The EU and NATO are at a historic turning point in the wake of the US presidential election. The survival of the transatlantic alliance, the bedrock of Europe’s security, has never been so uncertain since the end of the Cold War. However, this is no time to despair, but to act. The EU’s leadership has committed to strengthen cooperation with NATO, to keep the alliance with the US alive. It will not be easy, but there are ways to curb Donald Trump’s isolationist tendencies while also strengthening the EU’s contributions to NATO and to European security.
Alarm bells are ringing louder than ever
Before his return to the White House, Trump threatened to withdraw from the alliance if other states did not spend 2% of GDP on defence. On the campaign trail, Trump raised doubts about the United States’ commitment to defending Europe, saying that he would encourage Russia to do ‘whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO country that does not pay enough for its defence. This is reminiscent of the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, when Trump came dangerously close to withdrawing from the commitment to defend all allies.
Even if Trump does not withdraw from NATO – it would require congressional approval, which is very unlikely, according to a bill that was sponsored by Trump’s Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio – he can still impede the alliance’s ability to function effectively. He could simply announce on social media that he no longer stands by the United States’ decade-long security commitments and the effects on US deterrence would be immediate. In operational terms, he can scale back US commitments to the command structure to the bare minimum, withdraw forward-based forces and reduce cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing. Some members of Trump’s inner circle have pushed the concept of a ‘dormant NATO’, which would enable the US to refocus its efforts elsewhere, such as in the Indo-Pacific. And some of Trump’s cabinet nominations could indicate a readiness to move US policy in a direction that would be directly harmful to European security.
A reduction in the US forward presence and contributions to NATO’s command structure could create serious gaps in the alliance’s deterrence credibility. Europeans would not be able to fill them in the short term, and Russia could try to expose these vulnerabilities through hybrid or even military attacks, triggering crises of confidence among Europeans.
Divided, then outnumbered?
Count of selected military assets in the United States, other NATO countries and Russia; bubble size represents relative share
Data: IISS, The Military Balance, 2023
Fresh leadership, old conundrum?
Over the course of 2024, the new leaders in both the EU and NATO received a mandate to strengthen cooperation between the two institutions. NATO’s new Secretary General Mark Rutte has extensive experience of working within the EU. President von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines for the new Commission include strengthening the EU-NATO partnership ‘covering all security threats, including new dangers linked to cyber, hybrid or space’.
In their hearings before the European Parliament, both HR/VP Designate Kallas and Defence Commissioner Designate Kubilius argued that the EU should not pursue the development of a separate military force. Rather, the EU must ‘help develop the capabilities and resources needed for the implementation of NATO military deterrence and defence plans’. In other words, the new Commission envisions a complementary, rather than competitive, relationship with NATO in the endeavour to defend Europe.
The new Commission envisions a complementary, rather than competitive, relationship with NATO
This vision will not be easy to implement. Some enduring obstacles remain: the presence of non-member states in both institutions continues to hinder certain activities, such as the exchange of classified information. And some states will prefer to entrust their defence activities to NATO, or pursue bilateral arrangements with the US, rather than contribute to joint EU capability development.
However, one potential positive development in Trump 2.0 could be a more positive attitude towards EU defence contributions. Compared to the past, the US is now more supportive of EU contributions to defence. In 2019, the first Trump administration opposed EU initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF.
One potential positive development in Trump 2.0 could be a more positive attitude towards EU defence contributions.
In 2025, Trump’s vision is based on re-prioritisation (with the focus mostly on China and on domestic challenges) and freeing up resources. This will entail pushing allies to take on greater responsibilities. Allies who contribute to this effort – through spending more and addressing areas that are less of a priority in Washington’s eyes – will have a better chance of being heard, even in Trump’s transactional world. Any steps the EU takes to enhance its defence capabilities will align with this approach and should therefore be seen positively in Washington.
How to meet the new challenges
With Trump’s return to the White House, the EU and NATO face two additional challenges:
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On the one hand, how to strengthen European states’ contribution to deterrence and defence in the event of a potential reduction in US assistance.
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On the other hand, how to persuade the United States that the transatlantic bond is still useful to Washington, and that Europe can play a key role in supporting the Trump administration in the attainment of its security and defence goals, such as countering China.
What can the EU and its Member States do to meet these challenges and safeguard European security during Trump 2.0? Below are three concrete proposals:
Map the consequences: Before acting, we must have a sense of direction. Therefore, the first step the EU and NATO need to take is to map out the areas of European defence that would be most affected by a reduction in American commitments to Europe. This would include not just hard capabilities such as specific weapons, but also a reduction in personnel and shared intelligence, which could deal a serious blow to our ability to detect and deter hybrid attacks. The mapping process should also consider which capabilities can be contributed by non-EU Member States who are in NATO, and which cannot be replaced in the short run. A similar mapping should also address the need for continued support to Ukraine.
Smart capability development: Rather than trying to develop full-spectrum capabilities at once, resources should be focused on producing and procuring the capabilities for which Europeans are most reliant on the United States. These include strategic enablers such as air defence, intelligence, security and reconnaissance (ISR), outer space, cyber defence and electronic warfare capabilities. This process should, ideally, be informed by having access to the NATO Defence Planning Process. However, given the lack of access to classified information, EU Member States who are in NATO should take the lead in coordinating collective development efforts.
Develop a ‘one-theatre’ strategy: The US refocus on China is based on the assumption that the Euro-Atlantic, Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific theatres can be dealt with separately, with the latter taking precedence. However, the past two years have shown that these theatres are increasingly interconnected: Russia’s war against Ukraine relies on steady flows of ammunition (and now troops) from North Korea, ballistic missiles and drones from Iran, and dual-use goods from China. Russia, in exchange, empowers these actors’ aggressiveness with financial, military and diplomatic support. Dealing with all these actors as part of a unified ‘one-theatre’ strategy will be essential for both the EU and NATO. It would also signal to Washington that (1) deterring China cannot be accomplished without stopping Russia; and (2) Europeans are key allies in this effort.
Underlying these three proposals is the need for much higher levels of defence spending by all EU Member States, with full support from EU institutions using all available instruments. Without such investments, promises to Washington and deterrence efforts will lack credibility.