Too Little, Too Late: China Steps Up Military Aid to Myanmar’s Junta

Editor’s Note: Stimson’s Myanmar Project seeks a variety of analytical perspectives on issues relating to Myanmar’s civil war, domestic politics, foreign relations, and other topics. Zachary Abuza is a Professor at the National War College and an expert on Southeast Asian politics and security. Nyein Nyein Thant Aung is an Erasmus Mundus Scholar in the IMSISS Programme who specializes in Indo-Pacific security policy issues. The views expressed here are the authors’ own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, or Stimson.

By Yun Sun, Co-Director, East Asia

Introduction

Fearful of a Syria-style regime collapse, China has doubled down in support of Myanmar’s junta, four years after junta leaders seized power in a coup d’etat on February 1, 2021. While China has little confidence in Min Aung Hlaing and the State Administrative Council (SAC) leadership, it views the military as the only force that can hold the multi-ethnic country together and protect China’s sizable economic interests. Indeed, Beijing seems unconvinced that a transition to a federal democratic system is possible and fears instability along its border.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi recently pledged $3 billion in assistance to the junta,¹ to include earmarked funds for a census and “elections” as an off-ramp for the junta.² The assistance will ideally give the military a seat at the table in any post-coup government and a return to what constitutes the antebellum constitution. According to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defense’s 2024 Military Progress Report,³ the opposition is in full control of 95 of 330 townships (44%); the SAC has only full control over 107 townships (32%).⁴ The NUG believe the area under their control is higher.⁵ By the SAC’s own admission, the junta is only able to conduct a census and safely organize elections in 161 of the 330 townships.⁶

Chinese aid to the military government is not new. Until the democratic transition in 2015, China was the primary backer of the junta in military, economic, and diplomatic terms. The establishment of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor in 2018 as part of the Belt and Road Initiative solidified China’s economic dominance in the country. China has sold Myanmar’s military a range of weaponry both before and after the coup and is one of the primary sources of aviation assets and artillery. China also has been a key supplier of information technology, including jamming and interception technology, Huawei’s Smart Cities suite of CCTVs, and other tools that have assisted societal repression and weakened the NUG’s urban guerrilla operations. Since the coup, which China did not fully endorse, Beijing continued to sell an estimated $267 million in weaponry, trailing only Russia ($406 million).⁷

Chinese Diplomatic Engagement and Pressure

Chinese support has come in a number of ways, including high-level visits to China from Generals Min Aung Hlaing⁸ and Soe Win, Defense Minister Tin Aung San, and other SAC leaders. Chinese support has also taken the form of pledges of more foreign investment, as well as the infusion of cash to stabilize the kyat, which has lost over 40% of its value⁹ amidst soaring inflation, which was 27% and 22% in 2023 and 2024, respectively.¹⁰

China has intensified its pressure on the ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) along its border, resulting in partial progress in stabilizing northeast Myanmar. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) finalized a ceasefire with the junta in Kunming on January 20, 2025¹¹ pledging to return the town of Lashio to junta control by mid-2025.¹² The agreement came months after reports of China allegedly detaining the MNDAA commander Peng Deren to compel peace talks.¹³ With China’s subsequent brokerage for the peace talks, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) also met the Junta’s Special Operations Commander, Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo in Kunming on February 16, 2025; however, no agreement was reached according to TNLA’s announcement on February 19, 2025.¹⁴

China also encouraged the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to move west out of its enclave along the Chinese border to stop the MNDAA’s and TNLA’s southward advance into Central Shan State, while also demanding that the Wa stop selling ammunition and arms to opposition forces.¹⁵ Since Arakan Army (AA) has been expanding its control, with recent offensives in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State,¹⁶ it is highly likely that China will step up to hold the dialogue between AA and Myanmar military soon to safeguard Chinese investments and projects in Rakhine State.¹⁷ Beijing has also pressured the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which at the time of writing, controls some 13 of 18 townships,¹⁸ to stop their offensive.¹⁹

Compelling these groups – who have every incentive to continue Operation 1027 – has not been easy. Beijing resorted to cutting off electricity and internet service along the border, as well as shutting down all border trade,²⁰ which has devastated the local economies. Following the January 2025 ceasefire between MNDAA and SAC, China reopened three main border gates: Yanlonkyaing, Chinshwehaw, and Namtit, while maintaining a blockage on three others controlled by the TNLA and MNDAA.²¹ Despite Chinese pressure, the TNLA have rejected the latest ceasefire agreement, as junta forces continued air attacks. The KIA has continued fighting, taking full control of Mansi in early January 2025 and continuing their assault on Bhamo²² seizing the junta’s major positions, including Bhamo Airport as of January 2025.²³

On October 22, 2024, the SAC announced that it reached an agreement with Beijing to form a joint private security corporation²⁴ to protect Chinese interests.²⁵ The junta’s rubber stamp parliament passed the law in February 2025.²⁶ Already, the first deployment of private military company (PMC) forces has been documented in the Kyaukphyu SEZ.²⁷ While it is unclear what the rules of engagement will be, or whether PMC forces can provide anything other than static defense, this is a huge assistance to the resource-stretched SAC, which can deploy needed manpower elsewhere. Since March, the military has called up eight batches of conscripts – roughly 30,000 men – who are deployed after a very short training program, showing its desperate need for personnel.²⁸ Chinese PMCs, which are closely tied to the People’s Liberation Army, are expected to be deployed with an array of intelligence and surveillance capabilities and will likely provide targeting data to the military.

But arguably the most important assistance that Beijing is providing is in the military realm, including arms sales, drone technology, the deployment of technicians to defense industries (known as KaPaSa), and the blocking of dual-use exports to the opposition. While Beijing wants to see an end to the fighting, which is jeopardizing its economic interests, it also wants to see a negotiated offramp for the generals and the establishment of a transitional government that would enshrine military participation.

Chinese Military Assistance

China has long been a supplier of weaponry to the Burmese military, though the Tatmadaw has always been wary of over-dependence. The UN Office of Human Rights found that between the February 1, 2021 coup and May 2023, 41 Chinese suppliers had sold the junta some $267 million in weaponry.²⁹ The weaponry included new FTC-2000G jet trainers, and spare parts for jets (Chengdu J-7, JF-17, FTC-2000G, K-8, and Nanchang Q-5), Mi-2 helicopters, and tanks. China delivered a Y-8F-200W medium lift cargo plane in December 2024.³⁰ China has also supplied communications equipment and interception technology, truck parts, and a range of industrial equipment and machine tools for military production.³¹ Beijing also provided technical assistance to Myanmar’s naval shipyard.

Jet Fighters

China has increased the transfer of kinetic weaponry, meant to stem the considerable territorial losses of the regime, ahead of a census and “elections.”

The Myanmar Air Force purchased FTC-2000G trainers in 2020³² and took the first delivery in November 2022. It received its second batch in August 2024.³³ Three more were delivered in December 2024.³⁴ While these are less advanced than the six Russian SU-30s delivered between 2022 and 2024,³⁵ they are lighter, cheaper to run, and perfectly adequate against mainly civilian targets, or even military targets that lack surface-to-air missiles. This is important as the regime is increasingly reliant on airpower, given its setbacks on the ground. According to an independent monitoring group, the first 11 months of 2024 saw an average of 251 air attacks [per month?], but the last four months saw an average of 297. October alone had 347 airstrikes.³⁶

This has put a huge strain on Myanmar’s Air Force, which struggles to maintain its aircraft. Its 11 JF-17s produced in Pakistan are reportedly grounded due to cracks in the airframes.³⁷ The air force had a high of 36 Chengdu J-7s, a variant of the Soviet MiG-21, that are well past their lifespan.³⁸ Estimates are that only half are still in service. (Vietnam has lost two similar airframes in training accidents in the past two years.) The 20 Nanchang Q-5s (A-5s) are the bulk of the fighter force, requiring regular imports of spare parts.³⁹ While Myanmar’s Air Force is still flying the Yak-130 trainers from Russia in combat missions, a shortage of spare parts has grounded many. Indeed, the United States sanctioned a Myanmar firm, Sky Aviator, in December 2024, for importing parts for the Yak-130s.⁴⁰ The 15 FTC-2000Gs are now a key component of its airpower, and some six more are expected for delivery in 2025.⁴¹ The air force, likewise, has used the K-8 twin seat trainers as a mainstay, though it is unclear how many of the 60 that they are known to have are serviceable.

In addition to the transfer of aircraft, China has further supported the regime by providing training to Myanmar Air Force (MAF) officers. According to The Irrawaddy, a group of eight pilots, eight technicians, and two arms officers traveled to China for training in June 2022.⁴²

Despite the regime’s dependence on airpower, its air force is mostly used against civilian populations and has limited military utility, given the reliance on gravity bombs. Airpower remains costly to employ. All jet fuel is imported, and the regime is facing a dire shortage of foreign exchange. Researchers have noted the recent development of an unused airbase proximate to conflict zones in Magway, Mandalay and Sagaing, in order to save fuel.⁴³

But wars cannot be won from the air. Territory is controlled from the ground, which has made the tactical employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) so important for the regime.

UAVs

Unmanned systems are not new to the Tatmadaw. SIPRI reported that Myanmar imported 12 Cai Hong (CH)-3 reconnaissance systems from China between 2014-15.⁴⁴ Only four of the CH-3s are believed to still be operational. The Tatmadaw imported an undisclosed number of CH-3As, an armed variant, by 2016. The Tatmadaw first used armed UAVs in January 2020 against the Arakan Army,⁴⁵ but they have not been used routinely, suggesting a limited number of them. Two CH-3As were documented at the Shante Air Base⁴⁶ in Meiktila, Mandalay State, in January 2021. Shante is the operational headquarters of the Air Force’s Central Sector Operations Center and is home to several squadrons, including a CH-3A unit, but the base is now occasionally being targeted by opposition forces, including a mid-November 2024 strike using 24 drones that wounded six military personnel and damaged two small army Harbin Y-12 turboprops.⁴⁷

In addition to a host of recent indigenously-produced small and unarmed reconnaissance drones at the Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University,⁴⁸ Myanmar began producing a local variant of the CH-3, known as the Yellow Cat A-2, but it is unclear how many have been manufactured or are still operationally deployed.⁴⁹ While not equipped with the latest technology, the CH-3 and indigenous variants provide the Tatmadaw with its best overhead imagery.

The United Nations reported indigenous production of the CH-4,⁵⁰ an armed UAV produced by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which went into service in 2011 and can carry a 345kg payload of AR-1 missiles at a maximum altitude of 7,200 meters.⁵¹ While there have been some media reports about the use of CH-4 drones in offensive operations,⁵² it is unclear how many were imported, how many have been locally produced, and how many are operational. However, their use was documented in the late April 2024 offensives to recapture the Kayin State townships of Kawkareik, Thingannyinaung, and Myawaddy.⁵³

The regime continues to operate several different Chinese-made reconnaissance drones. In 2021, a Chinese-designed but locally assembled “Sky-02” unarmed reconnaissance UAV crashed in Pyin Oo Lwin.⁵⁴ Other reports suggested that it was a locally-produced Yellow Cat drone. Resistance forces captured an AheadX QP537 medium altitude, long endurance, vertical takeoff and landing surveillance drone in Sagaing.⁵⁵

In addition to Chinese-made drones, the Tatmadaw has employed the Israeli Skylark-I tactical reconnaissance drone in limited numbers. In June 2020, the Arakan Army captured one Skylark-I in a clash in northern Rakhine.⁵⁶

The opposition’s adroit adaptation of drones – primarily commercial models retrofitted for military use – has reshaped battlefield dynamics⁵⁷ and prompted the SAC to adjust its drone usage. Opposition forces leverage cost-effective, widely available drones to minimize combatant risk while maximizing strategic flexibility. These platforms, though non-military grade, enable precision strikes, surveillance and swarm tactics, with operators requiring only days of training. During Operation 1027, opposition forces dropped 25,000 munitions by drone, and the Three Brotherhood Alliance swarmed remote outposts.⁵⁸ In response, the SAC has belatedly imported, produced, and deployed a range of smaller quadcopters and hexacopters that can drop munitions, as well as Russian and Chinese-made kamikaze drones.

Organizationally, the Tatmadaw stood up a drone unit based out of the No. 5 Air Defense Operations Command at the Hwambi airbase outside of Yangon, in the first quarter of 2024. The unit is commanded by a one-star army general rather than an air force officer to ensure the close combat support mission of the unit.⁵⁹ The unit began training in late April 2024, with technical assistance from Russia, India, and China.⁶⁰ A Russian-educated officer, Colonel Kyaw Myo Aung, has been placed in charge of training.⁶¹ Another drone unit is based in Naypyidaw.

To be fair, the junta has not only courted Chinese support in drone warfare—in April 2024, a delegation from the SAC’s Ministry of Defense traveled to Russia to purchase Russian-made Orion-2⁶² and Orlan-10 UAVs.⁶³ The junta has also purchased the long-range Albatross-M5 surveillance drone, and there are reports that the Russian firm will license its production.⁶⁴ The delegation inspected and is believed to have tried to purchase Zala KYB loitering munitions, but it appears that Russian demands have curtailed exports.⁶⁵ At the time of writing, there is no confirmation that Russia has licensed their production. The Tatmadaw has also deployed the Russian VT (Vladlen Tatarsky)-40 kamikaze drone, a cheap ($300) quadcopter that can carry a 1.3-3kg payload up to 10km.⁶⁶ In December 2024, the United States sanctioned a Russian firm, Joint Stock Company Gorizont, for selling parts for its quadcopter S-100 drone to Miya Win International Limited, an arms broker used by the SAC.⁶⁷ It is unclear how many of each Russian system the military received. More are being produced under license, but given Russia’s pressing needs, China has become a far more important source.

In a well-publicized video, the new military drone unit displayed training on four separate Russian and Chinese systems, both armed and unarmed.⁶⁸ At the low end of the spectrum are DJI Mavic quadcopters. But the staple has become a Chinese-produced hexacopter designed for agricultural use. The military’s use of armed drones has clearly picked up since March 2024, when both small FPV kamikaze drones and larger hexacopters were used in an offensive against the Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) in Hsihseng Township, southern Shan State.⁶⁹

Since then, there has been tactical employment of drone operators across the country. Junta drone attacks killed two members of the Chinland Defense Force in Chin State’s Tedim township and Sagaing region’s Kalay township in April.⁷⁰ That month, the junta effectively used drones to retake Kawkareik along the Thai border from Karen rebels.⁷¹ The regime stepped up the use of drones especially in the Bamar heartland in Magway, Mandalay, and Sagaing, where intense fighting has raged. On July 10, the military launched a drone attack on a rebel-run hospital in Budalin Township in Sagaing, killing six.

Drones and trained drone operators have now been deployed at the tactical level. Local PDF commanders describe the use of drones as “day and night.”⁷² By late 2024, opposition forces acknowledged that “the military junta has extensively used drones in almost all their battles.”⁷³ Opposition forces have noted the regime’s improved offensive drone capabilities, despite its overall military setbacks.⁷⁴

According to individuals with close ties to the opposition’s drone units, the regime has quickly matched the pace of drone adoption, leveraging significant resources to bolster its capabilities. The regime benefits from the fact that there are almost no countermeasures or jamming devices available to opposition forces, aside from those they have managed to capture.⁷⁵ This advantage has allowed the regime to employ some of their most accurate weaponry to target resistance forces, contrasting sharply with their usual reliance on indiscriminate firepower.

Additional UAV capabilities are clearly a priority for the regime. The visits to China by Min Aung Hlaing, Soe Win, and Tin Aung San in 2024⁷⁶ underscore the regime’s urgent pursuit of low-cost drone technology. In September 2024, Defense Minister Tin Aung San toured several drone and aeronautical tech firms, where he discussed “advanced aviation technology products, drone production, and military equipment related to electronic warfare and air defense technology.”⁷⁷ Min Aung Hlaing traveled to Chongqing to meet with the Zhongyue Aviation Firefighting-Drone Company to discuss licensed production.⁷⁸ At present, the state-owned Heavy Industry Number 10, is doing the lion’s share of indigenous production of spare parts for planes, helicopters, and UAVs.⁷⁹

Janes has reported on the recent deployment of a new model of kamikaze loitering munitions employed by the junta, though the origin of the design, which bears some similarities to the Iranian Shahed-136 UAV, is unclear.⁸⁰ A regionally-based journalist who had extensive access to NUG drone-making facilities reported a “dramatic jump” in the military’s use of unmanned systems and cited opposition forces acknowledging a “heavy price” and “dramatic losses” due to both an increased number of drones and improved tactics by military operators.⁸¹

Beyond military training, researchers anticipate an increase in training programs for militia groups to deploy commercial drones in combat.⁸² This prediction is bolstered by discussions about collaboration between Chinese and Myanmar technology universities.⁸³

In addition to drone manufacturing, China has provided technical assistance to Myanmar’s defense industries to produce a range of UAV-specific munitions. These factory-made munitions have been described by opposition forces as “very high quality,” far larger and more lethal than the black-market mortar shells used by the PDFs and EROs.⁸⁴

Blocking Dual Use Technology to the Opposition

One final piece of military assistance has been the imposition of a new Chinese regulation in November 2024 blocking the export of dual-use technology to opposition groups, which are heavily dependent on importing a range of UAVs and parts. This followed a formal request from the junta’s deputy minister for home affairs, Lt. Gen. Ni Lin Aung, for Chinese assistance to “curb the flow of unmanned aerial vehicles” to the armed opposition on September 26. On December 1, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce, in coordination with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the General Administration of Customs, and the State Cryptography Administration, implemented the new export control regulations for dual-use items.⁸⁵

These restrictions have already begun to significantly affect the resistance’s ability to sustain its drone programs. Opposition units in Southern Shan and Karenni states have told the authors about rising costs for procuring UAV components, with leaders anticipating further losses due to the tightened controls.⁸⁶ The irony is that the same Chinese drone manufacturer supplying the junta indirectly impacts resistance forces by controlling key parts of the drone supply chain. According to opposition contacts of the authors, Thailand has also begun cracking down on drone and parts purchases by Myanmar’s opposition forces. Despite these challenges, resistance groups are working to overcome the junta’s countermeasures and adapt to the changing battlefield dynamics.

While the regulations have raised the costs for opposition forces, they are likely to be hard to enforce effectively. The proliferation of commercial drone manufacturers and distributors in China, coupled with a decentralized supply chain, complicates efforts to monitor and control exports. Nevertheless, Beijing’s restrictions reflect its clear intent to weaken opposition forces, which have leveraged UAVs to great effect on the battlefield. This is part of a broader trend in China’s export policies, as Beijing seeks to restrict drone technology in other contexts, including Ukraine, forcing the Armed Forces of Ukraine to develop alternative supply chains.⁸⁷

Conclusion

China’s military assistance, especially the sale of jet trainers, UAS, and spare parts, has continued unabated since the coup, despite a surfeit of evidence that these military materials are used to intentionally target civilians. Nonetheless, even as China bolsters the regime’s military capabilities while curbing the opposition’s drone warfare, these measures are unlikely to turn the tide of the conflict. The SAC faces profound structural challenges: the military is spread too thin across six distinct battlefields, and its logistics networks are fraying. Unit after unit has surrendered, often citing Naypyitaw’s inability to resupply them with food and ammunition as justification. Never before has the junta had to defend supply lines through the Bamar heartland, further complicating its position. The SAC increasingly relies on poorly trained conscripts (over 30,000 since April 2024) and ill-disciplined pyusawhti militias to terrorize the population, while airpower has largely been directed against civilians rather than decisive military targets.⁸⁸ The SAC has recovered little territory that it lost since Operation 1027 commenced. While it can punish the population through airstrikes, it is unable to control territory from the sky.

China’s support for the junta has not only not abated, but expanded, as it desperately tries to shore up an economically incompetent and militarily over-stretched junta. Beijing has thrown Naypyidaw a number of financial lifelines, continued to give it diplomatic recognition, and supported a political offramp for the junta, which would give the military a seat at the table in a post-coup government. But it is on the military front where Beijing is most clearly trying to stop the SAC’s battlefield setbacks.

While UAVs may give the military greater targeting accuracy, the reality is they cannot compensate for its ground-level losses and demoralized forces. Even with additional Chinese military support, it is difficult to see how the junta can overcome a surging opposition that continues to adapt to the challenges posed by Beijing’s restrictions and the evolving conflict dynamics. That said, the regime’s drone operations, though deployed late in the conflict, have sharply increased opposition losses.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, where he specializes in Southeast Asian politics and security affairs. He is concurrently an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Affairs. He is the author of six books, five monographs, and hundreds of articles. He is a columnist with Radio Free Asia and Benar News, and his commentary can be found elsewhere in Nikkei Asian Review, The New York Times, and The South China Morning Post. He is a three-time Congressional witness and has done extensive public and private sector consulting work. He is a frequent commentator in the press and has lived and traveled extensively in Southeast Asia and China.

Nyein Nyein Thant Aung is a security policy analyst and researcher who specializes in the Indo-Pacific region. She focuses on defense industry R&D and dual-use technology. She recently graduated from the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s program in Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies at the University of Glasgow, Dublin City University, and Charles University. Her research examines the implications of drone use in the Myanmar conflict and its impact on regional security dynamics.

Notes

1
“China promises aid for elections in Myanmar, junta-run media says,” Reuters, 15 August 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-promises-aid-elections-myanmar-junta-run-media-says-2024-08-15; Zachary Abuza, “Caveat creditor: China offers a financial lifeline to Myanmar’s
junta,” Radio Free Asia, 2 September 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/myanmar-china-abuza-09012024125833.html.
2
Wai Mar Tun, “Junta chief vows to complete Myanmar census by year-end—then hold elections,” Radio Free Asia, 20 November 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/11/20/myanmar-election-census/; Sa Tun Aung, “Despite escalating violence, Myanmar junta leader says elections will proceed,” Myanmar Now, 9 December 2023, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/despite-escalating-violence-myanmar-junta-leader-says-elections-will-proceed/.
3
Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government Ministry of Defence, “2024 Military Progress Report, 4 January 2024. See text at: https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/01/07/18046.
4
Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government Ministry of Defence, “2024 Military Progress Report, 4 January 2024. See text at: https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/01/07/18046.
5
Straight Talk Southeast Asia, Episode 72: The Road for Myanmar with NUG’s U Kyaw Zaw, 26 January 2025, http://apple.co/3CfvDSy.
6
“Myanmar to organize election in fewer than half of townships, parties say,” Radio Free Asia, 10 December 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/12/10/election-townships-vote/.
7
Special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks That Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar, United National Office of Human Rights, UN Human Rights Council, 53rd sess, conference room paper, UN Doc A/HRC/53/CRP.2 (17 May 2023), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf.
8
Jonathan Head, “China welcomes Myanmar’s embattled leader on first visit since coup,” BBC, 6 November 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yr8exg1gko.
9
Thompson Chau and Htet Phyoe, “Myanmar’s crisis-torn economy to contract further, World Bank warns,” Nikkei Asia, 11 December 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-s-crisis-torn-economy-to-contract-further-World-Bank-warns.
10
“Inflation rate, average consumer prices,” International Monetary Fund, accessed 17 January 2025, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/MMR.
11
“MNDAA Signs Ceasefire With Myanmar Junta After Chinese Pressure,” The Irrawaddy, 21 January 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/mndaa-signs-ceasefire-with-myanmar-junta-after-chinese-pressure.html.
12
“Kokang army to withdraw from Lashio under Chinese-brokered ceasefire with Myanmar junta,” Myanmar Now, 20 January 2025, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/kokang-army-to-withdraw-from-lashio-under-chinese-brokered-ceasefire-with-myanmar-junta/.
13
“Leader of rebel army detained in China’s Yunnan province,” Radio Free Asia, 18 November 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/11/18/myanmar-mndaa-leader-china-yunnan/.
14
“TNLA: Peace Talks With Myanmar Junta Have Failed”, The Irrawaddy, 19 February 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/tnla-peace-talks-with-myanmar-junta-have-failed.html.
15
“Wa Deploys Troops to Prevent Spread of Shan Fighting,” The Irrawaddy, 12 July 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/ethnic-issues/wa-deploys-troops-to-prevent-spread-of-shan-fighting.html.
16
“AA Shelling Signals Imminent Assault on Rakhine Capital as Myanmar Junta Digs In,” The Irrawaddy, 10 February 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/aa-shelling-signals-imminent-assault-on-rakhine-capital-as-myanmar-junta-digs-in.html.
17
Aung Thura Ko Ko, “Arakan Army’s triumph ripples through China, India, Bangladesh,” 19 February 2025, https://asiatimes.com/2025/02/arakan-armys-triumph-ripples-through-china-india-bangladesh/#.
18
“KIA seizes key areas in Bhamo amid intensifying clashes with Myanmar junta forces,” Mizzima, 13 December 2024, https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/12/13/17297.
19
“China Urges Kachin Rebels to Stop Fighting Myanmar Junta,” The Irrawaddy, 13 December 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/china-urges-kachin-rebels-to-stop-fighting-myanmar-junta.html.
20
“Residents in Myanmar feel the crunch as trade with China shuts down,” Radio Free Asia, 15 November 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/11/15/myanmar-china-border-trade-restriction/.
21
“China Maintains Blockade on Three Border Gates,” ISP Myanmar, 3 February 2025, https://ispmyanmar.com/mp-84/
22
Min Maung and Sa Tun Aung, “KIA captures southern Kachin State town near Chinese border,” Myanmar Now, 8 January 2025, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/kia-captures-southern-kachin-state-town-near-chinese-border/.
23
KIA, PDF Capture More Myanmar Junta Bases in Key Kachin Town, The Irrawaddy, 20 February 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/kia-pdf-capture-more-myanmar-junta-bases-in-key-kachin-town.html
24
“Myanmar and China to establish joint security company: committee formed to finalize MoU,” Eleven Media Group, 4 December 2024, https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/myanmar-and-china-to-establish-joint-security-company-committee-formed-to-finalize-mou.
25
“တရုတ် မြန်မာ လုံခြုံရေးကုမ္ပဏီထောင်ဖို့စစ်ကောင်စီပြင်ဆင်နေ,”BBC Burmese, 15 November 2024, https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/c4gzv8x6vvxo; Maria Siow, “Chinese security firms in Myanmar risk escalating civil war and diplomatic tensions,” South China Morning Post, 28 November 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3288394/chinese-security-firms-myanmar-risk-escalating-civil-war-and-diplomatic-tensions.
26
Maung Kavi, “Junta Passes Law Allowing Chinese Security Firms to Operate in Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, February 19, 2025, at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/junta-passes-law-allowing-chinese-security-firms-to-operate-in-myanmar.html
27
“Myanmar military, Chinese government to establish joint security company,” Myanmar Now, 4 December 2024, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-military-chinese-government-to-establish-joint-security-company/.
28
Hein Htoo Zan, “Yangon, Mandalay Deserted After Dark as Myanmar Junta Hunts for Conscripts,” The Irrawaddy, 16 December 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/yangon-mandalay-deserted-after-dark-as-myanmar-junta-hunts-for-conscripts.html.
29
Special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks That Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar, United National Office of Human Rights, UN Human Rights Council, 53rd sess, conference room paper, UN Doc A/HRC/53/CRP.2 (17 May 2023), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf. 11.
30
Myanmar Witness, “The 77th Anniversary of Myanmar’s Air Force (MAF) Day: A Review of MAF’s Claimed New Acquisitions,” Centre for Information Resilience, 30 December 2024, https://www.info-res.org/app/uploads/2025/01/[email protected]
31
Arms transfers database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/.
32
“Myanmar Regime Buys FTC-2000G Fighter Jets From China,” The Irrawaddy, 18 October 2022, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-regime-buys-ftc-2000g-fighter-jets-from-china.html.
33
Nyein Chan Aye, “Observers: Chinese-made fighter jets play key role in deadly airstrikes in Myanmar,” Voice of America, 9 October 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/observers-chinese-made-fighter-jets-play-key-role-in-deadly-airstrikes-in-myanmar/7816747.html.
34
Myanmar Witness, “The 77th Anniversary of Myanmar’s Air Force (MAF) Day: A Review of MAF’s Claimed New Acquisitions,” Centre for Information Resilience, 30 December 2024, https://www.info-res.org/app/uploads/2025/01/[email protected]; “Tatmadaw (Air) commissions aircraft and helicopters into service,” The Global New Light of Myanmar, 16 December 2024, https://www.gnlm.com.mm/tatmadaw-air-commissions-aircraft-and-helicopters-into-service/.
35
“Russia Completes Delivery of Warplanes to Embattled Myanmar Junta,” The Irrawaddy, 8 January 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/russia-completes-delivery-of-warplanes-to-embattled-myanmar-junta.html.
36
Personal communications, 6 December 2024.
37
“Myanmar raises issue of grounded JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft to Pakistan,” Asia Pacific Defense Journal, 5 September 2023, https://www.asiapacificdefensejournal.com/2023/09/myanmar-raises-issue-of-grounded-jf-17.html.
38
“2024 World Air Forces,” FlightGlobal, 2024, https://www.flightglobal.com/reports/2024-world-air-forces-directory/156008.article.
39
Myanmar Witness, “Airstrike Denial,” Centre for Information Resilience, 30 January 2024, https://www.info-res.org/myanmar-witness/reports/airstrike-denial/.
40
“US Sanctions Myanmar and Russia Firms Arming Junta,” The Irrawaddy, 13 December 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmars-crisis-the-world/us-sanctions-myanmar-and-russia-firms-arming-junta.html.
41
Arms transfers database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/.
42
“Myanmar Regime Buys FTC-2000G Fighter Jets From China,” The Irrawaddy, 18 October 2022, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-regime-buys-ftc-2000g-fighter-jets-from-china.html.
43
Nathan Ruser, “Pakkoku Airfield – major military construction,” The Geospatial Digest, 27 November 2024, https://geospatialdigest.substack.com/p/pakkoku-airfield-major-military-construction.
44
The CH-3 became operational in 2007, has an 80kg payload, and can reach an altitude of 4,000 meters. Matthew P. Funaiole, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Katherine Kurata, “Tatmadaw Deploys Chinese-Made UAVs,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 May 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tatmadaw-deploys-chinese-made-uavs. Arms transfers database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/.
45
Aung Nyein Chan, “AA accuses Tatmadaw of using combat drones,” Myanmar Now, 7 January 2020, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/aa-accuses-tatmadaw-of-using-combat-drones/.
46
Kelvin Wong, “Wings over Mandalay: Myanmar’s junta deploy Chinese-made CH-3A tactical UAVs to observe protest movements,” Janes, 8 April 2021, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/latest%20analysis/myanmar-junta-deploy-chinese-made-ch-3a-tactical-uavs-to-observe-protest-movements.
47
“Resistance drone strike hits military airbase in Mandalay Region; How to stop online harm in Myanmar,” DVB, 14 November 2024, https://english.dvb.no/resistance-drone-strike-hits-military-airbase-in-mandalay-region-how-to-stop-online-harm-in-myanmar/.
48
Thae Maung Maung, “Research & Application of UAV/Drone Technology for Civilian Applications & Disaster Management,” Ministry of Education and Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University, undated presentation, https://web.archive.org/web/20240131201354/https:/uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5e691d0b7de02f1fd6919876/5fbe417995273e8c8ab68bc6_A25%20Department%20of%20UAV%20Research%20Activities.pdf.
49
Beau Chapman, Alexander Suster, and Steven Ahart, “Burma’s Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale,” Irregular Warfare Initiative, 5 September 2024, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/burma-military-drone-program-irregular-warfare/.
50
“Arms and Military Equipment Suppliers to the Tatmadaw,” Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, August 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/Infographic2_Arms_and_Military_Equipment_Suppliers.pdf.
51
“Congo armed forces receive 9 Chinese CASC CH-4 Rainbow combat drones,” Army Recognition, 4 July 2023, https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2023/congo-armed-forces-receive-9-chinese-casc-ch-4-rainbow-combat-drones; Atul Chandra, “Why China’s armed UAVs are a global export success, and its fighter jets, not so much,” Defence Procurement International, 5 November 2021, https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/air/china-has-disrupted-the-military-drone-market.
52
“Myanmar military adds advanced Chinese drones to arsenal,” Radio Free Asia, 14 May 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/military-junta-china-drones-05142024134227.html.
53
“Myanmar military adds advanced Chinese drones to arsenal,” Radio Free Asia, 14 May 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/military-junta-china-drones-05142024134227.html.
54
“Mystery Chinese Drone Crashes Myanmar Village,” UAS Vision, 10 May 2021, https://www.uasvision.com/2021/05/10/mystery-chinese-drone-crashes-myanmar-village/.
55
“Myanmar resistance forces capture junta surveillance drone in Sagaing Region,” Myanmar Now, 6 September 2024, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-resistance-forces-capture-junta-surveillance-drone-in-sagaing-region/.
56
“Rakhine rebels in first clash with Myanmar troops since coup,” Bangkok Post, 10 November 2021, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2213227/rakhine-rebels-in-first-clash-with-myanmar-troops-since-coup; Arakan Army, “Three sons of soldiers from Myanmar Army, came to collect the UAS drone were Captured by Arakan Army,” Arakanarmy.net, 27 June 2020, https://www.arakanarmy.net/post/three-sons-of-soldiers-from-myanmar-army-came-to-collect-the-uas-drone-were-captured-by-arakan-army.
57
Aung, Nyein Nyein Thant, “Adaptation and Innovation: Commercial Drones in Myanmar’s Emerging Armed Conflict Dynamics” (International master diss., University of Glasgow, 2024).
58
“Insight: Learning from Myanmar’s rebels, junta builds new Chinese drone fleet,” Reuters, 13 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/learning-myanmars-rebels-junta-builds-new-chinese-drone-fleet-2024-06-13/.
59
“Myanmar Junta Chief Homes in on Chinese Drones as Resistance-Buster,” The Irrawaddy, 12 November 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-chief-homes-in-on-chinese-drones-as-resistance-buster.html.
60
“Military drone training at Yangon command headquarters,” DVB, 9 May 2024, https://english.dvb.no/military-drone-training-underway-at-yangon-command-headquarters/.
61
“Myanmar junta purchases advanced drones from Russia,” Mizzima, 7 May 2024, https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/05/07/9647.
62
“Myanmar military deploys drones from Russia,” DVB, 15 May 2024, https://english.dvb.no/myanmar-military-deploys-drones-from-russia/.
63
“Myanmar military bolsters drone capabilities after Russia visit,” DVB, 22 May 2024, https://english.dvb.no/myanmar-military-bolsters-its-drone-capabilities-after-visit-to-russia/.
64
Rebecca Tan, Caleb Quinley, and Yan Naing, “Myanmar military unleashes drones to counter rebel advance,” The Washington Post, 12 October 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/12/myanmar-civil-war-drones/.
65
Personal communication of the author with a regional security analyst.
66
အမှတ် ၂၇ စစ်ဗျူဟာ၊အမှတ်၂စစ်ဒေသခွဲ, Embedded video “Drone Operation Training,” in post “သတိ— “အန္တရာယ်ရှိသည်” အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ဒရုန်းအသုံးပြုပုံအဆင့်ဆင့်နှင့်လေ့ကျင့်ပျံသန်းမှုအားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များအားလုံးသိရှိနိုင်ရန်နှင့်ဒရုန်းအန္တရာယ်ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေးကြိုတင်ပြင်ဆင်မှုများပြုလုပ်ရန်မျှဝေပေးခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်,” Facebook, 28 November 2024, https://www.facebook.com/61566017618775/videos/1768374453973836/.
67
“US Sanctions Myanmar and Russia Firms Arming Junta,” The Irrawaddy, 13 December 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmars-crisis-the-world/us-sanctions-myanmar-and-russia-firms-arming-junta.html.
68
အမှတ် ၂၇ စစ်ဗျူဟာ၊အမှတ် ၂ စစ်ဒေသခွဲ,
Embedded video “Drone Operation Training,” in post “သတိ— “အန္တရာယ်ရှိသည်”အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏
ဒရုန်းအသုံးပြုပုံအဆင့်ဆင့်နှင့်လေ့ကျင့်ပျံသန်းမှုအားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များအားလုံးသိရှိနိုင်ရန်နှင့်ဒရုန်းအန္တရာယ်ကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေးကြိုတင်ပြင်ဆင်မှုများပြုလုပ်ရန်မျှဝေပေးခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်,” Facebook, 28 November 2024, https://www.facebook.com/61566017618775/videos/1768374453973836/.
69
Saw Reh, “Myanmar military deploys ‘kamikaze drones’ in southern Shan State,” Myanmar Now, 8 March 2024, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-military-deploys-kamikaze-drones-in-southern-shan-state/.
70
“Myanmar military adds advanced Chinese drones to arsenal,” Radio Free Asia, 14 May 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/military-junta-china-drones-05142024134227.html.
71
Rebecca Tan, Caleb Quinley, and Yan Naing, “Myanmar military unleashes drones to counter rebel advance,” The Washington Post, 12 October 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/12/myanmar-civil-war-drones/.
72
“Junta’s push to retake towns in Myanmar heartland prompts fierce fighting,” Radio Free Asia, 9 December 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/12/10/myanmar-junta-heartland-offensive-drones/.
73
“Junta’s push to retake towns in Myanmar heartland prompts fierce fighting,” Radio Free Asia, 9 December 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/12/10/myanmar-junta-heartland-offensive-drones/.
74
“Insight: Learning from Myanmar’s rebels, junta builds new Chinese drone fleet,” Reuters, 13 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/learning-myanmars-rebels-junta-builds-new-chinese-drone-fleet-2024-06-13/.
75
Personal correspondence with the opposition’s drone units in Southern Shan State and Karenni.
76
“Myanmar delegation arrives back after 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum,” The Global New Light of Myanmar, 17 September 2024, https://www.gnlm.com.mm/myanmar-delegation-arrives-back-after-11th-beijing-xiangshan-forum/.
77
Dominic Faulder, “Myanmar military plays catch-up in drone war with insurgents,” Nikkei Asia, 22 October 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-military-plays-catch-up-in-drone-war-with-insurgents#.
78
“Myanmar Junta Chief Homes in on Chinese Drones as Resistance-Buster,” The Irrawaddy, 12 November 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-chief-homes-in-on-chinese-drones-as-resistance-buster.html.
79
“‘Made in Myanmar’: Mapping the Military’s In-Country Weapon Production,” in “Fatal Business: Supply the Myanmar Military’s Weapon Production,” Special Advisory Council – Myanmar, 16 January 2023, https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/fatal-business/made-in-myanmar/.
80
Anthony Davis, “Myanmar’s drone warfare directorate rolls out new UCAV,” Janes, 22 January 2025, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/air/myanmars-drone-warfare-directorate-rolls-out-new-ucav.
81
Lorcan Lovett, “Los drones cambian la dinámica de la guerra en Myanmar,” El Pais, 15 January 2025, https://elpais.com/planeta-futuro/2025-01-16/los-drones-cambian-la-dinamica-de-la-guerra-en-myanmar.html.
82
Rebecca Tan, Caleb Quinley, and Yan Naing, “Myanmar military unleashes drones to counter rebel advance,” The Washington Post, 12 October 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/12/myanmar-civil-war-drones/.
83
Government of Myanmar, Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, “Chairman of State Administration Council Prime Minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visits Yunnan Vocational and Technical College and Kunming University of Science and Technology,” 6 November 2024, https://cincds.gov.mm/node/27307.
84
Rebecca Tan, Caleb Quinley, and Yan Naing, “Myanmar military unleashes drones to counter rebel advance,” The Washington Post, 12 October 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/12/myanmar-civil-war-drones/.
85
Chu Daye and Qi Xijia, “China issues list for export control of dual-use items, showing prudent approach: MOFCOM,” Global Times, 16 November 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202411/1323176.shtml.
86
Personal correspondence with the opposition’s drone units in Southern Shan State and Karenni.
87
Oleksandra Molloy, “Drones in Modern Warfare: Lessons Learnt from the War in Ukraine,” Australian Army Occasional Paper, no. 29 (2024), https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/occasional-papers/drones-modern-warfare.
88
“Air, artillery strikes set grim benchmark for civilian casualties in Myanmar in 2024,” Radio Free Asia, 31 December 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/12/31/myanmar-year-of-airstrikes/.