The eminent Australian scholar, Leslie Holmes, defined the movements against Communist rule in Europe as ‘rejective’ revolutions. His reasoning was that citizens knew what they were against, but not what they wanted in its place. One characteristic of recent West European elections is that they share in common the rejection of the political parties which have defined the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ electoral positions since the end of the Second World War. In the UK, the Conservative and Labour Parties have both suffered considerable loss of their traditional support. In France, Marine Le Pen, in Italy, Giorgia Meloni, in Germany, Sahra Wagenknecht, in Hungary, Viktor Orban, all lead parties which challenge the acceptance of domestic neo-liberal policies and a foreign affairs outlook predicated on NATO. Does the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA fit into the same picture frame?
The Current Waves of Political Discontent
The current levels of disaffection share in common domestic issues: the rising levels of immigration which adversely affect the lower income groups by providing low wage labour and competition for housing and state provided benefits. There are also wider economic changes: the liberal free market has changed the pattern of trade, the physical production of commodities has moved to the developing world, taking previously well paid and relatively permanent manual-labour jobs with them. The remaining skilled manual working class is cut adrift to find work in the shopping malls, temporary short term employment or no work at all with dependence on public or private charity. In its place has arisen a new class of non-manual labour with higher education engaging a high proportion of women. The rising professional classes – accountants, lawyers, teachers and lecturers, researchers and students, government non-manual employees, health, tourism and well-being professionals, estate agents and information technology specialists – enjoy stable incomes and comfortable working environments. Financial services and speculative dealing in housing, capital ownership, privatisation of public assets, and a diminishing role for collective state-funded social security have all led to a higher privileged social class with very high incomes and privatized life styles. In all the core capitalist countries, there has been a reduction in the share of labour in the national income.
Donald Trump’s electoral triumphs ride on these developments. Like the rising populist movements noted above, Trump has benefitted from those who have lost from the move to open foreign markets. Trump, however, does not challenge the American political system. His support remains firmly embedded within it. The total number of votes cast is still highly balanced with only a two percentage difference in the popular vote favouring Trump between the two candidates.
David Lane
C. Wright Mills exposed the political leadership of the USA in the 1950s as a ‘power elite’. The pillars of political power were constituted by the military (the ‘warlords’), capitalists (the ‘corporate rich’ and ‘chief executives’) and the Washington DC political establishment (‘the political directorate’). These elites formed a unitary ‘power elite’ sharing interdependent political, economic institutions and a common ideology.
The American Case: Support for Donald Trump
The exit polls capture some of the issues underlying the changes taking place. (The opinion polls utilised here are respondents questioned after voting in the Presidential election in November 2024 in ten key states, as reported by NBC News.) Trump’s support was drawn from all income groups. He had slightly less votes than the Democrats from those with a family income of more than $100,000 per annum; here the Democrats attracted 51 per cent compared to the Republicans 46 per cent. In the lower income group (under $50,000) the voting share was 47 per cent to the Democrats and 50 per cent to the Republicans. Trump attracted a disproportionate number of men (55 per cent compared to 42 per cent for Harris), while Harris received 53 per cent of women’s votes, which included 91 percent of black-skinned women (7 per cent of the electorate) while Trump’s share of the women’s vote was 45 per cent. Trump attracted older voters (56 per cent of the 50-64 age group); Harris younger women (61 per cent of the 18 to 29 age group). Married men voted overwhelmingly for Trump (60 per cent). His support included 63 per cent of voters who had secondary education or less; a very wide difference compared to the educational background of the Democratic party, which attracted 55 per cent of college graduates. By religious affiliation, 63 per cent of Protestants voted Trump, Catholics 58 per cent, but Jews only 22 per cent; those with no religion voted 71 per cent Democratic. The gay, lesbian bisexual transgender group was overwhelmingly (86 per cent) Democratic. Whereas 65 per cent of military veterans voted for Trump. Except for Black skinned Americans (Trump only received 13 per cent of their votes), Trump had considerable support among other ethnic groups and received 57 per cent of the votes of White Americans (71 per cent of the total surveyed).
We have then a picture of a wide social constituencies for Trump, with rather more older men and slightly more in the lower income groups; for Harris, rather more in the top income groups, more women and more College graduates.
Why vote for Trump?
A major explanation of why people voted as they did is to be found in people’s living conditions and how they had changed. Of the total number of people in the survey, a third considered that the nation’s economy had performed ‘badly’: of these, however, 87 per cent were Trump’s supporters. On the other hand, a quarter of the respondents felt that their family’s financial situation was ‘better’ than four years earlier; of these, 82 per cent were Democratic supporters. Of those who felt their situation was ‘worse’ (46 per cent of the respondents), 81 per cent turned to Donald Trump. When we consider the effects of inflation, 22 per cent of the population felt that ‘inflation was a ‘severe hardship for their family’: of these, 74 per cent voted for Trump. Whereas, of those who had experienced ‘no hardship at all’ from inflation, 77 per cent were Democratic voters. Of the total population, 24 per cent reported that their economic position was ‘better today’ than four years ago: of these 82 per cent were Harris supporters; the largest group of voters (46 per cent) said they were ‘worse off’ than four years ago: of these, 81 per cent looked to Trump for a remedy. These results indicate that considerable numbers were dissatisfied with economic conditions.
The Most Important Political Issues for the American Voter
What then were the issues which featured in the election? What motivated people to vote for one or the other candidate? When asked to select the most important issue which had affected their vote for President: the most important issue for 34 per cent of the respondents was ‘the state of democracy’ in the USA: the majority of these (80 per cent) were Democrats. The second most important frequently mentioned issue was the ‘state of the economy ‘ (32 per cent of respondents) of whom 80 per cent were Trump supporters. Abortion was the third issue prioritized by 14 per cent of the respondents: of these, three quarters were for Harris and only 25 per cent for Trump. Fourth came immigration (11 per cent of the total), with a massive 90 percent of those being Republican voters. Finally, came foreign policy issues with only 4 per cent of the respondents seeing this as the most important: of these, 57 per cent were for Trump and 37 per cent for Harris. As to issues in foreign affairs, support for Israel was divided equally into three groups: that the policy of the US was ‘too strong’ was the belief of 67 per cent, who identified with the Democrats; in the second group: ‘US policy is not strong enough’, 82 per cent were Republicans; and in the third group: ‘US policy is about right’ constituency, 59 per cent were for the Democrats. Clearly, there was a polarized position on the Israel issue. There were no question in the survey concerning the war in Ukraine.
Overall, the election of Donald Trump was overwhelmingly an expression of disappointment with domestic conditions. His supporters were drawn disproportionately from those who had lost out in recent years, those who bore the costs of inflation and deindustrialization. They were drawn disproportionately from rural areas and socially were constituted by a wide social mix, but particularly older people. The issues motivating Democratic voters were more abstract constitutional issues: an assault on liberal democracy (by their opponents) and the right to abortion. Here Democratic support came from mainly suburban, younger and more female supporters.
The polls show that, as a group, the Democratic voters were not adversely affected by declining economic conditions. The new middle classes were doing quite well. Trump triumphed because he picked policies with a political resonance: the decline of working class incomes, and the supposed threat caused by immigration. The issue of abortion was somewhat manufactured as an issue because, although Trump opposed abortion, it remains the prerogative of the constituent states of the USA. The main policy division between Trump and the Democratic Party was the issue of the war in Ukraine in which President Biden was deeply committed. This issue, however, did not figure as a major issue in the media and was not included in the NBC News survey.
What Next for the Trump Administration?
The election of Donald Trump is a long way from anything like a ‘rejective revolution’. Trump posed questions which had resonance with the population: immigration, foreign involvement in too many theatres of war, the rise of and competition from, China, the negative trade balance and ‘green’ environmental challenges. Kamala Harris lacked not only charisma but, apart from the abortion issue, any fundamental personal political policies. She frequently refused to answer publicly questions on policy issues. If elected, Harris would have been overwhelmed by her advisers and influence coming from the ‘deep state’ which had considerable influence in Trump’s first term as President. He will be better prepared in his second term and will have strong political backing in the legislature and the Supreme Court. But these are domestic issues with international implications, not in any way a ‘rejective’ revolution of the American political system. One might expect Trump to promote a narrower range of ‘America First’ policies; neoliberalism will continue within a national shell; what’s good for business will increasingly shape politics. One might expect the reindustrialization of the economy, stiffer import tariffs, stronger immigration controls, transfer of financial support for NATO to European states, backing for production for the American military-industrial complex, and involvement in fewer foreign wars with a shift in focus to China and Iran.
Roman Romanov
Despite Trump’s apparent superiority over Biden, the ex-president will have a difficult time winning in November. Republicans and their electorate are divided, criminal proceedings against Trump, the energisation of the Democratic electorate, and various “black swans” (given the age of the two main candidates) are all limiting Trump’s polling gains in swing states, Roman Romanov writes.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club’s, unless explicitly stated otherwise.