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The untimely death of Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi cast a long shadow over the nation, coming at a time of geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East. With the recently concluded elections in the Islamic Republic, Masoud Pezeshkian’s win is being seen as a glimmer of hope for reviving the stalled nuclear deal between Tehran and the international community. Pezeshkian, a cardiologist and a former Health Minister represents a more pragmatic approach, with a reformist outlook towards both domestic and international issues. One of the major challenges that the state is currently dealing with is the economic sanctions imposed by the United States (US). After the latter’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the deal is dead locked. The upcoming US elections and the newly elected reformist Iranian President have opened speculation over the prospect of reviving the deal. Understanding the strategic intricacies at play would help us understand the conditions for its revival.
The Deal: US-Iran equation
The JCPOA deal of 2015, popularly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, which was originally aimed at preventing Iran from building a nuclear bomb, would have technically expired next year. But it has been dead since the US withdrew from the deal in 2018 under the Trump administration. This has, in turn, encouraged the Iranians to continue enriching uranium, where certain experts say it has enough fuel to produce three or more bombs in a few weeks. Iran claims its nuclear programme is peaceful and that it is barred from manufacturing or using nuclear weapons by a ‘nuclear fatwa’ issued by the Supreme Leader in 2003. However, the Americans backed by the Israelis are quite apprehensive that this could change.
Iran claims its nuclear programme is peaceful and that it is barred from manufacturing or using nuclear weapons by a ‘nuclear fatwa’ issued by the Supreme Leader in 2003.
As of now, Pezeshkian has not put forth any specific foreign policy proposal to restart discussions with the West. But the chief foreign policy adviser for his campaign, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister who brokered the nuclear deal with world powers in 2015, would surely be inclined to revive it. This would not just commence the dialogue with the US, but would also ease the burden on the Iranian economy, which is currently reeling under high inflation, unemployment, and trade restrictions due to economic sanctions. The US, on the other hand, is currently going through an election campaign and is expected to wait until the new administration comes to power before making any significant foreign policy moves. But the US is expected to insist on the new Iranian administration fulfilling their previous commitments before any future negotiations can begin.
Limited power: The upper hand of the Supreme Leader
The domestic political landscape of the Islamic Republic of Iran is characterised by a complex interplay between reformist and hardline factions, each exerting influence within the nation’s unique theocratic-republican framework. The reformist President in power now, who seeks to alter the rigid status quo, would still be subordinate to the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with the influential clergy, play a pivotal role in maintaining the status quo limiting the advancement of reforms.
Ayatollah Khamenei wields ultimate authority over Iran’s political and religious domains, significantly constraining the reformist agenda. Despite the election of a reformist president with a mandate to improve relations with the US and the international community, the Supreme Leader’s overarching control effectively stifles such ambitions. Also, to protect the established principles of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has evolved into a formidable political and economic force. Its unwavering loyalty to the Supreme Leader and its close proximity to his office grant it substantial sway over any substantial policy diversions by the new President in the sphere of national security and foreign policy.
Ayatollah Khamenei wields ultimate authority over Iran’s political and religious domains, significantly constraining the reformist agenda.
The Supreme Leader’s stance on reviving the nuclear deal seems pretty stern stating: “Those who believe in achieving prosperity through friendlier relations with the US are deluded,” alluding to the fact that it was the US, not Iran, that withdrew from the nuclear deal. Pezeshkian is likely to be isolated with too many domestic forces arrayed against him. It will be a challenge for the new President to create a working relationship with the Supreme Leader as he seeks to improve relations with the West to remove sanctions that have long held back the economy.
Prospects for the revival
For the deal to be reinstated, it is important to look at the current status of Iran’s nuclear programme, especially since it restarted enriching uranium after the deal was rendered defunct in 2018. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, Iran has continued to violate the terms of the JCPOA agreement since 2019. It has defiantly lifted the cap that the agreement had put on its uranium enrichment. It has increased its enrichment level to 60 percent, which is 27 times higher than the level permitted.
The JCPOA caps the enrichment level up to 3.67 percent, allowing the civilian use of nuclear energy. Iran has expanded its enrichment capabilities and resumed nuclear activities at facilities that were previously prohibited under the terms of the deal. Under the JCPOA’s terms, Iran’s breakout time—the time it could take to produce enough fissile material for making a nuclear weapon—had reached zero. A 2023 IAEA report says that the uranium has been enriched up to 83 percent at a nuclear facility in Fordow, for which Iran had responded that it was the result of unintended fluctuations in enrichment levels, during a transition phase in the centrifuge operation.
The Iranian Government has blamed the violations on the failure of the signatories of the JCPOA to comply with their end of the commitment under the deal and deliver sanctions relief. The US has called such violations “extremely grave” and one that “further strengthened the view that there is no credible civilian justification for Iran’s violation”.
The Biden Administration had sought to restore the deal in 2022 and it was reportedly to be concluded by the end of the summer that year. However, the formal talks stalled, though they did not fail completely. Along with the enrichment violation, the US has accused Iran of making ‘extraneous’ demands to revive the deal, like the removal of IRGC from the US foreign terrorist list and closure of the ongoing IAEA investigations into the undeclared nuclear facilities. There is also a concern internationally and regionally that the political appetite for reaching an agreement has faded away after the Mahsa Amini incident; Iran’s supply of drones to Russia in Ukraine; and its covert support to Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen to create instability in the region.
The Biden Administration had sought to restore the deal in 2022 and it was reportedly to be concluded by the end of the summer that year. However, the formal talks stalled, though they did not fail completely.
At best, the prospects for reviving the nuclear deal under Iran’s new president inspire cautious optimism, potentially ameliorating Iran’s economic crisis and moderating its foreign policy. The Pezeshkian administration is inclined towards negotiating with Western powers, aiming to mitigate economic sanctions and foster a more stable and prosperous Iran. Nonetheless, the complexities inherent in US–Iran relations present formidable challenges. The Supreme Leader’s overarching authority, alongside the influential role of the IRGC, frequently constrains reformist endeavours while steering Iran to pursue a more conservative foreign policy.
This dynamic necessitates a nuanced comprehension of the interplay between Iran’s political factions. While the new president may ostensibly hold a mandate for change, the entrenched power structures and deep-seated historical mistrust between the US and Iran complicate the path to a renewed agreement. Furthermore, the possibility of former President Donald Trump returning to power in the United States introduces an additional layer of uncertainty. Given Trump’s previous withdrawal from the JCPOA, his potential re-election could undermine current negotiation efforts and exacerbate tensions.
Although some hope exists for progress, it is tempered by the difficult realities of Iran’s domestic politics and the enduring complexities characterising its international relations. Thus, a balanced outlook must acknowledge both the potential for diplomatic advancement and the significant impediments that remain, including the shifting political landscape in the United States.
Amey Velangi is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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