Venue: IDSA Auditorium
Press Release
Programme
09:40-10:00 hrs: Arrival of Participants; Tea/Coffee served
Inaugural Session
10:00-10:10 hrs: Welcome Remarks by Director General, IDSA
10:10-10:40 hrs: Keynote Address by Foreign Secretary Mr. Ranjan Mathai
10:40-11:10 hrs: Discussion
11:10-11.30 hrs: Tea/Coffee Break
11:30-13:00 hrs: Session 1: Asymmetric Warfare and International Security
Chair: Dr. Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA
IISS Speaker: Mr. Nigel Inkster, IISS Director of Transnational Threats & Political Risk
Indian Speaker: Dr. S. Kalyanaraman, Research Fellow, IDSA
13:00-14:00 hrs: Working Lunch
14:00-15:30 hrs: Session 2: Towards Stability in Pakistan & Afghanistan?
Chair: Amb. Yash Sinha, Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran), MEA
Indian Speaker: Dr. Ashok Behuria, Research Fellow, IDSA
IISS Speaker: Brig. (Retd.) Ben Barry, IISS Senior Fellow for Land Warfare
15:30-16:00 hrs: Tea/Coffee Break
16:00-17:30 hrs: Session 3: Engaging a Rising China
Chair: Mr. Gautam Bambawale, Joint Secretary (East Asia), MEA
IISS Speaker: Mr. Adam Ward, IISS Director of Studies
Indian Speaker: Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research
17:30-17:45 hrs: Concluding Remarks
by Amb. Pinak Chakravarty, Special Secretary (Public Diplomacy), MEA
by Mr. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, IISS Senior Fellow for South Asia
Chairperson: His Excellency, Shri N N Vohra, Governor of Jammu & Kashmir
Programme
1630-1635 hrs
Welcome Address by Dr Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA
1635-1640 hrs
Address by Representative of Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan, Mumbai
1640-1725 hrs
Talk by Prof Kanti Bajpai on “India and China:Can the Giants of Asia Cooperate?”
1725-1730 hrs Observations by Shri NN Vohra
1730-1800 hrs Question and Answer Session
1800 hrs Vote of Thanks by Cdr Sarabjeet Parmar, Research Fellow, IDSA
1805 hrs Refreshments
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Programme
November 24, 2011, Thursday
0945h-1015h: Registration
1015h-1045h: Inaugural Session
1015h-1025h: Welcome Remarks by Dr Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA
1025h-1040h: Inaugural Address by Shri M Ganapathi, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs
1040h-1045h: Vote of Thanks by Ms Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate, IDSA
1045h-1115h: High Tea
1115h-1245h: Session 1: Global Strategic Issues
Chair: Shri Shashank, Former Foreign Secretary, MEA
Speakers:
Prof Abednego Edho Ekoko, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria
Dr Arvind Gupta, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair, IDSA
Discussion/Q&A
1245h-1400h: Lunch
1400h-1545h: Session 2: Regional Issues – UN Peacekeeping and Prospects of Conflict Resolution
Chair: Shri HHS Vishwanathan, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation
Speakers:
Mr Festus K Aubyn, Senior Research Fellow, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC), Ghana
Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar, Distinguished Fellow, IDSA
Discussion/Q&A
1545h-1600h: Tea
1600h-1730h: Session 3: Regional Issues – Piracy
Chair: Vice Admiral (Retd) Pradeep Kaushiva, Director, National Maritime Foundation
Speakers:
Mr Richard Barno, Senior Researcher and Policy Advisor, IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT), Ethiopia
Cdr S S Parmar, Research Fellow, IDSA
Discussion/Q&A
November 25, 2011, Friday
0930h- 1100h: Session 4: Bilateral Issues – Economic
Chair: Ambassador V B Soni, Chairman, Overseas Infrastructure Alliance (India) Pvt. Ltd.
Speakers:
Ms Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa
Dr Sachin Chaturvedi, Senior Fellow, Research and Information System for Developing Countries
Discussion/Q&A
1100h-1115h: Tea
1115h-1300h: Session 5: Bilateral Issues – Security
Chair: Ambassador R Rajagopalan, Member, Executive Council, IDSA
Speakers:
Prof Paul Musili Wambua, University of Nairobi School of Law
Ms Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate, IDSA Discussion/Q&A
1300h-1400h: Lunch
1400h-1530h: Session 6: Bilateral Issues – Diaspora
Chair: Shri J C Sharma, Former Secretary, MEA
Speakers:
Prof Phillip O Nyinguro, University of Nairobi, Kenya
Prof Sanjukta Bhattacharya, Jadavpur University, Kolkata
Discussion/Q&A
1530h-1545h: Tea
1545h-1730h: Panel Discussion: India-Africa Strategic Partnership: Way Forward
Chair: Shri Vivek Katju, Former Secretary, MEA
Speakers:
Ms Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa
Prof Abednego Edho Ekoko, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria
Shri HHS Vishvanathan, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation
Prof S N Malakar, Chairperson, Centre for African Studies, JNU
Ms Ruchita Beri, Senior Research Associate, IDSA
Discussion/Q&A
September 26, 2011
Event: Fellows Seminar
Chairperson: Ambassador Arundhati Ghose
Discussants: Professor Jeffrey Legro and Dr. Manpreet Sethi
The paper is an attempt to explore US nuclear weapons policy and practice in the shadow of 9/11. In the first part of his presentation, Rajiv provided an examination of the major US national strategy and nuclear policy documents after 9/11 and their policy prescriptions regarding the ‘twin threats’ of proliferation and terrorism. Among the documents he examined included 2002 National Security Strategy, 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 2006 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2008 National Security and Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century, QDR 2010, and NPR 2010. Citing pertinent portions of these documents, he stated that they reinforce the importance of nuclear deterrence in US grand strategy and the imperative need to fine-tune its defence capabilities to face the twin threats. He noted that new type of weaponry was sought be developed such as conventional-cum-nuclear ‘bunker-busters’ to tackle the challenges posed by underground facilities (UGF’s). Other strategic innovations included transforming nuclear weapon platforms like the 4 Ohio-class SSBN’s to perform conventional roles and Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) which envisages the use of ICBM’s tipped with conventional warheads to strike high-value “time-sensitive targets” as incoming Defence Secretary Panetta noted.
Rajiv then points out that while the initial policy response to the twin challenges of proliferation and terrorism by US was to strengthen/fine-tune its deterrence postures, there has been a reduction in its arms control/disarmament obligations. In this context, Rajiv provided relevant details about BMD, FMCT and CTBT across US administrations since 9/11. The latter two have however been put on the front-burner as it were by the Obama administration but it remains to be seen what progress can be achieved. Subsequently, Rajiv provided an assessment of the reductions in US nuclear arsenals – including in warheads and strategic delivery vehicles (SDV’s). He pointed out the analyses by Hans Christensen and others about the role of negative security assurances (NSA’s) and nuclear targeting war plans on the size of the arsenal. In this context, he pointed out that the US for the first time in NPR 2010 pledged that it will “continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack.” The document however states that “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners.”
In the last part of his presentation, Rajiv discussed pertinent aspects relating to US policy initiatives at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels to deal with the ‘twin threats’, such as PSI, 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), G8 Global Partnership Initiative, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), Obama’s chairing of the Special Session of the UN Security Council in September 2009 – the first by any American president that resulted in UNSC Resolution 1887, April 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security, and the entry into force of New START.
Rajiv concluded his presentation by noting that despite significant reductions in the numbers of US nuclear warheads during the decade after 9/11, coupled with continuing successful bilateral and multilateral efforts to secure vulnerable material and prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD material/know-how, there has not been a concomitant reduction in the ‘role’ of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy and that there are limited prospects of any change in the foreseeable future.
Points of discussion and suggestions
- The paper is a sharp-edged critique of US nuclear weapons policy but could be improved with beefed up analyses and assessment of some of the issues involved. Aspects relating to ‘role’ can be further delineated into ‘centrality’ and ‘dimensions’ of nuclear use for greater clarity.
- The author can more closely look at whether there has been an evolution/change in US nuclear weapons policy as a result of 9/11 and examine specifically those aspects where these changes have/have not occurred. The author’s own assessment of his reading of US nuclear weapons policy can be expanded.
- A distinction could be drawn between ‘nuclear weapons policy’ and ‘nuclear policy’. If the former, aspects relating to FMCT, CTBT, and US policy activism at bilateral and multi-lateral fora may not be included.
- It would appear that Obama has succumbed to the nuclear weapons establishment with regards to arms control and disarmament.
- The increasing linkages of conventional weapons policy on nuclear weapons policy needs to be highlighted, especially in the light of the fact that US has superior conventional power/assets at its disposal.
- The author can look more closely at the debates on US nuclear weapons policy in the aftermath of 9/11 to provide a better context and set the tone for the rest of the paper.
- An examination of the alternative explanations regarding role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy, the challenges that US has faced in implementing some of its policies, could be better highlighted.
- The mismatch between US policy objectives and practice can be highlighted. This is especially visible in the context of US relationship with Pakistan and in US efforts to secure vulnerable material worldwide, most recently highlighted by the case of Belarus refusing to honour its commitments to return material to the US in the face of economic sanctions.
- In his response, Rajiv thanked the Chairperson and the Discussants and participation from the floor for the valuable comments and suggestions and promised to incorporate them as much as feasible while finalising the paper.
Report prepared by Sanjeev Kumar Shrivatsav, Researcher at IDSA.
Programme
0930-0945 hrs
Opening remarks: Shri N.S. Sisodia, Director General, IDSA
Inauguration: Air Vice Marshal M. Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD, ACAS OPS (Space)
0945-1130 hrs
Panel 1: Government: MOD, Armed Forces & DRDO
Chair: Air Vice Marshal M. Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD. ACAS OPS (Space)
Presentation: Dr. G. Balachandran, Distinguished Fellow, IDSA
Panelists
- Shri Gyanesh Kumar, Joint Secretary (Shipyards), Ministry of Defence
- Commodore R.K. Rana, Principal Director, Integrated HQs of Ministry of Defence (Navy), Directorate of Indigenisation
- Shri Manik Mukherjee, Director G-Fast, Scientist G
- Major General (Ret) P. K. Chakravorty, VSM, Advisor, Strategic Studies, Brahmos, DRDO
- Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, Director and CEO, CLAWS
- Anit Mukherjee, Fellow, IDSA
Q & A
1130: Tea break
1145-1300 hrs
Panel 2: Industry
Chair: Shri Gyanesh Kumar, Joint Secretary (Shipyards), Ministry of Defence
Panelists
- Shri Anjan Mukherjee, CEO, HyCa Technologies Pvt Ltd.
- Shri Ashok Kanodia, MD & Chairman of Precision Electronics
- Shri Rajinder Bhatia, CEO Defence, Bharat Forge
- Shri Rahul Chowdhury, CEO Tata Power Strategic Electronics Division
- Shri Bharat Singh, Deputy Director General DG / OF Board
- Mr. Sanjay K Agarwal, Group Managing Director, CbS Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
- Dr. M. Venkatraman, Vice President Essar Steel
- Shri Ajai Shukla, Defence Correspondent, Business Standard
- Shri A.S. Pundle, Advisor, Indian Machine Tools Manufacturers Association
1300-1330 hrs – Lunch break
1330-1430 hrs
Panel 2: Industry (continued)
Chair: Dr. Rajiv Kumar, Director General FICCI
Q & A
1430-1530 hrs
Panel 3: International comparisons
Chair: Ambassador Prabhat Shukla, former Ambassador to Russia
International Speaker: Prof Tai Ming Cheung: “Catching Up in Defence Innovation: The Lessons From China and other Late Industrializers”
1530-1630 hrs
Panel 4: Education and Brainstorming on Final Recommendations and Action Plan
Chair: Ambassador Prabhat Shukla
- Is the Indian educational system nurturing innovation?
- Reforms/action suggested
Speakers:
- Dr Anil Wali, CEO, Foundation for Innovation and Technology Transfer, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi
- All participants
- Wrapping up – Smita Purushottam, Senior Fellow and Joint Secretary (MEA)
1630 hrs
Closing address: Dr. V. Bhujanga Rao, Ph.D., FNAE, FAEFCT, CC R & D (HR), DRDO
Chairperson: Shri N S Sisodia
Discussants: Shri V K Misra, Shri Amit Cowshish and Shri Ranjan Kumar Ghose
Laxman Kumar Behera’s paper examines the structural and procedural weaknesses afflicting India’s defence acquisition system. In particular the paper focuses on three issues: acquisition planning, ii) accountability in acquisition, and iii) formulation of features of weapons system. According to Behera these three crucial factors have received least or half-hearted reforms. In the paper, he argues that for expeditious acquisition, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to overcome these weaknesses.
In his presentation, he began with the Bofors controversy that according to him set the foundation of India’s defence acquisition system which was again got the boost by the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) and subsequent procedural reforms. He was of the view that the Bofors controversy was a watershed in the India’s procurement history not because it had significant political cost to the then Central government, but because it stimulated a massive public debate on defence acquisition issues. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), which was instituted by the government under the Chairmanship of B Shankaranand, did an extensive inquiry into the then Army’s existing procedures for procurement and key decisions involved in Bofors purchase. Behera said that although the JPC did not point out any serious deviations from then existing procedures followed by the Army and other stake-holders, it nonetheless brought into open several practices which were prone to subjective interpretations, and subsequent charges and counter charges. One such practice was the non-requirement of formulation of General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) for the weapons procured from abroad.
Mr Behera noted that following the recommendations of the GoM, which was set up to review the national security in its entirety and the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in particular, the government initiated the process which led to the creation of present procurement organisation, consisting of five main bodies such as i) Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), ii) Defence Procurement Board (DPB), iii) Defence Production Board, iv) Defence Research and Development Board, and v) Acquisition Wing. With the setting up of defence procurement organisation, the MoD has also undertaken periodic review of the procurement procedures. Till now the MoD has carried out six rounds of major revisions, with the Defence Procurement Procedures DPP-2011(DPP-2011) being the latest in the series. He held that the changes in the DPPs have created a streamlined system that is now much more methodical, objective and process-oriented.
Behera argued that despite MoD’s reform measures undertaken so far, the acquisition process has not moved at the desired pace. This is evident from repeated surrender of funds under the capital head of defence budget, much of which is accounted for under the modernisation/acquisition head meant for procurement of ‘big-ticket’ items such as tanks, fighter, submarines, frigates, radars and missiles among others. Moreover, the delays and cost-over run is also a matter of concern to national security, especially when India’s adversaries are acquiring capability at a faster pace.
In the presence dispensation, Mr Behera pointed out that the acquisition planning is a major handicap. The GoM’s idea behind creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for a strong planning mechanism has been diluted in the set up of HQ IDS, which is constrained to force itself in articulating a truly integrated perspective plan for the three services, with due diligence towards capability development through inter-and intra-Service prioritisation, matching defence plan with available resources and hand-holding of domestic defence industry. Because of its lack of authority vis-à-vis COSC and due to the superiority of services chiefs over the CISC, the defence planning is constrained. The long term plan is also constrained in the absence of the resource commitment by the government. He said that in order to move towards a truly integrated perspective plan the creation of CDS is vital.
The paper argued that Qualitative Requirement (QR) formulation is concerned, which is the most vital part of the acquisition cycle, has not given required attention through out DPP’s nearly two-decades of operational history. The vital element is continues to be performed by Services personnel who are not trained to so such a specialised job..Moreover, the oversight of the vital part of acquisition is not so strong enough. Given the vitality of a QR in choosing the most cost-efficient selection in a time-bound manner, it is necessary that the job be performed by specialised body, preferably by an external agency. Given that the HQ IDS is tri-service body it would seem most logical that the function is transferred to it. However, the efficacy of HQ IDS would comeby its strong positioning vis-à-vis Services, which would come by putting a CDS as head its head.
Behera noted that contrary to the GoM’s recommendation for creation of “a separate and dedicated institutional structure to undertake the entire gamut of procurement function” what has been created is an Acquisition Wing which performs a part of acquisition functions. Several crucial functions having a strong bearing upon the cost and timeliness of procurement are being carried out beyond its command and control, thereby robbing the system of benefits of the single point of accountability. He pointed out that the organisational shortcoming in accountability has also not been compensated by the procedural means, both because of the professional shortcomings of acquisition functionaries and the lack of courage of the system to own up responsibility in cases which run into oversight problems. He stressed that given the importance of single-point accountability in the vital aspects of weapon procurement, it would be logical, as pointed out by GoM, to move towards an integrated procurement organisation.
Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions:
- Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) should be the principal authority for approval of acquisition plan of the services.
- The paper needs to define acquisition and differentiate it from procurement.
- There is misconception that the MoD is not utilising the money allocated to it. However, in recently years, the inability to spend money has changed. Now, it has even over-spent money allocated to it.
- So far as the 11th defence plan is concerned, there has been a marked improvements compared to previous plans. It is wrong not to cite in the paper the improvements in this regard.
- The level of infrastructure development in the country, R&D, and capacity building also need greater attention. In addition, there is need of a Defence Planning Board for the defence acquisition.
- The institutional structures further needs to be strengthened for better defence acquisition.
- It is not fair to compare India’s system with Pakistan’s acquisition system.
- The scholar rather needs to focus on how to strengthen the present structure and procedure of defence acquisition system.
- India is more dependent on Russian even for the maintenance of defence equipments. This should be changed in its present defence acquisition system.
- The present acquisition system is good but it needs further to be strengthened by way of more manpower.
- The Bofors case needs to be put in the right perspective; otherwise a wrong conclusion would be drawn.
- If one takes a comprehensive view of the defence acquisition system in recent years, things have improved very much.
Report prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi, Research Assistant, IDSA