Iran’s strikes on the Al Udeid air base in Qatar on June 23 forced the Gulf states to confront a long-feared scenario: getting caught in the crossfires of an Israel-Iran conflict. While Tehran carefully calibrated the attack by targeting only American assets—and not “brotherly” Qatar— the incident sparked vivid reactions across the region. Gulf leaders fear that diplomacy may no longer shield them from the fallout.
In recent years, Gulf countries have dramatically changed their approach to Iran. During the Obama era, they were deeply sceptical of diplomacy and staunch critics of the JCPOA, the multinational deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, calling instead for the United States to intervene militarily. However, growing doubts about US commitments to defend them in the case of a direct confrontation prompted a recalibration. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began prioritising bilateral engagement and diplomacy with Tehran, seeking to manage the tensions themselves.
This recalibration is also closely tied to the Gulf’s economic ambitions, which depend on stability, predictability and attracting investment—objectives incompatible with sustained tension. The Iran–Saudi normalisation deal brokered by China in March 2023 was a key milestone of this shift. Since then, GCC capitals have actively used diplomatic channels to mitigate the fallout following Hamas’ October 7 attacks and, more recently, the Israeli strikes on Iran. Gulf countries have publicly condemned the Israeli campaign and assured Tehran they would not support or facilitate any aggression.
Still, its leaders fear diplomacy alone may not be enough. The fragile ceasefire between Israel and Iran, negotiated after the Al Udeid strike with Qatari mediation, could unravel at any moment. A wider US–Iran war would be catastrophic. Iran has repeatedly warned that it would target Gulf states if they facilitated military action, and despite efforts to distance themselves, the presence of US bases on their soil exposes them to direct retaliation.
Moreover, the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz would trigger severe economic disruption, while nuclear fallout and radioactive leaks into Gulf waters—upon which GCC countries heavily rely, desalinating 60 to 90% of their domestic water—would pose existential threats. Escalation between Iran and Israel is already emboldening the Houthis to suspend their ceasefire with the US and increase attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, another vital trade artery for Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most critically, the carefully cultivated image of the Gulf as a stable haven would be shattered, undermining investor confidence and jeopardising long-term development goals.
New order in the making
Beyond immediate security concerns, Gulf capitals are closely watching the long-term implications of the crisis for regional power dynamics. While they have no love lost for Iran and have certainly welcomed its relative weakening, some fear that the current confrontation is going too far.
There is growing concern that Israel’s endgame—a restructured “new Middle East” anchored by overwhelming military power—leaves little room for Gulf interests and autonomy
A major concern is that the US-Israeli campaign could push Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, a development seen as an existential threat. At the same time, there is deep unease over Israel’s apparent pursuit of regime change and, ultimately, Iranian state collapse. Such actions would open a Pandora’s box, with spillover effects that could destabilise the entire region. Israel also appears to be seeking a vision of regional supremacy that deeply unsettles Arab powers. Israel’s seeming endgame—a restructured “new Middle East” anchored by overwhelming military power—leaves little room for Gulf interests and autonomy.
The ongoing campaign against Iran has also starkly exposed uncertainties about the US role as a reliable partner for the GCC. Only weeks earlier, President Donald Trump toured the region, praising the Gulf’s political stability and promising to back an environment conducive to economic growth. That promise now rings hollow. Washington’s unreserved support for Israel’s strikes, coupled with ambiguous talk of regime change in Tehran, is seen in the Gulf as reckless adventurism. Trump’s support for Israel’s miliary actions in Gaza, and earlier remarks about turning Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East”, had already dampened Gulf confidence in America’s ability to bring durable peace to the region. With escalation intensifying, Gulf states now wonder whether US policy is more a liability than a safeguard.
If there is one strategic lesson Gulf leaders are drawing from the crisis, it is the wisdom of their diplomatic outreach to Iran. By acting independently—often in defiance of Washington—they have succeeded in establishing communication channels that offer a degree of insulation from the worst outcomes. Tehran’s avoidance of targeting Gulf interests or closing the Strait of Hormuz is widely attributed to this diplomacy. This approach has increased Iran’s reliance on regional ties to weather US pressure, giving the Gulf states new leverage.
It has also elevated their role in regional diplomacy. Following Iran’s strikes on Al Udeid, Qatar helped broker the ceasefire between Iran and Israel, even as sporadic attacks continued. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, has been in frequent contact with Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian. Behind the scenes, Gulf capitals are working to de-escalate tensions and prevent further regional destabilisation.
Europe’s role
The ceasefire remains precarious, and the space for diplomacy is narrow. If European powers are serious about supporting a peaceful path—especially one that revives the Iranian nuclear talks—now is the time to act. Cooperating with Gulf players will be key. Although some Europeans support the US strikes, they share with the Gulf states a core interest in preserving regional stability, avoiding further conflict, and preventing Iran’s nuclearisation. With the risk of devastating escalation—and growing doubts about the success of the US military strikes—both Europe and the Gulf should insist on the importance of diplomacy over force.
In recent days, Gulf capitals have shown a genuine desire for Europe to play a more assertive role in moderation, particularly in counterbalancing the destabilising drift of US policy. The Gulf holds unique leverage: access to Iranian and Israeli decision makers, longstanding security ties with Washington and a vested interest in regional calm. By working together, Gulf states and Europe could lead a pragmatic de-escalation initiative.
At the heart of a pathway forward is the creation of a regional consortium between Iran and Arab Gulf states. Gulf countries could encourage Iran to return to the negotiation table while urging Trump to restrain Israel and avoid maximalist demands on Iran—both of which could kill all prospects of nuclear negotiations.
To be credible to their Gulf interlocutors, Europeans should also condemn much more firmly Israeli strikes on Iran as a violation of international law and a dangerous attempt to derail talks.
The recent postponement of the Saudi-French conference on Palestine was a missed opportunity for Europe to deepen its engagement with the Gulf. The current crisis may present a second chance. By supporting diplomacy, European actors can reassert themselves as credible and stabilising partners in a region where trust in the US is eroding.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.