Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been touring the Middle East, trying to build support for Tehran in anticipation of an Israeli response to Iran’s second missile barrage against Israel in a year of rising confrontation between Iran, Iran-backed groups, and Israel.
The regional tour has included rare trips to close U.S. allies Jordan and Egypt, both of which have peace agreements with Israel. But there has been no indication of any major shift in Iran’s rejectionist stance and no reconsideration of Iran’s support for the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” which has suffered major blows over the past year. While such diplomatic outreach is essential in terms of messaging, it does not substitute for a comprehensive and effective diplomatic initiative involving all relevant players.
The war that began with the Hamas assault on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, has continued to expand into Lebanon and as far as the Red Sea. Israel has also intensified a campaign of assassination against the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah as well as senior Iranian military commanders. On Oct. 1, Iran responded by sending nearly 200 ballistic missiles into Israel. This was followed two weeks later by a Hezbollah drone assault on an Israeli military base, killing four Israelis and wounding 60 others. In response, the United States has deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system to the region, along with 100 U.S. servicemen tasked with its operation. These moves reflect a heightened state of alert and preparation for potential escalation, particularly in anticipation of Israeli retaliatory strikes on Iran and Iran’s reaction to a possible attack.
The Iranian government, while aiming to redefine its foreign policy and engage with the West, faces criticism for not adequately addressing regional tensions and the need for negotiations to alleviate sanctions and stabilize the economy. Former top diplomat Ali Akbar Farazi told an Iranian newspaper that “with the series of events that took place in the Middle East, especially after the developments in Lebanon, the cabinet of [President Masoud] Pezeshkian did not have the opportunity to pursue the foreign policy it promised during the election campaign.” Farazi added that the new Iranian administration “may face obstruction and sabotage from various radical factions. However, all of these issues do not negate the fact that the outcome of such a duality in foreign policy falls on the shoulders of the people, and society must bear the cost of these sanctions.”
The current situation is the opposite of what Pezeshkian hoped to achieve when he came to office this summer. At the United Nations General Assembly in September, Pezeshkian made a strong pitch for new negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, including with the United States. However, Araghchi, while visiting Oman, informed reporters that indirect talks with the U.S. in that country had stopped, saying that Tehran sees no “basis for them” amid the ongoing wars and escalating regional tensions. Oman has historically served as a mediator between Iran and the United States, playing a crucial role in both nuclear negotiations and prisoner exchanges. Araghchi further stated, “As long as we cannot overcome the current crisis, we do not see a basis for these discussions, and we must decide whether to resume negotiations or not.”
Rather than establishing a foundation for improvement, the situation has deteriorated, suggesting that if this trend continues, the current government’s performance will mirror that of its predecessor, the late Ebrahim Raisi, or be even worse. The latest indication came on Oct. 16 when Iran reiterated its full military support for the Axis of Resistance in the aftermath of Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) issued a statement, saying the rights of Palestinians to self-rule are undeniable and that IRGC “will not hesitate to strongly support the Palestinian cause.” The head of the IRGC, Hossein Salami, went further, saying that the death of Sinwar “will inflame the fire of the anti-Zionist resistance and, by God’s grace, in the not too distant future, the usurpers of the Holy Land will turn into ashes.”
This emphasis on resistance comes as the Axis may be on the verge of losing one of its key members. Syria leader Bashar al-Assad has already shown that he wants to improve his relations with Arab countries even at the cost of losing Iranian support. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran and Syria have had a strong and close relationship based on a mix of strategic, ideological, and geopolitical interests. This alliance was especially evident in their opposition to common regional enemies like Israel and Iraq (during Saddam Hussein’s rule), and it intensified during the Syrian civil war when Iran played a key role in preserving the Assad government.
Syria considers Israel its enemy, and this hostility has escalated since Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967. In that sense, Damascus shares strategic interests with Tehran and Hezbollah.
Despite this, there are signs that Syria is trying to balance this alliance and improve relations with fellow Arab countries. On May 7, 2023, Arab League foreign ministers reached an agreement to allow Syrian delegations to return to League meetings for the first time in nearly 12 years. Assad also nurses a grudge against Hamas for moving its external headquarters from Damascus to Doha, Qatar during the Syrian civil war.
If Syria leaves the Axis, Iran and Hezbollah will be weaker and more isolated in the Arab world. Moreover, Iran may not be able to use Syria as a land bridge to provide weapons and supplies to Hezbollah.
Many Iranians believe that Israel, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, seeks to escalate conflicts and draw the U.S. into a direct confrontation with Iran. To counter this, Iran must prioritize negotiations with the West to try to get relief from sanctions.
For Iran to effectively navigate the geopolitical landscape and improve its economic situation, a dual approach is necessary: engaging in regional diplomacy while simultaneously pursuing negotiations with Western powers. Such a strategy could enhance Iran’s regional influence and secure its national interests, moving beyond a solely confrontational stance.
Iran’s priorities must also shift from focusing solely on nuclear negotiations to addressing the immediate threat of a wider conflict. This necessitates continuous dialogue and coalition-building with various international partners.
The complex dynamics unfolding in Gaza and Lebanon highlight the urgent need for Iranian officials to transition from reactive measures to a more structured approach that prioritizes sustained dialogue and coalition-building. Engaging both regional partners and Western powers is crucial for alleviating sanctions and addressing domestic economic concerns while countering Israeli threats of a wider war. Iran not only should refrain from more provocative rhetoric and confrontational actions but also commit to meaningful negotiations with the U.S. and the European Union to enhance its standing in the international community, stabilize its position, and work towards a peaceful resolution of regional conflict.