The Iraqi Government and Internal Balancing
Around two weeks after this postponement, U.S. Central Command announced in late August 2024 that its forces had conducted a joint raid with Iraqi security forces against ISIS elements in the country.
The timing of this operation was seen as an attempt to suggest that the continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was now tied to the resurgence of the ISIS threat, rather than internal political considerations in Iraq or external regional events. It’s noteworthy that the limited scope of the operation would have allowed Iraqi forces to execute it independently, without U.S. support.
The decision to delay the withdrawal of international coalition forces was the result of joint U.S.-Iraqi understandings within a high-level committee formed to review the withdrawal timetable. Therefore, it is evident that the Iraqi government had its internal political reasons for agreeing to this delay, despite the embarrassment caused by retreating from the planned U.S. withdrawal.
The Iraqi government’s position is primarily influenced by the attacks launched by Iranian-aligned Iraqi armed groups on U.S. bases in Iraq since the onset of the Israeli war on Gaza in October 2023. Any U.S. withdrawal under these circumstances could be perceived as a military defeat for the United States in Iraq, which would conflict with the interests of the Iraqi government – especially on the economic front, where maintaining close relations with Washington is crucial even after the withdrawal.
Iraqi officials are particularly concerned about potential financial crises in the event Iraq’s international financial transactions are exposed to future disruptions, especially given that the country’s general budget heavily relies on oil export revenues, denominated in U.S. dollars. For this reason, the Iraqi government is committed to maintaining a balanced relationship with both the United States and Tehran.
In reality, the government of al-Sudani is a product of the intersection between U.S. and Iranian influence within Iraq. Although the “Coordination Framework” coalition that formed this government includes Tehran’s closest Shiite allies in Iraq, including some factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the government has prioritized “organizing the relationship” with Washington and securing its support.
Implicitly, some coalition members have sought to balance Iranian influence in Iraq by fostering a strong relationship with the United States, to prevent Iraq from falling entirely under Iranian control.
Outside the “Coordination Framework,” the U.S. military presence has long been viewed as a guarantee for Kurdish and Sunni communities, which fear the expansion of Iranian influence within Iraq. This concern explains, for example, the absence of Sunni and Kurdish representatives from the February 2024 Iraqi parliamentary session dedicated to discussing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
Consequently, al-Sudani’s government appears determined not to exacerbate the concerns of these local communities through an abrupt and disorganized U.S. withdrawal.
Following the decision to postpone the withdrawal, al-Sudani’s adviser, Diaa al-Nasiri, stated that Iraq no longer needed coalition forces on its territory. However, al-Nasiri indicated that the attacks on Ain al-Asad base had led to the postponement of the withdrawal announcement, revealing that al-Sudani had engaged in mediation with local armed factions to halt these attacks.
Al-Nasiri’s statements confirm that the delay in the withdrawal was intended to ensure a dignified and organized exit for U.S. forces from Iraq, without destabilizing internal political balances or Iraq’s foreign policy.