Iran’s Shia crescent falters: How regional power shifts after October 7 – opinion

Before October 7, it could be said that Iran was at the peak of its regional influence and power. The Shia crescent was stronger than ever, and Iran’s regional influence was growing steadily. Many Shi’ite, or Shia, forces moved from Iran to Iraq, then to Syria, and from there to Lebanon, frequently traveling back and forth, carrying weapons and money. Hezbollah, a Shi’ite terror organization formed after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, held firm control over Lebanon and was considered one of the most intimidating terrorist organizations for Israel.

Iraq, a large Arab country of many religions, sects, clans, and ethnicities, is mostly populated by Shia Arabs. After the fall of ISIS, many Shia militias sent by Iran operated in Iraq, and until the last elections, the Iraqi government was openly pro-Iranian. However, after the recent elections, the Iraqi government has become less pro-Iranian, in contrast with the previous regime of Nouri al-Maliki. While Shia militias still operate in the country and even attack US forces stationed in Iraq, sending missiles to Israel under Iran’s orders, Iran’s influence in Iraq has significantly weakened in recent years.

Syria was controlled by Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite family (an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam), and Assad’s rule was advantageous for Iran in Syria. Ethnically, the Alawites in Syria identify with Shia Muslims, both because of their own Shi’ite origins and because, like the Shia, they are a persecuted minority (at least in the past) in the Muslim world. Moreover, Assad owed his rule to Iran for if it hadn’t been for the Iranian Quds forces that helped his army in 2015, Syria would have fallen to the rebels a decade ago.

Beyond the Shia crescent, which extended territorially from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, Iran also influenced other parts of the Middle East: The Houthis in Yemen, who began their terrorist activities with the outbreak, in 2014, of the current Yemeni civil war in the wake of the Arab Spring are Shia and loyal to the Islamic Republic and act according to Iran’s military and political requirements. The Houthis owe Iran much for its military and financial support.

The two Palestinian terror organizations in Gaza, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), are considered Iranian proxies, although one is ideologically closer to Iran than the other. Hamas, which originated from the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, was drawn to Iran due to their shared enemy: Israel. For many years, Iran has transferred financial assistance to Hamas, utilized to purchase weapons used against Israeli civilians. The other Gaza-based organization, the PIJ, was founded by Fathi Shiqaqi, who was inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran and established this terror group even before Hamas’s official formation.

Vulnerable Iran

YET, DESPITE all its proxies across the Middle East, Iran now finds itself in a weakened position. During the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s military capabilities were severely damaged by Israel. In addition to uncovering numerous weapons caches in southern Lebanon – as well as hundreds of thousands of dollars – Israel killed many Hezbollah operatives, both from the air and on the ground. Furthermore, Israel managed to eliminate much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, creating a reality where high-ranking members of the organization were constantly replaced, as they did not survive. Israel even managed to eliminate Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, a key ideological and influential figure in Iran’s resistance axis in the region.

The severe blows Hezbollah has taken from Israel since they attacked it on October 8 have greatly weakened the group, altering the military balance of power and regional influence it once enjoyed. 

Following the developments in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict and the aggressive weakening of the group, the terror group was unable to send fighters to assist Assad’s regime against the Sunni rebels in Syria. Hezbollah had frequently collaborated with Assad’s regime, under Iran’s direction of course. Once Hezbollah forces could no longer aid Assad’s regime and exert military power against its enemies, the balance of power in the region was disrupted, putting Assad in a militarily disadvantaged position and causing him to lose control of Syria. After Assad’s regime collapsed, Sunni rebels, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, once considered an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria – took control. 

The Sunni rebels view Iran as their enemy and, of course, will not cooperate with it. As a result, the Shia crescent has been severed. Iran no longer has territorial continuity to Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. It cannot send convoys of weapons from its territory through Iraq to Syria and Hezbollah.

Along with Assad’s fall and the blows Hezbollah has taken, the Palestinian terror organizations in Gaza are also no longer what they were before October 7. Only a third of Hamas operatives from before the war are still active, the organization has lost a significant amount of weapons, money, and the trust of Gaza’s residents in its promises and in the righteousness of its cause. Hamas has not disappeared, but with the deaths of Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Ismail Haniyeh, and many others, the organization and its military influence are nowhere near what they were before the war.

IRAN HAS lost Syria, along with the Shia crescent that provided them with territorial continuity. The Palestinian terror organizations in Gaza, which Iran funds, are weak and submissive. If they initiate another war or violate their agreements with Israel, the Jewish state will have full legitimacy to act and to completely destroy them.

The Iraqi government no longer cooperates with Iran and is preventing it from looting the country’s treasury for its foreign currency reserves. Furthermore, based on Israel’s recent operation in Lebanon, it is clear that the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria have not played a significant role in the fighting. In terms of airstrikes, although UAVs were launched through Iraq to Israel several times, they did not cause significant damage.

The Houthis are still acting on Iran’s behalf, but frankly, how much are they really contributing to Iran? Moreover, the Houthis have also taken heavy blows from the Israeli Air Force and other Western forces attacking them from the sky. 

Does this mean that Iran has thrown in the towel? The answer to this is definitively no.

Iran is operating in another theater: the Caucasus. In the Armenia-Azerbaijan war, Iran invested in Armenia, assisting it along with Russia (as during the Syrian Civil War when those two countries had helped Assad). The reason is that Azerbaijan maintains a positive and friendly relationship with Israel, and Iran fears that Israel will attack Iran from bases in Azerbaijan. Armenia indicated a commitment to Iran at the beginning of their partnership, but gradually NATO began drawing Armenia toward the West on the geopolitical map.

NATO personnel are active in Armenia, conducting surveillance on IRGC forces and Putin’s operatives in the region. Additionally, the Armenian military conducts joint drills with United States forces, and the US military is already stationed along the Armenian border with Iran in the Zangezur region.

There, an American unit operates in Armenian military bases tasked with tracking missile and UAV launches from Iranian territory. In response, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sent Ali Akbar Ahmadian, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to Armenia to meet with its leadership.

According to diplomatic sources, during the conversation, Ahmadian explicitly stated that Iran was dissatisfied with what was happening in Armenia. Iran demands that Armenia abandon its aspirations for EU and NATO membership and furthermore, expel the Western forces spying on Iran from its territory. Ahmadian added that if Armenia agrees to Iran’s demands, the two countries will sign a defense agreement, meaning that Iran will expel Western forces from Armenia and send its own troops to operate freely in the country.

It is clear that Iran is backed into a corner and sees Armenia as its way out of its geopolitical problems. If Iran indeed signs a defense agreement with Armenia and sends its forces there, it will achieve several goals. Iran will gain more territory bordering Turkey, enabling it to apply military pressure on Ankara through Armenia and Iraq’s shared border with Turkey. Iran’s goal is, of course, to restore the Shia crescent and currently, Erdogan is the strong ally of the rebels who have taken control of Syria, therefore, Iran may attempt to undermine Turkey, through intimidation or attrition, to restore the Islamic Republic’s sphere of influence.

Additionally, via Armenia, Iran could manage smuggling operations with Russia. Armenia’s proximity to Europe is a strategic and geopolitical advantage. In addition, by establishing a military presence in Armenia, Iran would gain more leverage over Azerbaijan, with which it shares an unstable relationship that is not as warm as often portrayed by Tehran.

It is clear that the Islamic Republic is trying to restore its regional power through Armenia and the Southern Caucasus. The IRGC has worked for years, diligently and patiently, to achieve the level of regional influence it had before October 7. Iran’s goal is dominance over the Islamic world. Iranians have the patience of elephants, and they plan for decades.

Therefore, we must monitor every one of their activities closely to try to understand Iran’s next move. Even if it operates in less scrutinized and less Arab regions, Iranian influence is an anti-Western influence.

The writer is a Middle East scholar and commentator on the region.