A week-long visit to Algeria and Tunisia (24-29 November) by an Iranian delegation led by Ebrahim Azizi, head of the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, signalled an important step in Tehran’s efforts to re-engage with these two Mediterranean countries. The visit coincided with the meetings of Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi with his Algerian and Tunisian counterparts, Ahmed Attaf and Nabil Ammar, respectively, during the 10th Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations in Lisbon (25-27 November).
Coming at the end of a year marked by unprecedented openings between Iran and the two North African countries, these recent diplomatic moves may signal a notable shift in regional dynamics. They underscore Tehran’s renewed efforts to expand its influence in Africa and in the Mediterranean at a time when the Islamic Republic faces mounting pressure following Israel’s attacks, Hezbollah’s weakening position in Lebanon, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. Against this backdrop, the Maghreb—strategically positioned between the Sahel and the Mediterranean—presents Iran with a key opportunity to deepen ties with nations that maintain independent and pragmatic foreign policies, thereby reinforcing its geopolitical reach.
High-level engagements and historical context
In February 2024, then-Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi visited Algiers, the first such visit by an Iranian leader in 14 years, at a time when relations between the two countries had been gradually strengthening for about two decades. Diplomatic ties had been severed during Algeria’s “dark decade” of civil war in the 1990s, when Tehran was accusedof backing Islamist insurgents opposed to the Algerian government.
Ties were re-established in 2000, and since then, the two countries have found common ground in multiple cooperation and partnership agreements, as well as international issues—including shared hostility toward Israel and friendly relations with Russia. However, bilateral trade between Algeria and Iran has fluctuated over the last twenty years. In 2021, Iran’s exports to Algeria reached $67.4 million, up from $30.2 million in 2016, reflecting a 17.4% annualised growth rate over five years, while Algeria’s exports to Iran have remained modest.
Since 2023, a series of high-level visits have indicated a deepening relationship. Algeria’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf and Ibrahim Boughali, the speaker of the House of Representatives, both visited Iran in July and August 2023 respectively. Mr Attaf announced at the time, alongside his Iranian counterpart, Amir-Abdollahian, that the two countries would soon eliminate visa requirements for travellers—though this change has yet to be implemented—and that bilateral cooperation would expand across various sectors, including industry, science and technology, tourism, and agriculture. During Raisi’s visit to Algeria for the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, several memoranda of understanding were signed between the two countries, including agreements on energy.
Tunisia’s relationship with Iran has always been troubled. President Kais Saied’s visit to Tehran in May 2024 for Raisi’s funeral was the first by a Tunisian head of state since Habib Bourguiba’s visit in 1965. Relations soured following the Islamic revolution and were severed by Tunisia in 1987, over concerns about Islamist influence in the country. Relations were restored under President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and remained intact after the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Saied’s May 2024 meeting with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran marked a significant tactical shift in Tunisian diplomacy. However, relations had been warming since Saied’s election, evidenced by growing interactions and meetings between Tunisian and Iranian political figures.
Maghreb fits into Iran’s broader African ambitions
Iran’s outreach to the Maghreb aligns with its broader strategy to enhance its presence across Africa. Under Ebrahim Raisi’s administration, the continent regained prominence in Teheran’s foreign policy. His July 2023 tour of Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe marked the first Iranian presidential visit to the continent in a decade. Raisi’s successor, Masoud Pezeshkian, seems equally committed to sustaining this momentum.
While Iran’s economic footprint in Africa remains modest—bilateral trade totaled $1.3 billion in 2023—Iranian officials have consistently pushed for expanded partnerships, using platforms like the Iran-Africa Trade Summit to signal intent. Tehran frames these efforts as mutually beneficial, appealing to growing anti-Western sentiments in Africa—particularly in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where several coups d’état have distanced governments from major international players like France and the United States.
Iran has also sought to position itself as an arms supplier to African states, offering cost-effective alternatives to authoritarian countries facing Western embargoes. Tehran’s success in exporting drones to conflict zones like Ethiopia and Sudan highlights its growing influence through military cooperation.
Strategic interests and implications
Tehran’s renewed engagement with Algiers and Tunis reflects its efforts to counter international isolation and extend its influence westward beyond the Middle East. Following the events of October the 7th, Iran’s regional standing has weakened due to setbacks in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. In this context, the Maghreb might offer an opportunity for diplomatic recalibration, allowing the Islamic Republic to diversify its alliances and rebuild its strategic posture in an evolving geopolitical landscape.
On the diplomatic front, Iran benefits from Algeria’s longstanding policy of non-alignment and Tunisia’s pragmatic approach to foreign relations. These positions enable Tehran to engage without pressuring its partners into divisive alliances.
Economically, Iran seeks to bypass sanctions and access new markets. Algeria, with its vast energy resources, offers opportunities for economic cooperation. During Raisi’s March 2024 visit to Algiers, agreements were signed in the gas, energy, and technology sectors to boost trade and investments. These ambitions extend beyond hydrocarbons, as non-oil trade has shown promising growth since 2023. Similarly, Tunisia has committed to revitalising its economic ties with Iran, as both nations have recently explored opportunities to expand trade relations and joint initiatives.
Iran’s partnership with Maghreb countries holds mutual significance. For Algeria, currently holding a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, Tehran’s partnership offers an opportunity to diversify alliances and project itself as a regional power. It also provides a counterweight to Morocco’s growing diplomatic influence, particularly as Rabat deepens ties with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE and normalises relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords—moves Algeria strongly opposes. By aligning with Iran, an outspoken critic of Israel’s influence, Algeria reinforces its anti-Israeli and anti-Gulf positions, reinforcing its regional position in Africa and the Arab world, aligning with Tehran’s rhetoric. Thus, while the Algeria-Iran relationship remains largely symbolic and limited economically, it serves Algeria’s goal of balancing Morocco’s rising influence and solidifying its role as a major player in African diplomacy.
The recent rapprochement between Iran and Algeria is complicated by allegations of Iranian support for the Polisario Front, a movement advocating for Western Sahara’s independence under the self-proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)—which Iran recognised in 1980. These claims, which led Morocco to sever diplomatic ties with Iran in 2018, revolve around accusations of indirect assistance via Hezbollah. While direct Iranian involvement remains unproven, the perception alone sends a strategic message to Rabat.
Likewise, Tunisia’s precarious political and economic conditions under President Saied’s leadership have created an opening for closer ties with Tehran, setting the stage for potential realignment. For Saied, this rapprochement aligns with his diplomatic trajectory, where “anti-imperialist” ideology intersects with Tunisia’s urgent need for financial relief amid an economic crisis. Domestically, this adds an ideological dimension to Tunisia’s engagement with Tehran, reinforcing Saied’s image as a leader who challenges Western dominance and strengthens his broader narrative of Tunisia as a sovereign actor capable of forging diverse alliances. Internationally, it underscores Tunisia’s pivot toward a more diversified diplomatic approach, despite the risks of alienating traditional allies. Even if Iran’s ability to provide substantial economic aid is limited, engaging Tehran symbolically bolsters Saied’s bargaining position with Western and Gulf powers, who may be prompted to offer more support to counteract Tehran’s influence.
Limits, not just opportunities
Despite shared interests, doubts persist about the long-term scope of Iran’s rapprochement with these Maghreb countries. Historical divides, ideological differences, and Tehran’s limited economic capacity remain significant barriers to deeper Iran-Algeria relations. Economically, their relationship remains largely symbolic, as Tehran’s constrained capacity to deliver significant investments or trade volumes limits its ability to transform this partnership into tangible economic cooperation. Unsurprisingly, Algeria’s diplomatic, economic, and political elites remain divided, with many still favouring strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia, perceived as a more influential and resourceful partner than Iran.
Tunisia, meanwhile, remains cautious, reflecting its pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Tunis is well aware that Iran would not address its primary concern: the economy. Hence, its opening toward Tehran may be seen as a calculated move to leverage potential Iranian ties in negotiations with Western and Gulf partners.
The collapse of the Assad regime may also have broader implications. As Sharan Grewal, senior fellow at Brookings, notes, “Iran’s inability or unwillingness to help its strong ally Assad in his moment of greatest need might dampen some of the enthusiasm for allying with Iran”. Nevertheless, cautious reactions from both capitals to Syrian events suggest that the logic driving this gradual rapprochement remains intact: an attempt to diversify alliances in a growingly multipolar world to improve their standing and strengthen economic ties.