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Gaza War Undermines Oman’s Role as Bridge in a Conflict-Ridden Middle East

Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero recently visited Oman, a country that has long played a bridging role in the region.

By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives

Few Omanis take for granted the prosperity and tranquility that have prevailed in their country since the 1970s. Memories of the Dhofar war that preceded this era remain vivid, underlining the importance of peace at home and in the neighborhood. This mindset has contributed to Muscat’s decades-long tradition of acting as a peacemaker in the Middle East.

Oman has served as a bridge between Iran and Arab and Western states, as well as a facilitator of talks between Yemen’s Houthi movement and its adversaries. During the 2017-21 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) schism, Muscat helped Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates resolve their feud with Qatar. While Qatar and Egypt have been the key interlocutors between Israel and Hamas, Oman has also sought to move Israelis and Palestinians toward peace. However, Muscat’s efforts to be an effective diplomatic actor in the Middle East have become more challenging because of the nearly 11-month-old Israeli war on Gaza, which has led to rising levels of anti-Americanism in Omani society.

Oman has joined other GCC states in calling for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. Muscat has also stressed the importance of restraint to prevent an all-out war in the Middle East. Omanis see regional conflict dynamics as threatening the Sultanate’s own security and prospects for economic development and diversification. Oman is particularly worried about insecurity in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

On a recent trip to the country by this author, Omanis universally condemned Israel as an aggressive state that they believe only the U.S. has sufficient leverage to restrain. That the Biden administration has not done so is a source of outrage and frustration in Oman. At the start of 2024, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies found that 69 percent of Omanis have increasingly negative opinions of U.S. policy with 94 percent calling the U.S. response to the Gaza war “bad” or “very bad.”

The war and far-right consolidation of power in Israel have led Oman to decide against improving relations with Israel at this point. The late Sultan Qaboos hosted three Israeli prime ministers, but Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who succeeded Qaboos in 2020, has not followed suit. “Despite all the efforts [to include] Israel and [integrate] it in the region, Israel and particularly [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu’s government ignored all the peace efforts and refused to engage in the two states solution process,” Dr. Abdullah Baabood, an Omani scholar and visiting professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, told this author. “Oman believed that Israel with its right-wing extremist government was not serious about peace negotiations … and Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza reinforced this belief.”

Muscat supports a two-state solution and sees a ceasefire as merely a way to temporarily freeze the conflict. At this point, according to discussions this author had in Muscat, Oman does not see any benefit in engaging with Israel’s government unless it is willing to engage in good faith to achieve a just and realistic solution to the Palestinian question.

Although geographically far from Israel-Palestine, Omanis fear they have much to lose from the continuation of the Gaza war, in particular, if tensions continue to rise between the U.S. and Iran. Omanis have told this author that they believe that Israel is purposefully subverting opportunities for the U.S. and Iran to continue to engage via Oman.“Much evidence indicates that Israel will continue to sabotage any dialogue between the U.S. and Iran,” said an Omani analyst who spoke to the author on the condition of anonymity. “I believe that if Netanyahu’s extremist coalition continues governing, Israel will be extremely sensitive to any dialogue facilitated by Oman in the future.”

After Joe Biden’s presidency began in January 2021, Muscat resumed a bridging role between Iran and the U.S. that it had played under previous Democratic presidents. It helped negotiate a September 2023 prisoner/hostage swap that freed five Americans in return for Iranian access to $6 million in funds frozen

in South Korea. In January 2024, U.S. Middle East envoy Brett McGurk held indirect talks with Iran in Oman to urge Iran, unsuccessfully, to pressure the Houthis to stop attacking ships in the Red Sea. Four months later, Omani diplomats again shuttled between American and Iranian delegations led by McGurk and Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani.  “We welcome the efforts of Omani officials, and we exchanged messages with the other party through Oman,” said Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani at the time.

Oman has a record of cooperating with other Arab states to lower temperatures in the region. While Qatar has also worked to reduce tensions between Iran and the West, Muscat sees this work as complementing its own. For example, the September 2023 deal with Iran was achieved due to efforts by both Oman and Qatar, along with Switzerland, which represents U.S. interests in Tehran. Oman also worked with Iraq to bring about the Saudi-Iran agreement signed in Beijing in 2023 and with Kuwait to help restore GCC unity in 2021.

Muscat’s relationship with the Houthis has ensured that the group, also known as Ansar Allah, has not targeted Oman. Still, the lack of peace in nearby waters threatens Oman’s prospects for economic growth. This is particularly important regarding the Arabian Sea port city of Duqm, which Oman is working to make its commercial capital, a “gateway to the world,” and the crown jewel of its Vision 2040 development plan. Omani officials believe that a Gaza ceasefire and diplomacy with the Houthis (as opposed to foreign military intervention) are the most realistic paths to restoring maritime security.

Omani officials say that the entire GCC has benefited from the relative peace on the Yemeni-Saudi frontier since the Houthis and Saudis reached a cease-fire agreement in April 2022. The de facto Saudi-Houthi truce, which Omani diplomats spent years working on, remains at least one driver of stability on the Arabian Peninsula.

Threatening this is rising sentiment against the U.S., Great Britain, and the West in general. Anti-American ideologies, narratives, and slogans emanating from Iran and Lebanon are gaining popularity and significant segments of Omani society appear to be in growing solidarity with Tehran and its “axis of resistance” against Israel. While Oman’s official policy does not endorse the Houthi maritime attacks, for example, there is support among some Omanis for the operations in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. “I strongly believe that Oman will continue to be against any threats to the maritime security surrounding the Arabian Peninsula because it affects our economic interests,” explained the Omani analyst. “However, the vast majority of [the Omani] public … will continue supporting anything they believe will stop the genocide in Gaza.”

Tellingly, the Grand Mufti of Oman, Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad Al-Khalili, has been highly supportive of Hamas and the Houthis and opposed to many aspects of U.S. policy in the Muslim world. While his outspoken statements do not reflect official positions, the Grand Mufti has influence among the Omani population.

There is no denying that the government is feeling bottom-up pressure to express disagreement with the U.S. and U.K. over Palestine, Yemen, and other issues, albeit while still promoting dialogue with any actor willing to engage in good faith. Omani officials describe the Hamas attacks on Israel of last October as “resistance to occupation” and have agreed with Iran about a need to deter Israel from actions such as the recent assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, which have raised fears of a wider war.

Oman’s leadership is pragmatic and likely to remain Western-oriented in terms of its own security. China, Iran, or Russia is unlikely to replace the U.S. or U.K. as Oman’s main sources of weapons and security guarantees. But the longer the Gaza war continues, the more challenging Muscat may find its traditional role of facilitating dialogue among adversaries.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.