which clearly has emotional resonance. But her worldview might sometimes compel more, not less, forceful international action, particularly in humanitarian crises or to rectify past wrongs. Her call for accountability in U.S. foreign aid, particularly regarding the conflict in Gaza, reflects an emotionally driven foreign policy, but one that does not necessarily preclude intervention. Her emphasis is on justice, not restraint for its own sake.

Bridging the Divide: Moral Narratives and Strategic Coherence

Even beyond these specifics, the problem is that foreign policy often employs an elite discourse. The vocabulary of restraint — realism, offshore balancing, primacy — still feels remote from the emotional register of everyday politics. For a foreign policy of meaning to enable restraint, its advocates need to translate academic abstractions into public values. A strategy premised on “offshore balancing” might be more appealing if it is reframed as a commitment to “shared global stewardship,” or if “making allies do more” is recast as “responsible democratic partnership.”

But this is only the beginning. To reconcile restraint with the Democrats’ search for meaning, it helps to think in terms of a emotional narrative that connects restraint to what voters value. A narrative gains public traction when it offers not just logical coherence, but moral clarity. Restraint, therefore, must be pitched to the U.S. public as a pathway to something emotionally intelligible: fairness, accountability, self-respect.

Governor Gavin Newsom, (D-CA), for example, offers one potential route. Newsom pioneers a sort of subnational diplomacy on climate change, which permits a narrative that allows internationalism to move more to the local level. “With the all-out assault we’re now facing on low-carbon, green growth from the federal level,” he announced in March 2025, “it’s the subnational leaders — those of us leading our states and cities — who have to step up.”¹⁷ His approach bypasses federal overreach while addressing transnational threats cooperatively — a kind of restrained engagement that reclaims the moral ground.

Importantly, neither Newsom nor most of other the political figures mentioned in this essay are inherently restrainers, but nor do they fully align with either of the other camps. Their foreign policy follows from their broad approach to policy, which in turns rests on an increasingly emotional foundation. Any of these leaders could end up with a restrained foreign policy if they find a coherent narrative that aligns restraint with their specific emotional appeal and their broader policy approach.

In other words, the challenge is not to replace foreign policy with sentiment, but to use foreign policy to support a candidate’s broader sentiment. Remember, the U.S. public does not care very much about foreign policy. The goal, therefore, is not to remake foreign policy for its own sake. Rather, the goal is to create a foreign policy that supports a candidate’s existing emotional approach to gaining connection with the voters. For restraint to serve that purpose, the restraint camp must demonstrate that pulling back from excessive military entanglement does not mean moral abdication or loss of meaning. Rather, it can involve investing in human security, decarbonization, technology norms, and democratic solidarity — all of which serve U.S. interests but also support meaning and community in U.S. politics.

The Meaning of Strategy

The Democratic Party’s current introspection is not merely a policy recalibration — it is a moral reckoning. The party’s emerging foreign policy voices are seeking to reinvigorate global engagement with a sense of coherence and community. They want foreign policy to do less harm, reflect more honesty, and help Americans feel less estranged from their institutions.

This search for meaning is not incompatible with strategic restraint. In fact, it may be its best hope for political traction. A foreign policy that heals rather than hollows, that prioritizes dignity over dominance, and that is emotionally sustainable as well as strategically sound could prove to be the bridge between elite doctrine and democratic legitimacy.

In the wake of defeat, Democrats are not just searching for votes — they are searching for meaning. In that search may lie the foundation for a new kind of American strategy: restrained, yes, but also resonant.

Notes

1
Jennifer Harris, “The Post-Neoliberal Imperative,” Foreign Affairs, April 22, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/post-neoliberal-imperative-tariffs-jennifer-harris.
2
Chris Murphy, “The Spiritual Unspooling of America: A Case for a Political Realignment, New Republic, December 12, 2023, https://newrepublic.com/article/177435/chris-murphy-case-political-realignment-economics.
3
George Winslow, “Survey: Turning Inward, Most Americans Consume Little or No International News.” TV Technology, May 2, 2024, https://www.tvtechnology.com/news/survey-turning-inward-most-americans-consume-little-or-no-international-news.
4
Linley Sanders, “Where US adults think the government is spending too much, according to AP-NORC polling,” Associated Press, February 14, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/ap-poll-government-spending-social-security-medicare-8a8ddb0e721355a4e9585da4147efe1a.
5
Matt Kroenig and Emma Ashford, “Do U.S. Voters Even Care About Foreign Policy?” Foreign Policy, November 1, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/01/harris-trump-do-voters-care-foreign-policy/.
6
“Cory Booker Historic Senate Speech Part 1,” Rev, accessed July 29, 2025, https://www.rev.com/transcripts/cory‑booker‑historic‑senate‑speech‑part‑1.
7
The Truman Doctrine, first articulated by President Harry S. Truman in March 1947, pledged U.S. support for democratic nations against authoritarian threats.
8
David Smith. “Elizabeth Warren Denounces Biden Administration over Gaza Humanitarian Situation,” Guardian, November 14, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/14/elizabeth-warren-biden-gaza.
9
Marco Margaritoff, “Bernie Sanders Slams Biden’s ‘Totally Absurd’ Israel Policy: ‘You Can’t Reconcile It,’” Senator Bernie Sanders, March 2, 2024, https://www.sanders.senate.gov/in-the-news/bernie-sanders-slams-bidens-totally-absurd-israel-policy-you-cant-reconcile-it/.
10
Ro Khanna, War Power and Peace in Yemen, (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2019), https://www.cato.org/policy-report/march/april-2019/war-powers-peace-yemen.
11
McKenna Horsley, “Kentucky’s Beshear Talks Politics and Business at World Economic Forum,” Kentucky Lantern, January 23, 2025, https://kentuckylantern.com/2025/01/23/kentuckys-beshear-talks-politics-and-business-at-world-economic-forum/.
12
Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-01-01/pull-back.
13
“Fewer Americans Want U.S. Taking Major Role in World Affairs,” Gallup.com, March 3, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/poll/471350/fewer-americans-taking-major-role-world-affairs.aspx.
14
“Pete Buttigieg Delivers Remarks on Foreign Policy and National Security,” June 11, 2019. https://www.democracyinaction.us/2020/buttigieg/buttigiegpolicy061119foreign.html.
15
Ibid.
16
Katherine Golden, “Senator Chris Murphy on Why US Foreign Policy Is ‘Mismatched’ to Its Challenges and What Democrats Can Do About It – Atlantic Council,” Atlantic Council, September 11, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/senator-chris-murphy-on-why-us-foreign-policy-is-mismatched-to-its-challenges-and-what-democrats-can-do-about-it/.
17
“Governor Newsom Joins Bipartisan Coalition of Leaders as States Step up to Combat Climate Crisis” Governor of California. March 21, 2025, https://www.gov.ca.gov/2025/03/21/governor-newsom-joins-bipartisan-coalition-of-leaders-as-states-step-up-to-combat-climate-crisis.