The results of the latest public opinion survey from Stasis Consulting provide key insights into how Iranians view Tehran’s foreign policy, regional influence, and diplomatic relations at a time of heightened tensions in the Middle East, including how they perceive the economic costs of Iran’s current approach and its support for its regional proxy groups.
Iranians overwhelmingly believe that the country’s foreign policy is responsible for ordinary citizens’ economic troubles, with more than three-quarters of survey respondents (78 percent) saying its foreign policy is very much or to an extent a cause of its economic problems, while nearly two-thirds (63 percent) believe Tehran’s foreign policy does not advance the well-being of ordinary citizens.
On the diplomatic front, a majority of Iranians (61 percent) are in favor of a nuclear agreement and believe Iran should negotiate with the West to resolve the dispute over Tehran’s nuclear activities. The survey also found strong support (68 percent) for normalizing relations with the US, although notably not for doing so with Israel (just 25 percent support vs. 67 percent opposition).
Amid the ongoing regional escalation, 43 percent of Iranians said they believe that Iran’s foreign policy is contributing to tensions in the Middle East, while a majority (59 percent) said that, following the recent conflicts between Iran and Israel, Iran is now in a stronger position regionally.
According to the survey, most Iranians support Tehran’s military presence in the Middle East, with 61 percent backing its policy of providing military support to Iran’s proxy groups, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” (Jebhe Moqavemat). Opinions were more divided on the issue of providing financial support, with 49 percent in favor vs. 45 percent opposed. Half of respondents also back Iran’s military presence in Syria.
More broadly, respondents strongly agree (69 percent) with the idea that Iran’s military presence in the Middle East makes them safer at home, with 66 percent of respondents saying the same when asked about Iran’s support for its regional proxies.
These findings are based on a public opinion poll carried out among 1,189 Iranians aged 18 or older living in Iran between Sept. 21 and Oct. 3, 2024. An interactive visualization of the results can be found here.
Iranians overwhelmingly blame Iran’s foreign policy for ordinary citizens’ economic problems
Seventy-eight percent of Iranians say Iran’s foreign policy is very much or to an extent a cause of the economic and social problems facing the country. These results are consistent across demographic groups, regardless of respondents’ age, gender, location, or educational level. Just 13 percent of those surveyed disagree.
Moreover, 63 percent of the population express their overwhelming dissatisfaction with the effects of Iran’s foreign policy on domestic life. When asked “how much do you think Iran’s foreign policy today advances the well-being of ordinary citizens like you?” a striking 59 percent answered in the strongest terms: “not at all.”
A plurality of Iranians believe Iran’s foreign policy is contributing to tensions in the Middle East
Forty-three percent of respondents believe Iran’s foreign policy is contributing to tensions in the region; 18 percent hold the opposite view, while 21 percent say it makes no difference.
Iranians support a nuclear deal and engagement with the West
The majority of respondents support the idea of reaching an agreement with Western powers on Iran’s nuclear activities (61 percent). Only 20 percent of Iranians say Iran should not make such an agreement, while a significant share of 19 percent say they do not know about this topic or prefer not to respond.
An interim agreement between Iran and the West on Iran’s nuclear program was signed almost 11 years ago, on Nov. 24, 2013. At that time IPOS, a survey company formerly managed by Arash Ghafouri, the pollster of this survey, posed this same question. That survey found that 65 percent of Iranians supported an agreement, 11 percent opposed, and 9 percent supported an agreement contingent upon terms that would favor the Iranian national interest. Despite the range of developments on this issue over the last decade, public opinion on a nuclear agreement remains almost unchanged.
Iranians are in favor of diplomatic relations with the US
Iranians overwhelmingly favor the normalization of relations with the US; 67 percent of respondents supported this idea, while only 25 percent opposed it. Male respondents are more likely to support diplomatic ties with the US than female respondents, with 73 and 62 percent approval, respectively. Moreover, respondents who live in urban areas are significantly more supportive (71 percent) than those who live in rural areas (57 percent). Additionally, 73 percent of those who have a college degree prefer normalization, while those without a college degree were less likely to agree, though still broadly in favor (65 percent).
Iranians do not support the idea of normalizing Iran-Israel relations
Although Iranians support normalizing Iran-US relations, they do not back the normalization of Iran-Israel relations. Just a quarter of respondents are in favor of this idea, compared to 67 percent who reject it.
Iranians are split on their preference for relations with China and Russia vs. the US and UK
When asked if they would prefer Iran to have stronger relations with countries like China and Russia or with Western countries like the US and UK, respondents were exactly split, with 34% favoring Russia and China and 34% favoring the West. Another 16% answered “both,” while 16% were undecided.
Educated Iranians (those with a college degree) hold a slight preference for stronger relations with Western countries (35 percent), as opposed to China and Russia (29 percent). Respondents without a college degree remain split, with 36 percent favoring China and Russia vs. 34 percent preferring the US and UK. However, this group was almost twice as likely (9 percent) as their college-educated peers to hold no opinion or refuse to respond.
Iran’s military support and financial assistance in the Middle East
The majority of respondents are invested in the idea of providing military support to Iran’s proxy groups in the Middle East, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” (Jebhe Moqavemat). Sixty percent are in favor of this policy and 31 percent are against it. However, respondents are almost evenly split in their beliefs about providing financial assistance for the Axis; 49 percent say they are in favor of it compared to 45 percent who are opposed. Exactly half of Iranians think Iran should have a military presence in Syria, whereas 41 percent are opposed.
Iran’s military presence in the Middle East makes Iranians feel safer
Most Iranians believe Iran’s military presence in the Middle East makes them feel safer at home (69 percent). Similarly, 66 percent say the same about Iran’s support for its proxy groups. Those who disagree with these two statements total 25 and 28 percent, respectively.
Iranian opinions on recent conflicts between Iran and Israel
Most survey respondents also believe that after recent conflicts between Iran and Israel, Iran is now in a stronger position in the Middle East (59 percent), while 26 percent say Iran is weaker in the region after its confrontation with Israel.
Rural respondents and those without a college degree are most likely to say Iran is stronger after the recent Iran-Israel conflicts (68 and 62 percent, respectively). Urban and college-educated Iranians also largely agree with this sentiment, though their conviction is not as strong as that of their counterparts. Fifty-six percent of Iranians residing in urban areas say Iran is stronger, as opposed to 28 percent who believe it is weaker; 51 percent of Iranians with a college degree consider Iran’s position in the Middle East strengthened, as opposed to 33 percent who disagree.
President Pezeshkian’s job approval rating
Although Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president just one month prior to this survey’s execution, only 39 percent of respondents approved of his job performance as president while 35 percent disapproved. Iranians are still conflicted about Pezeshkian’s presidency, as more than a quarter of respondents (26 percent) reported that they did not have an opinion of the president or refused to respond.
During the 10 years that Stasis has measured Iranian presidential job approval, this is the largest group that has not had an opinion. In the last three surveys Stasis conducted, which evaluated President Ebrahim Raisi’s job approval, the share of respondents who did not have an opinion or refused to answer was less than 10 percent. Mr. Pezeshkian’s first approval rating is better than that of President Raisi, which Stasis measured for the first time in June 2022 (10 months after he took office) at 28 percent vs. 64 percent disapproval. (Click here to see a visualization of Iranian presidential job performance over time.)
Iranians have serious concerns about the youth’s future and have limited faith in government officials
To track national sentiment on youth-related issues, the survey employs a four-point scale, asking respondents about six statements framed with four possible responses (completely agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, and completely disagree) on a biannual basis. The first set of these statements was tested in February 2024. For all six of these statements, there has not been a significant change in public opinion from February to October 2024.
According to this survey, most Iranians believe that the youth are pessimistic about their future in Iran (77 percent) and would rather emigrate than remain in the country (72 percent).
When asked whether the government interferes with the youth population in matters of lifestyle and political liberties, 52 percent of respondents say they believe that officials restrict the liberty of Iranian youth by interfering in their lifestyle, compared to 41 percent who disagree. While the views of the general population are more evenly distributed, the gap among youth is much larger. Only 39 percent of those aged 18-29 say the government does not interfere with their liberties and lifestyles compared to 57 percent who say that it does.
Most of the population also believes that Iranian officials do not care about solving the issues that matter to Iranian youth (76 percent). Moreover, just a slim segment of respondents say that officials listen to the needs and ideas of young people (23 percent). Additionally, just 31 percent completely or somewhat agree with the statement that “Iran’s political system welcomes Iranian youth with diverse beliefs to peruse high level government employment.” Fifty-one percent have the opposite view.
Arash Ghafouri is the CEO of Stasis Consulting.
Notes and methodology
While the fieldwork for this survey was being carried out, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese Hezbollah, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on the group’s headquarters in Beirut on Sept. 27, 2024, along with other Hezbollah commanders and high-ranking officers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force. During this period of increased tensions, Iran’s state TV aggressively promoted arguments for retaliation and attempted to stimulate Iranian nationalism. Moreover, during the last days of the fieldwork period, Iran launched a retaliatory strike against Israel on Oct. 1, 2024. These rapid changes in the region’s political environment could potentially affect public opinion on some survey questions, especially those directly related to Iran’s foreign affairs, the role of Iran’s military presence in the region, and military and financial support for its proxies.
Telephone interviews for this survey were conducted by native Farsi speakers during daytime hours between Sept. 21 and Oct. 3, 2024, among 1,189 respondents aged 18 and older living in Iran. This survey includes respondents from every province and is a representative sample of the entire population of Iranian adults aged 18 and older with a ±2.8 percentage point margin of error at the 95 percent confidence level. The survey is weighted by three main demographic variables, including gender, age, location (urban or rural), as well as the province of Tehran. The response rate was 21.9 percent. For more information on the poll, please see this link.
Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images
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