By Brendon J. Cannon, July 18, 2024
Turkey’s intervention in Libya that began in 2019 fundamentally reshaped the nearly decade-old conflict. Backed by its Bayraktar TB2 drones, Turkey’s support of the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli turned the tide against the United Arab Emirates-backed Libyan National Army (LNA) headed by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, as the TB2 disrupted LNA forces, took out Russian-made Pantsir missile systems, and established air supremacy in Libya’s skies.
Turkey’s role in Libya was significant because it was one more marker of the significant shift in Middle East power dynamics since the dawn of the new millennium. Turkish forces were in Libya for the first time in over 100 years. Their assertiveness alongside cutting-edge and affordable weaponry showcased Ankara’s growing influence in the “new” Middle East – a region where traditional powerhouses like Egypt and Syria are now challenged by the emergence of new power in Turkey and the Persian Gulf.
The Middle East is a dynamic region shaped by historical legacies, geopolitical rivalries, and the significant involvement of other countries. However, in recent years, a notable shift in the distribution of political and economic power has been underway, challenging traditional power centres and reshaping regional alliances. With political and economic power and influence moving from Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad to the Gulf states, Iran, and Turkey, Canada faces a new challenge: how to best navigate this evolving situation and develop a comprehensive Middle East policy.
Rise and decline of Middle East states
During the Cold War, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq vied for influence and for the title of leader of the Arab World. Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, came the closest to claiming it when it emerged as a powerful voice advocating pan-Arab unity against Israel. Syria, under the leaderships of the Arab nationalist Ba’ath Party, pursued a similar agenda and established a short-lived political union with Egypt, the United Arab Republic, from 1958–1961. By the 1970s, after the death of Nasser and the decline of Syrian power, Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, took up the cause of Arab nationalism and attempted to assert its influence both in the Levant (a region that spans modern-day Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) as well as further south in the Persian Gulf.
All three states experienced a litany of challenges and, at times, self-made tragedies since the early 1990s that contributed to their decline. Economic stagnation, exacerbated by mismanagement, corruption, and structural adjustment policies, for example, hampered growth and development. Political instability and internal conflicts further weakened state institutions and undermined governance. The Arab Uprisings or “Arab Spring” that began in Tunisia in 2010 was, for some, the final nail in the proverbial coffin. Syria, for instance, fell into a vicious civil war that has killed more than 600,000 and brought in proxy actors such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Iraq is only now emerging as a viable political entity 20 years after the US-led invasion in 2003 that toppled Saddam Hussein from power. And Egypt, a one-party state from 1956 to 2012, saw the overthrow of its first quasi-democratic government in 2013 by a broad range of military, civilian, and government factions who installed a former general as president. Once the most powerful actor in the Middle East, Egypt is now in debt to the Arab Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. This limits its sovereignty and exacerbates an already tense domestic situation in the form of bread riots, a terrorist insurgency in the Sinai, and the perennial security problem posed by Israel and Palestine. In sum, these once-powerful states have seen their influence wane in the “new” Middle East.
Rise of the Arab Gulf States
The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, have emerged as new powerhouses in the Middle East. Buoyed by vast hydrocarbon (oil and gas) reserves, gargantuan sovereign wealth funds, and ambitious economic diversification plans that foster sustainable development and aim to reduce their dependence on oil and gas exports, these states have increasingly positioned themselves as Middle East powerbrokers. Their investments in infrastructure, technology, and military capabilities have bolstered their influence and positive reputation throughout much of the region.
As their investments have started to pay off, Gulf Arab leaders such as Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and the UAE’s President Mohamed bin Zayed have become more assertive and adopted independent foreign policies that, at times, clash with their traditional security guarantors in the West, headed by the United States (US). From their intervention in Yemen in 2015 to their role as powerbrokers in Libya, Somalia, and Sudan to their game changing diplomatic pivots such as 2020’s Abraham Accords that normalized the UAE and Bahrain’s relations with Israel, Gulf states now assert themselves as some of the Middle East’s most influential actors.
Turkey’s return
Turkey’s history in the Middle East is a bit more complex. It ruled over most of the region from Istanbul for 500 years until the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War in 1918. During the Cold War, a much-diminished Turkish Republic allied itself with the West against the Soviet Union by joining NATO and strengthening its political, military, and economic ties with Europe, Canada, and the US. For decades, Turkey pursued European Union membership. But setbacks in the early 2000s led to disappointment with the EU process and, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – first as prime minister (2003–2014) and now as president (2014–present) – Turkey gradually shifted its focus to its east and south. This has precedent in Turkey’s national role conception, or mental map, that pictures Turkey as the “centre country” of Afro-Eurasia, one that transcends the confines of the nation-state. Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa are products of this worldview. But it is the Middle East that is most important to Turkey for reasons of geography and national security.
Ankara’s increasingly assertive foreign policy has seen Turkey actively engaged in regional conflicts and political initiatives. Military interventions in Syria and Libya aimed to protect Turkish interests and influence favourable political outcomes. This demonstrates how Turkey, politically and diplomatically, has adopted an independent foreign policy from its NATO allies. It regularly spars with Canada, the US, and Europe, but strongly supports Ukraine against Russia while maintaining relatively warm relations with Moscow. It deconflicts with Iran and Russia about Syria, clearly sides with the Palestinians against Israel, but remains one of Tel Aviv’s largest trading partners. Despite its successes, Turkey and its closest Gulf state partner, Qatar, failed to block Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they worked to remove the Muslim Brotherhood-elected government in Egypt in 2013. Nevertheless, Turkey’s strategic centrality is bolstered by its diversified economy and production range, spanning from white goods (major appliances such as refrigerators, dishwashers and washing machines) to specialized weaponry. This solidifies its status as a key regional power and shows commonalities with Iran, another growing regional power. Both Turkey and Iran’s size and military power distinguish them from the Arab Gulf states.
Iran’s resurgence
Iran shares borders with Iraq, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf. Its population, territorial reach, military power and technology, and historical influence naturally position it as a linchpin in Middle East affairs. This means Iran’s ideological ambitions and quest of regional hegemony are rooted in history, geography, and capabilities. This makes it hard for regional states and international actors to stop Iran’s assertive foreign policy that sees Tehran support multiple, dangerous proxy groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its elite Quds Force play a central role in projecting Iranian power beyond its borders and supplying these militias. Indeed, in the face of crippling Western sanctions, Iran’s vast energy reserves and self-help agenda have made it in many respects more powerful and dangerous. It has usurped the anti-Israel leadership of the Middle East, disrupted Western interests in Syria and Iraq, and indirectly caused a global shipping crisis through its support in both legitimacy and weapons of the Houthi in Yemen, who have attacked tanker and cargo ships with impunity since late 2023. In turn, Tehran’s development of ballistic missiles, export of one-way attack drones to “spoiler” actors in the international system like Russia and the Houthi, and its slow but steady pursuit of nuclear technology mean Iran is a particularly good candidate for the Middle East’s next regional hegemon.
Canada’s engagement options
For Ottawa, navigating the shifting distributions of power in the “new” Middle East presents both challenges and opportunities. In engaging with upstart and traditional actors in the region, Canada must adopt a nuanced and adaptive approach. Strengthening ties with emerging power centres in the Gulf and Turkey while maintaining relationships with traditional actors such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are essential. But this is easier said than done.
Over the past 20 years, Canada’s Middle East policy has become more securitized and divisive as Ottawa has engaged in high-profiled diplomatic sparring with important Gulf Arab states. At the same time, Canada has pushed a values-driven foreign policy that has been something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, values-based agendas have angered Muslim-majority states in the Middle East across the board without making any gains. On the other, Canada was active in the coalition that helped defeat ISIS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq and has contributed billions of dollars in humanitarian and development aid to key partners such as Jordan and Iraq for projects to enhance security, stabilization, and refugee protection.
To bring Canada’s foreign policy back into balance in the new Middle East, policymakers should consider the following steps.
- Improve ties with Turkey and the Arab Gulf states: Ottawa should proactively engage with the Arab Gulf states and Turkey and leverage shared interests in largely apolitical arenas such as energy security, counterterrorism and piracy, and STEM cooperation. Importantly, Canada should prioritize its relations with assertive Gulf actors, primarily the UAE and Saudia Arabia. Building on the agreements and momentum of COP28 climate change conference in Dubai is one avenue. Another is cooperating on Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 strategy to diversify its economy via a host of mammoth projects to include Neom, a futuristic city and related development projects. With Turkey, Canada must accommodate itself to the realities of 20 years of Islamist government under President Erdoğan and not see its foreign policy held hostage to Canadian citizens with ties to the wider Middle East. Developing a cohesive and comprehensive Canada-Turkey foreign policy agenda that defines and then prioritizes Canada’s national interests would be a start.
- Pursuing conciliation and practicing moderation: Canada has great strengths that separate it in the eyes of many Middle Easterners from its Western counterparts, particularly the US and former imperial powers. Canada’s role as a non-partisan diplomat should be encouraged to emerge again so Ottawa can uphold and defend a rules-based order that condemns predation and coercion in all its forms within the state system. This may mean adopting a macro, state-level international relations approach that critiques and fosters conciliation between states rather than hectoring their Middle Eastern counterparts about internal issues in Turkey or Saudi Arabia. It does not mean, however, that Canada should not take principled stands. Upholding a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific should extend to the Middle East, and Ottawa should be proactive in condemning violations of territory, sovereignty, and international law – whether this occurs in the Red Sea against international shipping or Israel-Palestine.
- Focus on achieving the achievable: Policymakers in Ottawa should prioritize foreign policies and strategic messaging in Turkey or the UAE that has a slim chance of making a difference. Diplomacy is the art of navigating complex international relations through dialogue, negotiation, and strategic engagement. It is done by states to achieve political objectives. Criticizing Saudi Arabia over human rights is laudable but insufficient for change and results in penalties for Canadians and their economic interests rather than the other way around. A Canadian diplomat to an Arab Gulf state recently told me: “My host state counterparts actively broach the topic of sexuality and human rights to tell me that it is not wanted here.” Does Canada wish its diplomats to push what is considered by many to be a divisive agenda with little chance of success? Or does it want to strengthen relations and cooperation to further Canada’s long-term national interests to regain its previous role as arbiter of international peace?
- Developing a comprehensive Middle East policy: Policymakers should define Canada’s objectives and strategies based on primary and secondary national interests for a comprehensive foreign policy. These would include policies related to security and counterterrorism, support for allies such as Israel, the promotion of peace and stability, and Canada’s economic interests, particularly in the energy-rich, renewables-driven Arab Gulf states. This would have a better chance of outlasting different governments and less chance of becoming the plaything of a particular interest group. In addition, prioritizing relations with Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Ankara by no means is equal to sidelining relations with Egypt or Israel. Instead, such a foreign policy would provide Canada with ballast and give Ottawa the leverage and gravitas it needs to better engage with the new Middle East.
Brendon J. Cannon writes and researches on the critical nexus between geopolitics, security studies, and emerging technologies in the wider Indo-Pacific. He is associate professor at Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. He has lived and worked in Istanbul, Nairobi, Tokyo, and Washington, DC.