Great Power Competition Shouldn’t Drive US Policy in the Middle East

As China’s engagement in the Middle East grows, fears of Beijing displacing the United States as the preeminent regional power increasingly dominate U.S. policy toward the region. President Joe Biden encapsulated these worries during a 2022 trip to Saudi Arabia, declaring, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran.”¹ Such concerns risk hindering an overdue recalibration of the U.S. role in the Middle East and motivating risky concessions, exemplified by the Biden administration’s proposal to offer Saudi Arabia a defense treaty in return for Riyadh’s limiting ties with China. However, China has neither the ability nor the desire to replace the United States in the Middle East or direct the regional order. Although Beijing does not pose a serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region, attempting to contest Chinese influence at every turn is unlikely to succeed in an increasingly multi-aligned Middle East. With the United States stretched thin and facing pressing challenges in other regions and at home, Washington should resist the temptation to let great power competition drive its Middle East policy.

China’s Rise in the Middle East

A series of headline-grabbing developments has amplified worries that Beijing is positioning itself to supplant the United States as the dominant external power in the region. These include China’s facilitation of the 2023 Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement, BRICS’ invitation to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to join the grouping the same year, and the reported construction of a Chinese military facility in the UAE.² Nonetheless, while China’s engagement in the Middle East has indeed grown, Beijing remains driven by its dependence on Middle Eastern oil and economic opportunities, with its diplomatic efforts and (very limited) military involvement intended to further that narrow set of interests, not pursue regional domination.

China-Middle East economic ties have greatly expanded during the last two decades, with China becoming the largest importer of Gulf oil — which comprises 50% of its energy imports — and the top trading partner for much of the region.³ In 2023, China’s bilateral trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran topped $300 billion, up nearly 48% from 2018.⁴ The Middle East has also become a focal point of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — all 22 members of the Arab League have signed BRI agreements — leading to major Chinese investments in physical and digital infrastructure projects, a particular concern of the United States.⁵

As its economic interests in the region have grown, China has cautiously expanded its engagement in the military realm, though these efforts remain largely confined to arms sales and limited military cooperation and exercises. Although Chinese arms sales to the region are increasing, especially in systems the United States is reluctant to provide, they comprise less than 5% of the GCC states’ arms imports.⁶

Owing to its economic-centric approach to the Middle East, Beijing prioritizes regional stability and maximizing economic opportunities. As a result, China aims to stay out of fractious regional disputes, seeking stable, transactional relationships with all countries in the region rather than special relationships with a select few. This explains, for instance, why China has forged close partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia while avoiding taking a side in their longtime rivalry, as well as Beijing’s interest in facilitating their rapprochement.

China’s Inroads Reflect a Changing Region

U.S. partners’ concerns about Washington’s commitment to the region, as well as their security, have contributed to their growing engagement with China.⁷ But more important, surging China-Middle East ties are emblematic of an increasingly multi-aligned region in which more assertive powers, especially in the Gulf, are seeking to diversify relationships and maximize their diplomatic flexibility.⁸ Indeed, while China has made the most significant gains, an array of other countries, including India, Italy, and South Korea, have boosted their involvement in the region.⁹

Amid this shift, Middle Eastern states have eagerly deepened ties with China, which they see as an attractive partner because of its energy demand, ability to support economic diversification and energy transition initiatives, and hands-off approach to human rights. As Gulf states seek to transform their economies for a post-oil world, China’s ability to cut through red tape and implement projects quickly — often at a lower cost than comparable U.S. projects — makes it a very appealing partner.¹⁰ These countries are seeking opportunities to advance their interests wherever possible and have become more comfortable bucking U.S. pressure, especially in the wake of the Ukraine and Gaza Wars. This realignment is a reflection not of U.S. partners being won over by China but of their refusal to maintain exclusive relationships with any great power. In a comment reflective of attitudes across the region, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE’s president, said, “The UAE has no interest in choosing sides between great powers.”¹¹

To be sure, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE also see U.S. anxiety about Chinese influence as an opportunity to extract concessions from Washington.¹² For instance, the Wall Street Journal reports that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman “has said he expects that by playing major powers against each other, Saudi Arabia can eventually pressure Washington to concede to its demands for better access to U.S. weapons and nuclear technology.”¹³ But above all, these two countries’ growing ties with China come down to what Beijing offers them, just as China’s Middle East engagement is primarily driven by narrow economic interests, not a desire to replace the United States.

US Response

U.S. officials have responded with alarm to China’s expanding influence in the Gulf and the broader Middle East — warning that it could “fully penetrate” the region — and labeling the Middle East a “vital theater for strategic competition.”¹⁴ With U.S. attention turning away from counterterrorism, officials now argue that a large-scale U.S. military presence must be maintained to prevent China from exploiting a vacuum.¹⁵ Likewise, a host of analysts have called for Washington to double down on the Middle East — including by extending a security guarantee to Saudi Arabia — to prevent China from filling a void created by U.S. disengagement.¹⁶

Concerned by China’s inroads, the United States has gone to great lengths to reassure partners of its commitment to their security. The Biden administration has done a U-turn on plans to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East and take a harder line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, lifting freezes on arms sales to both countries and bolstering the U.S. military presence (even before the Gaza War).¹⁷ Most notably, the administration has relentlessly pursued a “megadeal” with Saudi Arabia aimed at bringing about Saudi-Israeli normalization and pulling Riyadh away from Beijing. Despite the ongoing Gaza War making the latter unlikely in the near future, the White House is reportedly on the cusp of offering Saudi Arabia a package of concessions — including a defense treaty and support for a civilian nuclear program — in return for its restricting security and technological cooperation with China.¹⁸ Following earlier talks on a formalized security guarantee for the Emiratis, the United States designated the UAE a “major defense partner” in September in a bid to pull it out of China’s orbit.¹⁹

At the same time, the United States has leaned on traditional partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE to choose sides on issues of sensitive technologies and security, with mixed results. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo summed up the U.S. perspective following an April trip to the UAE, saying, “When it comes to emerging technology, you cannot be both in China’s camp and our camp.”²⁰ While Chinese technology continues to proliferate across the region, Washington has recently seen some success in forging more narrowly focused partnerships to limit countries’ tech ties with China, most notably with the UAE.²¹ Nevertheless, most Middle Eastern countries appear unwilling to fully forego cooperation with China.

Limits to Chinese Influence and Ambitions

Despite the alarm in Washington, China’s ambitions and influence in the Middle East seem modest. In a 2022 speech warning countries in the region against deepening ties with China, Colin Kahl, then the U.S. undersecretary of defense, correctly noted that “Beijing has neither the intent nor the capability to integrate the region’s security architecture. The PRC [People’s Republic of China] pursues ties based solely on its narrow, transactional, commercial, and geopolitical interests.”²² Although China’s Middle East engagement is growing, Beijing remains an opportunistic, transactional actor primarily focused on its energy and economic interests. Most important for U.S. concerns, China is not interested in or capable of assuming responsibility for the regional security order or dominating the Middle East.²³

China’s ability to project power in the region is limited, and it remains highly averse to military intervention, alliances, and large-scale foreign basing, seeing U.S. misadventures in the Middle East as cautionary tales. Beijing’s reluctance to intervene has only been underscored by its muted response to the ongoing Houthi attacks against ships in the Red Sea — which have disrupted global supply chains — despite the serious threat they pose to Chinese economic interests.

Indeed, China has been more than happy to free ride off the U.S. security umbrella, reaping the economic benefits of its regional engagement while Washington shoulders the security burden. This is unlikely to change because China does not need to dominate the region to secure its interests and is much more concerned about escalating military competition in the Indo-Pacific, as well as domestic challenges. Directing its limited military resources to the volatile Middle East would be a costly distraction from China’s core priorities, and taking on a major role in regional security, especially as a security guarantor, would also challenge its prized reputation as a neutral actor.

Moreover, the significance of China’s recent diplomatic initiatives has been exaggerated, both in the United States and China. Consider the Saudi-Iranian agreement. Although the New York Times wrote that China “upend[ed] Mideast diplomacy” and China’s foreign minister claimed Beijing was fostering a “wave of reconciliation,” the deal was the product of two years of negotiations mediated by Oman and Iraq, with China merely facilitating the final meeting.²⁴ More recently, China has steered clear of efforts to resolve the Gaza War and Red Sea crisis, making clear that its facilitation of the Saudi-Iranian deal did not mark the beginning of a new era of deep diplomatic engagement. Likewise, a number of China’s highly touted bilateral cooperation agreements — such as its stalled 25-year “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Iran —have not panned out.²⁵

China might seek to undermine the United States in the Middle East — often by seizing on frustration within the region over U.S. policy — but there is no hard evidence that Beijing intends to supplant Washington in the region.²⁶ Instead, China envisions a regional order in which U.S. power is diminished and the region’s states take responsibility for their own security and de-escalation, with China acting as a key diplomatic facilitator, not a security guarantor like the United States or even necessarily a mediator.²⁷ This modest vision is hardly a plan for hegemony. Regional states are well aware of the limits of China’s utility as a partner and interest in the region. Although eager to forge deeper ties with China, they do not want or expect it to replace the United States.²⁸

The Way Forward for Washington

As competition with China becomes a driving force of the United States’ Middle East policy, U.S. policymakers should be cognizant of two key dynamics. First, because China’s growing Middle East ties are a result of the region’s commitment to hedging and diversifying relationships, waging a zero-sum contest for influence and attempting to force countries to choose a side is doomed to fail — and risks backfiring. Just as coercion is unlikely to work, “recommitting” to the region or offering security guarantees will not win regional states’ allegiance.²⁹ Middle Eastern powers have proved themselves willing and able to act according to their interests — not in response to U.S. carrots or sticks — and are set on deepening their partnerships with China. Fortunately, these countries have their own reasons to support key U.S. priorities, including ensuring the free flow of oil and countering terrorism, irrespective of their alignment vis-à-vis the United States and China.

Second, and more important, China’s inroads in the region pose little threat to the United States’ limited interests in the Middle East. In fact, there is growing recognition that the U.S. can secure its vital interests in the Middle East — energy security, counterterrorism, and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon — without maintaining a major military presence.³⁰ Less appreciated is that U.S. and Chinese interests overlap in the Middle East more than in any other region. With its dependence on Gulf energy and sponsorship of many economic projects in the region, China has a key interest in ensuring the free flow of oil as well as regional stability. Beijing also shares U.S. concerns about terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Moreover, while China’s diplomatic clout is exaggerated, its diplomatic “wins” should not be assumed to be “losses” for the United States, especially when Beijing uses its unique position to advance stability, such as with Riyadh and Tehran’s rapprochement.

Misplaced fears of China’s exploiting a vacuum should not drive decisions about U.S. posture in the region or motivate risky security commitments. Longstanding security ties with Middle Eastern countries buy the United States little influence, and have often been a burden; thus, it is unclear what China would gain by assuming a major role in regional security. Indeed, the United States could even benefit from a reversal of roles, with Beijing expending its limited resources and attention on the region as Washington focuses on more pressing challenges.

If these realities are ignored, there is a risk that instead of ushering in an overdue pivot from the Middle East, competition with China will keep the United States entangled in the region. Rather than trying to turn back the clock, the United States should adopt an approach that reflects a changing Middle East — both its embrace of hedging and waning relevance for U.S. interests. In addition to straining U.S. resources and risking further conflict, doubling down on a zero-sum, securitized approach will fail to address what makes China appealing: the economic opportunities it presents.

The United States should prioritize competing in the economic and technological domains, offering mutually beneficial partnerships on renewable energy, infrastructure, and artificial intelligence (AI) (the recent US-UAE AI cooperation pact is a promising model). Specific areas of concern, such as emerging technologies, are manageable, including by clearly setting and enforcing redlines on the most sensitive issues. Above all, the United States should avoid overreacting as China-Middle East ties deepen or succumbing to pressure for concessions, recognizing that U.S. interests will remain secure and that at the end of the day, the countries of the Middle East need the United States more than it needs them. As Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) put it, “if the Bahrainis, Emiratis, or Saudis threaten to turn to other powers, Washington can afford to call their bluff.”³¹

Approaching the Middle East through the lens of great power competition is a recipe for an unnecessary, unwinnable, and distracting struggle. Instead, Washington should adopt a narrower conception of the purpose of U.S. engagement in the Middle East focused on advancing the overarching goals of U.S. foreign policy — preserving the security, prosperity, and independence of the American people. At a time when the United States must urgently prioritize, Washington cannot afford to let misplaced fear of Chinese influence derail a much-needed recalibration of the U.S. role in the Middle East.³²

Notes

1
“US ‘will Not Walk Away’ from Middle East: Biden at Saudi Summit,” Al Jazeera, July 16, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/16/biden-lays-out-middle-east-strategy-at-saudi-arabia-summit.
2
Gerald Imray, Mogomotsi Magome, and Jon Gambrell, “Iran and Saudi Arabia Are among 6 Nations Set to Join China and Russia in the BRICS Economic Bloc,” AP News, August 25, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/brics-russia-china-summit-b5900168d165cc78b36d5d5c068b7a50.; and John Hudson, Ellen Nakashima, and Liz Sly, “Buildup Resumed at Suspected Chinese Military Site in UAE, Leak Says,” Washington Post, April 26, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/26/chinese-military-base-uae/.
3
Howard Shatz, “Middle East–China Trade Prospects Remain Robust despite Red Sea Crisis,” Al Monitor, February 8, 2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/pro/memos/middle-east-china-trade-prospects-remain-robust-despite-red-sea-crisis.; and Keith Bradsher, “China’s Economic Stake in the Middle East: Its Thirst for Oil,” New York Times, October 11, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-oil-saudi-arabia-iran.html.
4
Joseph Webster, “China’s High-Stakes Diplomacy: Managing Middle Eastern Turmoil,” Lowy Institute, August 7, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-high-stakes-diplomacy-managing-middle-eastern-turmoil.
5
Chun Han Wong, “China Wants a Bigger Role in the Middle East. But Not Too Big,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china-wants-a-bigger-role-in-the-middle-east-but-not-too-big-1e8b0941?mod=article_inline.
6
Philip Loft, John Curtis, and Matthew Ward, “China and the US in the Middle East: Iran and the Arab Gulf,” House of Commons Library, August 26, 2022, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9612/CBP-9612.pdf.
7
Phil Stewart, “In Middle East, U.S. general hears concerns about American commitment,” Reuters, May 13, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/middle-east-us-general-hears-concerns-about-american-commitment-2022-05-13/.
8
William Roebuck, “Why Don’t Gulf States Get with the Program on Ukraine and Syria?” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 28, 2023, https://agsiw.org/why-dont-gulf-states-get-with-the-program-on-ukraine-and-syria/.
9
Albert Vidal Ribe, “South Korea bets big on Middle East defence exports,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), November 17, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/11/south-korea-bets-big-on-middle-east-defence-exports/.; Jack Dutton, “Italy and Saudi Arabia in Talks for Major Deals as Ties Grow Under Meloni,” Al Monitor, November 27, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/italy-and-saudi-arabia-talks-major-deals-ties-grow-under-meloni.; and Chietigj Bajpaee, “India’s Engagement With the Middle East Reflects New Delhi’s Changing Worldview,” War on the Rocks, May 22, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/indias-engagement-with-the-middle-east-reflects-new-delhis-changing-worldview/.
10
Jon B. Alterman, “The Middle East’s View of the ‘China Model,’” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/middle-easts-view-china-model.
11
Anjana Sankar, “UAE Has No Interest in Choosing Sides Between Great Powers, Says Anwar Gargash,” The National, November 14, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/2022/11/14/uae-has-no-interest-in-choosing-sides-between-great-powers-says-anwar-gargash/.
12
Stephen Kalin, Summer Said, and David S. Cloud, “How U.S.-Saudi Relations Reached the Breaking Point,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-u-s-saudi-relations-reached-the-breaking-point-11650383578.; and Jon Hoffman, “The Middle East and the Manipulation of Great Power Competition,” National Interest, May 9, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/middle-east-and-manipulation-great-power-competition-202264.
13
Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, “Saudi Crown Prince Test Drives Nonaligned Foreign Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-crown-prince-test-drives-nonaligned-foreign-policy-450ddefb.
14
Posture of USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY24 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 118th Cong., 2023.; and Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the Middle East and North Africa, Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 118th Cong., 2023.
15
Lolita C. Baldor, “US general: As US scales back in Mideast, China may step in,” AP News, May 23, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-china-europe-middle-east-government-and-politics-21995550f2a657e70768645425f21d78
16
See, for example, Michael Singh, “The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement,” Foreign Affairs, October 17, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/saudi-arabia/real-purpose-us-saudi-security-agreement.; James Phillips, “Saudi-Iran Deal: China Fills a Middle East Vacuum Left by the Biden Administration,” Heritage Foundation, March 24, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/saudi-iran-deal-china-fills-middle-east-vacuum-left-the-biden.; and John Hannah, “Biden Should Revive the Carter Doctrine for the Middle East,” Foreign Policy, July 12, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/12/biden-middle-east-carter-doctrine-israel-saudi-arabia-uae-gulf-iran/.
17
Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Restarts Offensive Weapons Sales to Saudi Arabia After Lengthy Ban,” Washington Post, August 9, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/08/09/us-saudi-weapons-sales/.; and Gregory Aftandilian, “US Troop Buildup in the Gulf Reemphasizes Military Power,” Arab Center, Washington D.C., August 15 2023, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/us-troop-buildup-in-the-gulf-reemphasizes-military-power/.
18
Stephen Kalin and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. to Offer Landmark Defense Treaty to Saudi Arabia in Effort to Spur Israel Normalization Deal,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/us-saudi-arabia-defense-treaty-israel-palestine-e2cc1821.; and Humeyra Pamuk, Alexander Cornwell, and Matt Spetalnick, “U.S. and Saudi Arabia Nearing Agreement on Security Pact, Sources Say,” Reuters, May 2, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-saudi-arabia-nearing-agreement-security-pact-sources-say-2024-05-02/.
19
Chloe Cornish and Andrew England, “UAE President Meets Joe Biden in Push for More U.S. AI Technology,” Financial Times, September 24, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/e85bef92-5f53-4f71-bb3b-a0d65f3a4c48.
20
Paul Mozur and David E. Sanger, “Microsoft Makes High-Stakes Play in Tech Cold War With Emirati A.I. Deal,” New York Times, April 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/16/technology/microsoft-g42-uae-ai.html.
21
Mohammed Soliman, “The UAE and U.S. Elevate Tech to a Cornerstone of Their Relationship,” Middle East Institute, October 10, 2024, https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-and-us-elevate-tech-cornerstone-their-relationship.
22
“Remarks by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl at the IISS Manama Dialogue (As Delivered),” U.S. Department of Defense, November 18, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3223837/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-defense-for-policy-dr-colin-kahl-at-the-iiss-mana/.
23
Yun Sun, “China Wants to Weaken, Not Replace, the U.S. in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy, February 29, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/29/china-middle-east-united-states-regional-hegemon-war/; and Jon B. Alterman, “The ‘China Model’ in the Middle East,” Survival 66, no. 2 (March 3, 2024): 75–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2024.2332062.
24
Peter Baker, “Chinese-Brokered Deal Upends Mideast Diplomacy and Challenges U.S.,” New York Times, March 11, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/us/politics/saudi-arabia-iran-china-biden.html.; “China-brokered Saudi-Iran deal driving ‘wave of reconciliation’, says Wang,” Al Jazeera, August 21, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/china-brokered-saudi-iran-deal-driving-wave-of-reconciliation-says-wang.; and Jesse Marks, “China’s Strategic Facilitation in the Persian Gulf Security Crisis,” Stimson Center, May 10, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/chinas-strategic-facilitation-in-the-persian-gulf-security-crisis/.
25
Eric Olander, “Head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce Pressures China to Implement Stalled Strategic Agreement,” China Global South Project, August 22, 2024, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2024/08/22/head-of-irans-chamber-of-commerce-pressures-china-to-implement-stalled-strategic-agreement/.
26
Yang Sheng and Zhang Changyue, “China Will Not Fill the So-Called Power Vacuum After US Pullout; Mideast Countries ‘Should Control Own Destiny,’” Global Times, January 16, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246091.shtml.
27
Marks, “China’s Strategic Facilitation.”
28
Jonathan Fulton and Michael Schuman, “China’s Middle East Policy Shift From ‘Hedging’ to ‘Wedging,’” Atlantic Council, September 5, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-middle-east-policy-shift-from-hedging-to-wedging/#challenges.; and Mostafa Salem, “UAE Eyes ‘Different Architecture’ for a Middle East Embroiled in Conflict as It Strengthens Ties With the US,” CNN, September 25, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/25/middleeast/uae-eyes-different-architecture-for-a-middle-east-intl/index.html.
29
F. Gregory Gause III, “The Limits of a U.S.-Saudi Security Deal,” Foreign Affairs, August 2, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/saudi-arabia/limits-us-saudi-security-deal-china-russia.
30
See, for example, Justin Logan, “The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East,” Defense Priorities, September 30, 2020, https://www.defensepriorities.org/reports/the-case-for-withdrawing-from-the-middle-east/.; Chris Murphy, “America’s Middle East Policy Is Outdated and Dangerous,” Foreign Affairs, February 19, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-19/americas-middle-east-policy-outdated-and-dangerous.; and Martin Indyk, “The Middle East Isn’t Worth It Anymore,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-middle-east-isnt-worth-it-anymore-11579277317.
31
Murphy, “America’s Middle East Policy.”
32
Christopher Preble, “A Credible Grand Strategy: The Urgent Need to Set Priorities,” Stimson Center, January 25, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/a-credible-grand-strategy-the-urgent-need-to-set-priorities/.