On February 24, 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the Ukrainian conflict. On February 17, Ukraine and Poland requested the resumption of the 11th UNGA Special Emergency Session, which had convened after the outbreak of the conflict in February 2022. It last met on the first anniversary of the conflict, in February 2023. In 2024, on the second anniversary, Ukraine did not request the resumption of the session. Now this has been done.
At this resumed session, one UNGA draft resolution (harshly anti-Russian, as usual) was introduced by Ukraine, all EU members, as well as Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Costa Rica, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, South Korea, Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, entitled “Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine” (draft resolution A/ES-11/L.10 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076441?ln=en&v=pdf ). This draft was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution ES-11/7 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076916?ln=en&v=pdf with 93 votes in favour, 18 against, 65 abstentions and 17 not voting. Russia and the United States voted against. Another draft, introduced by the United States, was much more moderate and briefer. Without condemning Russia, it repeated the text of the draft introduced by the United States to the UN Security Council that same day. It is titled “The Path to Peace” (draft A/ES-11/L.11 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076493?ln=en&v=pdf ). Russian amendments were proposed to the American draft, partially repeating the amendments to the Security Council on eliminating the causes of the conflict (A/ES-11/L.12 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076494?ln=en&v=pdf ), but they were rejected by the General Assembly. Also, three draft amendments were submitted to the American draft by the United Kingdom and all EU members except Hungary, Slovakia and, more unexpectedly, Italy (A/ES-11/L.13 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076516?ln=en&v=pdf , A/ES-11/L.14 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076512?ln=en&v=pdf , A/ES-11/L.15 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076514?ln=en&v=pdf ). They textually repeated the triad of amendments condemning Russia that European countries had submitted to the same American draft in the Security Council. However, while these amendments were rejected in the Security Council (due to Russia’s veto), the General Assembly adopted them. And while the original American draft was adopted in the Security Council (for which both the US and Russia voted), then the American resolution was seriously modified in the General Assembly. It included phrases such as “full-scale invasion of Russia” and about the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The US ultimately abstained from voting for this resolution, and Russia voted against. In general, this modified American resolution was adopted by the General Assembly (ES-11/8 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076919?ln=en&v=pdf ), the same 93 votes were “for”, 8 against, 73 abstained, and 19 did not vote.
For the first time in three years of conflict, a gap in approaches between the US and its European allies appeared in the UN, the balance of power in these two votes was very indicative and differed from the more or less established distribution of votes in the UN General Assembly over these three years. Therefore, it will be interesting to look at the positions of individual countries. Let us recall that we have previously addressed the results of voting on Ukraine among new BRICS partners https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/political-positions-brics-partner-countries/ , among old and new BRICS members https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/brics-expansion-as-non-west-consolidation/ , and among African countries https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/russia-and-africa-an-audit-of-relations/ . Previously, over three years, the UN General Assembly adopted 10 resolutions on Ukraine (these are 6 resolutions of the 11th extraordinary session ES-11/1-6 and 4 resolutions of ordinary sessions 77/229, 78/221, 78/316, and 79/184).
First of all, the situation among Russia’s allies in the CSTO and partners in the EAEU and the CIS is interesting. Belarus voted against both new resolutions. Belarus also voted against all 10 previous UNGA resolutions. This is the only case of complete coincidence and solidarity with Russia among the post-Soviet states. The phrase that sometimes appears in the media that Belarus is essentially the only real ally of Russia in the post-Soviet space now receives additional confirmation.
None of the other CSTO allies and partners of Russia in the CIS (we leave out Ukraine and Moldova, which remain members of the CIS, of course) voted against the two new resolutions; all preferred to abstain or not to vote. These are Kazakhstan (previously voted against 2 times out of 10, in the other cases abstained or did not vote), Kyrgyzstan (previously against 1 time), Tajikistan (previously against 1 time), Uzbekistan (previously against 1 time), Azerbaijan (previously never voted) and Turkmenistan (previously never voted). The position of Armenia stands out separately (previously always abstained or did not vote). Now Armenia also abstained on the Ukrainian resolution, but voted “for” the modified American resolution. This is the first time in three years that a CIS partner country of Russia voted for an anti-Russian resolution. A precedent has been set. On the other hand, we note the change in Georgia’s approach. Previously, it always voted for anti-Russian resolutions (10 out of 10), but now it did not vote on the Ukrainian resolution and it abstained on the second. Although in the case of the Ukrainian resolution, Georgia was one of the co-authors of its draft, but chose not to vote “for” and not to vote at all.
The next circle of countries are BRICS members and partners. None of them (except for the above-mentioned BRICS partner Belarus) voted against these two resolutions. All the “old” BRICS members abstained. These include China (previously 5 times “against” out of 10), India (previously always abstained), South Africa (previously always abstained), Brazil (previously 4 times “for” out of 10, including 1 time “for” under President Lula, not Bolsonaro, and never against). Even more indicative is the voting among the new BRICS members. Egypt voted for the Ukrainian resolution and abstained from voting on the American one (previously 4 out of 10 “for”, but after the invitation to BRICS in 2023 it has always abstained). Indonesia, which was officially announced as a new full member of BRICS in January 2025, voted “for” both times (previously “for” 4 times out of 10, but after the invitation to BRICS in 2024, it abstained). Other new BRICS members abstained from both resolutions. These include Iran (previously 5 out of 10 against), Ethiopia (previously 3 out of 10 against), the UAE (previously 4 out of 10 “for”, but after the invitation to BRICS in 2023, they always abstained).
Equally indicative is the voting among the new BRICS partners, for whom accession to this status has officially been confirmed. Malaysia (previously 4 out of 10 “for”, but after the invitation to join BRICS in 2024 abstained), Thailand (previously 3 out of 10 “for”, but after the invitation to join BRICS in 2024 abstained), Nigeria (previously 4 out of 10 “for”, but after the invitation to join BRICS in 2024 abstained) voted for both resolutions. Other BRICS partners either abstained: Cuba (previously 6 out of 10 against), Uganda (previously always abstained), or did not vote: Bolivia (previously 1 out of 10 against). BRICS partners Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were mentioned above.
Also, of the three other countries that were on the unofficial lists that could have been invited to become BRICS partners in 2024, but their official acceptance of this status has not yet been confirmed, Turkiye voted for both resolutions, and also co-authored the draft on the Ukrainian one (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), while Algeria (previously 1 out of 10 against) and Vietnam (previously 1 out of 10 against) abstained. Saudi Arabia, which has put its invitation to BRICS on hold since 2023 (previously 4 out of 10 “for”, but abstained after the invitation to BRICS), also abstained. Finally, Pakistan, a member of the SCO that is not part of the BRICS circle, abstained both times (previously it also always abstained).
Thus, the practice that developed during the second half of 2023 and the whole of 2024, according to which none of the BRICS members voted for anti-Russian resolutions, has now been violated. The practice that none of the new BRICS members and partners voted against Russia after their invitation to this structure has also been violated.
The next circle of states is the political West. The USA (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), we repeat, now voted against the Ukrainian resolution and abstained on its own project after it was modified by European amendments. Israel (previously 9 out of 10 “for”) spoke in solidarity with the USA (against the Ukrainian resolution and abstained on the second). For the first time in three years, there was a lack of unity among EU members on the Ukrainian issue (previously all of them were 10 out of 10 “for”). EU member Hungary now spoke in solidarity with the USA (against the Ukrainian resolution, although it was a co-author of its draft, and abstained on the second). The remaining EU members voted for both resolutions. Also, in addition to the US and Hungary, there were other cases where the unity of NATO was violated. NATO member North Macedonia (previously 10 out of 10 “for”) abstained on both resolutions (although it was a co-author of the draft on the Ukrainian one). NATO member Albania (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), although it voted for the Ukrainian resolution, abstained from the second. Among the non-European allies of the US and the countries of the political West, aforementioned NATO member Turkiye, as well as South Korea, Japan (previously both 10 out of 10 “for”), and Singapore (previously 6 out of 10 “for”) did not follow the US example and voted for both resolutions. Apparently, the EU position was closer to them than the US position. It will be interesting to see Trump’s reaction to this. Both resolutions were also voted for by “other Anglo-Saxon countries”, if we use the terminology of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (earlier, all of them were 10 out of 10 “for”). We will follow Trump’s reaction.
Of the other regions of the world, the most interesting are the countries that previously always or almost always voted for anti-Russian resolutions, but now have changed their position, not wanting to be at odds with the United States. In Oceania, these are primarily three countries officially in free association with the United States: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau (earlier, all three were 10 out of 10 “for”). All of them, as usual, co-authored the draft Ukrainian resolution. But then it suddenly became clear to them that the United States has taken a completely different position. As a result, the Marshall Islands and Palau, despite being co-authors of this resolution, voted against it (as did the United States), and Micronesia (let us recall, the only country, besides Ukraine, that severed diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation in 2022) abstained. Even more interesting for them was the vote on the second resolution, where the original US draft was seriously changed by British and EU amendments. While Micronesia and Palau, like the US itself, abstained, the Marshall Islands, surprisingly, voted “for”. Either they simply did not realize that the text of the US draft had been changed, and the US itself would not support it, and since it was written that this was a US draft, then they had to vote “for”. Or we are dealing with the amazing courage and independence of the foreign policy of a state that is in association with the US.
Among other small Oceanian countries, which previously, as a rule, voted for anti-Russian resolutions, Kiribati and Tuvalu (previously both 9 out of 10 “for”) have now changed their position, abstaining both times. Even more interesting is the behaviour of a number of other Oceanian countries, which voted “for” the first Ukrainian resolution, then saw that the US position was different, and chose to abstain or not vote on the second resolution. These are Vanuatu (previously 9 out of 10 “for”), Papua New Guinea (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), Samoa (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), Fiji (previously 8 out of 10 “for”), Tonga (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Nauru (previously 6 out of 10 “for”) and the Solomon Islands (previously 5 out of 10 “for”). They grasped the changing situation on the fly; well done, folks. None of the small Oceania countries that voted for the first resolution voted for the second. This shows the importance of the US position for them compared to the position of the more nearby Australia and New Zealand, which voted for both resolutions. An interesting observation about the balance of power in the region.
Let’s now look at those countries of continental Latin America that usually voted for anti-Russian resolutions (we will also include in this section the “non-Latin” Belize, Guyana and Suriname). What is interesting here is that Argentina (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), whose president Miley has positioned himself in every possible way as a friend of Zelensky, now abstained both times. Apparently, Trump turned out to be more important to him for some reason. Panama (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), Ecuador (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), Paraguay (previously 7 out of 10 “for”), Colombia (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), and Honduras (previously 4 “for” and 1 against) also acted prudently by abstaining or not voting on both resolutions. Costa Rica (previously 10 out of 10 “for”) abstained on the Ukrainian resolution, although it was a co-author of its draft, but voted “for” on the second. Guatemala (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), Uruguay (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), Chile (previously 10 out of 10 “for”), Belize (previously 8 out of 10 “for”), Guyana (previously 8 out of 10 “for”), Suriname (previously 8 out of 10 “for”) and Peru (previously 7 out of 10 “for”) voted for both resolutions. Apparently, they are indifferent to the US position. For the countries of the Western Hemisphere, this is an interesting and bold approach. Or they really cannot compromise their principles. Mexico, which is already in a clinch with the US over tariffs and drugs also voted “for” both times (previously 5 out of 10 “for”). Apparently, Mexico decided that it had nothing left to lose.
The situation with the small island countries of the Caribbean, which had previously usually voted against Russia, is as follows. Haiti (previously 5 out of 10 “for”) voted in full solidarity with the United States (against the Ukrainian resolution and abstained on the second). Grenada (previously 5 out of 10 “for”), and Dominica (previously 3 out of 10 “for”) abstained or did not vote both times. The Dominican Republic (previously 10 out of 10 “for”) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (previously 4 out of 10 “for”) acted more pretentiously, abstaining on the Ukrainian resolution, but voting “for” the second. Just as with the aforementioned small countries of Oceania, here too, a number of countries had an amazing epiphany on the fly. When countries voted for the first resolution the old-fashioned way, but suddenly something mysterious happened that for some reason made them change their position and abstain or not vote on the second. We cannot claim that this change in the US approach (and not immediately realized, but with a delay for the first resolution, it also takes a long time to sink in) so dramatically affected the foreign policy of absolutely independent and sovereign states. These include Antigua and Barbuda (previously 7 out of 10 “for”) and the Bahamas (previously 9 “for” and 1 against). Jamaica (previously 9 out of 10 voted in favour), Barbados (previously 8 out of 10 voted in favour), Saint Kitts and Nevis (previously 5 out of 10 voted in favour), Saint Lucia (previously 5 out of 10 voted in favour), Trinidad and Tobago (previously 5 out of 10 voted in favour) voted both times boldly, openly and without looking back at the United States. They are also brave and principled. Or they put the former metropolis Great Britain higher than the United States. For the countries of the Western Hemisphere, we repeat, it is interesting.
Let’s consider those African countries that previously usually voted for anti-Russian resolutions. Both times, Benin (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Ghana (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Zambia (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Libya (previously 5 out of 10 “for”), Botswana (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Mauritania (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Rwanda (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Lesotho (previously 3 out of 10 “for”), Gabon (previously 3 times “for” and 1 time against), Senegal (previously 2 out of 10 “for”), and South Sudan (previously 2 out of 10 “for”) prudently abstained or did not vote. Let’s leave out Chad (previously 7 out of 10 “for”), now abstained both times, but there really was a change in the previously pro-French foreign policy course. Also on the fly, as in the case of small countries of Oceania and the Caribbean, Gambia (previously 5 out of 10 “for”) and the above-mentioned BRICS member Egypt changed their approach, they voted for the first resolution, but abstained on the second. On the contrary, Malawi (previously 9 out of 10 “for”), Kenya (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Sao Tome and Principe (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Morocco (previously 2 out of 10 “for”) and Madagascar (previously 2 out of 10 “for”) abstained or did not vote on the first resolution, but voted for the second. But in principle, both times the following countries voted “for”: Seychelles (previously 9 out of 10 “for”), Cape Verde (previously 9 out of 10 “for”), Liberia (previously 9 out of 10 “for”), Côte d’Ivoire (previously 7 out of 10 “for”), Sierra Leone (previously 7 out of 10 “for”), Comoros (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Mauritius (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Somalia (previously 5 out of 10 “for”), Djibouti (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Tunisia (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), as well as the aforementioned BRICS partner Nigeria. Since, based on the results of previous votes, these countries can hardly be accused of a pro-Russian or even neutral position, we have to conclude that the US position does not mean anything to them either.
Finally, last but not least, we’ll look at Asia, those countries that previously voted for anti-Russian resolutions. The US allies and partners Japan, South Korea and Singapore have already been mentioned above; they voted against the US. Both times, Qatar (previously 7 out of 10 “for”), Kuwait (previously 7 out of 10 “for”), Afghanistan (previously 5 out of 10 “for”, represented in the UN not by the Taliban, but by the overthrown pro-Western regime), Bahrain (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Yemen (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Oman (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), and Iraq (previously 3 out of 10 “for”) prudently abstained or did not vote. By the way, Syria (previously 9 out of 10 against) now, after the regime change, did not vote “for”, and abstained both times. Jordan (previously 4 out of 10 “for”) changed its position on the fly (“for” the first resolution, but abstained on the second). By the opposite logic, Brunei (previously 3 out of 10 “for”), Lebanon (previously 3 out of 10 “for”), and Bangladesh (previously 2 out of 10 “for”) abstained on the Ukrainian resolution, but voted “for” the second. Both times, Myanmar (represented in the UN not by the current government, but by the overthrown pro-Western regime, previously 10 out of 10 “for”), the above-mentioned Turkiye, East Timor (previously 8 out of 10 “for”), the Philippines (previously 7 out of 10 “for”), the Maldives (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Bhutan (previously 6 out of 10 “for”), Cambodia (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), Nepal (previously 4 out of 10 “for”), as well as aforementioned BRICS member Indonesia and BRICS partners Malaysia and Thailand, voted “for” in principle and without regard to the US position.
Overall, the change in the US position led to surprising unrest in the ranks of the UN General Assembly. It affected many countries on all continents, and touched upon both the EU and NATO. Many had to simply change their shoes on the fly. We cannot help but admit that all this looked rather ironic. At the same time, let us not forget one of the worst voting results for Russia among our allies in the CSTO, and partners in the EAEU, CIS, BRICS and SCO.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club’s, unless explicitly stated otherwise.