The Middle East remains an epicentre of global change, where the interests of major world powers intersect, and conflicts coexist with ambitious projects. The change of power in Syria, a new wave of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the struggle for control over transport corridors, and the pursuit of technological leadership are all pieces of a single mosaic that shapes the future of the region and our still interconnected world. This article is based on the outcomes of the 14th Middle East Conference organized by the Valdai Club and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
For decades, the Middle East has been characterized by tension, which takes various forms and varying degrees of intensity. Periods of relative calm are followed by sudden escalations of conflict, raising the question of whether stabilization in the region is even possible.
Recently, there has been increasing talk of the Middle East as a model for the whole world, with its characteristic processes beginning to replicate in other, seemingly more stable parts of the globe.
These processes include not only bloody conflicts, military-political confrontations, and the growing role of non-state actors but also the formation of seemingly unnatural alliances, where parties are willing to compromise their stated principles to achieve tactical and strategic goals.
For Russia, the future of Syria is a key issue in its Middle East policy. The decisive military support provided to the Assad government in 2015 strengthened Russia’s regional influence. Against the backdrop of US foreign policy fluctuations, Russia’s consistent support for its Middle Eastern ally earned respect in many regional countries, despite negative attitudes toward the Syrian regime itself. The Russian Armed Forces’ operation in Syria allowed the legitimate government to regain control over most of the country, and Syria began to emerge from diplomatic isolation. However, in December of last year, the Assad regime fell within a few days.
This event was met with great enthusiasm in the West. Dominant were triumphant assessments of Damascus’s fall as a “strategic defeat” for Russia, which was “unable to save an important ally.” However, the peculiarity of the Syrian regime’s collapse is that it clearly did not want to save itself. The Russian expert community quickly reached a consensus on the reasons: the degradation of the army and state apparatus under suffocating US sanctions, coupled with Assad’s inflexibility on issues of internal dialogue and relations with external players, particularly Turkey. At the critical moment, Moscow correctly assessed the futility of military support for a government unwilling to defend itself, avoiding unnecessary losses.
The regime’s internal weakness was evident long before its fall, raising the question of whether Russia could have used its influence over Damascus more actively to accelerate necessary changes. The successes of the Syrian army, supported by Russian forces in 2016-17, gave Assad a credit of trust domestically that he failed to utilize. Could – or would – Russia have conditioned its support on demands for political reforms?
On one hand, this would contradict the very logic of Moscow’s Middle East policy over the past decade. As Maxim Suchkov noted back in 2020, the idea underpinning Russia’s foreign policy strategy can be summarized as “be with us – and remain yourselves.” Indeed, Russia gave a chance to remain themselves both to the Syrian regime, which completed its life cycle and passed into history, and the Syrian people, who – at least at this stage – seem to prefer anything but a heavily mutated Arab socialism.
On the other hand, state-building projects undertaken by the US in the Middle East at the start of this millennium are far from success stories. Cynically speaking, in Syria, we saw a collapse similar to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, but without the costs of nation-building. Another key difference: while the Afghan regime relied on American bayonets and collapsed in their absence, the Syrian regime is gone, but Russian “bayonets” remain.
The situation, where the government that invited Russian troops no longer exists, and power belongs to forces that have been in armed conflict with Russia for years, is undoubtedly dangerous for the Russian contingent. Any scenario is possible, including a “stab in the back” from the new Syrian authorities and/or their foreign sponsors. However, on February 6, Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Kasra said in an interview with The Washington Post that Russia could retain its bases in Tartus and Hmeimim “if we get benefits for Syria out of this,” adding that “in politics, there are no permanent enemies.”
As Vitaly Naumkin noted during the Middle East conference, the Syrian leadership is trying to legitimize itself in a haphazard manner, mimicking Trump’s style of acting quickly without considering consequences. This raises questions about the strength of current agreements and the durability of emerging ties. However, it is clear that Syria’s new leaders seek to establish as many contacts as possible and do not want to be perceived as proxies of external forces. In this context, the Astana format remains relevant and could be expanded to include countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, as testified during the discussions.
The beneficiaries of the power change in Syria are Turkey and Israel, but it is unclear how they will use the new opportunities. For example, does Ankara, which reportedly plans to build two airbases in Syria, intend to provide security services to Damascus? There is no consensus in Turkish society on this issue. Syrian Kurds face significant challenges. As noted in the Valdai report prepared for the conference, the US is “interested in maintaining leverage over its Turkish partners and the new Syrian authorities, but the extent of their commitment to investing in the Kurds under the Trump administration remains uncertain. It’s also unclear whether the positions of the Kurds and the Islamists holding key positions in Damascus may converge.”
Donald Trump’s statements since taking office have stirred many regions, and the Middle East is no exception. On February 4, Trump proposed placing Gaza under US control as a “long-term possession,” turning it into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” Earlier, he suggested relocating Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt and Jordan, sparking outrage in those countries. According to one conference participant, Trump is deliberately provoking to scare Arabs into making concessions. As examples from Colombia and Panama show, this policy works in the Western Hemisphere, and only time will tell if it will work in the Middle East. However, the idea that transferring territory to US control is the best solution to international problems seems to be a fundamental principle of Trump’s foreign policy thinking.
War, returning in various forms, remains a grim constant of Middle Eastern reality.
The concept of Middle East is so strongly associated with instability and conflict that “West Asia” – a term actively used by regional participants at the Valdai conference – seems to better describe the region’s role in global economic and logistical processes. Transport corridors, both existing and under development, play a key role in this context. Rising tensions in the Red Sea due to Yemeni Houthi actions have spurred the search for alternative routes. One response is Iraq’s “Development Road” initiative, to be implemented with Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE. Russia, Iran, and other Caspian states continue working on the North-South Transport Corridor. Western countries, along with India and Gulf states, are promoting the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. Increased economic connectivity in West Asia, boosting trade and reducing logistics costs, is indeed a path to prosperity and peace. However, two major problems persist.
First, the politicization of transport corridors, particularly by Western countries. The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor is presented as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, while the TRACECA program, launched in 1993, aims to weaken Russia’s transit role in Eurasia. Regional players notice that Western partners focus more on countering geopolitical rivals than creating development opportunities.
Second, the lack of infrastructure investment. As Alexey Bezborodov, a speaker at the conference’s transport corridors session, explained, creating new routes to complement existing ones requires massive investments that most Western Asian countries cannot afford. The absence of infrastructure and professionals to maintain these routes renders many projects ephemeral.
The final session of the conference highlighted the region’s potential and diversity in the context of scientific and technological development. On one hand, there are highly developed states actively participating in the global scientific and technological revolution, leveraging international partnerships even in a deglobalizing world. On the other, there are countries with significant potential but facing serious constraints. Iran, with its ambitious scientific and technological plans, is a prime example, forced to overcome the effects of punitive Western sanctions that hinder its development, despite the high achievements of its scientists and engineers.
The Middle East remains an epicentre of global change, where the interests of major world powers intersect, and conflicts coexist with ambitious projects. The change of power in Syria, a new wave of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the struggle for control over transport corridors, and the pursuit of technological leadership are all pieces of a single mosaic that shapes the future of the region and our still interconnected world.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club’s, unless explicitly stated otherwise.