Week of February 17, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
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• Waltz Warns of U.S. Determination, Pezeshkian Says “We Decide Our Future”
• Iran’s Oil Exports to China Surge Despite Intensified U.S. Sanctions
• Soaring Budget Allocations for State-Affiliated Media and Ideological Institutions in Iran
• Lebanon Extends Flight Ban on Iranian Planes, Causing Protests Ahead of Funeral of Nasrallah and Safieddine
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, arrived in Tehran on Wednesday, February 19, 2025, for an official visit focused on strengthening bilateral relations, discussing regional issues, and potentially mediating tensions between Iran and other parties—most notably the United States. His trip to Tehran followed a recent visit to Damascus, where he met with leaders of Syria’s new transitional government. Observers speculate that the Emir may be carrying messages from both Washington and Damascus, given the lingering friction between Iran and the United States and the ongoing political transformation in Syria.
In Tehran, Sheikh Tamim was received at Mehrabad Airport by Iran’s Minister of Energy, Abbas Aliabadi, before attending an official reception at the Sa’dabad Cultural Complex hosted by President Masoud Pezeshkian. During a joint press conference, the two leaders emphasized a desire to boost commercial and economic cooperation. They also announced plans to reactivate a joint commission tasked with developing major infrastructure projects—such as a proposed undersea tunnel connecting Iran and Qatar—and increasing the volume of bilateral trade.
Later, the Emir met with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A key topic of discussion was the billions of dollars of Iran’s restricted assets, which Khamenei urged Qatar to help release. In the 2023 prisoner swap agreement between Iran and the United States, the U.S. allowed the transfer of Iranian funds generated from oil sales from South Korea to Qatari banks. Iran was supposed to be allowed access to these funds to make various humanitarian purchases under U.S. sanctions exemptions. However, following the October 7 attack committed by Hamas, Washington requested that Doha freeze the funds once again, preventing Iran from accessing them. Khamenei noted that he would “ignore” American objections if he were in Qatar’s position, further underscoring longstanding Iranian skepticism toward Washington’s policies. He also stated there is “no difference” between successive US administrations in how they deal with Iran.
Although Iran views Qatar as a “friendly” regional partner, Tehran remains concerned that US pressure could continue to impede the relationship between the two countries. Still, Qatar’s constructive relations with both the United States and Iran position the Emir as a potential mediator between the two countries. Despite pressure from certain Gulf states to distance itself from Tehran, Doha has persisted in fostering ties with the Islamic Republic, hosting several rounds of indirect negotiations between Iranian and American officials over the years. During their talks, Khamenei also urged the Emir to work with other Muslim-majority nations to alleviate the difficult circumstances facing Palestinians.
Before arriving in Tehran, Sheikh Tamim traveled to Damascus, becoming the first foreign head of state to visit Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. In Damascus, he met transitional president Ahmad Shar’ and new Foreign Minister As’ad Shibani.
Relations between Iran and the new Syrian authorities have been strained since the fall of Assad, largely due to Tehran’s extensive support for the former regime throughout the civil war. This alignment has led to tension with the emerging transitional government, which views Iranian involvement as a factor that prolonged the conflict and led to significant suffering for the Syrian population.
With tensions between Iran and the United States remaining high, and Iran’s relationship with post-Assad Syria still evolving, Sheikh Tamim’s dual visits to Damascus and Tehran position Qatar as a critical intermediary. Going forward, it remains to be seen whether these meetings will yield concrete progress on unblocking Iran’s frozen funds, reviving broader negotiations with Washington, or developing Iran’s and the U.S. negotiations. Nonetheless, the Emir’s engagement in both capitals signals Doha’s ongoing commitment to mediating in a region long fraught with political and economic challenges.
Waltz Warns of U.S. Determination, Pezeshkian Says “We Decide Our Future”
U.S. officials have continued to make remarks regarding their stance toward Iran’s nuclear program. This includes National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who stated on Fox News that “a nuclear-armed Iran poses an existential threat to Israel and the world” and could potentially trigger a regional arms race. According to Waltz, “President [Trump] is determined to act” and all options remain on the table to prevent the Islamic Republic from obtaining nuclear weapons, including possible negotiations. Waltz stated that President Trump is open “to talk to Iran as well if they want to give up their entire program and not play games as we’ve seen Iran do in the past in prior negotiations.”
Likewise, Secretary of State Marco Rubio – in response to a question on what would happen if Iran sought to assassinate President Trump – suggested that the United States could end the Iranian government if it chose to. According to Rubio, “Suffice it to say that if the United States chose to do so, it could bring about the end of the Iranian regime. But the President is a peacemaker. He’d prefer to avoid that and avoid those circumstances.”
In Iran, officials have dismissed U.S. threats as inconsequential—most prominently President Masoud Pezeshkian, who insists the Iranian people will chart their own path. “Trump makes a statement, and some people here try to align themselves with his words,” Pezeshkian said during a meeting with local authorities in western Tehran Province. “But what can Trump actually do? We are the ones who decide how to shape our own future.”
He emphasized that Iran will not yield to external pressures or threats, asserting that true independence requires domestic determination and careful planning. “We create our own future,” Pezeshkian said. “If we give up, we only face misery and troubles. But if we decide to solve our problems, we plan and act accordingly. We have to do it ourselves; we can’t expect others to do it for us.”
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Seyed Mehdi Farahi, Deputy Minister of Defense for Industrial and Research Affairs, rejected claims that Iran’s air defense systems had been weakened. He described such allegations as “utter ignorance,” noting that in the face of both recent threats and actual clashes, Iranian defensive capabilities have actually grown stronger. “We assert that since before November 27, our air defense has not only not become weaker, it has become even more robust—whether in organization, variety, or overall capability,” Farahi said.
Observers suggest that the “maximum pressure” campaign led by the Trump administration, encompassing intensified sanctions and repeated talk of military options, aims to curb Iran’s regional influence and force Tehran into a negotiation that would further restrict military options. Iranian leaders, however, emphasize the importance of self-reliance. They point to the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under U.S. withdrawal as evidence that Washington’s assurances may not be credible.
While the White House indicates willingness to negotiate an agreement amid threats of military force, Tehran’s stance—echoed by Pezeshkian—remains resolute: “We will not sanction our own thinking. If we don’t do that, there is nothing Trump—or anyone else—can do to stop us from shaping our destiny.”
Renowned Iranian musicians continue to distance themselves from the Fajr Music Festival by rejecting commendations or dedications extended by the event’s organizers. Acclaimed composer Hossein Alizadeh, pop singer Mohsen Chavoshi, and vocalist Simin Ghanem all refused the festival’s tribute. Ghanem emphasized having “no need for recognition” from festival officials, criticized the restrictions on women’s singing, and noted that her opportunities to hold concerts for women have been denied in recent years.
Organizers of the 40th Fajr Music Festival, held annually in Iran to celebrate the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, initially announced that the closing-day performances would be dedicated to Ghanem “in recognition of her influential role among female vocalists.” Ghanem, who was at the peak of her career at the time of the 1979 Revolution, remained in Iran afterward. For many years, she could not perform publicly due to the ban on female solo vocals and was thus limited to teaching music at home. In a voice message, Ghanem acknowledged these “limitations on performances” specifically imposed on women and explained that she continued to live in Iran despite such constraints. Over the years, she staged concerts exclusively for female audiences, focusing on “bringing joy” to them and emphasizing that her true “award” has always been the public’s support. However, she noted that even this restricted ability to perform has been taken away from her.
Prominent musicians Hossein Alizadeh and Mohsen Chavoshi also criticized the festival. Alizadeh, a composer and tar virtuoso, declared that his “greatest pride” in Iranian music has been his consistent refusal to participate in the Fajr Music Festival, which he described as “ceremonial rather than artistic.” He stressed his independence from official endorsements and expressed gratitude to the public for unwaveringly supporting art and artists. Chavoshi, a popular pop singer, similarly rejected the festival’s tribute. In a statement, he made it clear that he was neither pleased with nor interested in seeing his name used “for any reason” at events of this nature.
Fajr Music Festival officials had explained that their plan to “dedicate each day’s performances” to a different musician was meant to show gratitude for the artists’ contributions to Iranian music. This approach has involved only the symbolic naming of performances rather than any actual ceremony or tribute, and organizers have yet to issue detailed responses to the criticism leveled by Ghanem, Alizadeh, and Chavoshi.
As arguably the country’s most significant annual music event, the Fajr Music Festival has traditionally been a focal point for musicians across Iran. Yet, many esteemed Iranian artists have boycotted it for years. They cite reasons such as government restrictions, pervasive censorship, and extensive bureaucratic barriers that hinder free musical expression. Women in particular face severe limitations; the ban on female solo performers in public venues is a longstanding issue. Moreover, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance employs a highly subjective approach to music licensing, further frustrating artists who feel that their creativity is stifled.
In this environment, numerous prominent musicians refuse to appear at official events like the Fajr Music Festival. Their stance reflects deeper tensions in Iranian society, where audience demand for a more diverse musical culture clashes with regulations limiting women’s roles and creative freedoms. As a result, an event once viewed as a premier showcase of Iran’s musical talent has been overshadowed by controversy, with some of the country’s most respected artists determined to remain absent.
Iran has recorded its highest number of executions in two decades, according to an annual report on the death penalty jointly published by Iran Human Rights and Ensemble Contre la Peine de Mort (ECPM). The findings reveal a troubling surge in capital punishment during 2024, with 975 people put to death—a 17 percent increase over the 834 executions in 2023. Observers attribute this uptick to government efforts aimed at instilling fear and crushing dissent.
The report underscores major transparency concerns: of all the executions, only 95—fewer than 10 percent—were officially announced. In 2023, by contrast, 15 percent were publicly acknowledged. Human rights organizations contend that this decrease in official disclosures is intended to evade international scrutiny.
This spike has also been accompanied by a troubling rise in female executions: at least 31 women were put to death in 2024, marking the highest total in 17 years. Furthermore, the document confirms at least one juvenile execution, placing Iran in direct breach of its international commitments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The country remains one of the few worldwide still imposing the death penalty on individuals under 18.
In response to the escalating use of capital punishment, Iranian civil society has taken action. On Tuesday, February 18, a group of activists—including Sediqe Vasmaghi, Aliyeh Motallebzadeh, Kambiz Norouzzadeh, Hasti Amiri, Shaghayegh Moradi, Ali Nanvaei, Majid Mosafer, Narges Mohammadi, and Elham Salehi—gathered outside Evin Prison in Tehran. They demanded the revocation of death sentences for three female inmates—Pakhshan Azizi, Verisheh Moradi, and Sharifeh Mohammadi—and called on the public to support prisoners’ hunger strikes through the “No to Executions Wednesdays” campaign. The protesters chanted, “We stand until the death penalty is abolished.”
Just two days earlier, 228 Iranian lawyers had signed a statement opposing the death sentences issued against these three women. Around the same time, human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh and scholar Sediqe Vasmaghi released another statement, calling the sentences “an act of vengeance against the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.” They argued the punishments were a direct reaction to widespread demonstrations following the “state-sponsored killing of Mahsa,” which sparked broader demands for women’s right to choose their attire.
Despite growing criticism, Iranian authorities continue to issue or reinstate capital sentences. According to the human rights news agency HRANA, the Second Branch of the Revolutionary Court in Rasht has again sentenced labor activist Sharifeh Mohammadi to death. Although the Supreme Court had overturned her death sentence and ordered a retrial, the verdict remained unchanged. Mohammadi stands accused of “armed rebellion,” or baghi, based on alleged ties to an opposition group. Supporters claim she was arrested on July 5 (14 Tir) over vague national security charges linked to her labor activism and anti-death-penalty posters. Critics say such charges are frequently used to silence peaceful civic engagement.
Additional details from Mohammadi’s family indicate that authorities presented “No to Executions” posters and Telegram group membership as evidence of her supposed armed rebellion. She was reportedly compelled to record a video confession and barred from attending court in person. Initially, her case was overseen by Judge Ahmad Darvish-Goftar, who sentenced her to death. In the subsequent retrial, Darvish-Goftar’s own son presided, fueling significant concerns about the partiality of the judicial process.
Meanwhile, three protesters from Bukan—Pezhman Soltani (32), Rezgar Bigzadeh Babamiri (47), and Suran Qasemi (28)—faced trials on national security charges and for alleged murder. BBC Persian reports that the proceedings resulted in one death sentence for Soltani and lengthy prison terms for the other two. Bigzadeh’s daughter asserted her father did not know the victim or his co-defendants, while the other men reportedly acknowledged a personal dispute but insisted Bigzadeh was uninvolved. Critics say the trial was marred by procedural irregularities, including dividing the defendants into two groups, limited legal representation, and video-link hearings instead of in-person court appearances.
Observers note that escalating executions, reinstated death sentences, opaque trials, and dubious due process collectively signify a deepening human rights crisis. Despite official assurances or repeated retrials, the range of offenses subject to capital punishment remains excessively broad, targeting labor organizers, peaceful protesters, and social media users as supposed threats to national security or participants in armed rebellion. Statements by Nasrin Sotoudeh, Sediqe Vasmaghi, and numerous other Iranian lawyers emphasize the urgent need for international awareness. They contend that overturning death sentences can help curb violence, while continued use of executions entrenches the government’s repressive approach.
Iran’s Oil Exports to China Surge Despite Intensified U.S. Sanctions
Preliminary data from the intelligence firm Kpler Ltd. indicate that Iran’s oil exports to China reached 1.74 million barrels per day (bpd) in February, marking the highest level since October. According to Bloomberg, this spike has occurred despite tightened U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil industry. Oil traders attribute the surge primarily to ship-to-ship (STS) transfers and the emergence of new private terminals in China, both of which have eased logistical hurdles and simplified the offloading process for Iranian crude.
Despite these developments, Scott Bessent, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, recently stated that Washington aims to reduce Iran’s oil exports to less than 10 percent of their current level, describing purchases by China and India as “unacceptable.” In response, a member of Iran’s National Security Commission rejected the notion that Tehran’s exports to China are declining, emphasizing that “Iran continues to prioritize its national interests” in its economic policies. Behnam Saeidi, another commission member, stressed that the Islamic Republic has consistently found ways to circumvent sanctions, suggesting that if any change in trade patterns occurs, it would more likely be an increase rather than a decrease.
Industry sources confirm that private terminals in China have become key hubs for unloading both Iranian and Russian oil. Dongying in Shandong Province has reportedly emerged as a pivotal port where oversight is less stringent, with the state-owned Shandong Port Group transferring at least one terminal to a private entity. This arrangement permits traders to offload Iranian cargo with fewer restrictions. The tanker Si He, sanctioned on January 10, allegedly discharged over 744,000 barrels of Russian crude in Dongying last week. Other private terminals, including Yangshan (south of Shanghai) and Huizhou (southern China), have also become key offloading points for sanctioned oil.
Although stricter U.S. measures introduced toward the end of the Biden administration have made major Chinese firms more cautious, smaller private refineries—known as “teapots”—are still purchasing discounted crude from Iran and Russia. Analysts estimate that Iranian and Russian shipments accounted for about 25 percent of China’s total oil imports in 2024, helping these independent refiners reduce their operational costs. As a result, Beijing appears unwilling to fully halt these deals, despite Washington’s ongoing attempts to deter such trade.
Observers predict that, as long as Tehran offers steep discounts, its oil exports to China will remain robust. Traders also point out that ship-to-ship transfers, shell companies, and the use of private terminals allow Iranian crude to bypass sanctions. While the White House continues its diplomatic efforts to dissuade China and other nations from buying Iran’s oil, experts suggest it is unlikely that China will significantly cut its imports. In the face of mounting U.S. pressure, the interplay of discounted pricing and strategic ingenuity underscores the resilience of Iran’s energy sector and China’s sustained demand for cost-effective crude.
Soaring Budget Allocations for State-Affiliated Media and Ideological Institutions in Iran
The Iranian Parliament’s Research Center has disclosed a steep increase in budget allocations for government-affiliated media outlets in the 1404 (2025–2026) draft budget. According to the Center’s report, approximately 62 trillion tomans have been earmarked for these institutions. Experts warn that, while infrastructure and public development projects remain underfunded, billions of tomans are funneled into organizations focused largely on political propaganda and state-sponsored ideological or cultural activities.
Among the allocations, the most substantial figures include:
• Center for the Promotion of Prayer 129 billion tomans
Critics argue that these institutions’ ideological and propaganda roles have limited positive impact on citizens’ daily lives. Meanwhile, the government plans to increase salaries for workers and state employees by only 20 percent, despite official inflation far exceeding that figure and living costs continuing to soar.
The draft budget also allocates just 350 trillion tomans for development projects, even though over two thousand infrastructure projects remain half-finished. Estimates suggest more than 13 years would be needed to complete these projects under current funding levels. Observers maintain that reallocating even a fraction of these “special” budgets to public works could expand healthcare facilities, renovate schools, enhance transportation, and improve social services. Instead, the government appears intent on satisfying elite groups and maintaining support from institutions closely tied to the state, rather than addressing ordinary citizens’ needs.
A particularly notable jump is seen in IRIB’s budget, set to climb to 35 trillion tomans—up from 24 trillion tomans in the current year. According to the newspaper Jomhouri Eslami, this figure equals or surpasses the combined budgets of several ministries (Oil, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Cultural Heritage and Tourism) and is comparable to the entire Agriculture Ministry budget. IRIB also anticipates an additional 8 trillion tomans in revenue, elevating its total funding to about 43 trillion tomans. This sharp rise occurs even as IRIB struggles with low audience engagement. A poll by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) in fall 1402 (2023) found that only 11.5 percent of respondents regularly watch IRIB-produced films or series, and just 12.5 percent rely on IRIB for news—figures that contradict the broadcaster’s claim of over 65 percent national viewership.
Analysts point out that dramatic budget boosts for ideological or political institutions reflect a broader strategy to secure support from powerful interests and retain political power. Meanwhile, urgent national priorities—such as controlling rampant inflation, raising stagnant wages, and completing large-scale infrastructure—are given secondary consideration. Critics warn that unless the government and Parliament address these disparities in spending, the divide between citizens and the ruling establishment may widen further.
Lebanon Extends Flight Ban on Iranian Planes, Causing Protests Ahead of Funeral of Nasrallah and Safieddine
The Lebanese government’s decision to block Iranian flights from landing at Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut has disrupted travel plans for Iranian visitors who intended to attend Sunday’s funeral of former Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine. Initially, authorities suspended all flights from Iran until Tuesday, February 18, but on Monday, February 17, they announced an indefinite extension to the ban. Najat Sharafeddine, spokeswoman for the Lebanese presidency, confirmed that the Public Works and Transport Minister was instructed to continue the flight suspension, though no timeframe was given for its cancellation.
A Lebanese security source told AFP that Washington had warned Beirut of a potential Israeli strike against Iranian passenger jets attempting to land in Lebanon, based on accusations that Tehran might use civilian aircraft to smuggle money or weapons to Hezbollah. Despite Hezbollah and Lebanese officials denying these allegations, many analysts interpret the prolonged ban as a sign of Iran’s diminishing influence in Lebanon, suggesting the new government is avoiding direct conflict with Israel.
In retaliation, Iran barred two Lebanese planes from entering its airspace, leaving numerous Lebanese passengers stranded. Hossein Pourfarzaneh, head of Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization, said Lebanese officials cited “special security conditions in Beirut” and the cancellation of all international flights when explaining their request to halt Iranian flights. Pourfarzaneh added that Iranian authorities are monitoring the situation daily to see if the ban will be lifted.
The flight suspension has sparked protests by Hezbollah supporters in Lebanon. Since Thursday, demonstrators carrying Hezbollah and Lebanese flags have rallied, denouncing the United States and Israel. By Saturday, February 15, the Lebanese Army used tear gas to disperse protestors near the airport, where they had set tires and trash on fire and erected makeshift barricades.
Meanwhile, a separate incident on Friday evening saw an attack against a convoy of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). One UNIFIL vehicle was torched, and two officers—including the force’s deputy commander—were injured. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun condemned the act as unacceptable, while Prime Minister Nawaf Salam called it a “criminal act” and vowed to pursue the perpetrators. UNIFIL branded the attack a “clear violation of international law” and potentially a “war crime,” urging Lebanese authorities to conduct a thorough investigation. Officials have detained 26 suspects in connection with the incident.
In distancing itself from the UNIFIL attack, Hezbollah denied any involvement yet affirmed it “will not surrender.” The group also called on the Lebanese government to “reconsider” its decision on Iranian flights, arguing Beirut should not bow to “Israeli dictates.” At the same time, Hezbollah criticized the army’s use of tear gas, describing the protests over canceled flights as “peaceful gatherings.”
Diplomats from Iran and Lebanon have been in telephone contact, hoping to resolve the dispute over flight suspensions. Tehran has expressed readiness for “constructive dialogue” to reinstate its flights, while Lebanese officials remain focused on airport security. Observers note that Lebanon’s precarious political climate—already stressed by economic troubles—faces further strain from the indefinite flight ban, the threat of Israeli action, and Hezbollah’s changing role in national governance. For now, however, Iranians wishing to attend Sunday’s funeral of Nasrallah and Safieddine will be forced to make alternative travel arrangements, underscoring the ban’s impact on both Lebanese and Iranian interests.