For the first time since October 7 , and after months of delays, the IDF on Thursday released its core investigations into Hamas ‘ attack — while a state commission of inquiry remains nowhere in sight.
Despite the grave failures uncovered, the investigation does not assign personal responsibility to any individual, leaving disciplinary actions and dismissals to outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi ’s successor, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir .
5 View gallery IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, Benjamin Netanyahu ( Photo: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, CONTRERAS / AFP, AP )
Total surprise
The IDF’s October 7 investigative conclusions, while largely unsurprising, paint a grim picture. One key finding highlights the extent of the army’s intelligence failure: the surprise and operational collapse on October 7 were more severe than those of the 1973 Yom Kippur War .
Unlike in 1973, when Israel had prior warnings of a possible Arab attack, debated whether to call up reserves and saw signals of impending war, no such indications were identified this time.
“There was no one who saw or detected any sign of this event in advance, not even at the lowest intelligence level,” one of the central investigations found.
“The surprise was total — situational and fundamental — against a strategic deception that lasted years, an operational deception leading up to the attack and a tactical deception throughout the night before the invasion.” No discussion was ever held about calling up reserves.
The military acknowledged that Hamas successfully employed deception at multiple levels, leading Israel into a deadly trap, including by manipulating its “Jericho Wall” defense concept — a dossier detailing a possible Hamas attack against Israel.
Investigative reports also confirm a that, in a classified General Staff meeting on July 27, 2022, then-Operations Division head Brig. Gen. Yaron Finkelman — who was the IDF’s Southern Command chief on October 7 — ordered preparations for war with Hamas based on the “Jericho Wall” plans. However, no action was taken.
5 View gallery IDF intelligence Unit 8200’s base ( Photo: Yariv Katz )
Deception and missed warnings
During that 2022 discussion, Finkelman concluded that Hamas could only achieve surprise through a deception operation disguised as a military drill or by misinterpreting its own heightened readiness as an Israeli threat.
In a report from November 2023, investigative journalist Ronen Bergman reported that Finkelman himself fell victim to the very deception tactics he had warned about in the early hours of October 7. In a phone assessment at 3:00 a.m. that day, he repeated the same two mistaken assumptions regarding Hamas’ increased alert level.
Hamas initially planned to launch its invasion during the Jewish High Holidays in 2022 and again on Passover in 2023, while the IDF chief was stationed at the Kissufim base for the night — unaware of the plans. Hamas ultimately postponed the attack to improve its elite Nukhba forces ‘ readiness.
Halevi first heard about the “Jericho Wall” report only two weeks after the war began, despite having served in key intelligence and operational roles — including as Military Intelligence Directorate chief, Southern Command chief and deputy chief of staff — over the past decade.
The investigation also suggests that Hezbollah refrained from joining the war due to a misunderstanding in its coordination with Hamas in July 2023.
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5 View gallery Terrorists infiltrating Israel on October 7 ( צילום: Hani Alshaer, AFP )
Failures in intelligence and defense strategy
Halevi insisted on launching IDF probes at the start of the war despite opposition from some military leaders, who feared it would lead to finger-pointing while soldiers were still fighting in Gaza.
Delays caused by the war’s expansion to Lebanon, Iran and Yemen, as well as political disputes over responsibility, slowed the process. Now, the military has concluded 18 General Staff-level investigations.
Four core reports have been presented to the public, focusing on Israel’s flawed perception of Hamas before October 7, intelligence failures at all levels — particularly the lack of strategic and tactical warnings — the critical hours leading up to the attack and the collapse of the IDF’s Gaza Division .
According to the findings, Israel’s long-standing policy of differentiating between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority strengthened the terrorist organization, including through the flow of Qatari cash into Gaza and humanitarian concessions.
Israel chose a “conflict management” approach that sought to maintain the status quo, based on the mistaken belief that Hamas neither wanted nor was preparing for a large-scale war.
This assumption was built on deterrence and cease-fire agreements, but Hamas used deception tactics to reinforce it. “In hindsight, this was a grave mistake,” the report read. The threat of a surprise large-scale attack was not considered a plausible scenario, as intelligence assessments assumed Hamas would not launch a war without warning.
The underlying belief was that Israel held military superiority, Hamas was a secondary threat and Military Intelligence “knew everything.”
5 View gallery Terrorists infiltrating Israel on October 7 ( Photo: Roy Edan )
Operational collapse on October 7
The massive above- and below-ground border defenses Israel built along Gaza created a false sense of security, forcing Hamas to develop alternative invasion tactics that bypassed tunnels. Confidence in the border barrier led to a reduction in troop deployment along the border.
The investigation found that on October 7 the IDF’s conflict-management strategy collapsed, as did the assumption that enemy attacks could be contained along the border fence. “The concept was deeply entrenched — there was no systematic effort to challenge it,” the report read.
Before the war, IDF Southern Command assessed that the worst-case scenario would be an infiltration of about 70 terrorists from two locations. In reality, around 5,000 terrorists breached the border, murdering more than 1,160 people in a single day.
Three months before the attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the military to shift its focus to Iran, Hezbollah and the West Bank while de-escalating the Gaza front.
Decision-making failures at the highest levels
Despite at least 10 warning signs in the two years before the war, IDF intelligence failed to reassess its assumptions. “We read the signals but we didn’t see what they actually said. There was a false sense of security,” IDF officials admitted. However, the investigation did not find evidence of negligence or dereliction of duty among intelligence officers.
The intelligence division lacked a critical approach, failing to challenge its own assumptions. Analysts focused on Hamas’ intentions rather than its capabilities and lacked sufficient understanding of radical Islam. Military Intelligence officers also showed long-standing organizational failures in questioning strategic assessments, even after October 7. Two officers were deemed unfit for their roles.
5 View gallery Defense Minister Israel Katz with Halevi and Zamir ( Photo: Ariel Hermoni, Defense Ministry )
Hamas, the investigation found, had been systematically preparing for war since 2016. The 2021 Gaza conflict bolstered its confidence, reinforcing its belief that Israel was weak and that total “liberation” was achievable. By July 2023, Hamas had developed an integrated war plan, coordinated with Hezbollah and Iran, aimed at Israel’s destruction.
Failures in military response
Although signs of an imminent attack were present the night before October 7 — such as increased rocket launch indications and Hamas militants disappearing into tunnels — these were not recognized as serious warnings. Intelligence was passed via WhatsApp messages from the Shin Bet to IDF intelligence but was not properly escalated.
In the crucial early hours of October 7, IDF forces remained in routine security positions, with no reinforcement of troops. The Gaza Division collapsed within hours, but this was not immediately understood by military leaders, delaying an effective response.
The failure to comprehend the scale of the attack in real-time resulted in critical decision-making gaps. The Israeli Air Force was also unprepared for an invasion of this scale. While its forces were on routine alert, it had no contingency plan for repelling a massive ground assault. Despite numerous intelligence and operational failures, no senior officers have been dismissed.
Calls for external investigations blocked
Despite demands from IDF leaders, political figures and the Israeli public, Netanyahu has blocked efforts to establish an independent state commission of inquiry into the worst attack on Jews since the Holocaust. Unlike past wars, no external military investigation has been authorized, apart from a partial review by Israel’s state comptroller.
Some senior officers consulted lawyers before giving testimony to investigators. Halevi himself chose not to do so and was reportedly disappointed to see legal influence in some officers’ responses.