With President-elect Donald Trump and his team poised to take office in January 2025, there is much speculation about how they intend to address the mounting strategic challenges in the Middle East. These include the ongoing wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the frozen normalisation process between Israel and some Arab countries and the heated hostility with Iran.
A close examination of US foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere suggests that any change will likely be incremental rather than transformational.
American foreign policy has always been driven by a combination of values and perceived national interests. The second Trump administration, like the first, is likely to prioritise the latter over the former. It is certain to be more assertive in pursuing what the political elite in Washington, both Democrats and Republicans, perceive as key US national security objectives.
First, since the creation of Israel in 1948, the US has provided approximately $160bn in foreign aid and strong diplomatic support. This ironclad informal alliance has been a constant in US foreign policy regardless of who occupies the White House or which political party controls the Congress.
Officially, Washington, like the rest of the world, endorses a two-state solution. But for many years, settlers and right-wing politicians in Israel have expanded settlements and, in the process, have undermined the foundations of a viable Palestinian state.
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Second, in the closing months of the first Trump administration, the president and his team succeeded in getting the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to normalise relations with Israel (Abraham accords). Morocco and Sudan joined the process as well.
The Biden administration followed a similar strategy and sought, unsuccessfully, to incentivise Saudi Arabia to follow suit.
Shadow war
Third, since the toppling of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, the US has considered the Islamic Republic of Iran its main adversary in the Middle East. For more than four decades, Tehran has been under heavy and comprehensive American sanctions.
President Barack Obama’s efforts to contain tension with Iran and slow the progress of its nuclear programme failed because of a lack of support from both Republicans and Democrats.
After withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Trump implemented a “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran. Under the Biden administration, sanctions were not lifted, though the enforcement was less rigid than under his predecessor.
A second Trump administration will vigorously pursue these broad themes – unwavering support for Israel, doubling down on the efforts to normalise relations between Israel and Arab countries, and a return to a maximum pressure policy toward Iran.
However, the Middle East does not just react to changes in Washington. The regional dynamics Trump will face in his second administration are significantly different from the ones he left in the early 2020s.
The conventional wisdom before 7 October 2023 was that Iran and Israel had established a balance of power or a strategic equilibrium in their “shadow war”. In the low-intensity conflict between the two adversaries, it was assumed that a war between Israel and Hezbollah was not likely, given the high price both sides would pay.
Meanwhile, some Arab countries and Turkey maintained a level of economic and diplomatic interaction with both Iran and Israel.
This fragile regional balance of power has been shattered since October 2023. With unconditional US backing, Israel has dealt a heavy, but not fatal, blow to Hamas and Hezbollah. It will take some time to provide an accurate assessment of the Israeli military operations in both Gaza and Lebanon.
Still, three interrelated outcomes are clear.
Israel as regional hegemon
First, despite Israel’s military and intelligence superiority, Hamas and Hezbollah are putting up fierce resistance which has caused Israel heavy military losses. Despite the assassination of several senior leaders and heavy air strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran, no one has waved the white flag.
Second, seeking to keep his governing coalition and enjoying full backing from Washington, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken uncompromising positions and failed to articulate a political strategy. He insists on a complete defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah and establishing a new regional order.
Israel’s over-dependency on military power has further isolated it both in the Middle East and the international system.
Third, the other regional powers have had to respond to these changing strategic dynamics. The unprecedented level of destruction in Gaza and Lebanon and the killing of thousands of civilians have fuelled Arab and Muslim anger at Israel.
Iranian, Turkish and Arab leaders strongly object to an alternative regional order where Israel is the dominant power with unrestrained capabilities to bomb its adversaries
Equally important, Iranian, Turkish and Arab leaders strongly object to an alternative regional order where Israel is the dominant power with unrestrained capabilities to bomb its adversaries.
Western powers, led by the United States, have failed to stop this overutilisation of military power. Israel has emerged as the unrestrained regional hegemon.
There are growing signs that leaders in Tehran, Ankara, Riyadh and other Arab capitals are re-evaluating their strategies in order to counter Israel’s expanded and unrestrained military operations and to restore a regional balance of power.
Kamal Kharrazi, head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, recently said a potential change in the country’s nuclear doctrine was a possibility if Tehran faced an existential threat.
Additionally, Iran plans to drastically expand its defence budget for the coming fiscal year.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that Israel might attack Turkey and vowed to increase his country’s long-range missile capabilities.
History’s important lessons
Shortly before 7 October 2023, a normalisation deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel was “within reach”, with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stating that “a normalisation deal was getting closer each day”.
A year later, in October 2024, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza. Similarly, Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s foreign minister, accused Israel of conducting ethnic cleansing.
Shortly after Trump’s election victory, the head of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, Fayyad al-Ruwaili, met in Tehran with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, to discuss military cooperation.
The regional rivalry between Turkey, Iran and Arab countries will not suddenly disappear. But the statements and movements by regional leaders in the last several months indicate a growing resentment toward Israel’s rise as a regional hegemon.
Netanyahu’s unrealistic and unattainable insistence on the full defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah has further isolated Israel both regionally and internationally. His uncompromising stance has contributed to the de-escalation of tensions between the other regional powers (Iran, Turkey and Arab countries).
The US’s “unwavering” support for Israel has given Netanyahu carte blanch to pursue his military objectives without consequences.
History does not repeat itself, but it teaches us important lessons. In 1956, President Dwight D Eisenhower rejected the Israeli occupation of Sinai and forced it to withdraw.
Two decades later, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger restored a balance of power between Egypt and Israel following the end of the 1973 war and were able to lay the ground for the two countries to sign a peace treaty.
The second Trump administration should learn from these experiences. The rise of Israel as the regional hegemon will not be accepted by its neighbours. It fuels instability in the Middle East and threatens key US national interests.
Since winning the election, Trump has nominated a number of hardliner politicians such as Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Representative Elise Stefanik as Ambassador to UN. These nominees suggest that the new administration is not likely to seek to restore a regional balance of power. Time will tell.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.