Shattered military and many challenges await IDF’s new chief of staff

The term of outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi is not the shortest in IDF history, but it is the most traumatic. It began with great promise, placed on the shoulders of someone who was marked for greatness long before reaching the General Staff, following a series of prestigious roles such as commander of the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal), commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, head of Military Intelligence and Deputy Chief of Staff.

However, it ended in the most severe military failure in the history of the country. This is undoubtedly a personal tragedy for a man who dedicated the best years of his life to defending the country he loves and cherishes. But it is an even greater tragedy for the bereaved families, the families of those kidnapped, the soldiers abandoned to their deaths, and the entire nation, which, after October 7, will never be the same. Halevi deserves appreciation for his contributions, but nothing will erase the mark of disgrace engraved on his name, a mark that will accompany him for the rest of his life.

The IDF Chief of Staff changeover ceremony, far from celebratory, takes place under the shadow of the jarring final note of Halevi’s term: the publication of investigations into the failure of October 7 collectively and individually paint an utterly horrifying picture. Between Nahal Oz and Nir Oz, between Kfar Aza and Netiv HaAsara, and between the senior leadership and field levels, an army emerges that was unrecognizable compared to the rosy image painted by much of the media.

This is an army that failed to follow basic procedures that could have saved dozens of lives, an army without clear and rigorous standards, one where an unsettling uniformity of thought prevailed, and an organizational culture that silenced anyone who dared deviate from the collective consensus. True, Halevi cannot be solely responsible for all of this: he himself assumed the role only nine months earlier. But the disaster not only happened on his watch but also occurred against the backdrop of policies he played a central role in shaping. His performance on that dreadful night raises tough questions, which will presumably need to be addressed by a state commission of inquiry.

However, such a commission may not suffice: reading the investigations, one can reasonably question why the Military Advocate General is not considering launching a criminal investigation against some of those involved in the failure. There was no “betrayal from within” or any other conspiracy, but in any training accident involving casualties, a criminal investigation by the Military Police is opened. Yet here, in a disaster where over a thousand civilians and soldiers were murdered, responsibility is belatedly taken and accepted as sufficient. Incidentally, Halevi did not dismiss even a single officer involved in the war. The only officer who was dismissed was the intelligence officer of the Southern Command, and that was due to an illicit affair with a subordinate.

Even then, Halevi arranged for him to be transferred to the National Cyber Directorate as a seconded officer to accumulate pension rights. Part of the Israeli tragedy is that the attitude toward Halevi is shaped by the scandalous behavior of the prime minister and most of the political echelon toward Halevi and Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar. However, both men, like the prime minister, deserve to be judged based on what they did, what they didn’t do, and what they could have done to prevent a catastrophe that will haunt us indefinitely.

All of them must stand trial before history, each for the domain they desecrated. The case of Halevi is particularly complex because the military is an enormous organization, and it is being handed over to incoming IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir in a state of advanced disintegration: junior ranks look upward and see darkness, and the entire public views those in uniform as if they are wearing costumes for Purim. Authority and trust, which made the IDF a sacred institution, have crashed like a drone over Metula.

Therefore, Zamir’s first and perhaps central test — something no Chief of Staff before him (not even Gabi Ashkenazi after the Second Lebanon War) has faced — will be to return to the basics: basic discipline, uncompromising professionalism, rewarding excellence, punishing failures to comply with orders and procedures, and setting a personal example that leaves no room for doubt — from the lowest-ranked private to the highest-ranked general — about what is right and what is not. From this, the character and composition of the new General Staff will also emerge. Contrary to various briefings, Zamir is not expected to part ways with all the generals at once, nor will he do so in a humiliating and irresponsible manner.

Some of the public, and certainly parts of the political system, would like to see heads rolling in the corridors of IDF headquarters. However, it is hoped and expected that Zamir is wiser than that. Thus, for example, the resignation of Operations Directorate head Major General Oded Basyuk will take place in a few months to maintain stability and a proper handover process. Similarly, Major General Tomer Bar, commander of the Air Force, will remain in his position for the time being due to regional developments.

Northern Command Chief Major General Ori Gordin might stay until summer to ensure continuity in a sensitive region. Nevertheless, there will definitely be changes, and not the minor, barely noticeable kind. The appointment of Major General Yaniv Assur to the Southern Command, replacing Major General Yaron Finkelman who resigned, indicates the desired direction for the command positions. Major General Eliezer Toledano is also expected to retire from heading the Strategy and Iran Directorate, and he recommended Zamir to close the department.

Brigadier General Itzik Cohen, commander of the 162nd Division, who has been fighting in Gaza continuously since the ground phase began, will be promoted to Major General but is likely to be placed in a staff role, as his entire career thus far has been field-based. He may be assigned to the Operations Directorate or the Home Front Command. The current commander of the Home Front Command, Major General Rafi Milo, is one of the candidates to become the next Northern Command Chief.

Regarding Major General Binder, it is likely Zamir will request a review of the investigation before making decisions about him. After the official changeover ceremony in his B uniform, Zamir is expected to convene the General Staff Forum Wednesday evening for an important discussion on appointments at the ranks of Colonel and Brigadier General, which have been stalled for many months.

He will demand that all generals dedicate lengthy hours until all positions are filled, as the bottleneck in this matter has paralyzed the military for many months, and problems have accumulated accordingly. On Thursday, he will visit the Gaza Division to review war plans. So far, plans presented to him have not been satisfactory, and he has demanded significant improvements.

The issue is that it is unclear whether he will have the necessary time to be completely satisfied: the cease-fire is hanging by a thread, the prime minister does not seem interested in moving to Phase II, and discussions about continuing Phase I appear stuck. Zamir might spend the first days of his term managing combat operations that the public keeps hearing will be “unlike anything we’ve seen before.” He himself will hope that his term will be slightly less scarring than that of his predecessor.