How is Trump’s reelection likely to affect US foreign policy?

Pavel K. Baev

Putin has reason to worry, rather than rejoice

Moscow was eagerly expecting discord and disarray after the U.S. elections, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sly hints that he would prefer a Harris administration provided only thin camouflage for his real preference. However, what he now faces is a commitment to a smooth transition of power and a boisterous U.S. president empowered by a strong mandate and unrestrained by other branches of government. As a result of Donald Trump’s unexpectedly decisive victory, Putin finds himself in a situation of swiftly reconfigured power balances and challenges. His ambition to be a champion in dismantling the U.S.-dominated world order (spelled out in his rambling performance at the recent Valdai Club gathering) is set to experience multiple setbacks, starting perhaps already next week at the G20 summit in Brazil, which he is unable to attend.   

What matters most for the Kremlin is the shift in the United States’ engagement in the long war in Ukraine. Putin’s “victory plan” is based on the premise of eroding Western unity during the war of attrition, in which Russia controls the strategic initiative. This plan is set to be tested by the Trump administration’s obvious aversion to sustaining such a war and its pronounced desire to bring it to a fast end. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has reasons to worry about these intentions and is doing his best to promote his cause. Yet, Putin must be even more worried  because his maximalist goals for subjugating Ukraine cannot possibly fit with any peace plan. This intransigence may invite a strong reaction from the new U.S. president, who is not known for his high tolerance of insolence.

Vanda Felbab-Brown

The U.S.-Mexico relationship heads into dire straits

Dramatic policy changes and radical challenges lie ahead in the U.S.-Mexico relationship under Trump. If his administration goes through with threats by President-elect Donald Trump and many Republican politicians to resort to unilateral U.S military actions to bomb fentanyl labs in Mexico, deploy U.S. special operations to kill Mexican drug lords, or blockade Mexican ports receiving illicit drug precursors, the U.S.-Mexico relationship will deteriorate in ways unseen in decades or even centuries. But while explosive, U.S. military actions would be ineffective and counterproductive in weakening the drug cartels. Other ominous developments lie ahead, even though in 2023, Mexico became the United States’ most important trading partner as a result of the Trump-sponsored United States-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (which will be up for review and reauthorization during the Trump administration) and the Biden administration’s policy of de-risking from China and near-shoring to Mexico. Many of the policy issues Trump cares most passionately about, and which lie at the core of his domestic agenda —ending irregular migration to the United States, deporting some 5 million undocumented Mexicans to Mexico and other 6 million nationals elsewhere, and imposing high tariffs to revive manufacturing production in the United States—are central in the U.S. relationship with Mexico and intersect in complex ways. They all represent large threats to Mexico’s economic policies, threatening to destroy Mexico’s auto industry and other manufacturing underpinning U.S. supply chains, as well as domestic stability.   

The first Trump administration taught the Mexican government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador that the U.S. government would not push hard on various U.S. interests with Mexico if Mexico stopped migrant flows. López Obrador continued to leverage the migration spigot similarly with the Biden administration, even though Mexico came to the verge of becoming a narcostate because of López Obrador’s disastrous internal anti-crime (non)policies. But deporting 5 million undocumented Mexicans into Mexico, as the Trump administration plans, is as politically explosive in Mexico as bombing Mexico. It is also deeply economically destabilizing for the country. The second Trump administration’s mass deportation policy promises to upend his first administration’s bargain with Mexico. 

Jeffrey Feltman

Trump and the Gulf

Middle East tsar Brett McGurk, currently the Biden administration’s “Gulf whisperer,” is unlikely to again reinvent himself (as he has done several times since joining the U.S. government during the Bush administration) to retain his job. Yet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed, and Qatari Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad will undoubtedly continue to enjoy ready White House access. The three Gulf leaders have the deep pockets and unchecked domestic powers that appeal to President-elect Donald Trump. Their muffling of dissent, generally overlooked by the Biden administration, is probably the envy of the returning president.   

The question is how the Gulf leaders will use this access. They have no illusions about U.S. security guarantees after the Trump administration failed to respond to the September 2019 Houthi-claimed (but likely Iranian-authored) attacks against Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing facilities. The Biden administration’s reaction to the January 2022 Houthi attacks against Abu Dhabi also disappointed them. To protect themselves from becoming collateral damage in any U.S. or Israeli conflict with Iran, the Gulf states are likely to continue de-escalation with Tehran.   

From Washington, the Trump administration may again aspire to extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia. But Gaza’s devastation and the ongoing war in Lebanon complicate that in terms of Saudi public opinion, which MBS would only dismiss out of hand at his own peril (even if MBS quietly cheers on Israel’s degrading of Hamas and Hezbollah). 

Formally, the intra-Gulf Cooperation Council dispute that bedeviled the first Trump administration, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE (along with Bahrain and Egypt) boycotted Qatar, ended in 2021. But, among these three Gulf powers, policy differences and suspicions persist, including in the Horn of Africa. In the Horn, all three countries—as well as Egypt, led by Trump’s “favorite dictator” Abdel Fattah el-Sissi— compete against each other for influence.   

In Sudan’s civil war, Egypt and Saudi Arabia back the Sudanese Armed Forces, while the UAE backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces. Qatar and Egypt support Mogadishu in opposing both Somaliland’s secession and Ethiopia’s proposal to trade recognition of Somaliland in return for a Red Sea seaport. The UAE, on the other hand, works with Ethiopia and Somaliland. Egypt, supported by the first Trump administration, opposes Ethiopia’s Nile River dam project, while the UAE intensifies its partnership with Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed. This list just scratches the surface of Gulf/Egyptian competing interests in the Horn. 

Whichever country offers the best transactional deals—arms purchases, flattery, investment, and trade opportunities—may tip U.S. policy in its direction on any of these portfolios.  To understand how the Gulf countries and Egypt employ their privileged relationship with Trump, then, use the development of Trump administration policies in the Horn of Africa as a litmus test.

James Goldgeier

Russia, Ukraine, and NATO

Samantha Gross

The world will lose U.S. leadership on climate issues

Ryan Hass

Trump and Taiwan

When Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he took a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s president. Beijing reacted sharply, withholding an introductory phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping until Trump reaffirmed his commitment to America’s long-standing “One China” policy. Beijing wanted to disabuse Trump that he could gain any leverage with China’s leaders by embracing Taiwan. Trump acceded to this request. When Trump and Xi held their first face-to-face meeting at Mar-a-Lago, Trump said he would not speak with Taiwan’s leader again without first consulting with Xi. Trump has not had direct communication with Taiwan’s leader since.  

Fast forward to the present. Trump rarely talks about Taiwan, but when he does, it is mostly to rehash grievances about how Taiwan is underpaying for its own defense and “ripping off” America’s semiconductor sector. Trump views his unpredictability as an asset in keeping adversaries off-balance. Trump’s own views on Taiwan are idiosyncratic. Trump’s willingness to buck conventional thinking is part of his appeal to a large portion of the American electorate.  

Even so, Trump is not a policy micromanager. During his first term, Trump’s national security officials took meaningful steps to show respect for Taiwan and support Taiwan’s strengthening of its defensive capabilities. There is no evidence that Trump will become any more involved in detailed policy decisions toward Taiwan in his second term than he was during his first term. Much of his approach to Taiwan will depend upon who he selects for top policy positions. That will take some time to evaluate.

Mara Karlin

The biggest questions for defense

The biggest question for the Department of Defense, a traditionally professional and nonpartisan institution, centers on civil-military relations within the Pentagon and vis-à-vis the White House. Will the second Trump administration be similarly characterized by a stunning lack of rigor and process on war planning, the use of force, and the defense budget, and broader norm-shattering by civilian overseers?   

More routine questions focus on defense strategy and resources. The defense strategy will likely continue focusing on China given that no other country has the will, and increasingly the capability, to fundamentally reshape global security. Tricky strategic decisions await the incoming team regarding how best to tackle other major national security threats, like Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent nonstate actors, particularly since increased collaboration among many of these (including with China) represents a notable geopolitical shift. Prioritizing the threat posed by China while giving sufficient time, attention, and resources to these other adversaries will require hard tradeoffs and thoughtful approaches to building and using the military. How the Middle East and Ukraine wars end will have implications for U.S. security commitments, and President-elect Donald Trump’s pledge to use the military for mass deportations may not only distract from serious threats overseas but could have a corrosive impact on the military and its relationship with the public.   

Finally, the $850 billion defense budget will likely increase, but that topline matters less than how the money will be spent—investing in emerging capabilities, shoring up munitions stockpiles, and expanding research and development, or on legacy systems.

Patricia M. Kim

Are U.S.-China relations headed for a freefall?

Is the U.S.-China relationship headed for a freefall in the second Trump administration? On the campaign trail, Donald Trump said that he’ll impose a 60%-100% tariff on all imports from China—a move that would trigger a trade war and rapidly pull the U.S.-China relationship into a downward spiral. A key question is how quickly Trump will move to impose tariffs and whether he would be open to negotiating an upgraded trade agreement—perhaps one that is “bigger and better” than the Phase 1 trade deal that China failed to live up to after the pandemic disrupted the global economy. Of course, whether Xi is willing to bring a potential deal to the table in the coming weeks is another key question. Beijing may choose to adopt a “wait and see” approach, fearing a loss of face if Xi’s overtures are rebuffed.  

Trump has repeated on the campaign trail that he will end the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The extent to which China is seen by Trump as an obstacle or a helpful counterpart to ending these wars will likely impact the broader thrust of his China policy. How Beijing handles its relationships with Moscow, Pyongyang, Iran, and other states in the Middle East in the coming months will be closely scrutinized by the new administration.  

Finally, Trump is not an ideologue. He has no moral qualms against working with dictators. He’s expressed admiration for Xi’s iron grip on the country and called the Chinese leader his “friend.” In contrast, many in Trump’s orbit believe the Chinese Communist Party poses an existential threat to the United States. They see China not as a potential counterpart on the other side of the negotiating table but as an adversary that must be countered and undermined. It remains to be seen which of these worldviews will drive the second Trump administration’s China policy. Beijing’s diplomatic maneuvers during the transition period and Xi’s ability to engage Trump’s personal interest in shaping the United States’ China policy will likely play a crucial role in setting the trajectory and tone of the U.S.-China relationship.

Lynn Kuok

Trump 2.0 will need allies in Southeast Asia, but tariffs may complicate this

Short of striking a major economic deal, competition with China will intensify. This will mean more continuity than change on the security front with Southeast Asian countries.  

We are likely to see the United States maintain its focus on the Indo-Pacific—a framing that found renewed salience under the first Trump administration, and which continued under President Joe Biden. Notwithstanding criticism of Donald Trump riding roughshod over alliances and partnerships under his first administration, and although he may revert to more transactional instincts, a second, more hawkish Trump administration would ultimately seek to forge strong security ties in Southeast Asia to counter China. A second Trump administration is likely to reiterate U.S. commitment to the U.S.-Philippines alliance, which is supported by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement granting the United States access to nine military bases. Under the first Trump administration, Washington clarified that the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty covered the South China Sea and extended to “armed attacks” against the Philippine Coast Guard. Yet despite the need to bolster U.S.-Southeast Asia alliances and partnerships, we are likely to see neglect for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under Trump 2.0; Trump 1.0 had little time for this multilateral grouping.  

Economic changes are likely to be pronounced. Trump has threatened 60% tariffs on China and 10%-20% tariffs globally. While this might allow some Southeast Asian nations to position themselves as alternatives to China, countries with large (Vietnam and Thailand) or significant (Malaysia and Indonesia) trade surpluses with the United States could eventually be pressured to reduce trade imbalances or face higher tariffs. A confrontational stance toward Chinese investments could see Beijing’s investments in Southeast Asia scrutinized more closely. Trump has threatened to withdraw from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which includes seven ASEAN members, putting an end to an already watered-down initiative meant to plug a hole in U.S. economic engagement with the region after the first Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. Without new trade deals or initiatives, the United States might struggle to show comprehensive engagement in a region for whom economics is security, although the United States remains the region’s top investor.

Tanvi Madan

Continuity and adaptation in the U.S.-India partnership

If the previous Trump term is anything to go by, there will be more continuity in the U.S.-India partnership than in other relationships. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has invested in building a relationship with President-elect Donald Trump, and his was among the first calls that the president-elect took. India is neither an ally with whom Trump is frustrated nor a priority problem. There will be different points of friction (trade and immigration rather than Russia or values), but New Delhi will not expect to be in the new administration’s direct firing line, so to speak. 

Whether there will be deeper cooperation, bilaterally or through minilaterals such as the Quad or I2U2, will arguably most depend on three factors: first, Trump’s personal view of India; second, the results of internal policy debates about trade, immigration, the balance between reshoring and friend-shoring, Russia, and China; third, the Trump administration’s approach to China. The last matters significantly because the U.S.-India partnership has been driven in no small part by a shared, even if not identical, vision of the Indo-Pacific and concern about Beijing’s assertiveness. That strategic convergence, which intensified during the first Trump term, has enabled deeper cooperation, especially in the defense, economic security, and technology realms, and incentivized Washington and New Delhi to manage their differences. 

So, India will watch closely whether Trump once again takes a competitive view of China or seeks a deal with Xi Jinping. Other elements New Delhi will keep an eye on the administration’s appointed personnel, its approach to the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza conflicts, how it executes its trade and immigration agenda, its approach in the Indo-Pacific, and its continued willingness to help enhance India’s capabilities. Indian policymakers, in turn, will adapt to the second Trump administration as they did with the first: making the strategic and economic case for ties, emphasizing India’s willingness to burden share, and adjusting to Trump’s more transactional and personalized approach and his priorities—while preparing for predictable unpredictability and volatility, deepening ties with other partners, and trying to stabilize or set a floor to their China relationship.

Suzanne Maloney

Iran looms large

Thanks to the shadow cast by the dramatic developments during President-elect Donald Trump’s first term, Iran looms large as a foreign policy priority for the Trump sequel. His first four years in office produced a series of shocks—the 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear deal and imposition of “maximum pressure” sanctions; the 2019 failure to respond to attacks orchestrated by Iran on Saudi oil export facilities; the 2020 U.S. assassination of the architect of Iran’s militia network—but did little to impose meaningful constraints on the threats posed by Iran. In the interval since Trump left office, Tehran’s nuclear advances, escalating regional aggression, and plots to assassinate former U.S. officials, including Trump himself, only have compounded the challenges. 

Trump’s incoming national security team has promised to rachet up economic pressure on Tehran once again. His administration will likely exert far less restraint than the Biden administration on Israel’s campaign to degrade Iran and its proxies’ capabilities, and the president-elect warned Tehran that he would “blow your largest cities and the country itself to smithereens” in response to any threat on the life of a U.S. presidential candidate.  

In practice, however, the new administration’s bark on Iran may prove worse than its bite. The early success of Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions relied on the willingness of major powers such as China to abide by them; that has long since eroded. Any reimposition will require active efforts to dismantle the complex networks that have enabled not just Tehran but also Moscow to prosper despite U.S. sanctions. It will also face headwinds from Washington’s key regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, who now prefer to coopt rather than confront Tehran.  

That position may in fact align well with the president-elect himself, who has long campaigned against the wasteful folly of American interventions in the Middle East and on the campaign trail disavowed regime change, declared his desire for Iran “to be a successful country,” and suggested his readiness to make a deal “within one week after the election.” A dexterous Tehran, unencumbered by destructive ideology, might succeed in exploiting the president-elect’s appetite for bargaining and the contradictions within his idiosyncratic governing coalition. However, Iran’s current sclerotic and increasingly risk-tolerant leadership is almost certain to choose a more truculent path. 

Alexander Noyes

More transactional relations with partners and allies

A second Trump administration is likely to bring some continuity at the strategic levels of U.S. defense policy, particularly regarding the centrality of deterrence and the focus on China, which will remain the pacing threat. Strategic competition will continue to be the organizing principle and buzzword, although it may be referred to as great power competition. And supporting Israel and countering Iran will remain priorities.  

The major exception will be Russia and Ukraine, where President-elect Donald Trump will likely drastically cut back, if not end, U.S. military assistance to Kyiv, which has been unprecedented in U.S. history since World War II in its speed, scope, and scale under the Biden team. Trump has also said he’d rapidly push for an end to the war, which will mean pressuring Ukraine to yield significant territory in negotiations. This could embolden Russia to encroach on other neighbors and offer China a template for its own territorial expansionism. 

Other shifts in U.S. defense policy may include more transactional relations with partners and allies, including an emphasis on arms sales over assistance, and a move from burden sharing to burden shifting, especially with NATO. This will mean the pushing and prodding of allies, often publicly, to increase defense spending and take the lead on regional security challenges. 

Expect a slight increase in defense budgets, which have remained largely flat under President Joe Biden. Finally, a renewed focus on irregular warfare is possible, given the naming of Rep. Michael Waltz, a former Green Beret, as national security advisor. These chances will increase if former Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller, also a former Green Beret, lands a senior Pentagon role. This would mean a more aggressive approach in the domains of influence operations and other measures short of conventional war, as well as increased resources for Special Operations Forces.

Sophie Rutenbar

A notable shift in Global South policy

The second Trump administration’s approach toward the Global South is likely to represent a notable shift from the Biden administration. President-elect Donald Trump’s “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement toward all but a handful of countries. If he follows the playbook laid out by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025—which, based on his initial appointments, seems increasingly likely—the State Department will pursue a limited set of priorities for the rest of the world, including increasing security, particularly in Latin America; promoting free-market-based growth over development assistance; and supporting counterterrorism efforts.  

In the short term, Global South countries are likely to see a profound slowing or stalling of U.S. engagement, particularly support for development priorities. Project 2025 calls for the incoming administration to immediately recall U.S. ambassadors not deemed sufficiently aligned with administration priorities and to conduct a wide-ranging review of the State Department. A new aid architecture is likely to tie the U.S. Agency for International Development more closely to the State Department, and aid distribution will align more closely with Trump’s foreign policy priorities, rather than international development objectives.   

However, tensions within the Trump coalition threaten to undermine the administration’s longer-term ability to implement this strategy. The administration is likely to encounter friction between its “America First” isolationist tendencies and its desire to counter China around the world, including in Latin America and Africa, which is home to critical minerals for key technologies. Other actors are prepared to fill any vacuum resulting from the United States’ pullback from Global South countries, which have already been hedging their bets by seeking out partners like Russia and China. Furthermore, Trump’s plan to cleanse the federal civil and foreign services risks wiping out expertise vital to navigating complex challenges and competing foreign policy priorities. As a result, the Trump administration’s approach to the Global South may further undermine the loyalty of many current partners and leave the United States more vulnerable, rather than less, to unforeseen threats.

Natan Sachs

New uncertainty in Middle East affairs

Donald Trump’s election introduces new uncertainty into Middle East affairs. With him at the helm in Washington, we are likely to see an attempt to return to the “maximum pressure” policy toward Iran. It is also easier to imagine an Israeli move toward formal annexation of the West Bank; Mike Huckabee, named as the next U.S. ambassador to Israel, has not ruled out annexation, and Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, a fierce advocate of annexation, has declared it a goal for 2025 after Trump’s election.

Yet it is also easier to imagine close U.S.-Israeli-Gulf cooperation on creating a day-after situation in the Gaza Strip—a tall order still, but easier to imagine, given Trump’s relations with the relevant leaders. In many regions of the world, U.S. partners justifiably fret over the election of someone openly hostile to many of America’s alliances and its allies. In the Middle East, however, several American partners, especially the Arab Gulf states and Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, are barely hiding their delight in Trump’s return to office. Despite his uneven record in supporting allies in the Middle East—most notably his lack of response to the attacks on the Saudi oil facilities in 2019—they were hoping for this result. They may now be eager to give Trump early “wins,” to capitalize on the relationship for their own interests and in the hope that Trump shows more flexibility as he enters office.

Chances of success in this regard are not great, but these players hold many of the cards today and may be best positioned to offer a better future for Israelis, Palestinians, and Lebanese. They share a very worthy desire to crowd out Iran’s influence from the same arenas and have the capacity, in might and wealth, to try.

Uncertainty is often a bad thing in international affairs as in business. In a high-stakes region as volatile as the Middle East, this can produce serious risk. However, the current state of affairs in the region is so dire that a massive jolt may offer an upside as well as a severe downside. If cease-fires can be reached, and a less-awful “day after” begun, it should be welcomed by all.

Mireya Solís

Will U.S.-Japan relations continue to thrive?

Tokyo’s deft management of relations with Washington in the first Trump administration was the envy of many a U.S. ally. Despite the arrival of a mercurial president deeply skeptical of the value of alliances and irked by persistent bilateral trade deficits, the “secret sauce” of Tokyo’s feat is in fact well known: a) then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s personal diplomacy with Donald Trump; b) Japan’s lead in direct investment in the United States, creating jobs for American workers; and c) Japan’s shift to becoming a “can-do” partner with a proactive security policy that included a regional blueprint in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific aligned with the U.S. goal of preventing China’s hegemony in Asia.  

While past recipes for success can help guide current choices (after all, Trump’s transactionalism and love of tariffs remain unchanged), Trump 2.0 heralds far wider economic disruption and geopolitical upheaval. A universal 10%-20% tariff, a 60% duty on goods manufactured in China and/or revocation of its most-favored-nation status, and the abandonment of the World Trade Organization would bring economic havoc that pales in comparison to the first U.S.-China trade war. An accommodation to Russian President Vladimir Putin in Europe and weakened deterrence in the Taiwan Strait would seriously comprise Japan’s security interests, given that many of the world’s gang of authoritarians reside in Japan’s neighborhood. As Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba presides over a more vulnerable minority government, he will have a more constrained hand in funding the defense expenditures increase to 2% and in bargaining with Trump over trade deals and burden-sharing.  

Renewed questions about the future of U.S.-Japan relations notwithstanding, first-order principles still hold: Japan is the key ally of the United States in this era of strategic competition with China and the United States remains a fundamental anchor to Japan’s security. But expect turbulence in the chapter that is about to unfold.

Constanze Stelzenmüller

Germany, the EU, and NATO

The Biden administration worked closely with NATO and the European Union, and embraced Germany, while President-elect Donald Trump is well known to have mixed feelings of varying intensity about all three. But it is far too early to speculate about what that could mean in specific policy terms. Instead, five points are worth keeping in mind as events unfold after January 20, 2025. 

1. Trump’s advisers depict themselves as the heirs of Ronald Reagan—yet the opposite is true. Reagan was a sunny optimist, an internationalist, a free trader, and what seems in retrospect like a very middle-of-the-road conservative. The Trumpians are declinists, ethno-nationalists, and protectionists; domestically, they span the gamut between reactionary and revolutionary. 
2. Trump’s foreign policy advisers are keen to cordon off international relations from some of the wilder domestic policy ideas (“Protestant Franco,” anyone?)—but turmoil at home could constrain their options. 
3. A possible Republican trifecta—the presidency, the Senate, and the House of Representatives—suggests untrammeled power, yet it could also unleash intra-Republican rivalries: not just between the domestic and foreign policy camps, but also between the different schools within the foreign policy camp. (One useful taxonomy distinguishes between restrainers, prioritizers, and primacists.) 
4. Trump Republicans have insisted that a second term would see a much more disciplined articulation and implementation of policies—but a key lesson from the first term was that people matter more than policy. 
5. The most important lesson from 2017-2021: Trump matters more than anybody else. His impulses decide. Always.

Shibley Telhami

Trump and the Middle East

While President-elect Donald Trump remains unpredictable, there are some things that could be said about his likely policies toward the Middle East. By all accounts, Trump is not closely familiar with details of international affairs and doesn’t bother to take the time to learn them. If this was true in his first term, it’s likely to be even more so given his age and evident slowing down. Add to this his well-documented personal attributes that make him more susceptible to influence and manipulation, his policies will largely depend on those who are appointed to key positions and those who have direct access to the president on any given issue.  

His policy toward Israel in his first term, for example, was shaped more by his lawyer-turned-envoy to Israel, David Friedman, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, than any other. The transactional relations he cultivated with Arab Gulf rulers are likely to be revived and strengthened. But the ongoing Gaza and Lebanon wars will have transformed the choices Trump faced in his first term, even if a cease-fire is attained before he takes office. Reviving his “deal of the century” diplomatic effort will run into a more determined Saudi demand for a Palestinian state while a far-right Israeli government leaves no doubt that it rejects one.  

The most personal Trump policy inclination may be his aversion to big wars. It served him well at the end of his first administration, as he resisted being drawn to war with Iran despite his strong support for Israel and efforts by its prime minister, Netanyahu, to draw the U.S. into a confrontation with Tehran over its nuclear program. This tendency is likely to be reinforced by his campaign emphasis on avoiding war and statements made by his vice-president-elect, JD Vance, that while Israel has the right to defend itself, “America’s interest is sometimes going to be distinct” and that “our interest, I think very much, is in not going to war with Iran.”

Valerie Wirtschafter

Tech competition will be central to U.S. national security objectives

During Donald Trump’s first term, his administration took some notable actions to maintain and bolster U.S. leadership in the technology sphere—with a particular focus on artificial intelligence (AI). Through two executive orders and engagement with international stakeholders, the Trump administration worked to boost AI research and development, foster innovation, adopt AI into federal agencies, and take on a leadership role in the development of international norms. The Trump administration also enacted the first set of export controls against Chinese technology company Huawei, which the Biden administration later expanded to encompass broader semiconductor export controls.   

In the second Trump administration, tech competition will be central to U.S. national security objectives. As a result, we can expect a further acceleration of past efforts, including potential extensions of Biden’s endeavors to stifle Chinese advances. A continued focus on promoting AI innovation and maintaining American leadership will mean avoiding domestic regulatory measures that could stifle private sector innovation, with a central focus on repealing and replacing Biden’s AI executive order with something that, according to the GOP platform, is more compatible with “Free Speech and Human Flourishing.” However, the desire to boost domestic innovation in this space could also conflict with perceived grievances against Big Tech’s censorship of conservative viewpoints and focus on developing “woke AI.” While the latter is certainly a popular talking point, it seems unlikely that the administration would risk hobbling leading AI developers as a result.  

What is more likely is an acceleration of AI research and development; a continued focus on mitigating potential catastrophic risks from frontier AI systems in areas like chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; less attention to civil and consumer rights impacted by AI systems; accelerated confrontation with China in the tech sphere; and a renewed focus on pressuring countries to decouple from Chinese tech investments.   

While the United States has many assets at its disposal to make this vision a reality, allies and partners will play a critical role in advancing this agenda—particularly with respect to the semiconductor supply chain. During Trump’s first term, many countries effectively used their own leverage to balance U.S. pressure and engagement with China. If a more stringent “America First” foreign policy approach meets resistance, the success of this agenda may be variable.

Andrew Yeo

Cautiously optimistic: U.S.-South Korea ties under Trump 2.0

U.S. allies including South Korea are bracing themselves for a more turbulent relationship with the United States under Donald Trump. During his campaign, Trump referred to South Korea as a “money machine”  and suggested that Seoul would need to increase its alliance burden-share tenfold. His demand for up to a 20% increase in tariffs from trading partners has also generated anxiety in Seoul.  

Nevertheless, there are still reasons to remain optimistic about the U.S.-South Korea alliance. First, Trump and many other Republican leaders want to sustain U.S. power in the Indo-Pacific, due in part to long-term U.S.-China competition. U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, which host the majority of U.S. troops in Asia, will remain fundamental to the incoming Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Trump cannot make America great or support a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific without preserving the defense ties and semiconductor supply chain networks that run through South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.   

Second, South Korean companies have invested $114 billion in the United States over the past three years. South Korean leaders can underscore to Trump how Korean investments have helped the United States reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, boost local economies, and provide American workers with jobs.   

Finally, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Trump may develop an early, personal rapport similar to Trump’s friendship with the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. During Yoon’s twelve-minute congratulatory call to Trump last week, the two leaders had a positive conversation and agreed to schedule an in-person meeting soon. Yoon is reportedly practicing golf, which could prove useful in managing U.S.-South Korea relations under Trump 2.0.