Iraq is grappling with an escalating water conflict, intensified by severe drought, rising domestic consumption, and the damming policies of neighbouring Turkey and Iran. While researchers have highlighted the transnational nature of Iraq’s water shortage, particularly the direct roles of Turkey and Iran in reducing water flow into Iraq, it is imperative to also consider the indirect factors that impact conflict across borders. Notably, corruption within the water sector in one state can exacerbate water conflicts in neighbouring countries. For instance, security actors like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran, driven by profit motives, have captured government contracts and now play a significant role in dam-building practices.
This system of corruption indirectly impacts water availability in key regions of Iraq which can fuel transnational conflict. Understanding how conflict systems operate, and how resource management, corruption, and the agendas of various actors intersect, is crucial for developing effective strategies. Members of the international community supporting the Iraqi government’s water challenges need to better understand and navigate these transnational dynamics that underscore the water conflict in Iraq.
In such a transnational context, the water crisis extends beyond physical supply and demand. It encompasses political relationships between countries, the influence of armed groups, and the presence of corruption within public and private sector projects. This intricate interplay shapes the potential for conflict and instability, revealing how water scarcity is both a driver and a result of broader systemic factors.
Dam construction in Iran: how corruption in Iran fuels Iraq’s water conflict
The IRGC’s involvement in the construction of water infrastructure inside Iran indirectly results in water shortages and increases the potential for instability and conflict in Iraq. More than just a security force with influence and activities across borders in the Middle East, the IRGC is a key economic actor, deeply involved in business and investment activities in Iran. Its role in dam construction is driven by the force’s ambitions to secure economic gains, often through corruption. The IRGC leverages its ties with the highest levels of the Iranian state and water management authorities to advocate for dam construction, ensuring that companies and firms aligned with the force are awarded contracts for the implementation of these projects.
Construction of dams across Iran is largely attributed to Khatam Al-Anbiya Headquarters (KAA), a business conglomerate with strong connections to the IRGC. The KAA, along with aligned companies and national and regional water management institutions, built numerous dams and other water projects in western Iran and on transboundary rivers flowing to Iraq. An example is the firm’s construction of 14 dams and a number of water diversion channels on the Sirwan River and its tributaries in Iran’s Kermanshah province. The low quality of the dams, when compared to their costs, generated criticism from experts in Kermanshah, highlighting the corruption associated with projects carried out by IRGC-aligned economic foundation.
The Sirwan River is a crucial source of drinking water for large sections of the population in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Sulaimaniyah governorate and serves as a lifeline for farming and agricultural activities in Diyala governorate in federal Iraq. The construction of dams on the river in Iran has reduced the water flow to Iraq, threatening citizens’ access to drinking water and causing water-related stress for many farmers. This everyday form of conflict could also lead to increased instability and social tensions in areas that rely on the river.
In Sulaimaniyah, declining water levels in the Sirwan River have contributed to contamination at Darbandikhan, Kurdistan Region’s second-largest reservoir, which serves as the primary source of drinking water for thousands of people living nearby. Due to contamination and concerns about health risks, residents of the town of Darbandikhan have stopped drinking water supplied through the public grid. Instead, they pay for water transported by truck from nearby streams and wells. This has further exacerbated the economic difficulties of the town’s residents, who are already grappling with the region’s financial crisis. Furthermore, water contamination has strained state-society relations in the affected areas, leading to anti-government protests and conflicts that demand a resolution to the water crisis.
The impact of reduced water levels in the river has also been felt downstream in Diyala, where large sections of the population are employed in agriculture. Between 2020 and 2023, for example, water scarcity led to the near-drying of the province’s Hamrin Lake, a key source of irrigation and drinking water. The crisis left local farmers under significant stress. Given the tribal structure of Diyala’s society and its recent history of sectarian tensions between the Shia and Sunni communities, water scarcity could lead to renewed tribal and sectarian conflict. Many of Diyala’s tribes are armed and aligned with Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which may exacerbate the potential for conflict.
Construction of dams in Iran and their impact on water availability in Iraq are closely tied to the economic interests of the IRGC but they also indirectly fuel various forms of water-related conflict across the border in neighbouring Iraq. This further complicates the root causes of Iraq’s water crisis, which cannot be resolved solely through Iraq-centric water management improvements. Findings from XCEPT research indicate that effectively addressing local issues necessitates a thorough understanding of the transnational dynamics at play. This includes recognizing the cross-border factors that exacerbate local conflicts. By placing Iraq’s water crisis in a transnational conflict systems framework, stakeholders can move beyond one-dimensional fixes and instead develop holistic strategies. This approach highlights how a single resource, shaped by corruption, conflict actors, and economic interests, can reverberate across borders, spreading instability if not properly managed.
While country-specific approaches, such as enhancing the capacity of water-related institutions and promoting the adoption of modern irrigation systems, may help mitigate some of the impacts of water shortages in Iraq, tackling the crisis requires navigating the transnational influences and interests of actors like the IRGC. This underscores the necessity for effective policy responses to integrate coordinated regional frameworks, robust oversight to curb corrupt practices, and conflict-sensitive approaches that acknowledge how decisions made outside Iraq’s borders profoundly affect its stability.
This article was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.