PSCRP-BESA Reports No. 133 (June 11, 2025)
Almost half a decade has passed since the diplomatic breakthrough in the previously informal relations between Israel and the “moderate” Sunni regimes of the Saudi-aligned Arab countries. The establishment, under U.S. auspices, of full diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in September 2020 marked the beginning of the “Abraham Accords” process, which was subsequently joined by Sudan (North) and Morocco.
However, the widely anticipated “wave” of recognition of Israel by Arab states did not materialize at that time. There were several reasons for this, including two primary ones. The driving force behind these agreements—U.S. President Donald Trump—was not re-elected for a second term in the November 2020 election. Those countries that had opted to wait for the outcome of the U.S. election before joining the process—such as Oman, which was expected to inaugurate a second round of agreements—ultimately did not become part of it.
Another influential factor was the position of King Salman bin Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—the leading country of the pro-American Arab bloc—who declared that his nation would be the last to normalize relations with Israel, and only after Jerusalem demonstrates a willingness to establish a Palestinian state. Moreover, this would be expected more in accordance with the parameters of the Saudi (Arab) Initiative than with the provisions of the “Deal of the Century”—a comprehensive regional conflict resolution plan presented by U.S. President Donald Trump on January 28, 2020.
Abraham Accords 2.0
The Democratic administration of Joe Biden was, to a considerable extent, aligned with the vision of official Riyadh, yet nevertheless sought to continue the policy trajectory of its predecessors and, as far as can be judged, considered the normalization of relations between Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to be one of the primary focal points of its Middle East policy. As a result, at a certain point, the Saudis appeared to be relatively close to establishing diplomatic relations with Israel without making the creation of a Palestinian state a precondition.
However, the war launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, disrupted this trajectory. According to internal Hamas leadership protocols cited by The Wall Street Journal and discovered by Israeli forces in tunnels under Gaza, one of Hamas’s principal goals was to derail the process of Israeli-Saudi rapprochement.
Just days after October 7, officials from Saudi Arabia announced the suspension of talks with the United States regarding normalization with Jerusalem and, as expected, joined the chorus of Arab-Muslim states and antisemitic (and anti-Zionist) circles in the West accusing Israel of committing a “genocide of Palestinians.” The reason lay in the powerful anti-Israeli sentiments of the “Arab street,” which even the pro-Western Arab leaders—often lacking deep pro-Palestinian sentiment themselves—could hardly afford to ignore, especially in the wake of the region’s past upheavals during the Arab Spring and the “ISIS Summer,” and given the renewed wave of public radicalization sparked by the Gaza war. That said, it would likely be inaccurate to speak of a complete identity between the sentiments of the Saudi establishment and those of the broader society.
For instance, a study published in December of last year (2024)—a content analysis of thousands of opinion articles and columns published throughout the year in leading Saudi English-language media outlets (Asharq Al-Awsat, Arab News, the Saudi Gazette, and others)—conducted by the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Information and Consulting Center of the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), revealed two opposing trends. On the one hand, the tone of the overwhelming majority of the analyzed publications regarding Israel was very negative, or at best simply unfavorable, with an almost complete absence of articles presenting the Jewish state in a positive light. On the other hand, articles specifically addressing the issue of normalization between KSA and Israel tended, in most cases, to present this topic in a relatively neutral and balanced manner.
It would be premature to interpret this data as an indication of a return to the pre-October 7 status quo. Nevertheless, one may reasonably concur with the conclusion drawn by the authors of the study: in a country where the media operates under the control of the monarchy, such a tone in relation to the idea of normalization likely reflected a directive from the authorities. If this is the case, then the chances of a resumption of the negotiation process along the Riyadh–Jerusalem track should not be considered negligible.
Such assessments gained additional momentum following the return of Donald Trump to the White House, along with renewed hopes for the resumption of processes that could expand the circle of participants in the Abraham Accords. The cost of such an agreement had long been understood: the first and foremost component remains Riyadh, which would normalize relations with Israel in exchange for US security guarantees; US assistance with the kingdom’s nuclear program; cooperation on technology; and progress on Palestinian statehood (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-a-normalization-agreement-with-israel-saudi-arabia-should-settle-for-nothing-less-than-palestinian-statehood/). The final demand left open the question of how much progress would precisely be required—indicating that the Saudis would, for the time being, be willing to settle for general statements of intent.
A certain cooling in relations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump—particularly in terms of divergent interests and approaches to resolving Middle Eastern conflicts, and most notably the White House’s growing frustration with the Israeli leadership’s position on how to bring the Gaza war to a close—also influenced the sentiment of the United States’ Arab allies. With some of these allies, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Trump reportedly preferred to negotiate with minimal (if any) coordination with Israel. One indicator of this was a recent statement by Saudi Crown Prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman, who declared that normalization of relations with Israel would not begin until the war in Gaza ends and a political process is initiated that leads to the creation of a Palestinian state. At this stage, vague declarations of intent to move in such a direction are clearly no longer sufficient for the Saudis and their Arab allies.
Nevertheless, it can be asserted with a high degree of confidence that the idea of abandoning plans for expanding the Abraham Accords as a strategic American-Israeli-Arab regional project is not under consideration. This possibility—indeed, its potential realization in the near future—was hinted at on May 5, 2025, during Israel’s 77th Independence Day celebration at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., by U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. It is safe to assume that policymakers in both Washington and the Arab capitals fully understand that “not pursuing this treaty would be rewarding Hamas”.
Moreover, in this new, second phase of the Abraham Accords, consideration is being given not only to expanding the agreements to Arab countries within the Saudi-aligned bloc that currently lack diplomatic relations with Israel but also to including certain non-Arab Muslim states. Importantly, this includes countries that already have relatively close partnerships with Israel, which may also be integrated into the emerging strategic alliance.
Azerbaijan in the New Regional Order
First on the list of this third category of potential members of the expanded Abraham Accords is Azerbaijan—a post-Soviet country in the South Caucasus whose long-standing partnership and alliance with Israel surpass, by a significant margin, those linking Jerusalem with any of the Arab signatories of the original Abraham Accords. The most frequently cited fact—namely, that Azerbaijan supplies Israel with 50% of its oil needs and, in return, receives 60–70% of its weapons imports from Israel—is perhaps the most vivid indicator of this phenomenon. Another illustrative example: despite widespread anti-Israel sentiment in the Muslim world since the outbreak of the current war with Hamas in Gaza, and despite pressure from Turkey on Azerbaijan to halt its energy exports to the Jewish state, Baku did the opposite—substantially increasing oil shipments to Israel.
Jerusalem and Baku are also connected through a wide array of business, diplomatic, scientific, technological, cultural, and other forms of cooperation. Many of these areas represent only the “tip of the iceberg” of a far-reaching strategic partnership between the two states, which extends well beyond the confines of bilateral relations. Among the public examples of this partnership, one of the most recent is a $900 million deal through which Azerbaijan’s national oil company, SOCAR, acquired a 10% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field. As part of the same deal package, SOCAR, in partnership with British Petroleum, won a March 2025 tender for new natural gas exploration in Israeli waters. Notably, it was clear from the outset that this cooperation extends far beyond purely economic considerations.
For Baku, Israel is a vital partner in the pursuit of its regional and supra-regional interests. Among other factors, the rapprochement between the two states is grounded in shared geopolitical challenges—first and foremost, those posed by the radical Islamist regime in Iran. The key difference, however, is that while Israel has long regarded the Shiite fundamentalist regime of the Iranian ayatollahs—who regularly threaten to “wipe” the Jewish state “off the political map of the Middle East”—as an open and declared enemy, Azerbaijan officially maintains what President Ilham Aliyev has termed “working relations” with the new administration in Tehran. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that in Baku—despite formally accepting Iranian leaders’ rhetorical assurances of “good neighborly intentions”—Iran’s imperial ambitions in the eastern segment of the “Greater Middle East” (including the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and the South Caucasus) are perceived as an existential threat to national security.
For its part, Baku, whose foreign policy doctrine is based on building balanced relations with Turkey, Israel, Russia, the European Union, the United States, and China, is ready and willing to respond to requests to mediate conflicts in the Middle East—or to initiate its own diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions—whenever such initiatives are in line with its national geopolitical interests.
In this sense, Jerusalem’s efforts to promote Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords—in its renewed form as a regional economic and defense alliance capable of effectively countering Iranian and other threats — are fully consistent with Baku’s geopolitical vision. This alignment has, from time to time, been conveyed to Israeli interlocutors (including the present author) by members of the Azerbaijani political and diplomatic establishment directly involved in strategic decision-making processes within the country.
It is telling that in Tehran, this possible course of events is viewed as entirely realistic—and evidently causes considerable concern. According to the Tasnim news agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran expects that following Azerbaijan, the “reconciliation pact” (i.e., the Abraham Accords) will attract the participation of Central Asian states and the broader Turkic world. In Tasnim’s words, “Baku plays a key role in persuading these countries.”
This conclusion is further supported by Azerbaijan’s launch of an ambitious initiative to position itself as one of the critical links in the Middle Corridor (TITR)—a trade route connecting Southeast Asia to Europe via Central Asia. From its side, Baku has recommended that Israel join this promising framework as well.
But the scope of potential expansion does not stop there: the broader vision for the Abraham Accords includes not only additional Arab nations—from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia (the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country)—but also states across Africa. Moreover, a number of experts and political figures have proposed that the “extended” Abraham Accords vision could be effectively integrated with the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—a 5,000-kilometer network including railway lines, an electricity transmission cable, a hydrogen pipeline, a high-speed data cable, and other strategic infrastructure components —envisioned as an economic and geopolitical alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Finally, one of the most significant contributions of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) could be its potential to reduce the global economy’s reliance on critical maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal. The corridor offers an alternative route that could alleviate congestion and significantly enhance trade resilience for countries like India, another major Israeli and American ally in South and Southeast Asia. This would represent an entirely new strategic configuration, offering both new and existing participants in the “Abraham Accords 2.0” substantially broader long-term geopolitical and economic prospects.
Accordingly, the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the U.S.-Israeli regional development framework—encompassing investment, technological partnerships, defense cooperation, and other strategic engagements—as part of an economic, diplomatic, and defense alliance built on the foundation of the Abraham Accords would constitute a full realization of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical potential within the emerging architecture of the “Greater Middle East.” It is also reasonable to assume that Baku could expect tangible benefits from participation at an early stage of implementation. For example, at a minimum, it might seek dividends comparable to those received by the Muslim-majority states that joined the Abraham Accords in 2020, including the lifting of U.S. sanctions under Section 907.
There is ample reason to believe that, if these plans come to fruition, the Washington–Jerusalem–Baku axis would emerge as a key structural pillar of the broader geopolitical framework outlined above. In strategic terms, it would play a role on the western-northern flank of the Middle Eastern–South Caucasian macro-region analogous to that which, on the western-southern flank, appears increasingly likely to be assumed by the Washington–Jerusalem–Riyadh vector. Within a framework of coordinated and complementary efforts, both axes could play a decisive role in constraining the destructive influence of the Iranian ayatollah regime and in advancing the interests of alliance members and their partners across critical domains such as energy, infrastructure, and regional security.
If the initiators of the “expanded version” of the Abraham Accords indeed share this vision, then the pairing of Israel and Azerbaijan on one axis and Israel and Saudi Arabia on the other—each operating under the aegis of Washington—will play a leading role in the implementation of corresponding programs on the ground.
The only distinction lies in the fact that, as of today, the formalization of the Israel–Saudi Arabia partnership, including the establishment of full diplomatic relations, remains contingent upon a series of preconditions set forth by Riyadh, as previously mentioned, and is further complicated by the negative public sentiment toward Israel within the kingdom in connection with the ongoing war in Gaza.
By contrast, the diplomatic relations between Jerusalem and Baku, established a quarter-century ago, have consistently experienced positive development, ultimately evolving— as demonstrated above—into a relationship of strategic partnership between the two states.
Notably, there have been no public protests against Israel in Azerbaijan in response to the current events in the Middle East. On the contrary, there have even been expressions of solidarity with the Jewish state, further underscoring the distinctive nature of Israeli-Azerbaijani relations in the context of the broader regional landscape.
The Cancelled Visit and Future Prospects
However, even on the Azerbaijani-Israeli track, certain challenges have emerged in the present context. One of the outward manifestations of these issues was the cancellation of a planned visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Baku on May 7 of this year, where he was scheduled to meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. The timing of the visit was not accidental: the meeting between the two leaders was intended to take place shortly after the visit to Baku by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and then that of U.S. Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff, during which Azerbaijan presented itself as a mediator in regional stabilization efforts—reflecting the prevailing view in both Israel and the United States of Ilham Aliyev as a figure capable of engaging in dialogue with virtually all sides in the region.
The five-day program for the Israeli prime minister’s visit was to include the presentation of Israel’s perspective on the content and prospects of the U.S.–Iran nuclear negotiations. However, the main focus was expected to be the discussion of final details and parameters—largely outlined during Witkoff’s visit—regarding Azerbaijan’s accession to the Abraham Accords. Notably, this was likely to occur within the broader macro-regional geopolitical context mentioned above, including, according to media reports, “strengthening Baku’s influence in Central Asia.”
However, the Netanyahu visit ultimately did not take place. On May 3, the Prime Minister’s Office announced his decision to postpone the trip to Baku to a later date, citing “developments on the Gaza and Syria fronts, as well as an intensive schedule of political and security commitments.”
Nevertheless, other explanations have circulated in the information sphere. One such version claims that Netanyahu’s visit to Azerbaijan was postponed due to threats from senior Iranian military officers, including IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami. Supporters of this theory refer to information published by Raja News, the media outlet of Iran’s ultra-conservative Front of Islamic Revolution Stability party, and subsequently cited by several media sources.
A third version, presented by the popular Israeli news agency Walla, cites its own sources and suggests that Netanyahu was forced to cancel the trip due to Turkey’s refusal to allow his aircraft to transit through Turkish airspace—a significant development given that Israeli–Turkish relations had already reached a “boiling point” following the events of October 7, 2023—and the inability to secure alternative flight routes.
If the first explanation did not convince everyone in Israel—at least because throughout a year and a half of war, even amid dramatic political and security developments, Netanyahu still found time for international visits—then the second and third versions appear, at first glance, more plausible. Indeed, both similar explanations were acknowledged as early as November 2024, when Israeli President Isaac Herzog canceled his planned appearance at the United Nations COP29 climate conference in Azerbaijan, citing “security considerations” as the official reason. However, commentators suggested that the real reason was Turkey’s refusal to allow the “Wing of Zion” jet to pass through its airspace.
In fact, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s objectives are not limited to hostile anti-Israeli rhetoric—bordering on, and at times crossing into, antisemitism—nor to the demonstrative trade embargo on Israel (which, incidentally, was ignored by Baku, which not only refused to curtail but significantly increased the flow of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through Turkish territory after October 7, 2023).
Erdoğan’s ambitions are far broader and more global. Upon coming to power in 2003, and in contrast to the earlier “European orientation” of Turkish foreign policy, he advanced the doctrine of “Neo-Ottomanism”—a vision of dominance in the Mediterranean region formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire and, through that position, the aspiration to be a major actor in both the Arab-Islamic world and global politics more broadly.
The gradual cooling and eventual dismantling of the strategic partnership that had existed between Turkey and Israel since the era of Ben-Gurion and Atatürk, along with Erdoğan’s claim to be a protector of the Palestinian Arabs (allegedly “suffering under the yoke of Israeli occupation”), was envisioned as a natural path to winning influence and prestige among Arab nations and populations. This strategic calculation, however, proved fundamentally flawed. The proclaimed Turkish policy of “zero problems with neighbors” quickly devolved into conflicts not only with Israel, but with nearly every country in the region, as well as with many external powers. As a result, Neo-Ottomanism was, for a time, shelved.
In recent times, however, amid the noticeable weakening of the Iranian Shiite axis—which has suffered significant damage from Israeli Defense Forces operations against Iranian proxies including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, and (in coordination with the U.S.) the Houthis in Yemen—and a corresponding shift in the regional balance of power, Erdoğan’s team has made efforts to resurrect the earlier doctrine.
In this context, a major success for Turkey was the fall in November 2024 of the pro-Iranian Alawite Assad regime in Syria and the rise to power of a pro-Turkish Sunni government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), the head of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist group that originally split from ISIS. Following these developments, Ankara, as the chief patron of the new Syrian regime, dramatically increased its presence in Syria, including a significant military buildup.
It is evident that Jerusalem views with little enthusiasm the prospect of replacing the collapsed hostile Iranian-Shiite foothold on territories adjacent to Israel’s northeastern borders with a similarly adversarial Turkish-Sunni presence. This concern is particularly acute given that, beyond Erdoğan’s standard “ideological” anti-Zionist motives, there may also be a desire to deflect attention from Turkey’s domestic problems by escalating confrontation with Israel.
Such a volatile situation not only further complicates already severely deteriorated bilateral relations between Jerusalem and Ankara, but also threatens the integrity of the entire northern flank of the geostrategic alliance being constructed on the basis of the expanded Abraham Accords framework.
This turn of events inevitably raises concern in Baku, where, by all indications, the leadership is seriously committed to joining the alliance and playing one of its key roles. Judging by recent developments, Azerbaijan does not intend to remain a passive observer. On April 9, 2025, during a keynote address at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy on the country’s geopolitical strategy, President Ilham Aliyev emphasized the following: “Both countries [Turkey and Israel] are close friends of Azerbaijan.” With the former, he noted, Baku has officially been allied since 2021, and regarding the latter, “for many years, mutual friendship [between Azerbaijan and Israel] has been demonstrated in difficult times for both of us.” He further underlined that: “It is always bad when your friends have bad relations. It is bad for them. It is bad for us, and bad for the world.” Finally, Aliyev expressed his hope that “despite legitimate concerns and despite quite a high level of mistrust, still, there can be found the grounds for normalization, and the areas of mutual interest.”
In fact, Baku already has experience mediating between Jerusalem and Ankara: this occurred in 2022. Following the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara, and Erdoğan’s meetings with then-Prime Minister Yair Lapid—after which, in August 2022, Israel and Turkey restored full diplomatic relations—and later with Lapid’s successor Benjamin Netanyahu, it seemed that the bilateral relationship might finally emerge from years of decline.
At the time, Aliyev’s role in this process was not publicly acknowledged (he officially confirmed it for the first time in the aforementioned April 9 address). Understandably, it was not his fault that, after October 7, 2023, Erdoğan chose to deliberately dismantle the fragile Israeli–Turkish détente from within.
Nevertheless, President Aliyev clearly did not consider the situation irreversible. In fact, on the very same day he expressed confidence in the possibility of détente on the Turkish–Israeli track, talks were already underway in Baku at his initiative between an Israeli negotiating team—led by National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi—and a high-level Turkish delegation. In Jerusalem, the meeting was described as the launch of a “dialogue for the sake of regional stability”; in turn, Ankara referred to it as the “first technical meeting between Turkey and Israel aimed at establishing a deconfliction mechanism to prevent unwanted incidents in Syria.” This appears to have been, at least in part, a response to the warning reportedly issued during the Baku contact that Israel “made it unequivocally clear that any change in the deployment of foreign forces in Syria, in particular the establishment of Turkish bases in the Palmyra (Tadmor) area, is a red line.”
According to the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation, Israel is pressing two principal demands: (1) the prevention of the deployment of forces that could pose a threat near its border with Syria, and (2) opposition to the presence of strategic weaponry on Syrian territory that might be used against it.
Despite mutual distrust, these contacts appear to have had some tangible impact. In mid-May, it was reported that Israel and Turkey have established a permanent direct communication line to prevent misunderstandings and possible military escalation in Syria.
A few days later, it was further revealed that direct, non-public talks between Israeli and Syrian officials had taken place in Azerbaijan, with Turkish observers present.
Finally, according to a Reuters report citing Middle Eastern sources, Israel and Syria are holding direct talks in an Israel-controlled area along the border between the two countries.
In parallel, rumors began circulating in diplomatic and media circles—shortly after the May 14 meeting between Donald Trump and Ahmad al-Sharaa in Riyadh—regarding a (still unconfirmed) interest on the part of Damascus in joining the Abraham Accords. This would potentially include mutual recognition of Israeli and Syrian sovereignty, the establishment of official diplomatic relations, and the formal conclusion of the state of war that has existed between the two countries since 1948.
In an interview with the Jewish Journal, Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa addressed the subject of Syrian–Israeli relations:
“We have common enemies, and we can play an important role in regional security.”
He called for a return to the 1974 disengagement agreement, which, as the publication noted, he invoked not merely as a ceasefire line, but as a potential foundation for mutual respect. Al-Sharaa also stressed the need to protect civilian populations, particularly the Druze communities residing in southern Syria and the Golan Heights.
None of this, of course, would have been possible without a “green light” from the Turkish leadership to Damascus and strong encouragement from Washington to Israel. The remaining question is what policy line Jerusalem should adopt—especially considering that the level of trust toward Ankara, even after all these developments, remains only marginally above zero, and not without reason.
Currently, neither sustainable cooperation nor a strategic partnership seem feasible. The most Israel can realistically afford under current conditions is to follow the same principle that Baku applies to Iran: namely, to maintain what President Ilham Aliyev has termed “working relations” with the new administration in Tehran—formally accepting Iranian leaders’ rhetorical assurances of good neighborliness while realistically assessing their imperial ambitions through the lens of Azerbaijan’s national interests and security.
If this analogy holds, then the process of constructing—even if not yet fully consolidated—a triangle of Israeli–Azerbaijani–Turkish relations, facilitated by what might be termed the “Baku Process” (a term still unofficial), and, in parallel, the development of substantial segments of the emerging “Abrahamic Alliance 2.0”, would indeed hold significant long-term promise.