Image Credit: Manuel Augusto Moreno, Getty Images
The adversarial relationship between Iran and Israel has deep historical roots, tracing back more tough to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Prior to the revolution, Iran under the Shah was a tacit ally of Israel with a shared interest in countering Arab nationalist movements and the Soviet Union. The revolution brought to power an Islamic government under Ayatollah Khomeini, which adopted an anti-Israel stance, viewing Israel as an illegitimate state and an enemy due to its occupation of Palestinian territory.
Over the decades, this relationship has manifested in various forms, from the support of ally militias of Iran, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The crux of their conflict revolves around Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its ballistic missile programme, viewed by Israel as an existential threat. In November 2024, senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that Iran has the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons and would change its nuclear doctrine if faced with an existential threat. This rhetoric came amidst heightened tensions following Israeli military actions near Iranian nuclear sites (Johnston, 2024).
Israel has consistently pushed for a hard line against Iran, advocating for military strikes or stringent international sanctions to curb Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Following an attack by Tehran on Israel in October 2024, Israel specifically pushed for sanctions targeting Iran’s missile capabilities. This advocacy resulted in the United States and European Union announcing new sanctions aimed at Iran’s drone and missile programmes. These sanctions were intended to restrict Iran’s ability to produce and export drones and missiles, particularly those used in attacks against Israel and its allies; the US also expanded its sanctions on Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors. Iran, on the other hand, has maintained that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, whilst also simultaneously expanding its regional influence through its “Axis of Resistance”; a term used to describe a network of states, paramilitary and political movements that are aligned ideologically with Iran.
In recent years, the situation has evolved from a “shadow war”, by which conflict is carried out through assassinations, cyber-attacks, espionage and other non-military methods, to more overt confrontations. Israel has intensified its military operations against Iranian assets, as well as in Syria, where Iran had a significant military presence to support the Assad regime. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Iran has lost a significant strategic land bridge, as well as being significantly weakened due to the loss of a key cornerstone of the axis of resistance.
The most notable escalation recently came with Israel directly attacking Iranian nuclear sites in late 2024 in retaliation to an attack of approximately 180 ballistic missiles launched from Iran. This signalled a shift towards a more aggressive policy aimed at crippling Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, whilst also avoiding civilian casualties, preventing international backlash and a full-scale war.
The election of Donald Trump in November 2024 has also added a new layer to the complexities of this relationship. Trump is a strong supporter of Israel, and has always maintained this stance, often going to extreme and unconventional lengths to prove this. Most recently, he announced that the US would “take over” and “own” the Gaza Strip as part of a plan to turn it into what he described as “the Riviera of the Middle East”. He proposed that Palestinians be relocated to Egypt and Jordan, suggesting that they have no right to return to Gaza. Trump’s vision was to rebuild Gaza into an international tourism and development hub. His remarks drew widespread condemnation from Palestinian leaders, Arab countries, and even some within the US who argued that the plan would violate international law and could be considered ethnic cleansing. (OHCHR, 2025). His first presidential term from 2017-2021 was marked by the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), first implemented in 2015 under the Obama Administration. President Trump also imposed the “maximum pressure” policy through sanctions designed to suffocate the Iranian economy.
Upon returning to office, the US President has doubled down on his approach, reiterating his “maximum pressure” campaign, aiming to force Iran into a new, more restrictive, nuclear agreement or significantly weaken its regional influence.
Recent intelligence shows that Israel is preparing for potential strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in the first few months of 2025 (Cohen et al, 2025), leveraging Trump’s political stance. This preparation is partly due to Iran’s enrichment of uranium levels very close to those needed for nuclear weapons, although Tehran denies weaponisation intentions. The fall of Assad’s regime in Syria has also disrupted Iran’s strategic depth, making it both militarily and diplomatically vulnerable, which could also explain Israel’s keenness to strike within the first few months of this year.
As mentioned previously, Trump’s return to office has emboldened Israel, with President Netanyahu seeking to capitalise on Trump’s pro-Israel policies. He made his stance clear in his first term by recognising Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the US Embassy there. This marked a significant diplomatic shift in US foreign policy, whilst also being extremely controversial due to the potential disruption of the ongoing peace process. This pro-Israel and anti-Iran stance was also emboldened further when the US assassinated General Qasem Soleimani, a key figure in Iran’s military strategy, leading many to fear it could spark a global war. Following this move, Trump announced that he would not take military action any further and new sanctions were introduced without escalating the already tense situation.
Trump’s rhetoric and actions all point towards him favouring a strong military and economic pressure strategy against Iran, potentially aiding an Israeli strike if diplomatic solutions were to fail. His administration has signalled an openness to negotiations, but under conditions that would severely curtail Iran’s nuclear capabilities and regional activities.
There are a number of short-term scenarios, which could occur when taking into account the elements at play here. The first being an escalation to war; if Iran feels cornered or if it’s nuclear facilities are being directly attacked, it may retaliate, potentially leading to a broader conflict. Iran’s military capabilities are certainly not on a par with Israel’s, however it does possess a significant number of missiles that could target Israel, US bases in the region, or even attempt to disrupt global shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. If this were to occur, there would be a sharp increase in global oil prices, and the economic impact on major oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE would be huge. The US, which has a significant military presence in the area, may also lead or join international operations to secure the strait, likely involving other countries such as the UK, France and China. Countries directly bordering the strait, including Oman and the UAE, would heavily increase their military cooperation with the US, further isolating Iran.
Although a much less likely scenario, there is also the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough. This would be where Iran, under severe economic strain and facing internal discontent, opts for a new deal to alleviate pressure. This, however, would require Iran to significantly scale back its nuclear ambitions and possibly its regional influence, as demanded by Trump. There would likely be a demand for a framework where Iran’s nuclear programme is tightly monitored, and its regional activities are curtailed. Based on the actions taken by both sides so far, this scenario is highly unlikely as Iran would not want to be perceived as weak, especially among other countries in the Middle East.
There are also some long-term scenarios which could occur. Iran is likely to continue to inch closer to nuclear capability by enriching more uranium to nuclearization levels. This would make any military action by Israel and the US much riskier -given the potential for nuclear retaliation or the rapid weaponisation of existing material. It must be noted that Iran may also be building up its nuclearization programme as a form of deterrence, rather than having the intention to use the weapons, however the past volatility of the regime must not be underestimated.
The weakening of Iran’s proxies and its own military capabilities may lead to a reconsideration of alliances in the region. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, previously wary of aligning too closely to Israel due to the Palestinian issue, might see strategic benefits in normalising relations to counter Iran, especially with US backing under Trump. Following the fall of Assad, and the loss of a key ally in Syria, Iran has shown an interest in establishing a dialogue with the new Syrian leadership in order to maintain some level of influence. However, with Syria now as a less viable option, Iran may pivot its focus towards increasing support for its proxies in Iraq and Yemen, where it still retains significant influence.
Overall, there could be a much wider global influence as the US and Israel’s actions could either stabilise or destabilise the Middle East, affecting oil prices, security in the Gulf, and US strategic interests in countering China and Russia’s influence in the region. It is likely, especially after the fall of Assad, as a key ally to Iran, that continuous pressure may lead to further political and economic isolation, with this potentially sparking internal unrest or more aggressive foreign policy moves by Tehran to demonstrate strength or resilience, which is evidently an important aspect to the country. Without diplomatic success, the region could see direct warfare, with long-term implications for peace processes, energy markets and global security. Overall, the situation between Israel and Iran, influenced by Trump’s policies, stands at a critical juncture. While the immediate future may hinge on diplomatic or military decisions, the next steps taken by these countries would influence the long-term outlook and there is a fine line between escalation and relatively peaceful coexistence in an extremely volatile region.
Sources
Cohen, Z. et al. (2025). US intelligence agencies believe Israel is likely to strike Iranian nuclear facilities this year. CNN. (Online Article).
Johnston, N. (2024). Iran warns it could seek nuclear weapons in the face of ‘existential threat’. The Guardian (Online Article).
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR). (2025). US proposal to ‘take over’ Gaza would shatter fundamental rules of international order, warn UN experts. (Online Article).
Disclaimer. The views and opinions expressed in this analysis are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of MEPEI. Any content provided by our author is of her opinion and is not intended to malign any religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual, or anyone or anything.
About the author:
Ms. Amelia Hepner THEODOROU
Ms. Amelia Hepner THEODOROU is a Regional Security Analyst based in the United Kingdom. Having graduated from the University of Liverpool with a BA in International Politics and Policy, she is currently completing an MA in International Relations and Security. Her interests focus on counter-terrorism strategy and the geopolitical dynamics of the MENA region, with a particular emphasis on intelligence sharing between the United States and United Kingdom.