Above: Imad Amhaz
In our article on Amhaz, we assessed with high probability that Hezbollah (with an emphasis on Unit 4400 – the unit responsible for transporting and smuggling money and weapons into Lebanon – in cooperation with the Naval Unit and the relevant Revolutionary Guards units – see details below) has operated in recent years to form a maritime infrastructure whose purpose is to operate a ship or ships under civilian cover, inter alia, for the purpose of carrying out smuggling operations. It is possible that Amhaz was supposed to be a key figure in this infrastructure, among other things, in operating such a ship for Hezbollah or as an official on a civilian ship that would serve as a proxy for Hezbollah to carry out smuggling.
The Air Route:
The air route is currently used mainly for smuggling cash intended for Hezbollah. As of this writing, there are no direct commercial flights between Iran and Lebanon, and the smuggling is carried out on two main commercial connecting routes: The first route is from Iran to Iraq and from Iraq to Lebanon. The second route is from Iran to Turkey and from Turkey to Lebanon.
The smuggling is carried out by passengers, equipped by the Quds Force with suitcases of money, appearing like any passenger’s regular luggage on a commercial flight.
The Maritime and Air Entry Points to Lebanon:
Lebanon has seven main civilian seaports (and in addition, a number of small marinas) and one main international civilian airport. The Port of Beirut is the largest seaport in Lebanon, and in addition, there are ports (from north to south) in the city of Tripoli, Jounieh, Sidon, Aadloun, Tyre, and Naqoura. The main airport is the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut.
For many years, Hezbollah has been developing and cultivating its control and influence over what transpires in the land, air, and sea border crossings in Lebanon, with an emphasis on the seaport in Beirut and the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut. To this end, Hezbollah maintains closed complexes for its activities within the Port of Beirut and within the airport (see, for example, “Hangar 12” in the seaport of Beirut before the explosion in August 2020, or buildings and hangars rented for Hezbollah within the airport). Of course, entry to these complexes is prohibited, except for the relevant Hezbollah operatives.
Moreover, with high probability, Hezbollah employs collaborators from among the professional civilian staff in these ports and, in addition, employs collaborators within the two main state organizations that are responsible for the proper functioning of the ports and their supervision: the General Directorate of General Security (GSGD) and the Customs Authority.
The relevant Hezbollah units, such as the Security Unit and Unit 4400, each operate their collaborators separately in these places.
The responsibility for coordination and liaison with senior officials in the formal security and supervisory bodies of the Lebanese state, including the General Security Organization and the Customs Authority, lies with Hezbollah’s Coordination and Liaison Unit, headed by Wafiq Safa, whose status has greatly strengthened as a result of the leadership vacuum created in Hezbollah after the war.
The General Security Organization, which is in effect the dominant non-military security organization in Lebanon, has only recently (March 13, 2025) appointed a new director, Hassan Shqeir, who is a Shiite identified with the Shiite Amal movement, an ally of Hezbollah. In an article we published in March 2025 about the appointments in the Lebanese security organizations, we asked two central questions:
What will be the extent of cooperation between the Shiite duo: Hassan Shqeir and Wafiq Safa? And how will Shqeir’s appointment affect Hezbollah’s freedom of action and movement in the ports of Lebanon, considering the General Security Organization’s responsibility for airport and seaport security?
In his position, Wafiq Safa is in contact with the Director of Customs of the seaport in Beirut, Mahmoud Massoud (a Sunni Muslim). Massoud has been accused over the years, several times, of corruption and managing smuggling networks in the port and was even arrested for investigation in August 2020 as a result. Currently, Massoud still serves in his position.
Wafiq Safa is also in contact with the Director of Customs of the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut, Samer Ibrahim Dia (a Shiite Muslim). Dia has been accused several times of heading a network that operates in favor of Hezbollah and allows Hezbollah deep control of the airport assisting in the transfer of cargo for the organization without legal supervision.
It should be noted that only recently (March 13, 2025) a new CEO was appointed to Rafic Hariri Airport. His name is Amin Jaber – a Shiite Muslim. Apparently, he is also on good terms with Wafiq Safa.
According to a report in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper from April 4, the Lebanese authorities revoked the security clearances of more than 30 employees at Rafic Hariri Airport. According to the report, these employees were Hezbollah collaborators within the airport who worked in the loading and unloading of aircraft cargo, inspecting luggage, and in the lost and found department. We do not know at this stage how to verify this report. If this report is accurate, then perhaps this is the beginning of a positive trend, although Hezbollah will always be able to recruit new collaborators in the right places.
The Syrian (Land) Route:
As of this writing, it appears that in light of the fall of the Assad regime, most of the routes of the original Iranian corridor through Syria have been blocked. However, while the air and sea routes have been completely blocked, it appears that some of the land routes of the original corridor, mainly in the area adjacent to the Lebanon-Syria border (in Lebanon – the Bekaa area, northeastern Lebanon, in Syria – west and southwest of the city of Homs), are not blocked and smuggling activity (and not only weapons) continues.
Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 continues its attempts to transfer weapons from Syria to Lebanon. These are weapons that Hezbollah acquires through local Syrian procurement collaborators, from the arsenal of weapons remaining from the former Syrian army. Apparently, this also includes weapons that were transferred to Syria before the fall of the Assad regime and were intended for Hezbollah but have not yet been transferred to Lebanon and are in effect “stuck” on Syrian soil in storage sites in the Homs area.
The Iranians and Hezbollah have not abandoned their intentions to try to re-establish a foothold on Syrian soil. The motivation for this exists. In our assessment, this could be expressed in the near future, inter alia, by creating new collaborations with local forces, based on various interests and money, to reactivate the land routes of the original corridor, which crossed Syria from east – the Iraqi border, to west – the Lebanese border (see the dashed routes in the attached map of the original land corridor).
The Iranian Units Involved in the Smuggling Operation:
Unit 190. The unit within the Quds Force tasked with worldwide weapons and personnel smuggling operations. The unit’s personnel apparently also operate within Iran’s oil smuggling network. The weapons transferred by the unit include a wide range, from light weapons, machine guns, and explosives to UAVs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air defense systems.
By virtue of its role, the unit works closely with Brigade 8000 in the Quds Force and with Unit 4400 in Hezbollah. The information currently available indicates that its commander is Behnam Shahriari, also known as Hamid Reza and Seyed Ali Akbar. Shahriari is subject to Western sanctions.
In recent years, the unit has worked to transfer weapons to Shiite militias in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, terrorist organizations in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, the Polisario organization in the Western Sahara, organizations and militias in Sudan and the Horn of Africa, various forces in Asia, and more.
The unit operates with various means designed to conceal the smuggled weapons as well as the association to Iran. These include, among others, the use of shell companies, civilian infrastructures and companies, the use of a third party, false registrations, and more. The smuggling routes are diverse and take place by air, sea, and land.
Past publications indicate that the unit makes frequent use of civilian merchant ships and commercial flights of Iranian companies. In some cases, weapons are smuggled inside shipments of innocent goods and products or those classified as medical equipment or humanitarian aid. Another course of action taken by the unit’s personnel is the use of a third country to obscure the connection to Iran.
Over the years, Israel has thwarted a number of Iranian smuggling attempts by ships and exposed them to the media. Among other things, the capture of the ships, Francop in 2009, Victoria in 2011, and Klos-C in 2014.
In addition to transferring weapons, the unit also operates to transfer combatants between the various arenas of conflict. In this context, there are known reports from the past that individuals from various militias are transferred to Syria under the guise of Shiite pilgrims visiting various sites in Syria. Similarly, militia personnel are transferred between countries under the guise of students.
Unit 700. Similar to Unit 190, Unit 700 is also involved in the transfer of weapons and logistical equipment for the Quds Force and the organizations operating with Iranian support. The unit works in cooperation with Unit 190 of the Quds Force and with Unit 4400 of Hezbollah and is considered to have connections with senior government officials in Iraq and Lebanon, and more. Various publications indicate that its commander is Gha’al Parseh.
In the past, several sources claimed that the unit took advantage of the earthquake that struck northern Syria in 2023 to smuggle weapons, equipment, and personnel into Syria and Lebanon under the guise of humanitarian aid.