PSCRP-BESA Reports No 141 (July 10, 2025)
None of the Muslim states bordering Iran to the northeast (they are usually called ‘stans’, from the Persian word “country”)—including Central Asian post-Soviet states (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), Pakistan and Afghanistan —are willing to become entangled in Tehran’s escalating confrontation with Israel or the West. This is especially clear in the case of the former Soviet Central Asian secular republics. The Central Asian states adhere to multi-vector foreign policies that balance between Russia, China, the West, and the Islamic world, carefully avoiding entanglements in ideological or military blocs. Even Iran’s most conservative immediate neighbor, Turkmenistan, has officially declared itself neutral.
This approach was also obvious in the recent Israeli-Iranian clash. According to observers, neither Israel nor Iran are key partners for the Central Asian countries in the political, military, economic, or security spheres, as well as – at least for the time being—in the foreign trade sphere. At the same time, they fear that a full-scale Iranian-Israeli conflict could negatively affect transport and communication projects aimed at providing Central Asian countries with access to Iran’s seaports in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea coast, which provide further access to the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Africa.
In addition, a tough confrontation between Israel and Iran could trigger the radicalization of Islamist circles that actively promote pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli narratives. Finally, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan fear that an escalation of the conflict between the US, Israel and Iran raises concerns not only because of the nuclear threat but also because of the possible collapse of governance in Iran, which would provoke a mass exodus of refugees to the east – through Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The regimes that employ militant Islamist ideologies—such as the Taliban in Afghanistan or the leadership in Pakistan —are unwilling to offer Iran more than occasional expressions of rhetorical solidarity or anti-Israeli sentiment. While these regimes may echo elements of Iran’s discourse for domestic or symbolic reasons, they have shown no inclination to become militarily involved in Tehran’s confrontation with Israel, and certainly not with the United States. Their priority remains regime survival and internal stability, not ideological adventurism on behalf of regional allies. The sectarian divide between Sunni and Shīʿa Muslims is important from this point of view, but pragmatic considerations are key determinants of foreign policy. The Taliban, despite their strict Islamist Sunni worldview, are primarily focused on consolidating power within Afghanistan and avoiding renewed international isolation in the condition of extreme economic crisis.
Strategically, the most important position is that of Pakistan, which possesses a powerful military and nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan, for its part, maintains a delicate balancing act between its Sunni Islamic ideological identity and its geostrategic interests, including its relations with Gulf countries, China, and the United States. For both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the costs of direct military confrontation with Israel and, especially, with the U.S., far outweigh any potential gains from aligning with Iran. Thus, Iran remains largely isolated in its most radical positions, able to extract only rhetorical sympathy—but no substantive backing—from even its most ostensibly ideologically aligned neighbors.
Ultimately, the most Iran can realistically expect from its post-Soviet and eastern Islamic neighbors is rhetorical sympathy or diplomatic hedging. Strategic alignment—especially on issues as sensitive as nuclear deterrence or military escalation—is a line none of them are prepared to cross. Since Pakistan’s position is strategically the most crucial, and in light of the spread of false claims that Islamabad pledged support to Iran with its nuclear arsenal, let us examine the current state of Iran–Pakistan relations. Later, we will also consider some tensions between Iran and the Taliban—in the context of general strategic relations between Tehran and Islamabad.
On June 16, 2025, a video appeared on social media and in some newspapers showing Iranian IRGC General and National Security Council member Mohsen Rezaei allegedly appealing to Pakistan for support. In this supposedly authentic footage, Rezaei, speaking on Iranian state television amid an intense missile exchange with Israel, stated: “Pakistan has assured us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, Islamabad will also attack it with nuclear weapons.”
This statement, which appeared to invoke Pakistan’s nuclear capacity, was swiftly and categorically rejected by Islamabad. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar dismissed the claim outright as “fake, fabricated” based on analysis from fact-checkers like iVerify Pakistan that confirmed no credible Iranian source supported the claim. He also emphasized that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reserved solely for defensive purposes against direct threats to its sovereignty—implicitly referring to its longstanding conflict with India. “This is irresponsible and false news,” said Dar. He added, “From our side, there has been no such statement. It was fabricated.” Dar said, “We have checked that it was an AI-generated clip and it was fake. He warned that Pakistan should be very careful, saying, “This is not a children’s matter. This is a serious war, like ours with India.”
“A second whisper campaign on X (formerly Twitter), citing an unverified report from Israel’s Channel 10, alleged Pakistan had warned Washington it would launch nuclear strikes on Israel to defend Iran”. This statement was also refuted in Pakistan as disinformation: Pakistani government has never told anything like that to Washington.
This reaction is particularly understandable given Pakistan’s own precarious security environment, especially its enduring rivalry with India. In early May 2025, following a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22 (claimed by Indian authorities to be perpetrated by Pakistan-linked militants), India launched a series of missile and airstrikes on Pakistani territory—code-named “Operation Sindoor”—on May 7 2025. Pakistan responded by launching a combination of drone and artillery strikes. These events marked the most significant military escalation between the two nuclear-armed rivals in decades, raising intense concerns of a potential slide toward nuclear confrontation. International diplomatic alarm was immediate. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President J.D. Vance intervened, mediating a ceasefire by May 10, 2025, after approximately four days of high-intensity conflict. The specter of nuclear escalation was not hypothetical; both nations had prepared their nuclear command systems for potential activation.
In this situation Islamabad must guard against rhetoric that could be interpreted as involvement in third-party disputes, thereby preserving its deterrence credibility and avoiding unnecessary diplomatic fallout. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains strictly defensive; any military entanglement—especially in foreign-driven escalatory scenarios—could inadvertently cross unwelcome nuclear thresholds. After nearly going to war with India, any participation—rhetorical or otherwise—in another state’s nuclear discourse would be highly destabilizing and strategically counterproductive. Adding further complexity is the history of strained bilateral relations between Pakistan and Iran, particularly in the border region of Balochistan. Pakistan–Iran relations in Balochistan are governed by a fraught mix of counterinsurgency cooperation and repeated provocations. Frequent militant activity and military incursions reinforce mutual suspicion.
Since the 1980s, Iran’s Sistan–Baluchestan and Pakistan’s Balochistan provinces have been epicenters of militant separatist insurgencies (Jaish al-Adl, Baloch Liberation Army). Both nations accuse each other of either harboring or failing to adequately suppress these groups. In 2014, Iranian border guards briefly occupied Nok Kundi (inside Pakistan) and launched rocket attacks that injured civilians, triggering Pakistani protests and diplomatic tension. Iranian missile and drone strikes on January 16, 2024, targeted Jaish al-Adl positions in Panjgur, Pakistan, killing civilians, according to Pakistani reports. Between 2023 and early 2024, multiple Pakistani military patrols in Kech and Panjgur districts came under “terrorist” fire traced back to militants allegedly operating from across the Iranian border. Pakistan’s retaliatory Operation Marg Bar Sarmachar (January 18, 2024) saw air, drone, and artillery strikes on militants in Iran’s Sistan–Baluchestan—marking the first Pakistani strike on Iranian soil since the Iran–Iraq War. Both governments are expanding border infrastructure, including fencing projects and planned fortifications by Iran, aimed at curbing trafficking and militant infiltration.
Therefore, amid the Iran–Israel crisis, Pakistan sealed pedestrian crossings at Taftan, Gabd-Rimdan, Chedgi, Jirrak, and Rideeg Mand, citing security and refugee concerns in Balochistan Pakistan’s leadership is acutely aware that militant flare-ups in Balochistan not only threaten internal stability but also risk reigniting tensions with Iran—making regional escalation a constant concern. Despite episodic cooperation, Islamabad and Tehran remain wary, blaming each other for enabling hostile groups—a dynamic that amplifies the strategic significance of any cross-border incident. From this point of view, Pakistan’s refusal to join ideological alignments, such as the Iran’s anti-Israel rhetoric in nuclear sphere, is rooted in pragmatic self-interest—a precaution to avoid conflagration along its volatile western flank. Finally, Pakistan already faces considerable challenges from the protracted Afghan refugee crisis, and its capacity to absorb additional pressure along its western frontier is limited.
Also, there is an issue of mutual distrust between Pakistan and Iran, which is deeply rooted in sectarian geopolitics. Pakistan’s historic connections with Sunni, anti-Shīʿa Taliban in Afghanistan is seen by Iran as a direct threat to Hazārā Shīʿa communities and Shīʿa influence in the region. During Taliban rule in the late 1990s and the resurgence since 2021, Hazārā communities have faced severe persecution—forced conversions, massacres, and systemic marginalization . Iran has long championed the Hazārā minority in Afghanistan, supporting groups like Hezb-e Wahdat during the 1990s Afghan civil war to counterbalance Taliban influence and Pashtun dominance.
Iran’s protection of Hazārā and support for rival factions in Afghanistan deeply unsettles Pakistan, which perceives these moves as strategic counterweights to its own regional posture. The result is a nuanced strategic rivalry—marked not by overt hostility—but by proxy competition, border skirmishes, and sectarian undercurrents that profoundly shape bilateral interactions. Tehran continues its backing economically and cultural-religiously, with Hazārā populations seeing Iran as a protective patron amid Taliban ascendancy. This is a situation very similar to Iranian support for Shīʿa groups in the Arab world (in the countries like Lebanon, Syria or Iraq), however, this part of Iranian policy is not so well known in the wider world. Tehran’s proximity to Taliban-held zones and intermittent border skirmishes indicate strategic distrust: Iran supports post-Taliban security actors such as Hazārā militias to mitigate Taliban dominance. There is also the issue of growing sectarian tensions in Pakistan itself. Semi-autonomous North-Western regions of Pakistan like Kurram have seen deadly Sunni–Shīʿa violence—often exacerbated by extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which Pakistan-based Sunni militants (sometimes having good connections with Pakistani army) have funded and supported. Finally, Pakistan and Iran both accuse each other of harboring militant proxies—Pakistan blames Tehran for supporting Hazārā-linked groups, while Iran rhetorically accuses Pakistani military intelligence ISI (together with Israeli Mossad) of backing Taliban/al-Qaeda factions with anti-Shīʿa agendas.
In conclusion, Pakistan’s measured response to the nuclear aspects of war between Iran and Israel illustrates a calculated approach to regional security. Islamabad is distancing itself from escalatory rhetoric and maintaining a focus on its own strategic imperatives. This is logical, especially considering Pakistan’s own issues with Iran in Baluchistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan’s strategic rivalry with India. Islamabad is carefully avoiding symbolic commitments that could compromise national interests or entangle this state in new conflicts beyond its borders. The same principle can be applied also to the Taliban, which has its own disagreements with Tehran concerning sectarian agenda and Hazārā issue.
These considerations, at least atfirst glance, also dominate Islamabad’s policy towards the Central Asia. Since late 1990s-early 2000s, Islamabad, which was eager to show a higher profile than India in this region, tried to utilize the independence of the Central Asian republics from the USSR in order to bring to life Pakistan’s dream of strategic depth, believe Melissa Iqbal and Teresita Schaffer. According to them, for Pakistan developing political ties with the Central Asians and to serve as a bridge between them and the rest of the world has much more meaning than simply military space. The same is true quarter centuries later, while economic cooperation especially in the field of energy with the Central Asia with their 46% of the world’s gas reserves, play even more important role than before. Hence, Islamabad also has to take seriously the Central Asian regimes’ concerns of the Israel-Iran conflict.