Atlantic Council experts
Now comes the even harder part. On Wednesday, negotiators from Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire in Gaza and the release of the remaining hostages taken by the terrorist group during its October 7, 2023 attack.
The deal, mediated by US, Qatari, and Egyptian officials, will take place over three phases, each slated to last six weeks. During the first phase, Hamas will release thirty-three hostages—women, children, and those over fifty years of age—and Israel will release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, begin to withdraw from some areas, and facilitate a significant increase in humanitarian aid into Gaza. In the second phase, Hamas is slated to free the remaining male hostages while Israel withdraws from Gaza. The third phase would include the return of deceased hostages and the beginning of reconstruction.
Does this deal, which now heads to the Israeli cabinet for approval, really mark the end of the war? What’s next for Gaza’s reconstruction, Israel’s security, and wider regional efforts such as Israeli-Saudi normalization? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their answers to these and other pressing questions.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
Jonathan Panikoff: The war has widened the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution
Shalom Lipner: The “Trump effect” will help Netanyahu sell this deal to his hard-liners
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: The deal risks freezing the conflict with no political horizon
Liz Cathcart: The disparities are striking, but there is never an “equal” hostage deal
Danny Citrinowicz: Now Israel needs to aim for normalization with Saudi Arabia
Thomas S. Warrick: Who governs postwar Gaza when the shooting stops?
Alex Plitsas: Now for the hard part—a long-term solution for Gaza
The war has widened the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution
The cease-fire between Israel and Hamas is likely to end this long and painful chapter for both Israelis and Gazans. Gaza is completely destroyed, with tens of thousands of innocent lives lost over the past fifteen months. Israel is safer today than it was on October 6, but at a painful cost of more than four hundred Israel Defense Forces (IDF) members killed and hundreds more injured.
In addition to the deaths and devastation in both Gaza and Israel, the war will be remembered for widening the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution. For many Arab states and European nations, the conflict was a turning point to reprioritize or declare their support for a sovereign and independent state of Palestine. At the same time, Israelis across the political spectrum remain fundamentally horrified and gobsmacked by the idea that after the suffering they’ve experienced—October 7 was the greatest single-day loss for the Jewish people since the Holocaust—anyone would think that now is the time to create an independent state of Palestine. Many in Israel would view such an outcome as increasing the odds of more October 7–type attacks happening. Moreover, the war may also be remembered as leading to a rise in global anti-Semitism, with a recent study finding a worldwide surge of such views among adults, especially younger ones.
But the war has also reshaped the Middle East in more unexpected ways. After months of tit-for-tat attacks between Hezbollah and Israel—prompted by the Lebanon-based group attacking Israel on October 8 and originally vowing not to stop until there was a cease-fire in Gaza—Hezbollah today is utterly diminished. Most of its military capabilities have been destroyed, and its leadership has been eliminated. That result is reshaping Lebanon, where a new president and prime minister are taking power, giving hope to many in the country that, for the first time in decades, Hezbollah will not be controlling the strings. The war has also helped lead to the end of the Assad regime in Syria, and it has put Iran in its weakest position in the region since the 1979 Revolution.
What comes next for Israel, Gaza, and the region is less clear. The ceasefire has multiple stages that if broken could result in a resumption of fighting. But the reality is that Hamas is battered and much of the group’s leadership has long sought an end to the conflict. In Israel, the Netanyahu government is also unlikely to break the ceasefire. President-elect Donald Trump has made clear that he wants a sustainable ceasefire in place by the time he gets into office. Breaking the deal could endanger Israel’s relationship with the new Trump administration and it could potentially jeopardize coordination and Israeli policy preferences being given due consideration when it comes to Iran. Iran is, after all, the issue that Netanyahu views as the most important in the relationship. Longer term, the reconstruction of Gaza, the security of Israel, and the future of normalization all remain unclear.
But those will all be the next set of challenges to address. Today, most people in Gaza will simply rejoice at not having to fear explosions from Israeli missiles and gunfire; and in Israel, most will rejoice in the knowledge that the hostages, at long last, will come home.
—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.
The “Trump effect” will help Netanyahu sell this deal to his hard-liners
The hopeful moment of an imminent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas comes with the subtext of circumstances that have facilitated the signing of this agreement—which has been on the table since last May—only now. US President Joe Biden has attributed apparent changes of heart to “extreme pressure” on Hamas, a transformed “regional equation” that has put Iran and Hezbollah on the defensive, and also “dogged and painstaking American diplomacy.” Israel’s calculus has been impacted similarly by mounting IDF casualties, vociferous calls to liberate the hostages and, in a different vein, Netanyahu’s improved prospects to garner political support for the controversial bargain.
But the real game-changer has been, to quote incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, “the Trump effect.” The president-elect’s ominous (if amorphous) threat that “all hell will break out in the Middle East” unless the captives are released before his inauguration energized the parties to reach a compromise before that deadline, lest they suffer those consequences. Additionally, from the perspective of Israel’s government, expectations that the incoming administration will offer strong support for Jerusalem on a host of issues—e.g. confronting Iran, cementing relations with Saudi Arabia, and supporting Jewish settlement in the West Bank—provided extra impetus to placate Trump.
Those aspirations will also play a pivotal role in Netanyahu’s struggle to keep his parliamentary majority intact. Although he should have enough votes to approve the deal, many of his core allies are vehemently opposed to any framework that would suspend the pursuit of “total victory” over Hamas, as he has promised repeatedly to achieve. Their objections will feature prominently when the cabinet convenes to consider the package on Thursday. The prime minister, who has assured these critics that Israel will not relent in its campaign to dismantle Hamas, will be encouraging their instincts to remain in the coalition and wait to advance their policy priorities under Trump—however dubious that opportunity may prove to be.
Meanwhile, this latest halt in the fighting will be no less tentative. Under the terms of the arrangement, Hamas will be securing freedom for about one thousand convicted terrorists, doubling the quantity of humanitarian aid coming into Gaza, and benefiting from extensive IDF pullbacks. The pledge of Waltz that “Hamas has to be destroyed to the point that it cannot reconstitute” notwithstanding, the possibility of the group’s resurgence—in the absence of any other authority—cannot be discounted.
—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.
The deal risks freezing the conflict with no political horizon
The declaration of a ceasefire and hostage deal between Hamas and Israel is a welcome respite for the more than two million Palestinian civilians trapped in a vicious war they didn’t start and were powerless to stop. Though much can go wrong between now and the time of the implementation of the deal on January 19, not to mention the potential impasse once the first phase is over, the absence of war may indeed provide space for a more optimistic pathway forward. Gazans will experience relief from the horrors of the relentless Israeli bombardment and attacks that have killed and maimed so many in the coastal enclave. However, Palestinians in Gaza will emerge out of this deal with the greatest humanitarian, political, and strategic losses. Not a dollar of reconstruction money will go into Gaza as long as Hamas controls the coastal enclave and in the absence of a political horizon.
The most significant risk ahead is that there will be a potential freezing of the conflict, in which Gaza remains destroyed and in ruins, entirely dependent on a few hundred trucks per day to sustain the population and stabilize the humanitarian catastrophe. This, of course, would allow Hamas the best of two worlds: It would not be responsible for actual governance or providing for its populace, but it would benefit from a steady stream of goods and items it can siphon and tax. Once again, such a scenario would be horrendously painful for the civilian population in Gaza, many of whom have no homes to return to and are unable to sustain themselves beyond the scope attainable through basic humanitarian and commercial aid and supplies.
It’s tempting for analysts to examine alternatives to Hamas’s rule now that there is an impending cease-fire. Such discussions are not only premature but also have ultimately proven irrelevant to the intractably static nature of Gaza’s governance landscape, which has hardly changed for almost two decades. This remains true even though Hamas is financially, politically, and militarily severely weakened, with little to no prospect for replenishing the physical stockpiles and geopolitical ballast that have enabled it to remain afloat for so many years in Gaza.
Most painful of all, many in Gaza are asking why their loved ones are dead or maimed, their homes destroyed, their businesses shattered, and their lives in shambles. These sacrifices were imposed upon them and feel utterly useless to the Palestinian national project for freedom and independence. The incoming US administration’s regional priorities, coupled with the possibility of a rejuvenated push for a peace process, may be the only hope for Gaza’s recovery, reconstruction, renaissance, and evolution.
—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
Israel’s military victory has come at immeasurable cost to its global standing
The forty-two-day cease-fire just agreed to by Israeli and Hamas negotiators is a whimpering close to a conflict that began with shock and awe. It started, of course, with a heinous attack that left more than one thousand people dead in Israel and humiliated the vaunted IDF. More than a year of bombing and fighting followed, which left tens of thousands of Palestinians dead and injured and destroyed the basic infrastructure that supports health, education, housing, and more. The very futures of Palestinian survivors and those coming into the world soon have been blighted by a deliberate strategy. The full extent of the impact of that strategy will be known soon.
The cost for the release of even one thousand prisoners is one Palestinians likely count as far too dear. Hamas, in the short term, is the clear loser.
Israel won. But it may be a Pyrrhic victory.
The conflict gave Israel the opportunity to strike crippling blows against its most dangerous foes: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But the brutality of its conduct has undoubtedly cost Israel in terms of economic strength, global reputation, and international standing. The latter two will not be revived soon. Israel is more isolated from the region and beyond than anyone could have imagined on October 8, 2023.
In the long term, however, Hamas’s actions reminded the world of Occupied Palestine. This war reminded the world that Palestinians are not a “non-people,” as acknowledged by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday at the Atlantic Council. And Hamas’s provocation led the Israeli government to show just how ruthless its treatment of Palestinians can be. The unrelenting response to the October 7 attack stripped away Israel’s reasonable, humane, peace-loving, good guy image for millions of people around the world, including in the United States.
That image will take a long time to restore.
Hamas is likely to abide by the cease-fire. Palestinians have everything to lose if it doesn’t. As we saw during the war, the driver of what happens next—whether the cease-fire lasts past the first phase—is Israel.
—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Abercrombie-Winstanley served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip and an assignment where she supported gender equality in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the first woman to lead a diplomatic mission there.
The disparities are striking, but there is never an “equal” hostage deal
As part of a deal reached between Israel and Hamas, thirty-three living and deceased Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza are set to be released. In exchange, Israel will reportedly release thirty Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli civilian and fifty for every Israeli female soldier released.
Does this disproportionate exchange make for a bad deal? On the surface it may seem so, making it difficult to remember the core of the problem of hostage taking—the hostages that Hamas took and held for nearly fifteen months were innocent individuals: civilians, soldiers, parents, and children. There would be no “equal” deal for these hostages when talking about humans being held as pawns. Countries negotiating for hostage releases must do what is needed to get their people home. And, in this case, Hamas effectively used the hostages they are holding to get to this point.
These releases only represent a third of the approximately one hundred hostages Hamas continues to hold. It was expected that this deal would not include the release of all hostages held, as the agonizing and lengthy negotiations to reach a deal involve not only the exchange of people held but also a cease-fire and options for increased aid. While the release of thirty-three hostages held by Hamas in Gaza is not the perfect outcome, it is a good one. It means thirty-three fewer individuals suffering the horrific conditions of being held hostage and thirty-three families who can have closure, in addition to the other positive outcomes for civilians in Gaza.
This deal will reportedly last forty-two days. Looking past those forty-two days for the hostages and Gaza alike, there is little clarity. Though the deal could allow for more hostage releases in subsequent phases, the work continues as there is no certain path for the release of the remaining hostages, prolonging their suffering and that of their families, communities, and countries fighting for their freedom.
—Liz Cathcart is a member of the Atlantic Council Counterterrorism Project and the executive director of Hostage US.
Now Israel needs to aim for normalization with Saudi Arabia
The prisoner-of-war deal concluded between Israel and Hamas is a bad deal for Israel, but one that it had no choice but to implement. Israel has a moral obligation to return its abductees even at the heavy price of releasing terrorists and accepting Hamas remaining in the Gaza Strip.
But in order for this deal to serve Israel’s strategic interests, there must be political continuity in the form of Israeli consent to the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, and the utilization of this move to promote diplomatic normalization with Saudi Arabia.
Because 2025 appears to be a decisive year regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, the deal in Gaza will make it possible to focus international attention on Iran. Together with an Israeli-Saudi normalization, greater focus on Iran will strengthen the Israeli posture in the Middle East.
If Israel seeks to return to the war in Gaza, then it will find the Trump administration and the whole international community against it. Israel must complete the cease-fire agreement in Gaza and Lebanon. It must also work with the new US administration and with Arab neighbors to strengthen the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, and offer a political horizon based on what US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the “deal of the century” during Trump’s first term.
“Absolute victory” for Israel will only come from normalization with Saudi Arabia, not any other military move.
—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.
Who governs postwar Gaza when the shooting stops?
Despite the talk about the sticking points in the negotiations, the real sticking point underlying everything still has not been resolved: Who will control postwar Gaza? Hamas wants to ensure it has the ability to rebuild and re-arm, and Israel is equally determined to prevent this. The agreement calls for postwar arrangements to be discussed during phase two, but make no mistake, no one is ready for what this will really require.
Both the outgoing Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration, as well as the Netanyahu government, understand that the essential requirement for a lasting peace is that Hamas has no role in postwar Gaza. Even Hamas surrogates are signaling that Hamas knows it will have to step back from governing Gaza—for now. What is needed is a workable postwar plan that puts Gaza under international administration for a transitional period. But how that is set up, and who participates in it, will make the difference between success and failure. The bare-bones plan outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described on Tuesday at the Atlantic Council would not succeed as is in preventing Hamas’s eventual return.
Given the tensions in Israeli politics—Netanyahu reportedly agreeing to the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank carries real dangers—prospects for a negotiated outcome in the next twelve weeks are extremely slim. Fighting could resume. Trump’s presidency will toughen Netanyahu’s position, and the Palestinians really need to take to heart what incoming Trump National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said on January 15: “There is nothing but downside” to holding out. The Trump administration will likely step back for a while and wait to see what the Israelis and Palestinians are able to do on their own.
The tensions in Palestinian politics also create a different danger. Just as Israel has failed to come up with a viable postwar plan, the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah is in even worse shape. The voices that dominate Palestinian civil society want international recognition of the justice of the Palestinian cause, apparently failing to recognize that the people they are talking to are not able to deliver what they want. Ramallah and Palestinian civil society need to broaden who they talk to about the future of Palestine.
—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.
The human cost of the war in Gaza is about to become clear—with repercussions for the region
The human cost of the war will become even more evident as a cease-fire takes effect. The visuals over the next several days and weeks will not only be jarring, but also may have political repercussions.
The Israeli hostages, who have likely endured unspeakable suffering, including rape and torture, will now be seen up close and personal by the Israeli public, who will then relive the trauma of October 7. This may reignite anger against Hamas and the Palestinians as a whole and further harden Israeli views toward a future two-state solution.
At the same time, this outcome may cause a backlash against Netanyahu, who essentially accepted an agreement that was on the table for many months. It was a delay that increased suffering and likely led to the death of some of the hostages. Let’s not forget that a tenet of Israel’s social compact with its citizen soldiers is that it will go to any lengths to bring them home if they are captured. There is a legitimate question as to whether Netanyahu adhered to this sacrosanct compact.
In addition, as Gaza opens up to the international press and to aid organizations, and as reconstruction efforts begin, the world is going to see devastation and death at every corner, on a truly dramatic scale. There are likely hundreds of bodies (or more) still buried in Gaza under tons of rubble. Entire neighborhoods are flattened. The humanitarian situation is dire. While some countries in the region may now see an opportunity for further normalization with Israel, many in the Arab world will get even more of a sense of the immense horror in Gaza as it opens up, and they could then question any rapid pace of change with Israel.
—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He worked for twenty-six years at the Central Intelligence Agency before retiring in July 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.
Now for the hard part—a long-term solution for Gaza
Despite the length of time and difficulty of the negotiations, this interim deal is actually the easier part. The difficult part is the long-term solution to the conflict and release of the remaining hostages. There is still no clear picture of the long-term governance and security in Gaza that would be required to facilitate reconstruction at the end of the conflict.
Hamas wants complete and total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and a permanent end to hostilities. Israel still sees Gaza as a security issue that will require a military presence, and there is currently no partner for peace or stability who can be relied upon to administer Gaza.
If Hamas and the Palestinian people in Gaza reject a security force and governing authority, then it could lead to a protracted insurgency in Gaza. As previously noted, Israel and Hamas had reached an interim security deal a year ago that failed to advance a broader peace. So, while the deal should be celebrated, there is still a lot of difficult work ahead to define Gaza’s future and Israel’s security.
—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Further reading
Image: A man waves Palestinian flags as Palestinians react to news on a ceasefire deal with Israel, in Deir Al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip, January 15, 2025. REUTERS/Ramadan Abed