reviving-turkish-iraqi-ties-with-the-development-road

Reviving Turkish-Iraqi ties with the Development Road

Turkish-Iraqi relations have gradually warmed over the past five years. In contrast to Iran’s approach, which relies heavily on a network of sectarian groups and militias to exert influence, Ankara’s Iraq strategy focuses on fostering economic growth and enhancing development as a key prerequisite to improving regional security and prosperity.

A key aspect of the Turkish strategy is the Development Road Project. As a significant milestone of Turkish-Iraqi cooperation, this project is poised to reshape regional trade with its 1,200-kilometer (approximately 745-mile) highway and railway network. Starting from the al-Faw port in the Persian Gulf and cutting through Iraq before entering Türkiye at Ovaköy, this massive route links key ports and border crossings, promising a game-changing shift for both economies. With three phases slated for completion in 2028, 2033 and 2050, this project isn’t just about connectivity – it’s about transforming the economic landscape of the region.

Geopolitical power move

The geopolitical stakes surrounding global connectivity projects are high, especially as the war in Gaza, triggered by Israel’s Oct. 7, 2023, offensive, ripples across the region. The Houthis have already disrupted vital maritime routes like the Red Sea. Meanwhile, grand plans like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project, announced with much fanfare last year, remain stuck on paper, far from securing a strong foothold in the Middle East. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also stumbling, with its flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project in Pakistan bogged down by attacks and sabotage by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). And let’s not forget Iran’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which, constrained by Western sanctions, offers limited global appeal.

In this tangled web of challenges, the Development Road shines as a practical alternative for ships traveling between China and Europe. While the southern corridor through the Suez Canal takes about 35 days, and the Cape of Good Hope route stretches to 45 days, the Development Road slashes travel time to just 25 days. With investment support from regional heavyweights like Qatar and the UAE, this project represents not only a new trade route but also a bold move towards self-driven regional development.

Of course, no grand project in this region comes without risks. The Development Road’s path passes through areas troubled by PKK terrorism, and the Syria-Iraq border is riddled with the destabilizing activity of the terrorist group’s Syrian wing, the YPG. Yet, Ankara has shown remarkable progress in its counterterrorism efforts, and its strengthened ties with Baghdad are starting to pay off. In recent years, Iraq’s National Security Council has gone as far as outlawing PKK-linked political groups. The military base in Bashiqa will also play a crucial role in Iraq’s military modernization, bolstered by Türkiye’s support.

But this isn’t just a Turkish concern anymore. PKK terrorism has evolved into a serious threat to Iraq’s social fabric, with the group committing extortion, blocking roads and launching attacks on villages. Unlike its predecessors, the Sudani government in Iraq is aligned with Ankara’s stance, signaling a united front against this mutual threat and opening up new ways of collaboration including intelligence sharing.

Iran’s role: A question mark

Iran, a key player in Iraq’s post-Saddam politics, might not be thrilled about Türkiye’s growing influence through the Development Road. How Iran-backed militias respond to investments linked to the project remains an open question. However, Ankara seems prepared for this. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s February meeting with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Falih Al-Fayyadh, where both sides are on the same page regarding the very necessity of removing PKK elements from Sinjar, suggests that Türkiye is actively addressing these security concerns through broad diplomatic engagement.

With the upcoming U.S. presidential elections and the possibility of a Trump return raising the specter of “maximum pressure” on Iran, Tehran might find it wise to reconsider its stance. A revitalized Iraqi economy, after all, could be a win-win for both countries. Blocking the Development Road entirely would be a strategic misstep, especially since Iran controls the Hormuz Strait, a key passage for the project’s Gulf link. If Tehran wants a slice of the pie, a deal can surely be made. This has always been the course of Turkish diplomacy as Fidan points out an open door policy for the initiative.

A boon for Türkiye’s economy

For Türkiye, the Development Road offers more than just a strategic trade route – it’s a potential economic catalyst. By establishing special economic zones (SEZs), expanding port and highway connections, attracting foreign investment and adopting an export-driven strategy, Türkiye could maximize the project’s benefits. Situated between Gulf and European markets, the country can become a production and logistics hub if it plays its cards right.

The Turkish-Iraqi partnership, encompassing economic, political, cultural and security collaboration, serves as a model for peace and prosperity in the region. Central to this cooperation is the Development Road Project, which is set to transform regional dynamics through shared economic progress and security efforts. By prioritizing development over militarization, this partnership represents a pivotal shift toward sustainable stability. With their focus on connectivity and addressing security challenges, both Türkiye and Iraq are positioned to take leadership roles in shaping the region’s future economic and geopolitical landscape.

This article originally appeared in the opinion section of the Daily Sabah.