The election of Donald Trump in November stirred concerns that a countdown on U.S. or joint U.S.-Israeli action aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities had begun. Reports in the Wall Street Journal and other outlets suggested that during the presidential transition period, Trump and his incoming foreign policy team had discussed a major U.S. strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure with their Israeli counterparts. Since his inauguration on January 20, however, Trump has reaffirmed his oft-stated intent to not initiate any new armed conflicts in the Middle East, and instead settle long-standing disputes. Rather than assessing the scope of any U.S. or Israeli attacks on Iran, experts have begun to imagine the contents of a comprehensive U.S.-Iran agreement that would supersede the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Still, Trump administration officials have indicated that Washington would impose the “maximum pressure” sanctions policies Trump employed in his initial term, which the president reimposed this week. The composition of Trump’s hawkish foreign policy team, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, suggest that U.S. conditions for a deal will exceed what Iranian leaders are willing to concede. Iran’s likely unwillingness to meet American demands sets the stage for an impasse, and a U.S. and Israeli turn toward possible military action.
A Familiar Fixation
Iran policy was a significant focus of Trump’s first term. In 2018, he withdrew the United States from the multilateral Iran nuclear deal negotiated by President Obama’s administration, and he re-imposed U.S. secondary sanctions intended to put “maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy. The stated intent of maximum pressure was to compel Tehran to negotiate a broader nuclear agreement, which failed to materialize. In January 2020, Trump ordered the airstrike that killed IRGC Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, the architect of Iran’s proxy-focused regional strategy.
Israeli and U.S. intelligence have grown increasingly concerned that Iran might construct a nuclear weapon to ensure the regime’s survival after Tehran and its proxies suffered significant losses at the hands of the Israel Defense Forces. In December, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, told Reuters that Iran is “dramatically” accelerating its enrichment of uranium to up to 60 percent purity, closer to the roughly 90 percent purity required to manufacture nuclear weapons. It already has enough 60 percent-enriched uranium to make four warheads, according to IAEA. Some experts have assessed that the decimation of Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah, coupled with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, have compelled Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to finally green light the bomb. Indeed, some Iranian officials have openly called for a reconsideration of Khamenei’s prohibition on the development and use of nuclear weapon.
Thus, with Iran’s behavior and the proclivities of the Trump cabinet, the return to maximum pressure should come as no surprise. The current American administration believes it must strictly enforce U.S. economic sanctions to compel Tehran to accept a revised and more comprehensive nuclear deal. The Trump foreign policy team—particularly Secretary of State Rubio and National Security Advisor Waltz—firmly believes in using economic sanctions as a core U.S. policy tool to pressure the Islamic Republic’s to come to the negotiating table.
More concretely, administration officials insist that U.S. policy can only succeed if it is able to restrict the large volumes of Iranian oil—estimated at 1.5 million barrels per day—that China’s small oil traders buy from Iran. Reducing China’s purchases will require the reinstatement of all U.N. sanctions on Iran under a “sanctions snap back” mechanism provided for by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. Beijing has argued that international law does not forbid Chinese companies from buying Iranian oil. A U.N. sanctions snapback would change that. During his confirmation process, Secretary Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he would work with U.S. partners in Europe to institute the snapback mechanism, and the National Security Presidential Memorandum issued by President Trump on February 4 directs the State Department work with US partners in Europe to invoke the snapback provision. Ironically, however, President Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA arguably precludes the United States from triggering the snap back mechanism, which any JCPOA party can do by accusing Iran of violating the accord. The European parties to the JCPOA—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—have supported reimposing sanctions in response to Iran’s JCPOA violations, as well as to punish Iran for selling sophisticated armed drones to Russia for use in Ukraine.
Compromise or Confrontation
A major question is whether sanctions represent the first salvo of efforts to pressure Iran to accept a more comprehensive and binding nuclear deal or a prelude to U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear program. As U.S. and Israeli concerns about Iran’s nuclear program mount, reports have appeared in several press outlets that Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have discussed a major air campaign against Iranian nuclear sites. But, during his visit to Washington in early February, Netanyahu did not get a clear signal from President Trump that Washington would provide political top cover and military support for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, even if U.S. forces do not directly participate.
Instead, President Trump clearly indicated he wants to test Iran’s willingness to negotiate before striking Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities. In September, Trump stated, “we have to make a deal [with Iran], because the consequences are impossible. We have to make a deal.” He has made similar statements since, including during the Netanyahu visit. For their part, Iranian leaders have publicly acknowledged that Tehran prefers diplomacy to conflict, but Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i injected uncertainty in that position in February 4 by publicly stating skepticism about negotiating with the Trump Administration.
Any negotiations between the Trump administration and Iran will likely be arduous, and the prospects for success doubtful. As he did during his first term, Trump has insisted that any revised nuclear accord include restraints on Iran’s support for regional proxies, its missile and drone arsenal, and other destabilizing behavior. Regarding the core nuclear issue, the National Security Presidential Memorandum makes clear Trump’s terms for a new deal will be strict—far beyond the requirements of the JCPOA. The document states: “A radical regime like this can never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, or to extort the United States or its allies through the threat of nuclear weapons acquisition, development, or use.” Yet, no Iranian leader has indicated that Tehran is prepared to completely dismantle Iran’s uranium enrichment program – an action the Memorandum implies will be required in any deal – underlining the intractability of the nuclear issue.
If talks reach an impasse, how the U.S. and or Israel might proceed is uncertain, but perhaps can be predicted. Israel, in particular, calculates that, if presented with clear evidence Iran is trying to acquire an actual nuclear weapon, Trump will back—or at least choose not to restrain— an Israeli kinetic action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and the direct Iranian attacks on Israeli territory that followed have dramatically increased Israel’s willingness to strike within the Islamic Republic. That Israel has arguably the most pro-Israel U.S. president in the White House will only embolden Netanyahu. In late October 2024, even before Trump’s election, Israel added Iran’s critical Parchin Military Complex to its target list in an air strike that responded to Iran’s October 1 missile barrage. Israeli jets sought to destroy sophisticated equipment at that facility that are needed to design and test a nuclear explosive device.
Most experts assess that American firepower would be required to adequately destroy Iran’s hardened facilities, such as the uranium enrichment complex at Fordow. But for now, Trump has revealed little about his intentions. Asked about the prospect of war with Iran during an interview with Time Magazine published in mid-December, Trump said, “Anything can happen. It’s a very volatile situation.”
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.
Issue: U.S. – Gulf Policy
Country: Iran